

BOOK REVIEWS



We have received several Army Center of Military History publications that you should find of considerable interest and value:

• **EBB AND FLOW: NOVEMBER 1950-JULY 1951.** By Billy C. Mossman. *United States Army in the Korean War.* CMH Pub 20-4-1, Softbound, 1990. 551 Pages. GPO S/N 008-029-00211-6, \$28.00. This is a solid, well-done history of the military operations during a critical period in the Korean War, from the time of the Chinese intervention through the period of recovery by the Allied forces under the command of General Matthew Ridgway. It is the third and last volume in the Center's combat operations sub-series.

The author, who was then a U.S. Army officer serving in the Far East as a military historian, concentrates on the events as seen at corps level. But there are times when he drops to the division and even lower levels of operation, such as the 2d Infantry Division's terrible ordeal at Kunu-ri and the Army and Marine operations in northeast Korea near the Chosin Reservoir. His battle descriptions are quite vivid. This volume has been a long time in coming, but we feel it is worth the wait.

• **THE U.S. ARMY GHQ MANEUVERS OF 1941.** By Christopher R. Gabel. CMH Pub 70-41-1, Softbound, 1991. 227 Pages. GPO S/N 008-029-00242-6, \$7.00. The maneuvers in Louisiana and the Carolinas between 15 September and 27 November 1941 were the largest ever conducted by the Army, and they have never been duplicated in size or scope. By the time the maneuvers ended, it was generally agreed they would have considerable effect on the way the Army would be organized to fight in World War II, if it was called on to do so.

The maneuvers also gave the Army's leaders a chance to observe and grade its higher level commanders—division, corps, and army—in action in the field directing large numbers of men and sizable amounts of equipment. It is interesting to note that most of the 42 such commanders were either relieved or reassigned to new commands during 1942 (including 20 of the 27 partici-

pating division commanders). Only 11 of the 42 commanders went on to significant combat commands during the war.

Numerous lessons came out of the maneuvers, and many of them should be of value to today's trainers. Perhaps the major lesson was one that everyone feared—the U.S. Army of late 1941 was not yet well-trained enough or properly equipped to battle a major foe.

• **A SOLDIER SUPPORTING SOLDIERS.** By Lieutenant General (Retired) Joseph M. Heiser, Jr. CMH Pub 70-40-1, Softbound, 1991. 323 Pages. GPO S/N 008-029-00217, \$12.00. This is the second in a series of publications prepared by former senior Army logisticians. This one, like its predecessor by General Carter Magruder (CMH Pub 70-39), offers the author's firsthand experiences on the organization and functioning of combat service support, along with the leadership lessons he wants future logisticians to study.

• **MILITARY POLICE.** Compiled by Robert K. Wright, Jr. *Army Lineage Series.* (CMH Pub 60-9-1, Softbound, 1992. 226 Pages. GPO S/N 008-029-00219-1, no price listed. This volume, a part of the Center's lineage series, contains compact histories of the 109 military police organizations (commands, camps, centers, brigades, groups, and battalions) that are authorized distinctive heraldic devices. Included are the histories of all Regular Army and Army Reserve military police units active between 1962 and 1987, as well as histories of all Army National Guard military police organizations active as of 30 September 1987. The book also has a section of color illustrations of the heraldic items (prepared by the Army's Institute of Heraldry), a bibliography, and a glossary of lineage terms.

• **A GUIDE TO U.S. ARMY MUSEUMS.** By R. Cody Phillips. CMH Pub 70-51, Softbound, 1992. 118 Pages. No S/N or price listed. This guidebook updates two previous publications, the last printed in 1975. Its format makes it easy to use, and each entry contains the basic information a person needs to determine a museum's theme and collection, its location, and

the programs and services it offers. (The National Infantry Museum's listing is on pages 38 and 39.) The user should note that the guidebook has information about both museums and historical holding sites, the latter being activities with fewer resources and public programs, and about Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard museums and historical holding sites. The Center has not included any mention of facilities that are closing or those that may not be accessible to the public in the immediate future.

Finally, you should get the Center's latest index of its publications: **PUBLICATIONS OF THE U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY.** Compiled by Wyvetra B. Yeldell. CMH Pub 105-2, Softbound, 1992. 72 Pages. No S/N or price listed. It is available to Army publication account holders from the Baltimore publications distribution center. Information about its availability can also be obtained from the U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-ZBP, Washington, DC 20374-5088. The brochure offers a comprehensive listing of all the Center's current titles and of other titles for which the Center is responsible.

THUNDERBOLT: GENERAL CREIGHTON ABRAMS AND THE ARMY OF HIS TIMES. By Lewis Sorley. Simon & Schuster, 1992. 384 Pages. \$25.00. Reviewed by Major General Albert H. Smith, Jr., U.S. Army Retired.

Readers of this long-awaited biography must reach one basic conclusion from it: Creighton Abrams was the best kind of military leader our Army can produce. Without doubt, he will be remembered as a great and good man.

Sorley's absorbing book follows Abrams' advancement from high school success through West Point graduation and service in three wars to his final job as Chief of Staff of the Army. At the same time, it provides a military oriented view of American history from 1932 through 1974.

While the narrative focuses on Abrams' military achievements, it also reveals a lov-

ing husband and a caring father. He married Julie Harvey following graduation, and the two formed a team that came to be admired and respected throughout the Army. Her strength of character matched his, as did her integrity, intelligence, and sense of self. Their enduring mutual trust and dependence provided bedrock support throughout his life.

This book is based on what his superiors, subordinates, and peers thought of Abrams during his 38 years of service to his country. Their recollections, anecdotes, and quotations show a fearless warrior, a remarkably capable administrator, and a leader who inspired confidence in young soldiers—and who never forgot their needs. He was a man of unquestioned integrity and high intelligence whose honest evaluations were important to three Presidents—Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon.

During World War II, General George S. Patton, Jr., described Abrams as the world's champion tank commander. Later, during the Vietnam War era, Sir Robert Thompson (a noted British analyst) called him the greatest American general since Ulysses Grant. To the men of the 37th Tank Battalion, he was the bravest of the brave.

Combat veterans of World War II—and, for that matter, our soldiers of today—will especially enjoy Chapters 3, 4, and 5. These chapters tell how Abrams' 37th Tank Battalion led the 4th Armored Division and Patton's Third Army across France and Belgium into the heart of Germany—and finally to Czechoslovakia. The actions in which they defeated determined, numerically superior German forces along that road to ultimate victory are described in vivid detail by the soldiers who fought for and with Abrams. He was their peerless leader, their key to victory and survival on the battlefield. They would follow him anywhere.

Chapters 6 to 12 cover the Abrams story from July 1945 until he was named Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and promoted to General in September 1964: He graduated from the Army War College in 1953, and was successively Chief of Staff of I, X, and IX Corps, U.S. Army, in Korea. His first star came in February 1956; his second, June 1960; and his third, August 1963. He commanded the 3d Armored Division, 1959-1960, and V Corps in Germany, 1963-1964.

While assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 1962-1963, Major General Abrams played a vital role in resolving the civil rights crises of that era. He was sent by the Chief of Staff

to Oxford, Mississippi, in 1962 and to Birmingham and Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in 1963 to be his eyes and ears on the ground and to make any immediate decisions that were required regarding the employment of Army troops. After Tuscaloosa, Robert Kennedy wrote to Secretary Vance expressing high regard for General Abrams and appreciation for his competence, patience, and advice. Abrams had served his President well during very difficult times.

From mid-1964 (when he became Vice Chief of Staff) until he was nominated in June 1972 to be the Army's next Chief of Staff, Abrams devoted all his energies to preparing for and fighting the Vietnam War. Lewis Sorley devotes 155 pages to telling that story—of what happened in Washington and Vietnam during those eight turbulent years. Once again, using eye-witness accounts to fill in the details, the author provides a fascinating text that takes the reader from Abrams' headquarters in Saigon to remote outposts, to critical areas of the combat zone, to meetings with the President and his National Security Council and to a hundred other locations where the presence of the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) was needed.

Despite decreasing support from the homefront and ever-changing missions from the White House, Abrams knew he could get the job done. His determination and confidence remained steady and inspired all those under his command to do their best. He almost succeeded in making Vietnamization work, and that singular accomplishment enabled him to execute a most difficult phased withdrawal of American forces. Unfortunately, he was a successful supreme commander in an unwinnable war.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird persuaded President Nixon to appoint Abrams Chief of Staff of the Army because, "the Army needed a leader like Abe at the helm." Two years later, as a result of his inspiring leadership, the Army had largely recovered its pride and professionalism. Sadly, for all Americans—especially those in uniform—this great man died on 4 September 1974.

The author is to be congratulated on a superb historical work. He also deserves a special salute for the wonderful photographic summary of Abrams' military career found at the book's center. His well-organized acknowledgments, notes, selected bibliography, and other sources, plus a fine index, will assist all those who use the book as a basic reference.

Finally, I agree with the enthusiastic reac-

tion of General John Galvin (former NATO commander). "A book that must be read—and not just by soldiers!"

A FROZEN HELL, by William R. Trotter. Algonquin Books, 1991. 283 Pages. \$22.95. Reviewed by Major Michael R. Jacobson, United States Army Reserve.

This excellent book covering the Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940 is one that all light infantrymen, sappers, and 6th Infantry Division personnel should read. It discusses how a small, well-trained, well-motivated, and well-led Finnish Army defended against a larger, better-equipped Russian Army.

The Finnish Army demonstrated that leadership, training, and defending their homeland were the factors that enabled their soldiers to defeat a numerically superior and much better-equipped Army.

The book covers the small-unit level and the relationship between the military and foreign policy. This war is not normally studied, sandwiched as it was between the invasions of Poland and the invasion of Norway and Denmark, but it is worth studying.

CRUEL APRIL: THE FALL OF SAIGON. By Olivier Todd. W.W. Norton, 1991. 470 Pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

Olivier Todd was a leftist French Journalist when he covered the Vietnam War from 1965-1973. But the agony of the Vietnamese under "the red fascists, the Prussians of Asia," since 1975 transformed his perspectives. He now believes that if the United States had been able to preserve South Vietnam, the worldwide anticommunist revolution today would be sweeping away the evil regime in Hanoi. He says that the American withdrawal, or defeat, postponed an inevitable democratic process in Indochina, but the forces of true Vietnamese democratic liberation will ultimately prevail.

His book is the most detailed account now available on the final four months in the spring of 1975 when North Vietnam took over the South. The collection of portraits of the American and Vietnamese who played roles in this sad drama is poignant, a saga of the collapse of a small nation and the inability of a great power to respond. Todd provides abundant evidence to challenge most of the sterile clichés about the South Vietnamese in the final days, and makes it impossible to dismiss them easily as Americans tended to do. The book is a

revealing and disturbing account.

Originally published in French in 1987, this volume suffers some in translation. The use of present tense throughout is awkward at times. Despite these minor flaws, though, it is a fascinating book that demands attention.

UNDERSTANDING DEFEAT: HOW TO RECOVER FROM LOSS IN BATTLE TO GAIN VICTORY IN WAR. By Colonel T.N. Dupuy. Paragon House, 1990. 312 Pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Cole C. Kingsseed.

This book is Trevor Dupuy's latest attempt to compel military planners and their supporting analysts to understand the factors that contribute to success, as well as defeat, on the battlefield. His underlying assumption is that a nation that understands defeat in battle is more likely to avoid it, or, if it is unavoidable, at least mitigate its consequences. To support his thesis, Dupuy uses examples of history's great captains and applies scientific analysis to show how defeat can be turned into success.

The author, a career officer and respected military theorist, proposes that the causes of defeat fall into three general categories: unfavorable circumstances beyond the control of a commander, unfavorable circumstances a commander may influence, and the failure of command. Dupuy also makes some interesting observations: The acknowledgement of defeat does not frequently appear to have been caused by the number of casualties; moreover, the outcome of war more likely depends on other considerations than on the mere fact of who won the first battle, particularly if the war lasts more than one year.

On the debit side, this book contains numerous facts that are superfluous at best and contribute little to the author's basic thesis. Is it important, for example, that Eugene of Savoy had only a 50 percent success rate against French generals whose names began with V? Other conclusions are highly questionable, such as that Robert E. Lee's loss at Gettysburg was chiefly due to the overwhelming numbers of his antagonist.

Unfortunately, the book offers little that is new to the reader's comprehension of transforming defeat into victory. Aside from identifying certain commanders whose tenacity and perseverance converted initial setbacks into ultimate victories, the author fails to identify other factors that convincingly support his thesis. Computer pro-

grammers and war game enthusiasts will find the appendix outlining simulation of defeat entertaining, but this book does not measure up to the author's former works.

FROM PUSAN TO PANMUNJOM. By General Paik Sun Yup. Translation by Bruce K. Grant. Brassey's (US), Inc., 1992. 254 Pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Snedeker, United States Army Retired.

On Sunday, 25 June 1950, Colonel Paik Sun Yup was commander of the Army of the 1st Republic of Korea (ROK) Infantry Division. As he says in the preface of this book, he is "one of the few soldiers left alive who spent the three years, one month, two days, and seventeen hours of the Korean War, from the beginning of the Sunday invasion until the armistice in 1953, as a field commander in the lines." In typical understatement, he adds, "I hope, then, that this book will add in some small way to the literatures of the war and of the Korean Army."

This is not just another book about the Korean War, or just another memoir by an eyewitness. One word characterizes what is unique about it—*perspective*. The story is told through Korean eyes and a Confucian temperament.

Paik served in a series of unique and important positions. He commanded the 1st ROK Division from north of Seoul through the disastrous retreat to the Pusan Perimeter, then in the victorious attack back north, then once again south as the Chinese intervened. In April 1951 he was promoted and became the commander of the I (ROK) Corps, the only major non-U.S. unit responsible for its own defensive sector. While serving as corps commander, he was also selected to be the sole ROK representative to the armistice talks with the North Koreans and the Chinese. Still later, he was twice selected to serve as the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army.

The details of his successes and failures are fascinating, and often incredible. For example, his 7,000-man force—composed of the remnants of two divisions "fresh" from a 200-mile retreat, with only 15 105mm howitzers for fire support, and without a military map of its defensive area—was required to defend a 25-mile wide sector at the critical juncture of American and ROK forces on the Pusan Perimeter, opposed by a North Korean force three times stronger in manpower and ten times stronger in firepower—and all this with a

29-year-old brigadier general.

Paik's narrative is straightforward, nonsense, and honest. From his description of the pleasures and difficulties of conducting coalition warfare with Americans, to his evaluations of his own subordinates, contemporaries, and superiors—including President Syngman Rhee and a host of American generals from MacArthur to Ridgway to Van Fleet—he pulls no punches. He is as generous or as critical in discussing others as he is discussing himself.

It is Paik's relation of events in the perspective of Korean history—not American history—that makes this book required reading. Bruce K. Grant's translation from the original Korean is masterful; it gives the reader not only a sense of Korean history but also of Korean ancestry, culture, religion, and tradition. One example will illustrate this point:

In October 1950 the United Nations Command had crossed the 38th parallel and was closing on the North Korean capital of Pyongyang—which Paik had fled earlier as a refugee. The original plan was to have the two American divisions of I (U.S.) Corps attack and seize the town, but Paik explained *his* plan to liberate *his* hometown—a plan patterned on the successful Japanese attack on the same city during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. After convincing the I Corps commander to include the ROK 1st Division in the attack, Paik melded Korean and American cultures by executing his battle plan "Patton's way." His own words best describe the result: *The youthful, homeless refugee who had fled North Korea only five years before was now returning as a general officer at the head of fifteen thousand American and Korean troops poised to capture his own home.... No words can convey the emotions that swept me.... The sight of the ROK 1st Division in assault was the grandest panorama I shall behold in my lifetime. No spectacle in a Hollywood war movie could run even a close second to the reality of our charge. A western general might have left it at that, but not a general raised in the ways of Confucius: I knew, of course, that collateral damage was unavoidable during combat in an urban area, but if I were to destroy cultural monuments deliberately in my hometown, future generations would scorn me forever.*

In short, read this book. You will be a better soldier for the effort.

HAIG'S COMMAND: A REASSESSMENT. By Denis Winter. Viking, 1991.

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362 Pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Major Harold E. Raugh, Jr., United States Army.

The controversy surrounding the performance of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig as Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force during World War I began even before the last shots were fired in 1918. This most recent salvo further damages Haig's reputation and also calls into question the credibility of Britain's official war histories.

Denis Winter, the author of two previous books on Great War topics, dissects Haig's military career, focusing on his performance during the cataclysmic campaigns of 1916, 1917, and 1918. Using mainly official Australian and Canadian military documents—many of which include much fuller and more detailed accounts of events than documents in Great Britain (if they still exist)—the author has shown that "Haig...systematically falsified the record of his military career," especially by re-writing his diary for publication after the war to justify his own version of events. In addition, Winter demonstrates that the British official history of the war was distorted purposely and methodically, and that documents that would have revealed weaknesses and criticisms of the higher direction of the war have been destroyed.

Four dozen superb photographs and nine well-drawn maps enhance the text. Thirty-eight pages of biographical sketches of leading participants in the study are especially welcome. The first appendix, "Sources Used: An Evaluation," is generally interesting, although the locations of some of the listed manuscript sources are inaccurate. The second appendix, "Haig: A Political Intriguer?" is much more problematic and speculative, which detracts from the author's research and assessment of the source material's reliability.

Nonetheless, Winter's book confirms many of the actions and traits that had been suspected about Haig and his self-serving role in bending history. Perhaps of greater significance is the lesson that official war histories should be honest, accurate, and critical. The success of a future conflict may depend upon an official historian's candid and objective spadework.

MOSBY'S RANGERS. By Jeffrey D. Wert. Simon and Schuster, 1990. 384 Pages. \$22.95. Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, United States Air Force.

One of the most famous of Confederate cavalry leaders was Colonel John S. Mosby.

Although his story has been told several times before, this book is the first attempt to provide an objective history of him and those who served with him in Mosby's Rangers (in the author's words, "to tell their story frankly and without the veneer of romance....").

Mosby began his military service to the South in 1861 as a junior enlisted man until General J.E.B. Stuart noticed his talent and boldness, which led to Mosby's selection for increased rank and responsibility. This book deals principally with the 28-month period from early 1863 to the war's end when Mosby operated his unit, the 43d Battalion of Virginia Cavalry, as an independent command.

Mosby and the 1,900 men who served with him between 1863 and 1865 operated largely in the Virginia counties of Fauquier and Loudoun, an area of 125 square miles widely known as "Mosby's Confederacy." While Mosby was also active in the 1864 Shenandoah campaign and the earlier Maryland and Pennsylvania campaigns, it was primarily within the confines of this "Confederacy" that his units operated.

Beginning in January 1863 with a company of 15 men, Mosby eventually commanded a regiment with two battalions of eight companies. While their successes and failures varied from month to month, Mosby's Rangers were mainly effective in harassing Union troop concentrations, railroads, and supply depots. They also captured some senior Union leaders during audacious night raids. It was largely due to popular support for Mosby among the civilians in his area of operations that he was so consistently successful and able to escape defeat from increasingly stronger Federal cavalry opposition.

Wert brings to this book an in-depth knowledge of Mosby and the Virginia campaigns, building on his earlier book, *From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864*. This latest volume succeeds in presenting a comprehensive analysis of this Confederate partisan ranger unit and a good study of unconventional warfare in this one sector of Civil War military operations.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE: LESSONS TO APPLY IN STRUCTURING TOMORROW'S ARMY. Prepared by the National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. Government Accounting Office, 1990. GAO/NSIAD-91-3. 62 Pages. USGAO (P.O. Box 6015, Gaithersburg, MD 20877). \$2.00, Softbound.

RE-ENTRY: HOW TO TURN YOUR MILITARY EXPERIENCE INTO CIVILIAN SUCCESS. Second Edition. By Keith O. Nymann. Stackpole Books, 1990. 192 Pages. \$13.95.

OFFICER CANDIDATE TESTS. Second Edition. By Solomon Weiner. ARCO-Prentice Hall Press, 1990. 402 Pages. \$15.95.

THE U.S. NAVY: A HISTORY. By Nathan Miller. A Quill Book. Morrow, 1990. 308 Pages. \$10.95.

THE DAY THE CHINESE ATTACKED: KOREA, 1950. By Edwin P. Hoyt. McGraw-Hill, 1990. 255 Pages. \$19.95.

THE COMPLETE AR-15/M16 SOURCEBOOK: WHAT EVERY SHOOTER NEEDS TO KNOW. By Duncan Long. Paladin Press, 1992. 224 Pages.

SWORD OVER RICHMOND. By Richard Wheeler. HarperCollins, 1991. 371 Pages. \$10.95, Softbound. (First published in hardcover in 1986.)

WITNESS TO APPOMATTOX. By Richard Wheeler. HarperCollins, 1991. 255 Pages. \$10.95, Softbound. (First published in hardcover in 1989.)

GENERATIONS: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA'S FUTURE, FROM 1584-2069. By William Strauss and Neil Howe. Morrow, 1991. 538 Pages. \$22.95.

AN UNCERTAIN HOUR: THE FRENCH, THE GERMANS, THE JEWS, THE KLAUS BARBIE TRAIL, AND THE CITY OF LYON. By Ted Morgan. Morrow, 1990. 416 Pages. \$21.95.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1990s. By Harold R. Moroz. Carlton Press (11 W. 32 Street, New York, NY 10001). \$12.95.

SOLDIER'S STUDY GUIDE: HOW TO PREPARE FOR PROMOTION BOARDS AND ADVANCEMENT. By Command Sergeant Major Walter J. Jackson. Stackpole Books, 1990. 128 Pages. \$13.50.

PERESTROIKA ANNUAL: VOLUME 2. By Abel G. Aganbegyan. Brassey's (US), 1990. 312 Pages. \$23.95.

AIRWARS AND AIRCRAFT: A DETAILED RECORD OF AIR COMBAT, 1945 TO PRESENT. By Victor Flintham. Facts on File, 1990. 424 Pages. \$40.00.

YAMAMOTO: THE MAN WHO PLANNED PEARL HARBOR. By Edwin P. Hoyt. McGraw-Hill, 1990. 281 Pages. \$19.95.

