

Aircraft sightings are also relatively common. Both Egypt and Israel have occasionally violated the treaty, either by flying training missions over an MFO site or by landing military aircraft at an airfield in the U.S. battalion sector.

**Medical Evacuations.** The MFO is committed to conducting medical evacuations of foreign nationals (non-Egyptian) whenever there is a potential loss of life, limb, or eyesight. For all critical cases, these patients are taken to the city of Eilat in Israel, which has the nearest modern facilities. Usually this involves a medical evacuation flight by the aviation detachment; the coordination for and deployment of medical support; coordination for border crossing by an aircraft through the liaison systems of both Israel and Egypt; requesting permission for the flight from Force Operations; monitoring of the flight of the evacuation aircraft; and the actual

contacting and treatment of the patient enroute. All this is for a simple medical evacuation. When actually finding the injured personnel becomes a factor, or when it may be a mass casualty situation, things get even more complex.

The 4th Battalion, 87th Infantry, evacuated people for a variety of reasons—diving, mountain climbing, and automobile accidents, and one explosion. Another common source of injuries is SCUBA-diving and snorkeling in the Red Sea.

The crisis action team must be trained to deal with these cases. The team should consist of the battalion commander, executive officer, S-3, S-5, and TOC crews. When the team arrives, it will also include the aviation unit representative and one of the doctors from the dispensary.

**Liaison System.** The liaison system for Egypt is the U.S. battalion's key host nation contact. The battalion's

specific point of contact is an Egyptian Army lieutenant colonel who lives in Sharm-el-Sheik, and good relations with him are very important in many ways. For one telling example, South Camp is about 100 miles from the nearest fresh water source, and this man controls the pipes that carry the water.

The keys to success for a multinational force and observer mission are, therefore, planning, preparation, and training. The battalion that follows these will avoid the mistakes that result from hasty, unplanned action, and will execute its critical MFO missions correctly and effectively the first time, every time.

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# Combat Identification

*EDITOR'S NOTE: This article was prepared by the Infantry School's Directorate of Combat Developments and staffed through other School departments.*

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During Operation DESERT STORM, the variables that can cloud the battlefield reached an all-time high. Warfare had become so sophisticated and complex that the units involved had a much higher probability of suffering casualties from friendly fire.

The recognition booklets and flash cards once used to teach soldiers silhouette identification shapes were no longer adequate, because specific items of equipment were often common to both friendly and enemy forces. For example, Soviet-designed battle tanks were

used by three members of the coalition force as well as by the Iraqis. Carefully planned and timed ground maneuver of the force, although rehearsed repeatedly, did not reduce the risk of fratricide, when targets were often engaged and destroyed before they could be positively identified.

As a result of the air-to-ground fratricide incidents, a multidiscipline center for fratricide technology was established at the U.S. Army Laboratory Command (LABCOM) Advanced Systems Concept Office (ASCO). At the same time, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) was tasked with developing a plan that would focus on the future effort to reduce fratricide and a plan for organizing and managing research and development for fratricide and identification friend or foe (IFF) on

a permanent basis.

As AMC was beginning work on the reduction of fratricide, a parallel effort was under way at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The Army combat identification system (ACIS) concept is the result of that effort. It will attempt to provide the means for positively identifying potential targets as friend, foe, or neutral (noncombatant). Positive identification must be made in real time from any area within a theater of operations, under any condition of terrain and weather, during day or periods of limited visibility (with emphasis on nighttime and dirty battlefields). The ACIS concept covers air-to-air, air-to-ground, ground-to-air, and ground-to-ground combat identification systems. Passive technology will be stressed, with the

overall intent of reducing fratricide.

The Infantry School became involved in fratricide prevention in 1988 when TRADOC established its fratricide action plan. This plan coordinated and directed TRADOC's efforts to resolve recognized shortfalls in doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and materiel products relating to fratricide on the battlefield. A continuing effort to update and refine the document was completed in December 1991.

A series of joint working groups recommended milestones for quick fixes for combat identification, as well as longer term improvements. The recommendations included the technical approaches that might be used to solve the air-to-ground and ground-to-ground fratricide problem.

Under the guidance of the Director of Training and Doctrine, the Infantry School has established a fratricide action board whose function is to recommend to the commandant steps the infantry can take to reduce fratricide. The School is determining the best way to educate the force on methods of reducing the risk of fratricide. Solutions may include a combination of approaches that involve resident and nonresident instruction and materials, scheduled revisions of doctrinal publications, and combat identification techniques and procedures.

The Infantry School's position throughout this process has been to work within existing branch proponentcy (Armor, Aviation, Infantry) in the context of the TRADOC fratricide action plan. In general, the focus has been on reinforcing training and on adhering to existing doctrinal procedures that are designed to bring the full weight of our combat power to bear on the enemy while reducing friendly casualties. As training, doctrine, leader development, and organizational improvements are implemented, the infantry will also look to technological advancements to ensure fratricide prevention in areas not otherwise covered.

No amount of gunner training will completely solve the fratricide problem until our target acquisition systems can positively identify targets at the full

acquisition and killing ranges of our weapons. For that reason, any near-term technological solution must concentrate either on a fail-safe passive means of locating, identifying, and marking friendly vehicles and soldiers, or on a target acquisition system that is equal to the effective range of the weapon it serves.

Materiel solutions to an improved combat identification are being incorporated into the documentation of all future systems. The desired improvements to the Bradley fighting vehicle (M2A2+), for example, include modifications to weapons and specific items of command and control that will contribute directly to combat identification. High on the priority list for improvement is the global positioning system (GPS) with a digital compass; a laser range finder; improved optics for increased target acquisition range; and a passive combat identification system. Other desired improvements include the intervehicular information system and a vehicle integrated defense system.

Individual weapon systems, such as the TOW and the Dragon, also need to be modified to include a combat identification capability. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, off-the-shelf, quick-fix devices were selected for use on the basis of their immediate availability and their ease of mounting and operation. These devices were the first to be selected in the Army's attempt to pre-

sent a comprehensive plan to prevent fratricide. The Advanced Systems Concepts Office provided several items to the Infantry School for evaluation during October 1991: These included the "Budd light" (a lightweight, low-cost battery-operated, near infrared strobe); the DARPA light (a battery-powered, omnidirectional near-infrared strobe with an adjustable elevation angle); and thermal tape (completely passive, easily applied adhesive backed tape that reflects the atmospheric temperature).

The quick-fix devices were evaluated in two phases: The Infantry School participated in the combat vehicle evaluation of the devices at Fort Knox. The task was to identify procedures for mounting the devices and to determine their capabilities and possible configurations when mounted on the M1, M2, M901, M106, FIST-V, and HMMWV. At the Infantry School, preliminary data was collected during October, and an evaluation was conducted in November 1991 using a Bradley fighting vehicle and dismounted troops. Tactics, techniques, and procedures were developed on the basis of the results of both assessments. The evaluation results and recommendations were forwarded to the Combined Arms Command for incorporation into a user's package to be provided to units training at the Army's National Training Center.

The Soldier Modernization Plan describes the development of the



Soldier System from 1991 to 2006, with the goal of providing improvements in combat effectiveness. Among these improvements will be a fully integrated positive combat identification system designed with the specific intent of reducing fratricide.

A soldier-to-soldier positive combat identification capability is of considerable concern. To date, there is no suitable covert, passive method of positively identifying friendly, threat, and neutral soldiers under all battlefield conditions at ranges greater than those provided by the unaided eye.

Such optical enhancements as rifle scopes and binoculars will allow com-

bat identification range to be extended for short distances during clear daylight operations. Night weapon sights, image intensification and thermal weapon sights are minimally effective in positively identifying dismounted troops. The goal is to give the dismounted soldier a combat identification system compatible with those of other friendly soldiers, vehicles, and aircraft that will provide a 360-degree positive identification. This device must have little or no probability of detection by similarly equipped threat forces.

The Infantry School is dedicated to the prevention of fratricide and is making every effort to evaluate and imple-

ment fratricide prevention techniques as they become available. As technology evolves, the infantry will be able to increase its combat capability with the added benefits of reducing fratricide by using sound doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and materiel solutions. The ultimate goal will be to field the world's finest infantry fighting force and, at the same time, to make fratricide a thing of the past.



# A Framework for SOPs

CAPTAIN RANDALL A. SOBOUL

Standing operating procedures (SOPs) provide the glue that binds a unit together. It is not high-speed plans, abundant resources, or the outstanding abilities of key personnel that enable an infantry unit to win in combat. It is small groups of organized soldiers doing routine tasks *routinely*. And routine tasks are executed through established SOPs at levels from battalion down to buddy team. Most of the shooting, moving, and communicating that lead to mission accomplishment are not new at all; in fact, they are routine—they are SOP. And knowing the SOP gives soldiers confidence during periods of uncertainty.

We are often subjected to a time-constrained operations order (OPORD) that gives the guidance, "Per SOP," for many tasks. But what happens when the order is complete and subordinate orders are issued? Do the riflemen have a basic understanding of what is

required, or have they been referred to an SOP which is outdated, obsolete, or—worse—nonexistent?

There are many ways to mold unit SOPs. I would like to share a simple, proven *framework* from which to begin: "Left to right, 1, 2, 3; and front to rear, 1, 2, 3."

An infantry company—whether tactically employed (attacking or defending) or administratively employed (police call)—is arrayed from left to right, 1st Platoon, 2d Platoon, and 3d Platoon. Once the soldiers are trained using this framework, they will move out immediately, or assume attack formation, on the single command, "Per SOP."

The 1st Platoon is always on the left flank of the company; the 2d Platoon is always the center platoon; and the 3d Platoon is always on the right flank of the company. In a reconsolidation during a night attack on a difficult objective, for example, confusion reigns, and

with casualties and enemy prisoners of war to take care of, what happens when a rear security team is recalled by the 3d Platoon leader? The security team leader moves forward, makes contact, exchanges the appropriate challenges and passwords, and upon seeing a soldier from 2d Platoon immediately executes a right face (in relation to the direction of attack) to link up with his platoon. He knows that "per SOP" the 3d Platoon is always to the right of 2d Platoon.

The possibilities are unlimited, and leaders must ensure that they formulate their SOPs and plan missions in accordance with this framework. This does not mean the commander cannot be flexible in maneuvering or that he cannot designate special tasks to particularly proficient platoons. But whenever he does go against his SOP, he must announce to his personnel, "This is not SOP," and say it twice. His subordi-