

INFANTRY LETTERS



MORTAR SMART MUNITIONS

I want to comment on Mr. Earl W. Rubright's letter (INFANTRY, September-October 1992, page 3) in response to Major Christopher A. Collins' article, "Mortar Employment" (March-April 1992, pages 15-19) concerning the "smart" and "guided" mortar rounds proposed for a contingency force.

Mr. Rubright contradicts the doctrine on the employment of mortars to "defeat dismounted forces... [and] for suppression of combat vehicles" (Field Manual 6-20). The current heavy and medium mortars are not optimized for the close fight (0-500 meters) due to weapon system errors. The U.S. Central Command's goal of reducing airlift tonnage is admirable, but adding an antiarmor capability changes the wrong part of the effectiveness equation and may not achieve the desired results. Providing a "smart" ammunition is not as effective a solution as it appears. The "guided" element adds to system cost, could adversely affect operations, and implies a weight burden that is not noted in Mr. Rubright's letter. The unit cost alone would be prohibitive.

A better way to add effectiveness is to improve weapon accuracy; this could indirectly result in reduced ammunition lift tonnage. Colonel Robert Stiles, former chief of staff at the Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill, noted after the Gulf War that "the greatest advantage possessed by the U.S. artillery [in that war] was the ability to achieve a first-round kill at great ranges with conventional 'dumb' artillery projectiles."

There are improvements in Phase 1 of the program plan for weapon position/location and fire control computation (as noted in INFANTRY, May-June 1992, p. 5). Target location and kill radius need fixing to maximize conventional ammunition. Phase 2 of the plan in-

cludes improvements in munition accuracy, effectiveness, range, and lethality.

The writer of the letter is advocating putting "old wine in a new bottle." Similar approaches were considered in the mid-1980s to strengthen the light forces in a "forced entry" scenario. Then a need for "attack of armor formations... beyond the FLOT, at higher rates of engagement, and with better accuracy and lethality" was stated. (See *Organizational and Operational Plan, Guided Antiarmor Mortar Projectile (GAMP)*). For reasons that are even more valid now, the smart-GAMP was terminated in 1985. (Like the rounds now being looked at, GAMP was also a fire and forget round.) The principal motive for ending GAMP in 1985, and for ending a "smart" mortar projectile now, are the same—affordability. If we stopped work on a "smart" mortar round during a time of relatively big budgets—a round that was for use against masses of Warsaw Pact armor—how can such a round be judged cost effective now?

Concerns over fratricide and the proliferation of other antiarmor killers weighed in the decision. In 1985 we didn't have the benefit of the advanced smart or precision ammunition we now have, such as TOW IIA/B, Copperhead, sense and destroy armor (SADARM) antitank submunition system, and AT-4+ or Javelin. There are several other funded antiarmor items that will better add to a light force deterrence and that should be fielded well ahead of a "smart" mortar round. These include the armored gun system (AGS), extended range rocket for the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), fiber optic guidance (FOG), 105mm rocket assisted projectile (RAP), and dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM). Should we take funds from these projects for a "smart" mortar round?

It will take ten years to field a "smart"

or "guided" mortar round and the necessary life cycle support elements. The Army's plan for a foreign comparative test of the seeker/sensors supported by Central Command is a good first step to baseline performance and data for future use. This test, however, should be amended to include other available improved rounds for evaluation and comparison.

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TENTH PRINCIPLE OF WAR: LEADERSHIP OR MORALE?

I wish to respond to Captain Richard A. Turner's article on leadership (INFANTRY, January-February 1993, page 7-8).

This article would certainly interest Colonel Thomas B. Vaughn (U.S. Army Retired). His article "MORALE: The 10th Principle of War?" appears in *Military Review*, May 1983.

Captain Turner concludes that leadership is the tenth and most important principle of war. Colonel Vaughn also argues forcefully that morale is the tenth principle. Both find that their prospective tenth principle is an essential element of combat power. If we agree that combat power decides the outcome of battles, from squad contacts to campaigns, then Captain Turner has resurrected an interesting argument.

Field Manual 100-1, *Leadership* (page 9), tells us that the Army has distilled the nine principles of war through long experience while recognizing the continuing challenge to maintain appropriate doctrine. The U.S. Joint Staff Officers Guide 1991, AFSC PUB 1, pages 1-3, lists 12 principles, adding *timing and tempo, logistics, and cohesion*.

The existing nine principles of war

detailed in FM 100-5 are therefore not immutable—unless Army doctrine is to be at variance with joint service doctrine.

U.S. Army doctrine is leadership intensive. Along with FM 100-5, FM series 22-100, 22-101, 22-102, 22-103 and FM 25-100 testify to this. Whether we argue for *morale* as a function of leadership or for *leadership* itself, it appears there is justification for one more principle.

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OPERATIONS RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM

The U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity is sponsoring the Thirty-Second Annual U.S. Army Operations Research Symposium to be held at Fort Lee, Virginia, on 13 and 14 October 1993. Attendance will be limited to invited observers and participants.

The theme of this year's symposium is "The Expanding Role of Modeling and Simulation in Military Operations Research." Papers are being solicited that address this theme; selected papers and presentations will be published in the proceedings.

Anyone who wants additional information should write to Director, U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, ATTN: AMXSU-DA, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5071; or call DSN 298-6576, commercial (410) 278-3580.

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LRSO ISOLATION BRIEFBACK PROCEDURE

I would like to respond to Captain John A. Schatzel's excellent article "LRSO: Adapt, Improve, and Overcome" (INFANTRY, January-February 1993, pages 38-41). I take exception to one point he makes concerning briefbacks.

When I served as the S-3 for plans and later as the isolation area director for the 10th Special Forces Group, then consisting of 54 teams, we used an isolation briefback procedure that Captain Schatzel and other LRSO commanders may wish to consider.

At the briefback, we required every team member to brief the group commander without notes. (Each had a specific area of responsibility, as the captain recommends). Everything was memorized. The map used for the briefing was blank, and such details as the infiltra-

tion point, hide site, routes, and exfiltration point were briefed from memory.

Also, the group commander might call on any team member to brief any other member's area of responsibility. As a result, all members knew *all* phases of the team's operation—everything was cross-walked and coordinated—and not just their own areas. Impossible, you say? Not at all. Each man on the team *should* have his area of expertise, but he *must* know all portions of the operations order.

This idea was not original with us. We got it from our British Allies.

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REUNION OF 1st DIVISION

The Society of the First Division (Big Red One) will hold its 75th annual reunion 28 July to 1 August 1993 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The society is composed of soldiers who served in World War I, World War II, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and in peacetime.

For further information, anyone who is interested may write to me at 5 Montgomery Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19118, or call (215) 836-4841.

ARTHUR L. CHAITT
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