

PROFESSIONAL FORUM



INTERVIEW

The Reshaping of an Army

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following is the text of an interview with General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia, conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Colin K. Dunn, Editor of FIELD ARTILLERY. Before the interview, INFANTRY and the other combat arms professional bulletins were given an opportunity to submit questions of interest to their particular branch audiences.

As the Army moves toward a continental U.S.-based contingency force, what capabilities do you see as critical to responding to crises?

General [Gordon R.] Sullivan [Chief of Staff of the Army] is reshaping our Army into a post-Cold War Army and not just a smaller version of our Cold War Army. We are reshaping both intellectually and in our training and leader development programs.

As we move toward a strategic Army, the majority of our forces will be in the United States. But forward presence also will be part of our national military strategy. So we'll deploy from either forward presence or CONUS locations.

With this strategy, rapid mobilization and deployment become increasingly

important. The circumstances under which the Army can deploy are more ambiguous now than they were a few years ago. When we had the certainty of the Cold War contingencies, commanders trained and prepared to win in those particular circumstances.

Now we must be more versatile—mix and match units in tailored force packages, fight battles at the tactical and operational levels, and organize our contingency theater to defeat threats in many scenarios. This versatility is critical, but we've shown such versatility before. A lot of the capabilities we demonstrated in operations such as JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD and STORM will continue to be important for our contingency Army in the future.

What are some of the greatest challenges the Army faces in training for joint operations?

First, we have to base our training on the situations we could face—the circumstances unified commanders need their forces to practice. We must have a relevant set of circumstances or conditions within which the training takes place.

Scenarios are very important in joint operations. So, as we watch scenarios being developed in unified commands,

in our schools, leader development programs, and CTCs [combat training centers], they should be relevant for the U.S. Army now and in the future.

Next, we must capitalize on the significant strengths each service brings to the operation and harmonize them in accordance with emerging joint and Army doctrine. For example, joint special operations at the JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas] harmonize air-ground fires, both close and deep. As the organic fires of our Army systems reach out farther and farther—MLRS [multiple launch rocket system], cannon artillery, Army tactical missile system [Army TACMS], Apaches—as the ground commander can employ these assets at greater distances, that requires more coordination and more training in joint operations.

How do you see the Army increasing the lethality of our early deploying forces in a contingency operation?

We can increase our lethality in several ways. The most talked-about way is through materiel solutions. Certainly, we'll pursue developing the armored gun system [Armor's lightly armored gun system with a high-velocity cannon, which is transportable by C-130 aircraft], HIMARS [Artillery's high-

mobility artillery rocket system, a lightweight, wheeled version of MLRS], the Javelin [Infantry's one-man operated, fire-and-forget, advanced anti-tank weapon with a 1.25-mile range] and others that give us more lethality on the ground early. Fielding the M119 light howitzer and adding fuel pods to Black Hawks, Apaches, and the CH-47D model of the Chinook, plus the helicopters' capability to be refueled in mid-air, give us lethality options early on. Our aviation now can self-deploy as well as deploy aboard ships and inside strategic aircraft. Again, versatility is key.

Depending on the contingency's circumstances, deployment means and time available, the commander can increase the lethality of his deploying light forces by introducing other types of units early on. He can mix and match his light, special operating and heavy forces to meet that particular threat.

You'll see more mixing and matching in your NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California] and JRTC rotations as you train on contingency operations. Those CTCs are employing heavy and light forces in operations specifically aimed at developing versatility.

In the joint arena, our sister services are helping us get forces on the ground faster in contingencies. The Navy, for example, is committed to building more fast sea-lift ships in the next few years. So we'll see a dramatic improvement in our forces' ability to deploy by surface means. The Air Force has committed to the C-17. So our strategic transport aircraft capability is improving. Additionally, we can pre-position Army materiel on ships at selected locations.

The materiel, force package and other solutions to increasing our lethality early on are all part of being versatile enough to meet any contingency. What we don't want to do is get locked into inflexible formulas for specific scenarios. Our doctrine should guide us—describe how to *think about* mobilization and deployment—how to think in terms of versatile force mixing and matching in combat, combat support,

and combat service support forces, etc. Using such doctrine, we would be flexible enough to organize and operate in any situation.



“Fires are too important to be left solely to the Artillery.”

As the sponsor of the “Fighting with Fires” initiative being worked by the Field Artillery School, would you explain your notion of the combined arms commander's role in synchronizing operating systems?

My goal—with Major General [Fred F.] Marty, Brigadier General [Tommy R.] Franks [Field Artillery School Commandant and Assistant Commandant, respectively] and the Field Artillery School leading the way—is to ensure the Army makes the most of our increasingly lethal fires.

In what General George S. Patton called the “Musicians of Mars,” the combined arms commander is the “conductor of his orchestra” of operating systems performing on the battlefield. He's responsible for pulling together all the elements of combat power to fight and win. In the tactical battle, major engagements or campaigns, the elements of combat power are the same: firepower, maneuver, protection, and leadership.

The combined arms commander must be as involved in the fires part of his battle as he is in the maneuver part. I want combined arms commanders Army-wide to know how to skillfully maneuver fires, and we accomplish that first in our doctrine and leader development programs and then in training.

And I want those skills honed.

The lethality of our fires has increased significantly. During DESERT STORM, in one-half hour we delivered more fires more effectively than World War II artillery could have delivered in eight hours. So we have extraordinary fires capabilities—and the systems and munitions under development promise even greater lethality.

The maneuver commander must become the *combined arms* commander and fight more than the maneuver battle—know how to fight with fires and make them an integral part of the battle. He must be able to quickly maneuver and mass fires and skillfully employ counterfire.

If the fire support officer [FSO] plans fires as a separate entity—not integrated in the total battle by the combined arms commander—the plan ends up having little relevance to the conduct of the battle. Fires are too important to be left solely to the Artillery.

Fire planning by the FSO is certainly necessary, but the plan has to have an agility built in—an interrelationship with maneuver—to make the maximum contribution to winning.

Planning is one thing, fighting is another. The fire plan can't be “put on automatic” and executed as though the enemy's not going to react to it. He will. In a fight, you've got two minds working on the same problem: the commander's and the enemy's.

How would you rate our ability to synchronize operating systems at the combat training centers (CTCs)?

I was enormously proud of the DESERT STORM commanders' orchestrating capabilities, at least those I observed personally. Their ability to synchronize fires and maneuver was superb. The 1st Infantry Division in the breach, the 1st Armored Division (United Kingdom) with the 142d Field Artillery National Guard from Arkansas and the 1st Cavalry Division in their raids, feints, and demonstrations, the artillery raids and counterfire ambushes with MLRS, were all professional, skillful operations. The 1st and 3d Armored Divisions in their zones of action

against the Iraqis demonstrated their success in employing massed fires. (I define "massed" as the fires of two or more battalions, not batteries.)

We need to continue this awareness of the capabilities of fires, an awareness forged in DESERT STORM. And we need to practice it at the CTCs. I'm encouraged by some recent work at the National Training Center. Both counter-fire and target acquisition are beginning to get the attention they deserve. I also see some encouraging changes at the JRTC, such as the participation of key players, for example ANGLICO [air and naval gunfire liaison company] teams.

We need continued emphasis on getting every player on the combined arms team "on the field" at the CTCs. That way, combined arms commanders can train to synchronize the team.

How do you envision the future CTCs evolving to maintain our Army's warfighting edge?

We've got to ensure our practice fields remain relevant to the circumstances in which the Army finds itself. At one time we trained to fight based on the Cold War world order. Now the playing field has changed, and we've changed our training accordingly.

General Sullivan has directed we conduct contingency operations at both the NTC and JRTC. At the JRTC, you'll see joint operations on a continuing basis and armor-mech, light and special operating forces. You'll see light and armor-mech forces at the NTC. Units now face the threat in a variety of configurations as opposed to one threat. In our BCTPs [battle command training programs] for our divisions and corps, you'll see the same type of changes occurring. We're shifting quickly to post-Cold War warfighting.

But relevancy is key. Our training has to be relevant to the circumstances in which the Army finds itself. We must sustain excellence and relevance in training and leader development.

Current doctrine addresses the commander's intent in his concept for fires and maneuver but in general terms.

What should fire support and maneuver expect from the combined arms commander?

The commander needs to precisely describe the effects he's trying to achieve and where and when he wants them. In simple, straightforward language, he should describe his desired effects in the conduct of the operation, the point of his main effort, a sensing of the speed of the operation and where it needs to be relatively tightly controlled. And depending on the echelon, the commander may have to tell where he chooses to fight the decisive battle over time. If he's the corps commander, he's probably describing two to four days of operations.

But the combined arms commander doesn't come up with his intent in isolation. Before he expresses the intent, either verbally or in the order, there needs to be continual dialogue face-to-face with subordinate commanders and



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his staff so he can harmonize his operating systems. He gets advice for his running estimate by talking to subordinate commanders, members of his staff, commanders of fire support and engineer units, and so forth. That's the way to make the combined arms orchestra play.

But when the intent arrives, then it's

the responsibility of the logistician, fire supporter, engineer, etc., to say, "How can I involve my organization to best achieve the desired effects?" For example at the division or higher level, the fire support officer should give the commander some alternatives for task organizing the artillery and weighting the effects of fires to achieve his desired outcome.

How can artillerymen best help commanders synchronize firepower?

The formulations of the intent and plan are a team effort. So the fire supporter needs to take an active role in ensuring that fires are a part of those thought processes. And that happens at all levels—company/team, task force, brigade, etc.

What the combined arms commander doesn't want to do is "sub-optimize" his systems—have each piece of the orchestra playing its own tune. He must optimize his systems at his level. The one thing the commander never wants to run out of is options, and synchronized systems give him options.

Then, the fire support officer should be close to the commander during the fight because one of the first casualties of the fight is usually the plan. The commander has to be prepared to adjust fires and maneuver and the tempo of operations. He may need to shift the point of his main effort.

For the orchestra to continue in harmony, everyone has to have his "head in the game." The fire supporter and commander have got to keep talking back and forth. If the fire support coordinator spots the need for an adjustment before the commander does, he grabs the commander to fix it.

The relationship between the commander and his fire supporter is critical from the company/team to corps levels—in a sense, all the way through the theater level. To promote that relationship Army-wide, we need continuing dialogue in our schools—Forts Knox, Benning, Sill, and Rucker—on integrating fires and maneuver. Integrating the two must be built into our doctrine, leader development programs, and training.

AARs [after-action reviews] at the NTC, JRTC, and in BCTP should look at this relationship during the planning for and conduct of the battle.

The observer-controller or evaluator's question should be: Did the combined arms commander take full advantage of the fires available to him to accomplish his mission?

What impact do you believe future intelligence and fire support systems will have in terms of achieving success on the battlefield without major engagements of maneuver forces?

Most combined arms commanders would tell you that the major intelligence shortcoming in terms of identifying targets is their inability to see over the hill. What they're trying to avoid is unplanned meeting engagements. Friendly reconnaissance out front, either in the defense or the attack, is of utmost importance to commanders. Our ability to see over the hill will be improved, by and large, by the UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle].

We need the ability to rapidly target and deliver fires that contribute to the overall tactical scheme. For example, in Southwest Asia, we were fortunate to have the Pioneer [UAV]. So we flew it and, with a quick-fire capability, spotted and fired on targets in real time. It's the real-time capability we're looking for in delivering fires—not only with cannons, but also with the Army TACMS and MLRS.

As far as fires substituting for maneuver engagements is concerned, you have to watch how you think about that. Fire and maneuver are linked; one contributes to the other.

Of course, it depends on the type of target you're talking about. With MLRS and Army TACMS, you can achieve lethal effects without involving maneuver forces. For example, if you're firing at a SAM [surface-to-air missile] site with Army TACMS, you can probably put it out of business.

How can the combined arms commander make the most of his fire support and aviation assets?

In the factors of METT-T [mission,

enemy, terrain, troops and time available], he looks for those elements of combat power he can rapidly shift from one part of the battlefield to another. I call those "reusable combat assets." Though the commander can usually shift his artillery the quickest, his reusable combat assets also include aviation and close air support.

So the commander formulates his plan to take advantage of the reusable combat power available to him. But a fire plan is just that—a plan. The fire supporter, the aviator, and the Air Force representative must understand that the



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commander will have to deviate from the plan to seize opportunities, and rapidly adjust to take advantage of situations as they occur during the fight.

The notion of positive control of indirect fire—as opposed to "silence is consent"—has caused some concern that fires on the battlefield could be less responsive. What are your thoughts on this?

As we saw in DESERT STORM, clearing fires quickly is critical. Certainly that's an area we'll continue to talk about and develop procedures for, especially as our artillery can fire at longer ranges.

We have to clear fires so we know the area we're firing into has no friendly

forces in it. It's an issue of force protection versus the risk you incur in your situation—the commander has to weigh all the factors.

We must start with the base line of an agreed set of tactics, techniques, and procedures for using fires. We've got to establish the right joint coordinating measures. Then we need to practice them in a variety of scenarios—the more practice, the better.

Clearing fires is important in any battle, whether you're clearing close air support, TAC [tactical aircraft], helicopters or cannon, and rocket or missile artillery. It's a difficult challenge, especially on a highly mobile, fluid battlefield, using day and night all-weather systems.

The Army's capstone warfighting doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, Operations, is under revision. How is this manual changing?

The Chief of Staff of the Army has charged TRADOC with leading the Army through this intellectual change to a post-Cold War world by using doctrine as the engine of change. A part of this effort includes revising FM 100-5. Our doctrine isn't broken. But we need to include in it the operational versatility our Army now requires in a post-Cold War era.

FM 100-5 will describe how to think about mobilization and deployment, how to think about employing Army forces in actions short of war, and other intellectual changes we must make—all of which we've done before in some form or other. But the centerpiece of the revised 100-5 will continue to be fighting at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels—guidelines for employing forces, conditioned by the factors of METT-T.

We're engaging not only TRADOC, but also the total Army in developing FM 100-5. The process is as important as the product. If we do the process right, if we have the kind of dialogue we need, we'll accomplish two things. First, we'll inform the Army about the need for change as we change. And second, by the time we publish the manual sometime in 1993, we'll have

tapped the collective wisdom of the Army to include in the revised manual. FM 100-5 is TRADOC's "point of main effort" and requires the full attention of leaders Army-wide.

What message would you send to combined arms soldiers worldwide?

We've got a great Army, and I'm proud to be part of it. It's one that's confident in itself, as proved by its successes in JUST CAUSE, the Cold War and DESERT STORM. But we have work to do. We must rapidly shift our focus from preparing to fight the battles

of a Cold War world to the battles of the future. And to do that in our smaller Army, we must optimize all our combat capabilities, including making the most of our fires. So our doctrine, training and leader development strategies must evolve as we reshape the Army.

Then, as we reduce forces in Europe and move units to our TRADOC installations, and as our Army gets smaller, we must do it all while caring for our soldiers, civilians, and their families. For those who leave the Army, we must show our great appreciation for their service in peace and war, helping to

make the Army the best in our nation's history. All Army alumni should depart with a sense of dignity and respect.

To our many soldiers who will remain in the Army, all of whom play some part on the combined arms team, I thank you for all you've done and challenge you to continue your record of excellence.



Operation DESERT STORM

Armored Brigade in Combat

LIEUTENANT COLONEL G. CHESLEY HARRIS

In August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in Bamberg, Germany, was far from the conflict. One of the brigade's battalions was inactivating, and its vehicles and equipment were being readied for depot turn-in. The rest of the brigade's soldiers and families were planning their Christmas holidays. But all this would change quickly. When the Secretary of Defense named the units that would deploy to the Persian Gulf, the 1st Armored Division, along with its 3d Brigade, was among those units deploying as elements of the VII U.S. Corps. The war was no longer just a news story. It was real; it was us.

But we were ready. We had to be, for it was truly a come-as-you-are war. The next month and a half were a blur of 20-hour days and seven-day weeks as we tackled this enormous challenge.

Our task organization was set—one

Bradley infantry battalion, two tank battalions, an artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a support battalion, and many more specialty support units—a force of more than 3,000 soldiers (Figure 1).

The complex deployment planning began. The soldiers and equipment would begin moving to Saudi Arabia in 20 days—on 29 November. Mean-

while, individual training intensified. Local firing ranges ran 24 hours a day, and the instruction on individual survival skills now included operations in a chemical and biological environment. Meanwhile, tank and Bradley crews deployed to Grafenwoehr for gunnery qualification while other soldiers prepared the vehicles for the deployment.

The brigade emphasized battle drills




Figure 1