

The sniper squad should be authorized the equipment shown in Table 2. Again, M16A2 rifles and M9 pistols are required, but they must be added to the equipment allowance of the headquarters company.

The current system for requesting changes to an MTOE is lengthy and time-consuming, and it requires

approval at all levels of the Army, but the absence of snipers is an issue that requires more immediate attention. Many infantry professionals may argue with my recommended personnel and equipment lists. But professional debate concerning the composition of light infantry snipers, particularly at the highest levels of the infantry, is the first

step toward revitalizing the sniper program and recognizing the very special men we call "snipers."

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Leadership

The Tenth Principle of War


CAPTAIN RICHARD A. TURNER

FM 100-5 explains that wars are fought and won by men, not by machines, and that the fluid nature of war places a premium on sound leadership. If leadership is as important as we think it is, it needs to be included in our Principles of War.

The Principles of War, from the work of J.F.C. Fuller, are guidelines for our Army to use in conducting warfare. According to Field Manual 100-5, Operations, we adopted these nine Principles of War in 1921 and have revised them only slightly since that time. Given the great importance of leadership in today's Army, and the effectiveness of U.S. leaders throughout history, it is now time for another revision: I propose that *Leadership* be added as the tenth, and most important, principle. I offer evidence, based on two key manuals and two historical examples, to support this proposal:

FM 100-5 identifies leadership as an element of combat power. The leader decides the degree to which maneuver, security, and economy of force are to be emphasized. Leaders also decide the

degree to which the other six Principles of War are to be emphasized. It certainly takes a leader to decide what *Objective* must be taken or how to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative (*Offensive* principle). *Unity of Command* dictates that for



every objective there should be one commander or leader. In fact, all of the principles rely on timely and accurate leadership decisions.

FM 22-100, Military Leadership,

says that our success as an army depends greatly on outstanding leadership. It explains that quality leadership is essential if a nation is to have an army that is ready to fight. This is especially important today, given the wide variety of contingencies for which the Army must be prepared. This manual is devoted to training and developing leaders so our army will be as successful in the future as it has been in the past. This devotion to training leaders is another reason *Leadership* should be included in our Principles of War.

One example of the kind of leadership that can pull victory from the jaws of defeat is from the Battle of Gettysburg. The 20th Maine, commanded by Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain, was ordered to hold Little Round Top at all costs. Colonel Chamberlain had 15 minutes in which to place his regiment in position and did so in an outstanding fashion.

Two Confederate regiments attacked the 20th Maine's position at least six times, inflicting heavy casualties, but were repeatedly repulsed. During a lull

in the battle, Colonel Chamberlain realized his regiment was in dire straits. Out of ammunition and outnumbered following the last assault, he ordered his men to fix bayonets and led a bold assault against the Confederates that took them completely by surprise. The stunned enemy soldiers were defeated and fell back in disarray. The men of the 20th Maine swept their brigade's whole front and wanted to go farther, but Colonel Chamberlain's outstanding skill as a leader allowed him to maintain control of his soldiers and move them back into position.

The outcome of the Battle of Gettysburg and the fate of the United States were determined by many factors in that time but none so telling as the bayonet charge of the 20th Maine. Colonel Chamberlain's leadership allowed his regiment to hold the line and the Union Army to win the battle.

Another example of the importance of leadership to success in battle is our

1991 victory in the Persian Gulf War. Although we faced a numerically superior force that had had months to prepare, we were able to deploy our forces, seize the initiative, and decisively defeat the Iraqi Army. Outstanding leadership at all levels was responsible for that victory.

As one specific example of this success, a young cavalry scout with the 3d Armored Division evacuated the crew and organized a hasty defense after his Bradley was hit by enemy fire. Although he was severely wounded himself, he was able to direct his platoon to his position and still place effective fire on an Iraqi squad.

To include *Leadership* as a Principle of War, we must first understand the term. FM 100-5 states that leadership provides purpose, direction, and motivation in combat; it also describes leadership as the process of influencing others to accomplish a mission. We can combine these two ideas somewhat to

come up with an acceptable definition: *For every military operation, the leader must provide the task, purpose, and motivation.* In order to do this the leader must apply all of the Principles of War, including his ability to influence others to accomplish the mission.

In past wars, our success has always depended on the outstanding leadership displayed by U.S. soldiers at all levels and in all branches. Our future success, given the wide variety of contingencies we must prepare for, will continue to depend on competent leadership. This is why I believe *Leadership* should be our tenth Principle of War.

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Evaluation Reports Whom Do We Really Reward?

MAJOR JOSE M. MARRERO

As military professionals, we all want to be treated fairly at rating time, and our subordinates expect the same. But whom do we really reward in our evaluations and our daily activities? Do we reward the soldiers who most deserve it? What specific traits do we reward? And are we aware that when we reward one subordinate, we send a message to all the others? That message is, "This is how it's done. These are the traits we want to see in this unit."

Let's look at an example:

A captain receives a less than outstanding officer evaluation report (OER) and has trouble understanding why. After all, during the rating period, he made sure the battalion commander saw him in action and saw his company in the best light. He chatted with the colonel, impressed him with astute observations, and joked around with him, all to foster a closer relationship. He took pains to show he was in control of everything. He always had his uni-

form pressed and his boots shined. Who deserved a better rating than he did?

He complained to the colonel, "This is the first time in my military career that I received anything less than outstanding on an OER. You've seen how good my company is. And no one can question my loyalty to you. Every time you asked me to do something, I was there. I came through, whatever it was. You could always count on me."

He was surprised at the colonel's