

# BOOK REVIEWS



***Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning: The World of a Combat Division in Vietnam.*** By Eric M. Bergerud. Westview, 1993. 328 Pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

Eric Bergerud's 1991 book, *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province*, which dealt with the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations (AO), is one of the very best books on the Vietnam War. Although less seminal than the earlier work, *Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning* is another fine and valuable book. It is a collective glimpse into the war as the men of one combat division saw it.

The 25th Division served in Vietnam from January 1966 to the Spring of 1971 in one of the more active AOs. The unit suffered more than 5,000 deaths, one of the highest casualty rates in the Army. Although it was not as well known as the 1st Infantry, 1st Cavalry, or 82d Airborne Divisions, no unit produced a richer literary heritage. Al Santoli, whose two oral histories, *Everything We Had* and *To Bear Any Burden*, served with the unit, as did Larry Heinemann, whose *Close Quarters* and *Paco's Story* are considered among the best novels of the war. But the Tropic Lightning Division is probably best remembered as unit veteran Oliver Stone's inspiration for the movie *Platoon*.

This book is not a narrative history. Rather, it relies on lengthy oral interviews to capture perceptions on such topics as physical surroundings, weaponry, battles, the medical effort, the Vietnamese, and morale. Although the interviews represent only one unit, clearly this is a universal and quintessential account of Vietnam combat. Bergerud's ability to weave in his own explicative narrative—on the basis of years of works in the archives and the long, candid interviews—makes this one of the best of the many oral histories.

This is a powerful and moving book that says as much about the war as is possible to capture on paper.

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***Lost Victories: The Military Genius of Stonewall Jackson.*** By Bevin Alexander.

Henry Holt and Company, 1992. 384 Pages. \$30.00. Reviewed by Colonel Howard W. Crawford, Jr., United States Army Retired.

This short history of Jackson's battles is easy to read, but there is not much new in it. The book's main thesis—that Jackson, not Lee, had the strategic vision necessary for the South to win—remains unsubstantiated. At best, the book provides a quick chronological overview, chapter by chapter, of Jackson's tactical engagements. None of these short chapters is insightful, and none of them supports the author's thesis. He shows limited understanding of strategy in a contemporary setting and often drifts into operational concepts that are clearly regional in both execution and design, without defining a vision that was to have guided the south's strategy.

Alexander does not seem to understand vital interests or center of gravity as they relate to strategic application. He postulates that Jackson somehow had a clearer vision in the fog of war than Lee had. The attacks on Lee in almost every chapter are the most disturbing aspect of the book. Instead of proving his thesis through facts, the author continually compares Lee to Jackson as if he had forgotten that the South, with its limited resources and experience, did not have a well-conceived strategic plan from the outset. This was a war of trial and error, and there was plenty of blame to go around. Alexander mixes tactical execution with strategic thinking at the expense of the thesis that he laid out in his introduction.

Save your money. This is not a book to add to your professional library on strategy.

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***The Battle of Belmont.*** By Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes. University of North Carolina Press, 1991. 307 Pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, United States Air Force Retired.

Historical accounts of Ulysses Grant's Civil War career normally begin with the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson in early 1862 and end with the famous encounter between him and General Robert E. Lee at

Appomattox Courthouse in 1865—touching on the Shiloh, Vicksburg, and 1864 Virginia campaigns in the process. A much-overlooked and very interesting segment in Civil War history is Grant's first significant campaign in November 1861 and the subsequent battle at Belmont, Missouri.

Belmont itself was nothing more than a steamboat landing on the western bank of the Mississippi. Just across the river, however, lay Columbus, Kentucky—"the Gibraltar of the Mississippi"—which became the most heavily defended spot in North America during the early days of the war. Brigadier General Grant, having been given command of the Union forces in southeast Missouri and southern Illinois, wanted to attack Columbus but was restrained from doing so by his department commander, General John C. Fremont. Showing the fighting qualities that would eventually propel him into the public eye (and that of President Lincoln), Grant said, "What I want is to advance." When Fremont was relieved by the president, Grant got the green light.

Author Hughes sets the background for the story of the Belmont campaign by providing some good information about the manner in which Grant organized, trained, and conditioned his green forces in preparation for the expected battles.

When Grant was ready, the Union forces packed aboard troop transports and deployed down the Mississippi River from Cairo, Illinois, accompanied by the Navy's timberclad gunboats, *Tyler* and *Lexington*. After giving the Confederate forces a scare by tying up overnight on the Kentucky shore, the Union troops landed northwest of Belmont landing on 7 November 1861, while the gunboats proceeded downriver to duel briefly with the Columbus batteries.

Grant deployed a total of five regiments (numbering 2,500 men) against an initial Confederate defense of 3,000 troops. The Union infantry, artillery, and cavalry forces were well integrated against the poorly positioned defenders, resulting in a complete rout and capture of the rebel camp. The day's fight continued for nine hours with an additional 2,500 Confederate troops being ferried across the river from Columbus

throughout the day. As the fighting drew to a close and Grant moved his forces back to the boats for withdrawal, his column was severely mauled by Confederate troops who were able to flank him.

Despite the long duration of the battle, each side suffered only about 600 casualties, certainly light compared to the battles that lay ahead of these same troops. The question of who won Belmont remains unsettled, but Grant's moderate success with his land-water campaign obviously led to much greater successes with similar combined operations at Forts Henry and Donelson two months later.

Author Hughes previously wrote an outstanding military biography of Confederate General William J. Hardee, who was known as an authority on infantry tactics in the pre-Civil War army. This equally well-written book includes several excellent battlefield maps that help the reader understand the battle and the troop movements. It is a worthwhile illumination of a very little-known and little-appreciated part of the early days of the Civil War.

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***Wavell in the Middle East, 1939-1941: A Study in Generalship.* By Harold E. Rough, Jr. Brassey's (UK), 1993. 323 Pages. \$50.00.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, United States Army Retired.

The author of this study, oddly enough, is a serving U.S. Army officer, but one who has long been interested in British military history, particularly the 19th and 20th centuries. He has written extensively in that field, and during his research and writing grew more interested in the life and times of Field Marshal The Earl Wavell, who—as General Sir Archibald Wavell—served as Commander in Chief, India, from July 1941 to June 1943, and then as Viceroy of India until 1947.

Wavell, who had been commissioned in the Black Watch Regiment in 1901, was very much a friend of the infantry throughout his long and distinguished career, and in an April 1945 letter titled "In Praise of Infantry," let his feelings for infantry soldiers be more widely known. Perhaps this is the trait that drew the author of this book to Wavell, for Major Rough himself is an infantryman.

Rough's book grew out of his doctoral dissertation, completed while he was serving as an instructor in history at the United States Military Academy from 1988 to 1991. He has mined official records and personal rem-

iniscences on both sides of the Atlantic and has demonstrated an ability to write more coherently than most dissertation writers. There were times, however, when he let his feelings get the better of him, and certain of his rhetorical flourishes might have been toned down, if not deleted entirely.

In general, Rough accomplishes what he set out to do and, in some cases, more. The book traces Wavell's career from his commissioning to his assumption of command in Cairo in July 1939. Seriously wounded while serving with his regiment in 1915 on the Western Front (he lost his left eye), Wavell eventually returned to duty during the war and held a variety of staff positions, primarily in the Middle East, where he came to know and admire General Sir Edmund Allenby.

Between the wars, he held a variety of command and staff positions, became an excellent writer, and proved "a gifted speaker and lecturer," and earned a "reputation as the originator of vigorous realistic, and challenging training." Unfortunately, along the way, he developed a strong, almost intense, dislike for the mixture of politics and military matters that he saw at the highest levels; at the same time, however, in the presence of politicians, he could not bring himself to speak out boldly and forcefully. Rather, he seemed to withdraw into some sort of shell, which bordered on stubbornness, and by his subsequent actions appeared to indicate a dislike for the politicians around him. He was soon to discover that politicians do not take to people who dislike them, particularly their key subordinates.

Rough—feeling that Wavell had been consigned to the dustbin of history upon his death in 1950—set out to resurrect the man and his career. This he does quite well, even though the focus of his story is on a single two-year period. But what a period it was! So at the same time Rough has shone the spotlight on that period and given us a good, concise history of Balkan, Middle East, and East African military operations about which most U.S. military men know little. (A greater awareness of those operations may have better prepared us for actions in those same areas.)

Rough admits, of course, that Wavell was not a "perfect" general, but points out that Wavell—as the commander of an operational theater stretching 2,000 miles east to west and 1,700 miles north to south—"bore a mantle of responsibility greater than [that of] any other British general, with the possible exception of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the early years of the Second

World War." Rough also reminds us that "from February 1941 to July 1941. . . Wavell was directly responsible for the conduct of some eight campaigns, with three on hand at any one time and five running simultaneously in May 1941." In the end, Rough concludes that "Wavell. . . clearly performed his duties as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, in a highly laudable and outstanding manner."

Unfortunately for Wavell, as Rough makes abundantly clear, his political boss was Winston Churchill, a domineering figure Wavell could not handle. From their very first meeting on 8 August 1940, Churchill came away with the impression that Wavell lacked "offensive spirit, resolution, and mental dexterity." Rough, who is extremely critical of Churchill, believes that "nothing could have been further from the truth." Eventually, Wavell fell prey to Churchill's beliefs and was moved to India where he would be out of the way, or so Churchill thought. Thus, to Rough, Wavell was a scapegoat whom the "Churchillians" have vilified down to the present time.

Rough certainly sets the record straight, but more needs to be done, particularly on Wavell's feelings and attitudes about and toward politicians. Perhaps he will take up the charge at a later date. For the time being, U.S. military professionals can gain much from this book, particularly as it pertains to military leadership and its influence at all ranks.

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***SAS: Secret War in South-East Asia.* By Peter Dickens. Ballantine Books, 1992. 300 Pages. \$4.99, Softbound.** Reviewed by Leroy Thompson, Manchester Missouri.

This new paperback edition of Peter Dickens' classic work on the Special Air Service (SAS), first published in 1983, makes more readily available one of the finest studies of the SAS yet published. This book was one of the first works on Britain's premier special operations unit to be based directly on first-hand accounts of members of the 22d Special Air Service Regiment who had served in the Borneo "Confrontation." Termed a "confrontation" rather than a war, the Borneo campaign offers a view of classic SAS employment in the mission of border surveillance, cross-border raiding, and indigenous training.

One of the factors that has consistently made the SAS such an outstanding military unit is the core of experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs) staffing the four-man patrol, which is the basic SAS opera-

tional unit. Dickens manages to capture the personalities of many of these NCOs superbly—so well, in fact, that even before the names were mentioned I recognized two friends who had served in Borneo from his description of their personality traits. This presentation of members of the SAS as dedicated, highly trained soldiers, instead of supermen, gives a far better feel for the regiment than many other works concerned more with myth than reality.

From the point of view of the infantryman, the most useful aspect of the book is that it traces the evolution of the SAS role in border security throughout the years 1963-1966. At the same time the U.S. Special Forces were developing their own border surveillance mission in Vietnam, their British counterparts were dealing with Indonesian infiltrators. The fact that the U.S. Special Forces and the SAS have traditionally carried out extensive exchange training, while the Indonesian Special Forces operating against the SAS had also been trained by the U.S. Special Forces, made this evolution of special interest to U.S. special warfare soldiers.

Additionally, while MACV (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam)/Special Operations Group operations were evolving in Vietnam, the SAS began carrying out cross-border operations into Indonesian Borneo, both for intelligence gathering and as "claret" operations to punish the Indonesians with raids. Once again, the fact that British operations were being carried out in a jungle environment at the same time as similar U.S. operations in Vietnam makes this book of special interest. Finally, while U.S. Special Forces personnel were training Montagnard tribesmen as scouts and irregulars, members of the SAS were training Ibans and other tribesmen as scouts and irregulars.

This book offers an excellent combination of fascinating anecdotes with well-documented operational narrative. It is highly recommended.

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***The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform.* By James S. Corum. University Press of Kansas, 1992. 288 Pages. \$29.95. Reviewed by Dr. Charles E. White, Infantry School Historian.**

The development of the German doctrine used so effectively in the early years of World War II has captivated U.S. military readers for more than 50 years. This obsession with things German has often led Amer-

icans to misinterpret the past. Finally, James Corum has produced a well-written, well-organized, and comprehensively researched book that destroys the myths of popular history.

In *The Roots of Blitzkrieg*, Corum traces the critical transformations in German tactical doctrine, organization, and training in the years following World War I. He demonstrates conclusively that the development of German doctrine (erroneously called *Blitzkrieg*) was not due to Heinz Guderian, Adolf Hitler, the limitations placed on Germany's armed forces by the Versailles Treaty, or Soviet assistance. Rather, it was the general staff system—created by Scharnhorst during the Napoleonic wars, refined by Moltke during the wars of German unification, and maintained (in secret) after World War I by Hans von Seeckt—that created Germany's concept of mobile warfare. And, ironically, it was the peacetime military establishment of Germany's "democratic" Weimar Republic that provided the fruitful environment in which the German General Staff worked.

Corum shows how Hans von Seeckt guided the operations and policy of the *Truppenamt* (the name given to the outlawed General Staff) during the years immediately following World War I. It was Seeckt who created the atmosphere that gave "visionaries" (such as Guderian) free rein to develop an "army of the future." Seeckt wanted a highly mobile force capable of executing operations aimed at encircling an enemy or the breakthrough attack (with superior tactics and weapons) if the enemy's flank could not be turned.

This splendid book is timely for the U.S. Army, because the situation facing the Army today is similar in many respects to the one that faced the *Reichswehr* in 1919. At a time when the U.S. Army is laying the foundations for fighting the nation's future land wars, this book can provide leaders with some valuable lessons on the development and implementation of sound tactical doctrine:

First, the Army must have a sound methodology or process for developing that doctrine. Second, those selected as doctrine writers must have great intellectual capacity. Third, realistic combat training that tests this doctrine must have absolute primacy over all other types of training. Finally, the Army must place a high priority on developing the individual initiative and reliability of the soldier.

Significantly, as Corum points out, all of these "lessons" have little to do with the

sizes of budgets. Faced with a massive reduction in force, declining resources, an unstable international situation, and a hostile domestic political environment, the *Reichswehr* nevertheless quietly and intelligently faced the problems of maintaining a small volunteer force, developing a sound tactical doctrine, and training an effective fighting force in times of austere fiscal limitations.

Will the United States Army be as wise? Those who read this book will have a better idea of how to approach and solve the problems facing the Army today.

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***A History of Military Medicine. Two volumes.* By Richard A. Gabriel and Karen S. Metz. Greenwood Press, 1992. 551 Pages. \$110. Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, United States Army.**

In their latest collaboration, authors Richard Gabriel and Karen Metz have written a comprehensive treatment of the history of medicine in the Western world from ancient Sumerian civilization to the present. The first volume addresses the subject from earliest times through the fall of Constantinople in 1453, while the second carries it from the Renaissance through the Vietnam War. The authors succeed admirably in their purpose of attracting attention to a largely unstudied subject and provoking others to think about new subjects in different ways.

What makes this history so applicable to today's Army is the focus on combat lifesaving techniques that characterized classical civilizations, as well as the emphasis on speedy evacuation that has been the hallmark of 20th century military medicine. As outlined by noted historian John Keegan, the authors view modern war as an "epidemic of casualties" that threatens to overwhelm the resources of traditional medical practices. This increase in lethality, in turn, has been offset to some degree by three emergent factors—the discovery of anesthetics and the principle of antisepsis, the advent of blood transfusions, and the discovery of antibiotics.

The factors that distinguish modern military medicine from its predecessors are the dispersion of combat forces over larger areas, the increased rates of destruction of locally engaged forces made possible by incredible increases in the rates of fire and lethality of conventional weaponry, and the greatly increased vulnerability of combat medical assets on the high-mobility battlefield.

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The authors suggest that the key to survival on the modern battlefield may be more medical training in traumatic First Aid for all combat soldiers to the degree that they will be able to act as trained medics to halt bleeding and prevent shock. Current infantry commanders will recognize this message as the very foundation of combat lifesaving and casualty evacuation training.

***Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War.*** By Martin Samuels. Greenwood Press, 1992. 225 Pages. Reviewed by Major Harold E. Raugh, Jr., United States Army.

There is still a great deal to learn about the development of tactics and doctrine, and about command and generalship, of the opposing armies during World War I. Unfortunately, Martin Samuels' *Doctrine and Dogma* provides little new insight into these important topics.

This study appears to be an unedited scholarly treatise. Its stated objectives are to analyze the development of German infantry tactics, "to examine the British attempt to adopt the German defensive system," and to compare and contrast the British and German armies. In attempting to do this, Samuels has divided the book into eight chapters, five of them devoted to the Germans and three to the British—an early indication of his bias.

The first chapter is little more than a synthesis of an unpublished 1939 Berlin University doctoral dissertation, and other chapters rely heavily upon this same source. The author suggests the British had no "up-to-date" defensive doctrine before they captured and reissued two outdated German manuals on the subject in December 1917. In making this assertion, he is either ignorant or fails to consider the 1916 British War Office's *Notes for Infantry Officers on Trench Warfare*, a manual that set the pattern for most British trenches for much of the war. The chapter "British Training" is noticeably superficial and generally void of substantive analysis. These and similar omissions and errors in interpretation make this volume of doubtful value.

The author suggests that his "analysis is of more than merely historical interest." With its selective use of evidence to bolster a preconceived thesis, lack of understanding of British tactical and doctrinal development, and barely disguised admiration for the German Army, this book will be of little interest

to discerning military readers. Their money could be better spent elsewhere.

### RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

***Scouts and Raiders: The Navy's First Special Warfare Commandos.*** By John B. Dwyer. Praeger, 1993. 224 Pages. \$49.95.

***Flames Over Tokyo: The U.S. Army Air Forces' Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944-1945.*** By E. Bartlett Kerr. Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1991. 348 Pages. \$22.95.

***With a Black Platoon in Combat: A Year in Korea.*** By Lyle Rishell. Texas A&M University Press, 1993. \$24.50.

***Payback: America's Long War in the Middle East.*** By John K. Cooley. Brassey's (US), 1991. 272 Pages. \$19.95.

***Sandy Patch: A Biography of Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch.*** By William K. Wyant. Praeger, 1991. 264 Pages. \$49.95.

***The Story of the Second World War.*** By Henry Steele Commager. First published in 1945. Brassey's (US), 1991. 352 Pages. \$23.95.

***Norway 1940.*** By Francois Kersaudy. St. Martin's Press, 1991. 272 Pages. \$22.95.

***DMZ Diary: A Combat Marine's Vietnam Memoir.*** By Jeff Kelly. McFarland & Company, 1991. 220 Pages. \$15.95.

***To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority Over Germany, 1942-1944.*** By Stephen L. McFarland and Wesley Phillips Newton. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. 304 Pages. \$35.00.

***Stalin: Breaker of Nations.*** By Robert Conquest. Viking, 1991. 346 Pages. \$25.00.

***The Penguin Encyclopedia of Modern Warfare.*** By Kenneth Macksey and William Woodhouse. Viking, 1992. 373 Pages. \$29.95.

***Writers on World War II: An Anthology.*** Edited and with a Foreword by Mordecai Richler. Knopf, 1991. 727 Pages. \$30.00.

***The Collapse of Communism.*** By the Correspondents of *The New York Times*. Revised and Updated. Edited by Bernard Gwertzman and Michael T. Kaufman. Random House, 1991. 600 Pages. \$13.00, Softbound.

***The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans.*** By Charles R. Royster. Knopf, 1991. A Borzoi Book. 523 Pages. \$30.00.

***Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis.*** By Dino A. Brugioni. Random House, 1992. 622 Pages. \$35.00.

***The Fate of the Maine.*** By John Edward Weems. A reprint of the 1958 edition. Texas A&M University Press, 1992. 207 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

***U.S. Army Uniforms of the Korean War.*** By Shelby L. Stanton. Stackpole Books, 1992. 256 Pages. \$39.95.

***In the Eye of the Storm: The Life of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf.*** By Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti. Berkley Books, 1992. 356 Pages. \$5.99, Softbound.

***Warriors' Words: A Quotation Book from Sesostris III to Schwarzkopf.*** Sterling, 1992. 528 Pages. \$29.95

***Military Fortifications: A Selective Bibliography.*** Compiled by Dale E. Floyd. Bibliographies and Indexes in Military Studies, Number 4. Greenwood Press, 1992. 384 Pages. \$59.50.

***U.S. Fighters of World War Two.*** By Robert

F. Dorr. Sterling, 1992. 160 Pages. \$24.95.

***U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The War That Would Not End, 1971-1973.*** By Charles D. Melson and Curtis G. Arnold. History and Museums Division of the United States Marine Corps, 1992. 311 Pages. \$21.00.

***Rome's Enemies 5: The Desert Frontier.*** Men-at-Arms Series No. 243. Edited by Martin Windrow. Osprey, 1992. 48 Pages, Softbound.

***The French Army in the American War of Independence.*** Men-at-Arms Series, No. 244. Edited by Martin Windrow. Osprey, 1992. 47 Pages, Softbound.

***British Territorial Units, 1914-18.*** Men-at-Arms Series, No. 245. Edited by Martin Windrow. Osprey, 1992. 47 Pages, Softbound.

***The Romanian Army of World War 2.*** Men-at-Arms Series, No. 246. Edited by Martin Windrow. Osprey, 1992. 47 Pages, Softbound.

***German Tanks of World War II in Action.*** By George Forty. Sterling, 1992. 160 Pages. \$17.95, Softbound.

***U.S. Tactical Air Power, Europe 1942-45.*** By Roger A. Freeman. Sterling, 1992. 48 Pages. \$8.95, Softbound.

***A-6 Intruder Carrier-borne Bomber.*** By Robert F. Dorr. Sterling, 1992. 56 Pages. \$9.95, Softbound.

***U.S. Marine Corps Scout-Sniper: World War II and Korea.*** By Peter R. Senich. Paladin Press, 1993. 217 Pages, Hardcover.

***Modern Combat Helicopters.*** By George Sullivan. Facts on File, 1993. 120 Pages, Hardcover.

***American Defense Annual.*** Edited by Joseph Kruzell. Lexington Books, 1993. 357 Pages, Hardcover.

***The Imperial War Museum Book of the First World War: A Great Conflict Recalled in Previously Unpublished Letters, Diaries, and Memoirs.*** By Malcolm Brown. University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. 288 Pages. \$27.95, Softbound.

***JG 26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe.*** By Donald L. Caldwell. Published in hard cover in 1991. Ballantine Books, 1993. 440 Pages. \$4.99, Softbound.

***Mexico and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas.*** By W. Dirk Raat. University of Georgia Press, 1992. 259 Pages. \$45.00, Hardcover; \$18.50, Softbound.

***Rangers at War.*** By Shelby L. Stanton. Ballantine Books, 1993. 321 Pages. \$4.99, Softbound.

***Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: An Introductory History.*** By Emanuel Raymond Lewis. Naval Institute Press, 1993. 145 Pages. \$15.95.

***100 Missions North: A Fighter Pilot's Story of the Vietnam War.*** By Brigadier General Ken Bell. Brassey's (US), 1993. 330 Pages. \$24.00.

***A Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines.*** By Molly Moore. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993. 336 Pages. \$22.50.

***Combat Service Support Guide, 2nd Edition.*** By Major John E. Edwards. Stackpole, 1993. 304 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.

***A Proud American: The Autobiography of Joe Foss.*** By Joe Foss, with Donna Wild Foss. Pocket Books, 1992. 320 Pages. \$22.00.

***Arms Limitation and Disarmament Restraints on War, 1899-1939.*** Edited by B.J.C. McKeercher. Praeger, 1992. 272 Pages. \$55.00.