

TRAINING NOTES



Infantry Gunnery Training Program

STAFF SERGEANT PHILIP R. ALBERT

Despite any technological advantage our armed forces may have over an enemy, success still hinges on the actions of rifle squads and platoons in close combat—on their ability to react to contact, employ effective suppressive fires, maneuver to a vulnerable flank, and fight through to destroy or capture the enemy. Our infantry rifle forces—including airborne, air assault, Ranger, light infantry, and dismounted Bradley infantry—therefore have a critical need to sustain their gunnery proficiency.

The infantry training environment must be realistic and demanding, and the training must challenge soldiers to master all infantry tasks, both individual and collective. It must also constantly remind them of their mission and the physical and mental toughness that is required of them.

The Berlin Brigade has developed a new concept in infantry marksmanship training called the Infantry Gunnery Training Program. The program—now being tested and implemented in the brigade as well as in the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry in Italy—is cohesive and progressive, similar to tank and Bradley gunnery. The gunnery tables have specific training events and gates that take infantrymen from individual weapon

familiarization to a platoon live-fire maneuver exercise.

A key component of the gunnery program is the squad engagement training system (SETS). SETS is a multipurpose device designed to support the indoor training of squad-sized units on basic and advanced rifle marksmanship as well as fundamental tactical engagement skills. The device uses the latest in videodisc-based, synchronized wide-screen image projection, hit detection laser and micro-computer technology to provide a variety of target arrays; courses of fire (including several qualification courses); and tactical engagement exercises.

Once an exercise is selected, SETS displays proportionately correct targets on a screen. These targets are engaged with laser fitted, modified M16A2 rifles, M249 and M60 machineguns, and M203 grenade launchers that provide the recoil and sound of weapons firing live ammunition. SETS provides both on-screen and printed feedback for evaluation and after-action review.

Table I, Preliminary and Basic Marksmanship Instruction. This table provides infantrymen with preliminary and basic marksmanship instruction on the M16 rifle, M203 grenade launcher, M9 pistol, AT4 light antiarmor weapon,

M47 Dragon, and M249, M60, and M2 (.50 caliber) machineguns. The trainers include team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon sergeants. Rifle training includes shot grouping and zeroing and incorporates the use of the Weaponeer training device. Machinegun basic marksmanship instruction includes preparatory training, 10-meter and field zeros, and a basic live-fire course.

Table II, Rifle Qualification. This table helps small-unit infantry leaders produce infantrymen who qualify expert on their assigned weapons. Rifle qualification is conducted on an Army standard 300-meter pop-up record fire range and includes firing in chemical protective gear and at night. Machinegun qualification includes 10-meter and transition range qualification as well as firing in protective gear and at night.

Table III, Advanced Marksmanship Instruction. This advanced instruction—led by small-unit infantry leaders—consists of tactical marksmanship training and field target firing courses. The goal is for infantrymen to apply the fundamentals they have learned to acquire, engage, and hit targets in a tactical environment. During periods of both good and limited visibility, infantrymen engage target arrays depicting the



enemy formations they may confront on a battlefield.

Table IV, Fire Team Practice Qualification. This practice qualification, using SETS, provides the initial link between individual and collective tasks. The goal is to develop fire team leaders, refine individual skills, and practice collective battle drills to build an aggressive and capable infantry fire team. This table, which consists of day, night, and NBC phases, evaluates a fire team's ability to hit stationary and moving targets.

Table V, Fire Team Qualification. This qualification uses a scaled 50-meter live-fire range. The goal is to produce a qualified and combat-ready infantry fire team that has refined and integrated individual tasks, collective battle tasks, and infantry leader skills. Table V also evaluates a fire team's ability to conduct tactical operations such as *prepare for combat, move tactically, maintain operation-*

al security, attack, defend, react to NBC attack, and consolidate and reorganize.

The AT4 is incorporated into this event using the 9mm subcaliber tracer round and stationary and moving scaled armored vehicles.

Table VI, Squad Practice Qualification Using SETS. This qualification uses SETS to develop squad and fire team leaders, refine individual gunnery skills, and practice squad battle drills to build an aggressive and capable infantry squad. This table, which consists of day, night, and NBC phases, evaluates a rifle squad's proficiency in emplacing weapons, designating sectors, executing fire commands, and engaging stationary and moving targets.

Table VII, Squad Practice Qualification on Scaled 50-meter Live-fire Range. The goal of the table is to produce a qualified and combat-ready infantry squad that has refined and integrat-

ed leader warfighting skills, individual tasks, and squad battle drills. This table evaluates a squad's proficiency in both gunnery and maneuver tasks such as *prepare for combat, move tactically, maintain operational security, attack, defend, react to NBC attack, and consolidate and reorganize.* The AT4 light antitank weapon is incorporated into this event using the 9mm subcaliber tracer round and stationary and moving scaled armored vehicles.

Table VIII, Squad Qualification Gate. This qualification gate, conducted on a live-fire maneuver range, combines gunnery and maneuver and evaluates a squad's proficiency in conducting selected live fire tasks. Also evaluated are ARTEP-MTP tasks such as *prepare for combat, move tactically, cross a danger area, maintain operational security, and consolidate and reorganize.*

Tables IX and X are being developed as a scout platoon practice qualification and live-fire qualification.

Table XI, Platoon Practice Qualification. This table is designed to evaluate a rifle platoon's ability to successfully complete selected ARTEP-MTP tasks using a force-on-force opposing force (OPFOR) scenario and MILES equipment. The goal of this table is to refine the skills of the platoon leader as well as the squad and fire team leaders, validate platoon drills and SOPs, refine individual warfighting skills, and incorporate M60 machineguns and Dragons to build an aggressive and combat-ready infantry platoon.

Table XII, Platoon Qualification. This is the culminating event of the infantry gunnery training program. It combines gunnery and maneuver on a live-fire range and is designed to evaluate a platoon's proficiency in conducting selected ARTEP-MTP tasks. The goal is to evaluate small-unit leader skills, platoon drills, individual and crew-served gunnery, and selected tactical ARTEP-MTP tasks.

A key component of the gunnery training program concept is the infantry master gunner. He is the subject matter expert on all organic infantry battalion weapons and the commander's primary

advisor on all aspects of gunnery training, ranging from individual weapon proficiency to the platoon live-fire exercise of Table XII. Like the master gunners in tank and Bradley units, infantry master gunners are found at company,

battalion, and brigade levels.

The infantry gunnery tables provide the cohesive and progressive training program that is needed to sustain the proficiency of infantry units and ensure their combat readiness.

Staff Sergeant Philip R. Albert is an assistant operations sergeant in the 5th Battalion, 502d Infantry, Berlin Brigade. He has served as an infantry squad leader, a Bradley platoon sergeant, and a scout squad leader and platoon sergeant. He is now attending the University of Maryland.

Using Deception Techniques

CAPTAIN EDWARD R. WARD

The 82d Airborne Division recently completed an exercise in the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), in which commanders successfully used deception to gain a significant advantage over the opposing force (OPFOR). Although this was a computer exercise for corps, division, and brigade staffs, the lessons learned from it can also be applied to any size unit and to real-world tactical situations.

During the BCTP Warfighters simulation, a commander meets an opposing force (OPFOR) that is as dangerous an opponent as he would face at any of the maneuver training centers. Like the OPFOR at the National Training Center or the Joint Readiness Training Center, this OPFOR intimately knows the terrain and the best way to fight on it. Since the BCTP OPFOR is a free-play, thinking enemy, however, he can be deceived. Deception can paralyze his command and control functions and cause him to misplace his assets.

Along with the 82d Division staff elements, other participants in this exercise were the staffs of the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82d Division's three brigades plus the 194th Armored Brigade (Separate). The 101st Airborne Division was played notionally.

The XVIII Corps deception plan was to make it appear that the 82d Airborne Division was the main corps effort in the attack. To accomplish this, the 101st

Division launched the main attack 24 hours after the 82d Division. During that 24-hour period, the 82d had priority of corps assets.

The 82d Division's deception plan not only supported the corps plan but went beyond it by implementing a division-level plan to deceive the OPFOR as to the planned location of the division's main attack. The 82d Division wanted the OPFOR to believe the main attack would be in the 2d Brigade sector in the west, when the actual main attack was in the 3d Brigade sector in the east.

The 82d built its deception plan by stacking the 194th Brigade behind the 2d Brigade. The division weighted the artillery in the 2d Brigade sector and gave the 2d Brigade priority of fires during the reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance fight. The 194th Brigade had units under the operational control of the division's 2d Brigade. The division positioned bridging assets in the west for a river crossing operation in support of the 194th Brigade. The division used most of the assets it received from corps in support of the 2d Brigade, especially during those first 24 hours. The division deception cell constructed a fake artillery battery and a fake tank company in the 2d Brigade sector. The 82d Division also attempted to conceal the location of its 3d Brigade by having the brigade's soldiers wear 101st Airborne Division patches and paint 101st Airborne Divi-

sion bumper numbers on their vehicles.

As the division began the main attack, the 194th Brigade moved east behind the 3d Brigade at H-plus-4 and assumed the main attack at H-plus-8. Additionally, the division deception plan called for a deceptive battalion-sized air drop at H-plus-3 to delay the commitment of mechanized reserves.

The division's plan to show the main attack in the 2d Brigade sector in the west was very successful; that is where the OPFOR templated the attack. The terrain in the west best supported the movement of a heavy armored force, chiefly because the only large main supply route (MSR) in the division sector was to the west. The OPFOR was looking for the positions of the 194th Armored Brigade and of the artillery as indicators of where the main attack would occur.

The first 48 hours of the fight was the reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance battle. The OPFOR located the 194th Brigade through communications intelligence interception and direction finding and a small number of human intelligence contacts. The OPFOR came into contact with the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, at the line of contact and saw the rest of the 194th Brigade behind the battalion. The OPFOR also saw the vast majority of the artillery positioned to support the 2d Brigade in the west, which helped convince the OPFOR commander that the division's main attack would