

The detachment's SOP identified PIR as intelligence that must be reported immediately, SIR (special intelligence requirements) as intelligence that the team would report during its next communications window, up to 12 hours later, and OIR (other intelligence requirements) as intelligence the team would report in person at the debriefing at the end of the mission. Although these terms may not have been used doctrinally or conventionally, they caused no confusion in the unit.

Every soldier's ability to identify threat vehicles and aircraft was tested as part of a rigorous program of instruction at the Long Range Surveillance Leaders Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. (See also "Selecting and Training Long Range Surveillance Unit Commanders," by Captain David A. McBride, *INFANTRY Magazine*, July-August 1992, Pages 42-44.) The soldiers kept these skills finely tuned in the desert by looking at hard-copy

surveillance photographs and 35mm slides projected against a tent liner at the company base camp.

Trust. After all of these points had been made, debated, and instituted, the chain of command delegated the execution of its mission to the soldiers of the detachment. The training phase had taken months in a field and garrison environment back in the United States and 12 days of pre-combat rehearsals in Saudi Arabia. Over the next 33 days, a solid, confident trust developed between the soldiers and leaders of the detachment—forged during training and tested in combat, and which resulted in 14 successful combat surveillance missions.

At 1200 hours on Saturday, February 23, two Black Hawk helicopters linked up and performed the unscheduled extraction of Teams 1 and 2. In less than 18 hours, the detachment crossed the berm it had observed for five weeks and, along with the rest of the division,

completed its DESERT STORM mission.

During the next four days, the detachment moved hundreds of miles, conducted bunker and trench clearing operations, destroyed a handful of armored vehicles, and collected dozens of enemy prisoners from the Iraqi Republican Guard.

The men of the 1st Infantry Division's LRSD—whether at the NTC, during EIB competition, on a C-130 over a drop zone at Fort Riley, or in the sands of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—proved their ability to *adapt, improvise, and overcome*.

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Security of the Force

A Commander's Call

CAPTAIN BRUCE H. IRWIN

When rioting broke out in Los Angeles, California, in April 1992, my unit of the California Army National Guard was mobilized to conduct civil defense operations. I had just assumed command of Company B, 2d Battalion, 159th Infantry, in March. On 30 April at 1600, I received notice of the mobilization. By Active Army standards, I had had only four days, or two drills, as the commander.

During two weeks of riot control, certain conflicts developed from incidents that my unit faced; in the process, we learned some lessons. Some of the

incidents during those two weeks may also raise thought-provoking questions for other company commanders as they prepare for future operations of this kind.

At 1600 on Friday, 1 May, after a 12-hour truck road march, we arrived in the Los Angeles area. Our initial mission required us to protect critical terrain (malls, stores, checkpoints) so the police could conduct arresting patrols. In our initial staging area, we received our second issue of the Rules of Engagement (ROEs); the rules shown here (Table 1) were passed to each sol-

dier the next day, along with the arming order matrix (Table 2).

The authority to move to a different arming order created a problem. We were required to coordinate with numerous organizations for the order. At times, a conflict developed between our duty to follow the guidelines of these organizations and our duty to make sure our soldiers were safe and had enough time to react to a threat.

On 2 May we were given part of the responsibility for protecting a major mall. As we prepared to go to our guard positions, two shots rang out at

the end of the parking lot. The shooters escaped. Later, several suspected gang members began driving by, looking at our positions. One group stopped in front of one of our positions and gestured for the soldiers to come to their car; the soldiers ignored them.

The policemen had told us that a gun store several blocks from our positions had been looted and that weapon trading in the local area had been observed. Obviously, the local gangs were well armed. Before this activity, numerous organizations wanted our soldiers at Arming Order 1; now we faced a difficult decision on whether to go to a higher arming order.

Around noon, a car began moving around the perimeter, stopping at many different places—the classic mode of a drive-by shooting, or a reconnaissance for one. At one point, several soldiers aimed their weapons at it. When the police chased the vehicle and pulled it over, the driver turned out to be a man driving around with his family trying to thank the National Guardsmen for being there. He admitted that he was not wise to be driving around our perimeter.

At the same time, my second platoon stood guard at a police checkpoint and conducted roving patrols. During this operation, one squad made four arrests. Apparently, the squad had come across two looters taking two cases of beer. The soldiers detained the two individuals and followed the same procedures as they would in taking enemy prisoners of war. Later, they detained two more people who were trying to take the same two cases of beer. For this operation, Arming Order 1 deserved serious reconsideration.

Saturday evening, the battalion deployed its reserve to guard two fire stations. The reserve consisted of two sections that came under Company B—cooks, mechanics, medics, and staff members. When I was notified, I went to the first station, which had plenty of police and plenty of light. As I went to check the other station, however, I saw all the burned-out buildings and, within a few blocks, no power. (All other vehicles to this point had police escorts.) As I looked at the map and

**SPECIAL ORDERS
FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS**

A. Every serviceman has the right under law to use reasonable and necessary force to defend himself against violent and dangerous personal attack. The limitations described below are not intended to infringe this right, but to prevent the indiscriminate use of force.

B. Force will never be used unless necessary, and then only the minimum force necessary will be used.

- 1. Use non-deadly force to:**
 - a. Control the disturbance.
 - b. Prevent crimes.
 - c. Apprehend or detain persons who have committed crimes.
- 2. Use deadly force only when:**
 - a. Lesser means of force are exhausted or unavailable, *and*
 - b. Risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not significantly increased by the use, *and*
 - c. The purpose of use is one of the following:
 - (1) Self defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm.
 - (2) Prevention of crime involving death or serious bodily harm.
 - (3) Prevention of destruction of public utilities that have been determined vital by the task force commander.

(4) Detention or prevention of escape of persons who present a clear threat of loss of life.

- 3. When possible, the use of deadly force should be preceded by a clear warning that such force is contemplated or imminent.**
- 4. Warning shots are not to be used.**
- 5. When firing, shots will be aimed to wound, if possible, rather than to kill.**
- 6. Weapons will not be fired on automatic.**
- 7. When possible, let civilian police arrest lawbreakers.**
- 8. Allow properly identified news reporters freedom of movement as long as they do not interfere with your mission.**
- 9. Do not talk about this operation or pass information about it to unauthorized persons; refer them to your commander or public affairs officer.**
- 10. Joint task force commander withholds authority for use of riot control agents and sniper teams.**

Table 1

Arming Order	Rifle	Bayonet Scabbard	Bayonet	Pistol	Baton	Ammunition Magazine/Chamber	Control
1	Sling	on belt	Scabbard	holstered	belt	in pouch/empty	OIC/NCOIC
2	Port	on belt	Scabbard	holstered	belt	in pouch/empty	OIC/NCOIC
3	Sling	on belt	Fixed	holstered	hand	in pouch/empty	OIC/NCOIC
4	Port	on belt	Fixed	holstered	hand	in pouch/empty	OIC/NCOIC
5	Port	on belt	Fixed	holstered	hand	in weapon/empty	OIC/NCOIC
6	Port	on belt	Fixed	in hand	bolt	in weapon/locked & loaded	OIC

Table 2

tried to read street signs without lights, a suspected gang vehicle began following us. (One feature of typical gang vehicles was darkened windows.) The vehicle followed mine for about four blocks until both had to stop. The other vehicle pulled alongside us on our driver's side, and a window came down—a pretty good indication that this might be a drive-by shooting. My driver made a quick right turn, and as we drove away the other vehicle remained parked for several minutes. To say that things got

a little tense is an understatement.

On Sunday morning, a problem arose with the firemen, who, along with the paramedics, had received gunfire and threats over the previous days. I spoke with the fire captain and agreed to put National Guardsmen on the fire engine and in the paramedics' ambulance. This improved the firemen's morale considerably, and there were no further incidents.

On Monday, my company assembled to protect a mall south of the sports

arena. The mall had been looted to some extent, but remained intact for the most part. Around midnight—while I was walking the perimeter with my XO and operations NCO—a car went by and stopped out front. The driver's window was opened, and an arm came out with a pistol and fired four rounds in our direction. (Fortunately, the rounds did not land near us.) We let the police know about it, and they caught four youths with a .25 caliber automatic pistol and a starter pistol. The operations NCO identified them and would later testify against them. None of my soldiers returned fire.

Then, while I was talking to a squad leader on the opposite side of the mall, another car with tinted windows went by slowly. As the driver turned around and slowed to a stop about 25 feet from my position, I ordered everyone to take cover. At this point, the driver stopped and began rolling his window down. I ordered everyone to lock and load. The driver must have heard 40 M16 bolts sliding forward with the weapons aiming at him: He yelled, "Camera, I've got a camera!" and quickly drove off. Either he was conducting a reconnaissance mission for a future drive-by shooting, or he was just plain foolish. Obviously, we did not stay at Arming Order 1 in that case.

The only other incident that evening involved soldiers performing observation operations. As part of our protection plan, my platoon leaders had placed snipers on the mall roof. Two of the soldiers were observing a "crack house" where cars were coming and going. Every time one car left, we would hear shots. The soldiers told the police, who then raided the house and confiscated an Uzi machinegun. Staying alert, reporting, and communicating played a major part in this operation.

The next day, the company received a mission to protect another mall. That night, we posted guards in front of the mall with roving patrols to the rear. During one of these patrols, one of my squads saw a truck outside a door and heard the sounds of a possible break-in. The squad leader put one team in over-watch while he and the rest of the squad

moved up from the rear of the vehicle. As the squad leader walked up behind the passenger side of the vehicle to ask the personnel their intentions, he saw a gun in the ash tray. He yelled, "Gun!" and the entire squad surrounded the vehicle. Without any command, a squad from another platoon ran to the aid of the first squad. When I arrived, I saw the squad facing outward and two individuals with slip cuffs against the truck. The platoon leader had already called the police, who then took charge. The question of which arming order was applicable here is a tough call.

The next day, we moved to our final mall position. Around midnight, one of our roving patrols turned a corner as shots rang out, and we thought the worst. Driving to the location, I loaded the reinforcing squad into my vehicle to help the platoon leader and quickly moved to the roving squad's position. When I arrived, the platoon leader deployed his second squad, and I found that the other one had suffered no casualties. No other significant events occurred that evening.

This operation really opened my eyes to the meaning of "command decisions." I had never really thought that being a commander involved issues of this kind. It is never a good situation for a commander when his soldiers either risk injury or face killing someone, especially fellow U.S. citizens.

Overall, the gratitude of families, police, firemen, and other people of Los Angeles made this a worthwhile operation. We learned many lessons:

- Bring everything. We forgot our field sanitation kits and had a serious problem with flies and garbage at one location.

- Squad leaders win conflicts. Twenty percent of my soldiers were combat veterans of Southwest Asia, Panama, or Vietnam, and their experience helped a lot.

- Conduct training using rules of engagement.

- The police and the local populace provided the best intelligence. Additionally, we used local radios to communicate with the police and security personnel.

- Use professional development classes to bolster unit proficiency. Much of my focus and training came from classes on the operations in Panama.

After our initial alert, we began civil defense training within six hours. Requiring platoon certification in the training helped the soldiers focus on the gravity of the situation. As soon as they felt they had trained to standard, I added more difficulty—fixing bayonets, employing snipers, and operating with protective masks. I also had the soldiers perform battle drills.

Upon our arrival at any assigned location during this operation, the platoons used the same procedures dismounting their trucks that they would use dismounting an armored personnel carrier. The soldiers also began squad combat patrols as soon as they arrived at any site. This not only put them in a tactical frame of mind, it also sent a message to any gang members who might be watching. As in other operations the enemy (in whatever form) can be expected to exploit any apparent weakness.

During this operation, I found it important to stay near the troops and to walk the perimeter. Additionally, staying in uniform and using field discipline were just as important here as anywhere else. Under the circumstances, I believe a commander absolutely must know the capabilities of all his soldiers. By the end of this operation, I had a good idea of which soldiers I could count on, although these were not the ideal circumstances in which to test some of them.

Finally, I feel confident that my soldiers and leaders will rise to the call in case of another mobilization.

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