

F, as well as the CTT manual, will provide the doctrinal standard that is missing from STP 7-11BCHM as a Skill Level 1 task.

In the proposed tables, basic through advanced CPTs incorporate an OPFOR with marksmanship. Table A uses MILES and blanks, BB guns, or paint ball guns. Table B uses dry fire techniques, then live rounds. The soldiers are outfitted with MILES gear for both tables for scoring and control purposes. They are given a minimum amount of time to choose their course of action from a certain vantage point; then they must negotiate the course. MILES zero would be required before execution. Soldiers would negotiate the basic through advanced CPTs with their assigned weapons. Thus, the squad automatic weapon, the Dragon, and the M203 would be incorporated.

Individuals would not be allowed to negotiate the next table until they had achieved a satisfactory score on a requisite table, as determined by the unit. Individual scores would be used to determine cumulative scores at buddy team and higher levels. The replication of battlefield effects would be kept to a minimum in order to stress IMT and marksmanship skills and remain focused on them.

The final outcome of CPTs would be a qualitative score for the various tables, not unlike the evaluation a foot-

ball player receives after a game. The trainer would then have an accurate assessment of the individual's IMT and marksmanship skills from buddy team through platoon. This score could be referenced much like the SQT score or a BFV crew Table VIII qualification score. Leaders would be evaluated on the basis of the amount of combat power that reached the objective.

Once the CPTs were complete, the trainer could be assured that he would progress into effective collective training. The result would be a smart, able, and aggressive dismounted infantryman who was integrated into his unit team.

The inability of dismounted soldiers to move under direct fire is a disturbing deficiency that must be corrected. This change must begin with the individual infantry soldier and his squad leader.

Squad leaders must be expected to know their soldiers' IMT skills in respect to their marksmanship ability. Including IMT skills as part of the train-the-trainer concept in the infantry Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course would help the squad leader do this. CPT would complete the battery of assessment tools the squad leader could use to judge and subsequently train his soldiers' offensive fighting skills.

Combat power tables would give company commanders and first sergeants the basic tool for training fire team and squad leaders on how to get

all their combat power on the objective. Battalion commanders and command sergeants major could use CPTs to ensure that the BFV platoons' dismounted and mounted elements could execute battle drills and collective tasks in concert. The speed and firepower of the BFV, therefore, would not overshadow the combat power the dismounted element contributes to the battlefield.

Finally, all trainers would endorse their superiors' confidence in the offensive skills of the dismount element by reminding them—through higher proficiency on collective tasks—that the dismounted soldier is an integral member of the combined arms team.

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# Light Infantry Battalion Counterreconnaissance

LIEUTENANT ROBERT L. BATEMAN

A successful defense is made up of reactive and offensive elements working together to deprive the enemy of the initiative. A defense that can destroy the coherence of the enemy's operations

can then ultimately defeat his uncoordinated forces.

Fundamental to a good defense are four key points: *preparation, disruption, concentration, and flexibility*. By

focusing on these points, a tactical commander can develop and execute a plan that disrupts the enemy's synchronization. He does this by defeating or misleading the enemy's reconnaissance

forces, impeding his maneuver, disrupting his reserves, and interrupting his command and control.

All of this is outlined in Field Manual 100-5, Operations, which describes the doctrine the Army will use in fighting the AirLand Battle. This manual does not state how this is done (since it is concerned with doctrine and not tactics), but it does list some of the key points for a successful defense. One of these points is that the defense must "fight the enemy throughout the depth of his formations to delay him, disrupt him, and create opportunities for offensive action." A light infantry battalion is capable of putting up such a defense, but only if it creates a counterreconnaissance force. But, again, no current manual describes how a light infantry battalion might organize such a force and use it on the battlefield.

One of the problems of a light infantry force is its comparative lack of mobility. This characteristic is highlighted in the manual by its discussion of using light infantry forces within the two broad categories of mobile defense and area defense.

A mobile defense focuses on the destruction of the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to counterattack and envelopment by a mobile reserve. Relatively small forces are deployed forward while the commander uses maneuver supported by fire to take the initiative away from the attacker. A force that is conducting a mobile defense must have mobility equal to or greater than that of the enemy. In this type of defense, light infantry forces are used mainly in a static role to channel enemy forces; heavy forces are required in the counterattack for their speed and shock value.

An area defense is usually conducted to deny the enemy access to specific terrain for a specific time. Most of the defenders are deployed to defend ground with a combination of defensive positions and a small mobile reserve. Such a defense is usually required for a light force. Here, then, is the problem for light infantry units: How do they organize for and execute a defense that

"fights the enemy throughout the depths of his formations" when they are tied to a specific area by their own inherent lack of mobility?

Again, FM 100-5 is helpful in describing two kinds of forces that act as the forward security echelon in close operations: screening forces and covering forces.

A screening force repels enemy reconnaissance and keeps enemy artillery from firing on the FEBA (forward edge of battle area). A covering force is designed to fight a major action to destroy leading enemy formations, to force the early deployment of enemy follow-on units, and to force the enemy to disclose his main effort.



The manual's description of these forces, however, refers to the commitment of entire battalions, brigades, and regiments to this role. And this is the domain of colonels and generals—not sergeants, lieutenants, and captains.

How, then, does a light infantry small-unit leader apply this information? Fortunately, the concepts that work at higher levels still work down at battalion level. The point here is that a light infantry battalion needs a force that will provide the flexibility a screening or covering force offers.

At this point, I would like to provide a link between the upper echelon doctrine of FM 100-5 and the way a light infantry battalion might organize and execute this concept—and to provide some practical lessons one battalion learned when it tried this technique.

In April 1990, a joint study project was published on observations at the

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and their implications for senior leader training. This project provided lessons that were based upon the observation of 11 separate units that had rotated through the JRTC. One of these lessons was the need for a light infantry battalion in the defense to deploy some sort of counterreconnaissance force to defeat the enemy's reconnaissance efforts.

This study was co-authored by then-Lieutenant Colonel Howard W. Crawford, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Hensler. Colonel Crawford is now Director, Operations and Training at Fort Benning, Georgia. Colonel Hensler now commands the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), where he has implemented some of the observations and suggested changes. As part of the study, the 4th Battalion, 87th Infantry, executed an area defense during its annual external evaluation in which it deployed a counterreconnaissance force in the form of a company team tailored for that mission.

The following recommendations and lessons, drawn from that experience, are provided here to give other light infantry units guidelines they can use to execute the counterreconnaissance mission.

#### Organization

Light infantry is designed to be employed in restrictive terrain and in low-intensity and mid-intensity conflict scenarios—depending, of course, upon an analysis of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time).

A METT-T analysis in these situations draws heavily upon the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and upon the limited assets a light infantry battalion has at its disposal. The 4th Battalion, 87th Infantry, was no better off than any other light infantry unit in these areas, and our solution reflected these limitations.

The counterreconnaissance force was organized as follows:

- A line infantry platoon.
- A battalion scout platoon.
- A ground surveillance radar (GSR) section.
- An antiarmor (Dragon) section.
- A team headquarters element.

This organization gave the counter-reconnaissance force a moderate field strength of 62 men. The team, under the commander of the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), operated as a separate battalion asset, rather than as a subordinate element of one of the line companies. (This TOE is obviously flexible.) The battalion may use two line platoons in addition to the scouts or, if the terrain is appropriate, substitute the TOW platoon for the Dragon section. (In fact, the original plan for our team included the TOW platoon, until an analysis of the area where the team was to deploy showed that the terrain and vegetation were too restrictive for the TOW's range.) In addition, a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) team (if attached to the battalion) might be useful, or one or more sniper teams could be used.

### Mission

The planned mission for the counter-reconnaissance team we sent out was to be executed in three phases:

The first phase began 12 hours before the time when the battalion main body was to arrive at the planned location for its area defense. At this time, the team was to conduct an air movement to a landing zone a short distance to the rear of the planned defensive line. The team would then patrol the area to clear any OPFOR scout teams that might have already occupied positions in the vicinity. The main effort for this was the team's line platoon. The scout platoon was to begin moving toward their planned positions early, and the Dragon section was to set up a hasty blocking position to cut off vehicle access to the area.

Phase two consisted of moving to and occupying positions forward of the main battalion line. The scouts, acting in their normal role, were sent three to six kilometers forward. The line platoon occupied a series of squad-sized positions spread across the battalion front one to two kilometers forward. The antiarmor section was split to cover the only two possible mounted avenues of approach, and the GSR team, based upon its analysis of the best sites for its

equipment, was attached to one of the squads.

During Phase three, the active reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance phase, the team was to collect intelligence (primarily a scout function) and intercept and destroy any OPFOR scouts who tried to move into positions from which they could call fire on the battalion main line. This phase would end when the OPFOR's main body approached the counterreconnaissance team's main line (which centered on the infantry line platoon). At that point, the team—minus the scouts who would remain forward in hide positions—was to move back to the battalion, conduct a passage of lines, then act as the battalion reserve.

### Lessons Learned

We learned many lessons during this operation. The most important of them are presented here, arranged by battle-field operating system.

**Maneuver.** The ability to disengage is imperative to the survival of the counterreconnaissance force. It must plan to shoot-and-scoot, remembering that it is all alone out there. The disruption of the enemy scheme of maneuver by direct fire should be part of the plan. Massing the assigned line platoon to hit the OPFOR's main body while the troops are in column—without becoming decisively engaged—can impede his maneuver and interrupt his command and control. We did not do this, but we will certainly do it in the future.

Conducting a passage of lines is also a very important skill that line infantry companies do not practice often enough, even when they plan for it in an exercise. Line companies should—as a minimum—reconnoiter and identify the point at which they plan to move back into friendly lines, and then coordinate with the unit that is responsible for that section of the defense.

**Fire Support.** A fire support officer (FSO) should be sent with the team to coordinate fires. The team, when it is forward of the main defense, should have not only priority of fires but positive *control* of fires. This is for safety, because it is quite possible that some-

body out there with a radio may *not* know there is a friendly counterreconnaissance force to his front and may call for fire.

Additionally, pre-coordinated no-fire zones should be placed on the counter-reconnaissance force's position. On the last night of our exercise, the lieutenant in charge had to place check-fires on five separate missions that were called on the FSO net before the OPFOR assault. At least one of these missions probably originated from a main defensive line Dragon team that may have seen elements of the team through their thermal sight. This argues for the no-fire zone; by this time, the control and priority of fires had shifted to the main defense line.

**Intelligence.** For the battalion command element, one of the most frustrating aspects of the operation was the sheer volume of reports coming from the team. Even with a very experienced captain as commander, the team still sent quite a few reports to the rear. On the battalion command net, some of these reports either got lost in the shuffle or took too long to get in. The solution to this problem would be a direct link to the battalion S-2 on a separate net, possibly the HHC command net. Thinking of the counterreconnaissance element more as a dedicated S-2 asset makes this linkage clearer. True, the additional element in the chain could impede communication, but it is also the S-2's job to establish the value of the reports that arrive, regardless of the source.

Some battalion commanders may not approve of this method, but that is easy to rectify by an SOP that says the counterreconnaissance force will switch to the battalion command net when in heavy direct contact, as well as making hourly battalion net communication checks.

Also, for the hard intelligence, there should be a regularly scheduled S-2 pickup. We later found that much of the hard intelligence we had captured had been misrouted because of the unorthodox methods we had used, by necessity, to get it to the rear. This same pickup could also be used to bring

to the drop point whatever limited resupply the counterreconnaissance force might need, thereby eliminating the need to dedicate a second vehicle to resupply.

**Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability.** Mobility means survivability for the counterreconnaissance force. Hasty fighting positions are good, but anything larger would detract from the mission and might develop a "bunker mentality" in the force. The best defense against artillery is not to dig and hold but to be gone by the time it arrives. This force is not large enough, nor does it have the assets, to dig full fighting positions with 18 inches of overhead cover and still accomplish its primary mission.

In the area of countermobility, our counterreconnaissance team used vehicle and antipersonnel mines to increase the limited killing power it had with direct fire weapons. Again, these were not meant to be used to initiate a major engagement but rather to give the OPFOR a bloody nose and give the team time to decide whether it wanted to continue with direct fire or pull back and use indirect. In any future operation like this, it is advisable to think about doubling the basic load of mines the force carries. At worst, the OPFOR units will be slowed by the need to detect and clear the mines; at best, they won't know what hit them.

**Air Defense.** On the last day of our defense, there were multiple overflights by OPFOR AH-1 and OH-58 helicopters. The counterreconnaissance team was under a battalion-imposed yellow-tight air defense artillery status, but the team would have imposed this status in any case. Being as spread out as we were, there was no way to effectively mass the fires needed for air defense. In such cases a Stinger team attachment might be used to provide a nasty surprise to OPFOR aircraft that believed they were well out of line-of-sight from their target.

**Combat Service Support.** Resupply needs to be redundant. The counterreconnaissance force will probably not have the assets or the time to conduct resupply on its own. Either a cache sys-

tem or one or two good push packages could have sustained our counterreconnaissance team for quite a while longer. The battalion should plan for this, with input from the team commander.

**Command and Control.** If a force is configured along the lines of what we used (scout platoon, line platoon, antiarmor section), it will work well with either the HHC commander or the S-3 Air as the team commander. The S-2 should not be selected to command the force, because it is his job to evaluate *all* of the information that comes to the battalion and to develop the scenario and the OPFOR's probable courses of action for the battalion commander.



Also, the linkage from the team to the battalion should pass through the S-2 at the tactical operations center, for reasons that have already been discussed.

A decision matrix based on the battalion guidance regarding the engagement criteria would be helpful. The counterreconnaissance force should be given the information they need to decide when they can use direct fire weapons. When should their mission shift from strictly self-defense direct fire and primary use of indirect, to possibly aggressive short range and duration patrolling to throw the OPFOR maneuver element off balance? The soldiers of the counterreconnaissance force may excel in both of these roles,

but they need to know when the battalion wants them to execute each phase. And lacking direct orders, they need certain criteria that will allow them to decide for themselves when to switch over.

Our counterreconnaissance team was reporting on the battalion net, in effect acting as a fifth company. As a result, the team commander also had some difficulty sending in the reports he was collecting on the team radio net. The suggestion here would be for the team to act independently, reporting all normal communications and reports through a separate S-2 net. Command and control by the battalion may be somewhat impaired by this arrangement, but it should not be an obstacle if the team is given enough guidance before its deployment. Also, if a situation should require the direct intervention of the battalion command group, the team commander could still switch over to the battalion radio net.

There is no established doctrine that states how a counterreconnaissance force should be structured or how it should operate. In our battalion task force, we simply set out to build a team that would work. It was a learning experience and one that worked out well in the execution.

The team accomplished two missions for the battalion: The scout platoon fulfilled its normal role of providing deep reconnaissance for the battalion and the team. The line platoon and the antiarmor section dominated the middle region between the scouts and the battalion main body. They accomplished the mission of killing the enemy scouts and providing the battalion with mid-distance intelligence.

Our continued control of the reconnaissance battlefield denied the enemy a clear picture of the battalion's real strengths, weaknesses, and dispositions. There was one area, however, the team did not address that may be useful in the future: A deception plan could be included in a counterreconnaissance force's mission statement.

One last suggestion in regard to lessons learned: Because of the special nature of the counterreconnaissance

mission, it could be beneficial to select a single platoon to use for the counter-reconnaissance mission. Operating to the front of the battalion is normal for the scouts, but a line platoon with a mixed offensive-defensive mission needs to practice the coordinations and skills essential in a counterreconnaissance force. Not every platoon needs to

execute this mission; few, in fact, ever will. Those few should be given the opportunity to learn from their mistakes, retrain, and execute better the next time. Other platoons that replaced these in the force would be more likely to repeat the same mistakes.

In essence, it all comes down to one thing: On the battlefield, intelligence is

power, and there is no reason a light infantry battalion should not have this power.

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# Aerial Resupply The Blackstar Technique

**CAPTAIN MARK SHANKLE**

Numerous evaluations, battalion level exercises, and training rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) have revealed one glaring weakness in the light infantry battalion: With its austere tables of organization and equipment (TOEs), it cannot afford to commit the resources and personnel needed to establish and maintain a secure main supply route (MSR).

Supply convoys, even with security from the military police and the TOW platoon, repeatedly encounter vehicle ambushes prepared by opposing force (OPFOR) units.

Aerial resupply also has some disadvantages. Specifically, an approaching helicopter that is landing, or even hovering, during daylight is easily detected and always draws the OPFOR to its location. The OPFOR may also establish direct and indirect fire ambushes on possible landing zones.

The 10th Mountain Division, after experiencing the disadvantages of both vehicle convoys and daylight aerial resupply, decided there had to be a better way. The division developed a tech-

nique that enables the light infantry to conduct secure resupply operations during periods of limited visibility without compromising their positions.

This technique (called Blackstar) was designed specifically for light infantry rifle and scout platoons. It has proved successful in the jungles of Panama in summer and in the forests of northern New York in winter. A single UH-1H helicopter has supplied four light infantry platoons at four separate locations during a 27-minute period in darkness. The Blackstar technique has been adopted as standing operating procedure in the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 10th Mountain Division.

The following scenario will illustrate the way it works:

*During a light infantry battalion search and attack operation, the MSR has been interdicted, and resupply must be done by air. To protect the air assets and maintain operational security, the unit determines that its best option is to conduct the resupply during the hours of limited visibility. There are few landing zones in the sector and*

*some of these are unusable—either because of enemy obstacles, because they are suspected of being under enemy observation, or because they are covered by direct or indirect fire.*

The aerial resupply annex of the Ranger Handbook is ideal for pre-mission coordination. When units are down range, however, the information needed is not difficult to obtain. As long as FM communication is good, the minimum coordination required is the following:

- Communications checkpoint (CCP) locations (prominent terrain features within the battalion's sector).
- Report times and windows (the time the aircraft will arrive at the designated CCP).
- Frequencies and call signs.
- Actions on enemy contact (both ground unit and aircraft).
- Courses of action in case of communication failure.

For purposes of this scenario, the S-3 air and the S-4 have completed their coordination with the ground unit, the aviators, and the supply personnel. The