

## TRAINING NOTES

than shooters to more shooters than movers; again, the leader up front decides after assessing the effectiveness of the enemy's firepower.

**Squads and Teams Bound.** The leader of the entire assault element may select this technique, in which one team or squad provides the base of fire while the other maneuvers. The firing team must be able to gain and maintain fire superiority—the key decision of the leader.

**Team Moves by Buddy Team.** As the team leader maneuvers his element, he encounters fire that prevents him from moving all of his force at the same time. He gives the command to move by buddy team—one two-man team suppresses as the other bounds forward. In this case, the fire of half of his element is enough to suppress the enemy.

**One Man Moves per Team or Squad:** A numbering system for each

member of the team allows the team leader to control the one man moving. The following number system might be used:

**#1 Man — Team Leader**

**#2 Man — SAW Gunner**

**#3 Man — M203 Gunner**

**#4 Man — Rifleman**

The soldiers know that the movement sequence is always 1, 3, 2, 4, or whatever their leader deems best. Once movement is initiated, the #3 man always moves after hearing that the #1 man is set and so on. No continued commands are required, and the team moves with three men shooting and one maneuvering. This works just as well with a squad—one fire team provides a base of fire while one moves a soldier at a time to a predesignated location. From the new location it provides fire for the other team while it comes on line.

Trying to get the best of all worlds—speed, firepower, and control—is difficult, but it is a worthwhile challenge for commanders who want well-trained units. Relying on only one set method or another fails to develop junior leaders and disregards the advantages of having a leader up front to make the decision. The best possible solution is to have a number of techniques that vary speed and firepower. The end result is a team or squad leader who learns to think, apply the basics, and then maneuver his unit to close with and defeat the enemy.

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# LRSD

## Adapt, Improvise, and Overcome

### CAPTAIN JOHN A. SCHATZEL

During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the 1st Infantry Division's long-range surveillance detachment (LRSD) conducted 14 successful combat surveillance missions. The soldiers' training back at Fort Riley, Kansas—along with their ability to *adapt, improvise, and overcome* in the face of difficulties—led to that success. The success of those missions was a result of the following ideas, policies, and actions:

**Modify the MTOE.** The modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) for the divisional LRSD

authorizes six surveillance teams, each consisting of five 11B infantrymen and one 31C communications specialist. The radio base station consists primarily of 31Cs but also incorporates eight 11Bs.

In our detachment it was obvious that the 31Cs needed to be moved out of the surveillance teams and to be replaced by the 11Bs from the base station. Since communication procedures are an essential part of every LRSD soldier's training, there was virtually no difference in communications abilities between the soldiers in the 11-series

and those in the 31-series.

This reorganization produced two great benefits with no drawbacks:

First, the noncommissioned officers were now in a position to train soldiers in the same specialties as themselves. Under the old organization, it was difficult for a surveillance team leader to train his 31Cs for the portion of the skill qualification test that dealt with communications equipment his team did not use. Likewise, it was difficult for an NCO in the communications section to train a subordinate 11B soldier for an expert infantryman's badge (EIB) test.

The reorganization resulted in soldier skill test scores and EIB success rates that were significantly higher than in previous years.

Second, the soldiers were now in a position to advance from private to staff sergeant, depending on their specialties, without having to transfer from a surveillance team or communications section.

**Stabilize the Teams.** With the communications and infantry soldiers realigned in the teams and the communications section, stabilization increased. The first sergeant insisted that a soldier be kept in the same team, communications section, or headquarters element unless there was a very good reason to move him. Team leaders were permitted to move soldiers within a team, either permanently or on a mission-by-mission basis, in the interest of cross-training.

Stabilizing soldiers in the teams gave the team leaders every opportunity to develop the SOPs and the team cohesion that were essential to mission accomplishment. As a result, more than 75 percent of the surveillance team members who deployed during the Gulf War were in the same team they had been in during a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) a year earlier.

**Develop an Isolation Drill.** The isolation phase of an operation consisted of the troop-leading procedures required to prepare a team for its mission. The teams prepared in isolation to ensure that the missions of adjacent teams would not be compromised in the event a team was captured. The detachment's operations section standardized the troop-leading procedures with an isolation drill that did not detract from the team leaders' individual leadership styles.

The experience gained during training exercises convinced the team leaders that isolation for longer than 72 hours was counterproductive because of "cabin fever." They also concluded that 18 hours was the minimum time isolation could be maintained without degrading the teams' readiness. The operations section therefore developed an ideal 72-hour isolation timeline and

a worst-case 18-hour timeline.

These timelines used the one-third, two-thirds rule as a guide. They were marked with the "no-later-than" times for the completion of specific events, such as inspections, the mission brief to surveillance teams, team backbriefs to the commander, and rehearsals.

Training at the NTC soon revealed the need for one more control measure: Team leaders needed to brief the commander not later than one hour after receiving a mission. They briefed their scheme of maneuver, the isolation and mission timelines, and areas of concern.

Before the isolation drill was developed, the mission packet the team leader was given, the operations order he presented, and the detailed backbrief all followed different formats. Further complicating the process was the perception that every team member needed to know every piece of information. The isolation drill standardized all of the formats using the five-paragraph operations order format and assigned areas of responsibility on the basis of duty positions.

The only deviation from the standard operations order format was the placement of the intelligence requirements. Since the LRSO mission of observing and reporting differed from the missions of other combat units, it seemed logical to move the intelligence requirements from the Coordinating Instructions of Paragraph III to the end of the Enemy Forces portion of Paragraph I. Briefings were much easier when the senior scout briefed what the enemy had, what the enemy could do, and what the LRSO could observe to help it anticipate what the enemy would do.

The teams soon realized that they could plan faster if each soldier had an area of expertise and responsibility, similar to the radio-telephone operator (RTO) or medic on a Special Forces team. The senior scout and scout observer divided Paragraph I; the RTO and assistant RTO wrote Paragraph V; the assistant team leader coordinated Paragraph IV; and the team leader formulated Paragraphs II and III.

Although the entire team was required to memorize critical pieces of

information such as intelligence requirements and the communications plan, most of it could be memorized by one or two soldiers. The other team members who listened to the three operations briefings and participated in the preparations and rehearsals also gained a general understanding of that portion of the operation.

Using a timeline and standardized briefing formats in Iraq, the surveillance teams were better prepared for a mission with 18 hours of isolation than they had been with 72 hours at the NTC.

**Anticipate Operations.** The ability of the leaders in the detachment headquarters to anticipate and influence future operations contributed as much to condensed planning at detachment level as the isolation drill had at team level. The detachment executive officer had established a close working relationship with the Military Intelligence battalion, the G-2 and G-3 sections, the aviation brigade, and the map agencies during simulation exercises and training missions.

We learned where to go for indications of possible missions and conducted planning on timelines parallel to, or in conjunction with, those of the other agencies. As a result, we could usually anticipate requirements, and we were never caught off guard. During the Gulf War, we continued to anticipate future missions while planning current operations with maneuver brigades and battalions, special operations units, and allied nations.

**Implement a No-communication Drill.** The science of AM communication is not as exact as commanders would like it to be (or as unpredictable as communications sergeants often claim). By knowing and using all available systems, developing SOPs to handle contingencies, and rehearsing the communications plan, the detachment was able to establish reliable communications over distances of more than 1,000 miles. In anything short of a perfect plan, of course, several factors invite problems—the limitations and constraints imposed by the authorized and on-hand types and quantities of

communications equipment; expertise with expedient antennas; and the geographic area, terrain, weather, and atmospheric conditions.

The team leaders also learned not to keep a team radio turned off in a team box between missions instead of lending it to the base station, which could use it to monitor another frequency or transmit in another direction.

The company commander also never forgot the initiative of the NCOs who—through liaison with the U.S. Army Natick Research, Development, and Engineering Center—became the voluntary test bed for a dozen state-of-the-art antennas. These antennas, like the global positioning system, were to prove themselves invaluable in the desert.

It became apparent during training exercises that communication rarely worked exactly as planned. Without an alternative means of communication, it was difficult to establish radio communication. Invariably, as the element on one end was changing batteries, the other was trying to transmit. When one end was on the primary frequency, the other was on the alternate. If frequencies were changed, antenna lengths had to be adjusted. This was time-consuming in training and could be life-threatening in combat.

After months of training and more than a fair number of failures and good ideas, the communications section devised a detailed no-communication drill. This drill standardized the process of systematically and incrementally changing the various factors and components until communication had been established.

The process started with the obvious troubleshooting of batteries and connections and worked its way through various antenna types and alternate frequencies. Only the surveillance teams performed the no-communication drill; the base stations, augmented with the radios of the non-deployed teams, stood ready 24 hours a day with every available radio tuned to an alternate frequency. The antennas were cut to resonate on a specific frequency (like a tuning fork), laid on an azimuth, and inclined

at a take-off angle based upon the transmitting distance to improve the chances of establishing communication.

A good communication plan and a solid SOP were ready for combat only after rehearsals in the desert had perfected them. By deploying a base radio station to the detachment's rear—a distance that roughly matched the distance the teams would eventually be deployed to its front—the detachment conducted a realistic rehearsal. Information gathered during these rehearsals led to the modification of communication windows to avoid the inevitable downtime caused by atmospheric conditions. The



dedicated logging and analysis of data to determine which frequencies and antenna configurations worked best for various distances and times of day demonstrated again that the detachment could adapt, improvise, and overcome.

**Dig In.** The first sergeant concluded that the communications rehearsal would provide a great opportunity to refine our methods of digging a surveillance site. Each team prepared its experimental site within the perimeter of the base camp. After much discussion and experimentation, a "Y" configuration was adopted as the standard.

**Insert Teams.** Once the team leaders established a standard configuration for their surveillance sites, they and their team members started putting the pieces together while establishing priorities and following the commander's

intent. The LRSO complied with the commander's intent, even though our insertion was not as glamorous as we had envisioned during training. The intent of the Central Command commander was to show strength in the east and then flex units to the west. The LRSO therefore inserted its surveillance teams using Bradleys, which brought the teams within 10 kilometers of their surveillance position.

The decision to use ground insertion outweighed any consideration of airmobile insertion, since insertion by air could be observed from a greater distance. A Bradley fighting vehicle, even if it was observed, would attract less attention than a Black Hawk helicopter.

On the ground, the team leaders constantly reminded their teams of the importance of communications. The first report would inform detachment operations and then the division commander that the team had been successfully inserted and had established communications.

The division could now be confident of two things: First, if there was activity in a sector that met one of the intelligence requirements, a report from a team would be received. Second—just as important, although not as obvious—once the team's insertion was verified, if there was no report from a team, it could be assumed that there was no activity in that sector. Making communication a priority on the ground reminded the surveillance team that an ideal site was one that afforded both fields of view onto the objective area and communications with the base stations.

**Know What to Observe.** After analyzing the commander's intent and the G-2'S collection plan, the operations section conveyed this information to the teams by establishing intelligence requirements based upon precise quantifiable observations. For instance, the divisional primary intelligence requirement (PIR) of looking for the main effort or counterattack force at the NTC was refined in the desert and relayed to the teams as a requirement to report ten or more combat vehicles moving in formation.

The detachment's SOP identified PIR as intelligence that must be reported immediately, SIR (special intelligence requirements) as intelligence that the team would report during its next communications window, up to 12 hours later, and OIR (other intelligence requirements) as intelligence the team would report in person at the debriefing at the end of the mission. Although these terms may not have been used doctrinally or conventionally, they caused no confusion in the unit.

Every soldier's ability to identify threat vehicles and aircraft was tested as part of a rigorous program of instruction at the Long Range Surveillance Leaders Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. (See also "Selecting and Training Long Range Surveillance Unit Commanders," by Captain David A. McBride, *INFANTRY Magazine*, July-August 1992, Pages 42-44.) The soldiers kept these skills finely tuned in the desert by looking at hard-copy

surveillance photographs and 35mm slides projected against a tent liner at the company base camp.

**Trust.** After all of these points had been made, debated, and instituted, the chain of command delegated the execution of its mission to the soldiers of the detachment. The training phase had taken months in a field and garrison environment back in the United States and 12 days of pre-combat rehearsals in Saudi Arabia. Over the next 33 days, a solid, confident trust developed between the soldiers and leaders of the detachment—forged during training and tested in combat, and which resulted in 14 successful combat surveillance missions.

At 1200 hours on Saturday, February 23, two Black Hawk helicopters linked up and performed the unscheduled extraction of Teams 1 and 2. In less than 18 hours, the detachment crossed the berm it had observed for five weeks and, along with the rest of the division,

completed its DESERT STORM mission.

During the next four days, the detachment moved hundreds of miles, conducted bunker and trench clearing operations, destroyed a handful of armored vehicles, and collected dozens of enemy prisoners from the Iraqi Republican Guard.

The men of the 1st Infantry Division's LRSD—whether at the NTC, during EIB competition, on a C-130 over a drop zone at Fort Riley, or in the sands of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—proved their ability to *adapt, improvise, and overcome*.

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# Security of the Force

## A Commander's Call

**CAPTAIN BRUCE H. IRWIN**

When rioting broke out in Los Angeles, California, in April 1992, my unit of the California Army National Guard was mobilized to conduct civil defense operations. I had just assumed command of Company B, 2d Battalion, 159th Infantry, in March. On 30 April at 1600, I received notice of the mobilization. By Active Army standards, I had had only four days, or two drills, as the commander.

During two weeks of riot control, certain conflicts developed from incidents that my unit faced; in the process, we learned some lessons. Some of the

incidents during those two weeks may also raise thought-provoking questions for other company commanders as they prepare for future operations of this kind.

At 1600 on Friday, 1 May, after a 12-hour truck road march, we arrived in the Los Angeles area. Our initial mission required us to protect critical terrain (malls, stores, checkpoints) so the police could conduct arresting patrols. In our initial staging area, we received our second issue of the Rules of Engagement (ROEs); the rules shown here (Table 1) were passed to each sol-

dier the next day, along with the arming order matrix (Table 2).

The authority to move to a different arming order created a problem. We were required to coordinate with numerous organizations for the order. At times, a conflict developed between our duty to follow the guidelines of these organizations and our duty to make sure our soldiers were safe and had enough time to react to a threat.

On 2 May we were given part of the responsibility for protecting a major mall. As we prepared to go to our guard positions, two shots rang out at