
portion of a sample contract for a scout platoon sergeant in the 25th Infantry Division.)

On the contract form, the rating chain is identified, the *draft* duty description is identified, and the standards for success and excellence regarding each area—competence, physical fitness, military bearing, leadership, training, responsibility, and accountability—are spelled out.

During an initial counseling session, the rater explains the rating chain and the duty description, discusses the meaning of the values and responsibilities section on the NCO-ER, and explains from the informal contract the standards for success and excellence that apply to the specific duty position. All the data that is documented during initial and quarterly counseling sessions is recorded on a DA Form 2166-7-1, with the informal contract attached to it.

During a quarterly counseling period, the rater updates the informal contract on the basis of what he has observed and the NCO's demonstrated behavior and results, discusses what was done well and what could have been done better, and records this data on the DA form.

The process is painless and lets the rated NCO know exactly what is expected of him and where he stands. Then, when it is time to prepare an NCO-ER for the rated NCO, the rater can refer back to the bullet comments made during the quarterly counseling sessions.

All NCOs deserve effective counseling and an honest and fair rating. If a rater uses the informal contract method, he will improve NCO duty performance, open lines of communication (without interpersonal gaps), and ensure that standards are set and met. He will not

be forced to second guess a rated NCO's accomplishments and cause an inaccurate or unfair NCO-ER to be sent forward with meaningless bullet comments.

A leader must read and study the regulatory guidance regarding counseling, no matter what method or technique he uses. If he does this, he and his NCOs can make the counseling and rating system work.

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Command Sergeant Major Angus A. Gray, command sergeant major of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, has completed 27 years of active service. He conceived and developed the informal "contract," which was then further developed and modified for use at platoon and squad level.

The Bradley

Let's Make It Even Better

LIEUTENANT LAWRENCE A. LEONE

With an ever-decreasing budget and limited research and development funds, it is time the Army started making conscientious efforts to acquire off-the-shelf technology and reapply existing technology that can help us field the most lethal fighting force possible.

In the M2A2 Bradley, the Army has one of the world's finest fighting vehicles. Its ability to engage and destroy both tanks and light armored vehicles has been well documented. Its speed, agility, and survivability are almost unmatched in the free world. With its add-on armor and anti-spall kevlar lining, its crew is doubly protected.

While the Bradley excels in passive protection, I believe it falls short in providing the crew with close-in security capabilities. The M231 firing port weapon is designed for the rear security of the vehicle while moving or at short halts. The gunner is supposed to fire strictly tracer ammunition so that he can more easily adjust his fire onto a target he is observing through the rear vision blocks. The M231's minimum cyclic rate of fire is 1,225 rounds per minute from a 30-round magazine. For a soldier trying to suppress an RPG team to his rear, that high cyclic rate of fire will cause him to run through

his loaded magazines in a short period of time, maybe too short to properly suppress an enemy threat.

A simple and cost-effective solution to this problem is available today on the civilian market — a 90-round drum magazine specifically designed for the M16 family of weapons and made of high-impact, clear plastic. It costs about \$45. If the Army bought these magazines in large numbers, the price would surely go down and would better allow the M231 to be used for its designed purpose. This 90-round drum magazine could also be used by both the M16A2 and the M249 in emergency conditions,

making it more valuable to the entire vehicle.

The Bradley is further hampered by not having a coaxial or hatch-mounted machinegun. Today, if the vehicle experiences turret power failure or battle damage, it requires an extreme effort on the gunner's part to traverse and elevate the weapons to defend against close attack by dismounted infantry, aircraft, or vehicles.

The solution to this problem is to slightly modify the vision block guards around the Bradley commander's hatch to accommodate the mounting of an M60D machinegun. This would allow the gun to traverse about a 90-degree arc left and right while the pintle would give the machinegun an almost unlimited ability to depress and elevate. A Bradley commander would immediately be able to protect his vehicle from attack.

Serious consideration should also be given to what the Bradley's driver, gunner, and commander have as personal weapons. Under the current TOE (tables of organization and equipment), they are issued M16A2 rifles and no side arms. They are stored in hard-to-reach places in the vehicle and certainly cannot be passed through a hatch that has someone standing in it. This

means they cannot be used quickly. Simply put, the Bradley crew members need to be able to fight for their vehicle much the same way artillerymen have historically fought for their guns.

On the next point, it appears that armor soldiers agree with me that the crews of both the M1A1 tank and the Bradley need side arms and sub-machineguns for the security of their vehicles. The M9 pistol is replacing the M1911A1 as the standard side arm for both the infantry and the armor, but the tankers are replacing the M3 submachinegun with a shortened variant of the M16A2. Tankers have used the M3 since World War II, and it has proved itself when an enemy climbed on a tank, for example. It was smaller than either the M1 Garand or the M1 carbine and used the same ammunition as the M1911A1. The infantry has no such weapon for its vehicle crews, and even the tankers now need a different one.

The replacement weapon should use the same ammunition as the M9 and be small enough to handle easily, and, should the need arise, to be stuck through an open hatch and fired.

The solution, again, is readily available. I believe that several weapons in use by police around the world meet

those criteria now. The Army could easily acquire MP5s, Uzis, or rechambered MAC-11s in the required numbers. These types of weapons are compact, light, and capable. They have high rates of fire and could easily suppress an enemy at 150 meters. Shoulder holsters are available on the civilian market that would allow both tank and Bradley crews to carry those weapons while performing their missions in the vehicle.

It's time for the Army to start acquiring the "off-the-shelf" items that make sense and that will help us now. If an item is available today that will save lives and accomplish the mission, then we need it today. The common infantryman on the ground does not want to wait for the Army to develop a weapon that will carry him into the next century when the lack of such a weapon tomorrow may cost him his life. Let's not pay the price for learning a hard lesson.

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Land Navigation

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS STUART M. JOHNSTON

In *INFANTRY's* November-December 1990 issue, Major Charles F. Coffin discussed the merits of the protractor compass. (See "The Protractor Compass," pages 15-17.) I would like to take this discussion a few stages further, because there are various aspects of land navigation that I believe are lacking in our current training.

To start with the basics, we seldom teach or even mention tactical navigation to our soldiers, but surely this is what an infantryman must do to reach his objective and accomplish his mission. Infantrymen are not orienteers who want to get to the next point by the quickest, shortest possible route. They want to use the most covered and

concealed route to mask their movement to the objective. To do this they must learn to read the ground they will be covering, and they learn to read the ground by conducting map reconnaissances and developing the ability to see this flat piece of paper as a three-dimensional picture. Then, once out on the ground they look for dead ground