

Billeting and staging soon became a problem for armories near the action during the riots. At one point, my headquarters armory—which was never built to house troops—held more than 600 soldiers, and this was a real challenge for a building with seven toilets and five showers. One solution to this problem would be to pre-position portable toilets and showers, or at least to include them in contingency planning.

Another issue is the security of the armories themselves. Consideration must be given to upgrading fencing and security systems, pre-stocking barrier materials, and installing exterior lighting.

As part of contingency planning, additional civilian facilities such as schools, sports complexes, and similar structures should be identified and evaluated for possible future use, with particular attention to cooking, latrine, and shower facilities, as well as any special security

considerations. Given the problems with telephone facilities during the riots, the telephone capability of each location needs to be assessed and plans for emergency augmentation coordinated with the telephone companies involved.

In the recent past, California has experienced many natural and man-made disasters, and the need for detailed, integrated planning exercises and readiness tests is self-evident. In such disasters as the riots, the greatest threat is complacency; careful preparedness is the only way to prevent such a devastating loss of life and property in the future—not just in California but anywhere in the country.

The California Army National Guard and its 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry, can be justly proud of their rapid, professional response during the riots. But there is always room for improvement. On the basis of lessons learned during those trying days, much has already been im-

proved, and planning is under way to provide for even more efficient responses. Some improvements, such as communications, equipment, and integrated training will take even more time. But we have begun, and we must continue our efforts and rely upon constant re-assessment to ensure that we are ready to respond swiftly and decisively to any crisis that threatens the lives and property of our fellow citizens.

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# The Combat S-1 In a Heavy Task Force

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A battalion S-1 in garrison faces a daily mountain of administrative requirements—paperwork to be processed, correspondence for the commander, evaluations nearing the suspense date, and innumerable strength reports. But these administrative tasks are only part of his job. He also plays a vital role as a staff officer in the field—in preparation for combat. Unfortunately, this role is largely ignored in unit training programs. Keeping the training focus on tactical training and deploying the S-1 section to

the field requires considerable forethought.

A brief examination of the S-1's responsibilities reveals several techniques he might adopt, techniques that have proved successful at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC) in Germany.

The S-1 carries out his duties on the battlefield from the combat trains command post (CTCP). Although the S-4 doctrinally commands the CTCP, the S-1 is second-in-command and, in the S-4's

absence, often oversees the minute-to-minute operation of the combat trains. He must aggressively sustain the unit in terms of his doctrinally specified critical military functions as well as his implied overall logistics responsibilities.

According to Training Circular (TC) 12-17, *Adjutant's Call*, the S-1 has overall responsibility for the efficient execution of seven critical military personnel functions. From his forward location on the battlefield at the combat trains, however, he immediately influences only

the four most critical of these functions: Replacement operations, strength management, personnel accounting and strength reporting, and casualty management.

Before the S-1 can perform any of these functions, however, he must receive and process information sent to him by the individual companies. The key players in reporting unit status are the first sergeants, who have the most complete and accurate personnel and logistic information for their units. They operate on the administrative/logistical (A/L) net and readily transmit reports to the CTCP. Likewise, the S-1 and his crew on duty at the CTCP must be prepared to receive and record the reports coming from subordinate elements.

### CTCPSOP

A CTCP standing operating procedure (SOP) can augment the task force field SOP on the internal operation of the CTCP and further clarify established report formats and times. This SOP should also cover such topics as the CTCP's sleep plan, responsibilities for security, and the positions of vehicles within the perimeter. Such an SOP is essential in keeping the first sergeants and the CTCP in agreement.

In a heavy task force, an M577 vehicle best serves the CTCP's command and control needs. Manning this vehicle from the S-1 section are the S-1 and one or two soldiers from the section. The rest of the section's soldiers are located at the S-1 main CP in the field trains. The S-4 provides the CTCP with a vehicle driver, an NCO, and one or two additional soldiers. The S-1 forward therefore has limited capabilities.

One way to improve the capability of the S-1 section "forward" is to co-locate an S-1 clerk with the medical platoon, or two clerks if the operation calls for a split medical aid station. This enables the S-1 to record casualty information quickly and leaves him more room in the M577, but detailed planning and execution are necessary to accomplish the four most critical personnel functions from the CTCP:

**Replacement Operations.** Replacement operations consist of the coordinated transport and support of incoming replacements, as well as soldiers returning to duty. The S-1 must coordinate with the field trains command post (FTCP), to determine the best way to bring replacements forward. A coordinated, efficient time to transport replacements is with LOGPACs. The first sergeants may pick up their soldiers directly, but they must be notified of pickups so they can have enough transportation on hand. Sometimes, replacements who arrive at the CTCP cannot proceed immediately to their units. If these soldiers are to be at the CTCP for any length of time, the S-1 must have tents and cots available for them to rest out of the weather. They cannot be allowed to sleep outside on the ground by themselves. If replacements are to be at the CTCP for more than a few hours, they must also be supervised and incorporated into the security plan. In short, replacements must be positively accounted for and cared for throughout their transportation to the line company. The task force needs fit soldiers who are fully prepared to be assimilated into their new units.

**Strength Management.** Strength management is the process by which the S-1 assesses the battalion's combat power in terms of personnel. The S-1 allocates replacements and analyzes future require-

ments. One tool for projecting organizational strength is the personnel estimate form (Figure 1), which the S-1 completes during the command estimate process. Through this form, the S-1 gives the task force commander and the supporting headquarters his best guess as to the losses the unit may suffer during an upcoming operation. Planning data for completing the estimate is in Field Manual 101-10-2, *Staff Officers' Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors*. In assessing strength management, the S-1 must also consider such factors as the leadership, morale, and training level of each company in the task force. The task force commander provides further guidance concerning replacement priorities.

**Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting.** This area includes timely accountability for every soldier on the battlefield. This reporting establishes the basis for battlefield decisions from a personnel perspective. At the CTCP, the S-1 concerns himself only with hasty, manual reporting systems. The S-1 main CP operates the automated Command and Control Strength Reporting System to reconcile deliberate personnel information.

The S-1 should receive a personnel report from each subordinate element at least twice a day. This report, commonly called a "red" report, is usually de-

PERSONNEL ESTIMATE:-----					MISSION:-----		DATE/TIME GROUP:-----	
PROJECTED LOSSES BY PHASE (KIA/WIA)					PROJECTED STRENGTHS			
UNIT	PHASE			TOTAL	D+-----	D+-----	D+-----	D+-----
CO/TM A	/	/	/	/				
CO/TM B	/	/	/	/				
CO/TM C	/	/	/	/				
CO/TM D	/	/	/	/				
ENGR	/	/	/	/				
ADA	/	/	/	/				
SCOUT	/	/	/	/				
MORTAR	/	/	/	/				
GBT TRNS	/	/	/	/				
FLD TRNS	/	/	/	/				
TF TOTAL								

Figure 1

UNIT/ STATUS	KIA	LITTER UNCON 2hrs	NBC SEV 2hrs	LITTER 4hrs	WALK WND 24hrs	NBC MLD 24hrs	RTD	DOW	OTH
CO/TM A									
CO/TM B									
CO/TM C									
CO/TM D									
ENGR									
ADA									
SCOUT									
MORTAR									
CBT TRNS									
FLD TRNS									
TF TOTAL									

Figure 2

livered by FM radio on the A/L net. At every LOGPAC, the S-1 receives hard-copy reports from the first sergeants.

In accordance with doctrine, DA Form 5367-R (Personnel Status Report) is used to report personnel status. A simple way for the S-1 to consolidate these reports is to create a binder containing an acetated copy of the form for each company. He can then transfer the information from the first sergeants' reports onto those in the binder; thus he will always have the latest status of the task force. He must not forget the reports from specialty platoons and attachments such as air defense artillery and engineers, since the task force commander will need to know the individual strengths of these elements as well.

**Casualty Management.** The coordination and logistical processes involved in treating casualties and removing them from the battlefield define casualty management, which is the most urgent task the S-1 faces during the battle. Several techniques are available to help him meet this challenge:

While the fight is in progress, the first sergeants report casualties by type of wound only. (Names and battle roster numbers become important later; the first priority is evacuation.) To coordinate ambulance coverage, the S-1 must know immediately which unit is suffering casualties. He may track casualty reports on a chart at the CTCP (Figure 2). (This chart

reflects an exercise at the CMTC, but each S-1 can tailor it to reflect his unit's task organization and expected casualties.)

Each subordinate element reports the number and types of casualties as they occur, and the S-1 notes this information on the chart. Mass casualty situations will become readily apparent, and the S-1 can push additional ambulances to the element involved. At the earliest break in the action, the first sergeants update this information with names and battle roster numbers.

Another method of tracking casualties is a record form that has columns for roster number, last name, MOS, time of wound, unit, type, status/destination, and time at destination. This record is maintained by the S-1 clerk assigned to the medical platoon. The clerk completes an entry for each wounded soldier who enters the aid station. To verify the list, the S-1 checks the information he has received from the units against the list of the wounded actually arriving for treatment. These techniques supplement the doctrinal use of DA Forms 1155 (Witness Statement on Individual), and 1156 (Casualty Feeder Report). They provide redundant systems that allow the S-1 to monitor the complex flow of casualties quickly and efficiently.

In addition to these formal responsibilities, the S-1—as second-in-command of the combat trains—must follow the fight

so that the CTCP can quickly take over command and control of the battle if directed by the main CP. During the fight, the S-4 is usually busy following the status of the various classes of supply, as well as coordinating emergency resupply and maintenance assets. By virtue of his location with the S-4 at the CTCP, the S-1 must also be familiar with these activities. But while the S-4 focuses primarily on logistics, the S-1 divides his time and attention between sustainment and operations. The S-1 does this by continuously monitoring the task force command net to stay abreast of the operation. The S-1's dual role in this case accomplishes several tasks for the CTCP.

The techniques the S-1 uses for tracking the battle are the same ones the Main CP uses. He plots unit positions on a map board, issues updates to the first sergeants on the A/L net; and dispatches ambulances (because he understands the operational situation, he can be most effective in this task). The S-1 becomes the link between the logisticians and the operators, keeping both the S-4's supply personnel and his own medical coverage closely tied to battlefield events. Thus, the CTCP is always prepared to assume control of the task force fight. Essential to battle tracking are an accurate map with graphics, secure communications, and a way to record combat power quickly. A simple chart allows the S-1 to record the exact status of the task force's combat vehicles.

The combat S-1 is a fighter who directly contributes to the success of a task force. All too often, he is tactically unprepared when he arrives in the field. Yet he must perform critical personnel functions for the task force and also make sure the CTCP remains a functioning command and control center. Fortunately, some simple techniques such as the ones presented here are now available to help him prepare for field training.

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