

# INFANTRY LETTERS



## CLARIFICATION OF 60mm MORTAR PRODUCTIVITY

I appreciated Sergeant Robert S. Underwood's thoughtful critique (INFANTRY, March-April 1994, pages 3-4) of my proposal to splice two 60mm mortar cannons on one baseplate (INFANTRY, January-February 1994, page 3).

One point needs clarification. I did not intend to suggest that the size of the 60mm mortar section should be reduced. On the contrary, having previously identified an unresourced need for four additional soldiers (two for ammunition resupply, two for fire direction), my intent was to reallocate the two spaces saved to dedicated ammunition resupply or fire direction capabilities, leaving overall section strength at six. At this level, the 60mm mortar section is still understaffed.

RICHARD K. FICKETT  
Herndon, Virginia

## CREDIBLE FORCE AND DETERRENCE

I would like to comment on the subject of the emerging need for smart mortar munitions.

The capabilities of a force, enemy or friendly, affect the way it perceives another or the way it acts in the face of possible confrontation with that force. There's nothing new here. It is basic tactics—METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). The overt fielded capability can act as a deterrent to combatants judging how to behave when coming into contact with a peacekeeping force. In the case of United Nations (UN) elements deployed in a theater of conflict, it is a matter of tactical usage, rules of engagement, and in-

theater strategic reaction to the circumstances of the combatants.

U.S. Army light and medium infantry forces seem to lack the organic capability to deliver accurate, pinpoint counter-fire at extended range with minimal collateral damage to non-combatants and property in the vicinity. Judging from the Mortar Program Plan of 1992, after-action reports from Operation DESERT STORM, and continued discussion by readers of and contributors to INFANTRY, there seems to be need for an infantry precision delivery weapon or munition.

Artillery accomplishes the precision fire task by using the laser designated 155mm M712 Copperhead projectile. But this size or type of tube artillery weapon is not usually available to UN peacekeepers, and it has not been deployed in Bosnia. Further, the UN rules of engagement often dictate the type of soldiers (foot, motorized, mechanized) to be used and how they are to act under fire. Infantry elements routinely have an organic infantry, hip-pocket "artillery" on such UN deployments. Having a precision guided mortar munition seems to be a solution worthy of further investigation.

Previous INFANTRY letters have addressed mortars and smart munitions (Mr. Earl Rubright's letter, September-October 1992, page 5; Mr. Richard K. Fickett's, January-February 1993, page 3; and my letter, May-June 1993, page 3). In my earlier letter, I cautioned against a precipitous or premature judgment on the adoption of a smart mortar projectile when other antiarmor solutions are at hand. This position is based primarily on cost factors in light of the decline in defense budgets. An ongoing Army study advisory group is addressing future improvements to the mortars and their family of munitions. Also, the Army is wrapping up its evaluation of

smart mortar technology based on a foreign comparative test of smart projectiles from Sweden and the United Kingdom.

According to the commentaries on the war in Bosnia, there is an apparent force credibility issue for the UN peacekeepers. The UN reaction to Serb attacks (mostly indirect fire) focuses on selecting the appropriate level of force in defensive actions. According to the reports, no suitable alternative weapon, short of a NATO tactical air strike, would extend the range of the UN's direct-fire weapons to counter the Serb artillery. If these peacekeepers were equipped with a precision mortar munition of sufficient size and range, there might be less risk to the UN self-defense ground elements from the indirect fire assaults of the Serbs. I recognize that this one solution greatly oversimplifies the situation, and that there are other viable responses or combinations of responses. This peacekeeping lesson has a direct bearing on the United States' rapid force projection initiative and on shaping and equipping future light forces.

What roles or tasks should this smart, or precision, munition be capable of performing? Obviously, in a world-wide sense, ranging from low to high intensity, the sky's the limit. Realistically, in the area of peacekeeping, certain tasks are exemplified in the Bosnian conflict. A few that come immediately to mind are counter-sniper fire, counter-mortar, defeat of a bunker or strongpoint (machinegun), specific attack on a medium vehicle target, and so on. With these targets, the developer can focus on what the munition needs to do and which seekers/sensors and warheads are appropriate to defeat them.

At first approximation, there is a need to fill two general needs—rapid counter-fire and precise target kill. The first

implies an area target such as in counter-mortar fire, and the second requires a soldier to guide the round. This soldier can be either a forward observer (FO) or a designator to mark the target. The FO/designator is deemed critical in providing positive identification friend or foe (IFF) and controlling the fire, thus minimizing collateral damage or friendly fire incidents. A dual-mode seeker is therefore required. In short, we need a precision mortar to do the job; we need it to be organic to our infantry contingency force; and we need it now!

The fastest way to get such a capability is through a non-developmental item (NDI) acquisition, as in the Army's approach to the armored gun system. It is uncertain, however, whether available smart mortar munitions can presently meet all of the Army criteria, especially interoperability. Instead of a totally new development, there could be an NDI+ to get a smart projectile sooner. Results of the foreign comparative test program undoubtedly will help refine a munition system definition. The Army could choose to meet its needs in parallel, as was done with the baseline 120mm mortar program—for example, buying a limited quantity of "off-the-shelf" hardware for use now and planning to modify NDI smart mortar ammunition for long-term optimization.

ROBERT F. GAUDET  
Fairfax Station, Virginia

## DUAL-MOUNTING 60mm MORTARS

I would like to contribute to the discussion between Mr. Richard K. Fickett (INFANTRY, January-February 1994, page 3) and Sergeant First Class Robert S. Underwood (March-April 1994, pages 3-4) on the challenges facing the 60mm mortar section and on the current suggested solutions.

I completely disagree with Mr. Fickett's suggestion of mounting two 60mm mortars side by side; this is not feasible for the following reasons:

- Section survivability would decrease.

- The section could not operate split-section (independent of each other).
- A misfire would render both tubes inoperable until it was corrected.
- Coordinated illumination missions would be impossible.
- The section could not fire traversing missions.
- Firing both guns from a single baseplate could be too powerful for it (assuming both guns fired simultaneously).
- Dual-mounting would cause uneven settling of the baseplate, unless both tubes fired at the same time during adjustment.

Sergeant Underwood and Mr. Fickett are correct in resurfacing a long-standing light infantry problem. My position is that the M224 60mm mortar is an excellent system and that the solution is not to modify the mortar but to increase the number of soldiers on a crew.

On the basis of my 11 years as an airborne infantry mortarman (four years with 60mm mortars and seven with 81mm mortars), I believe that only the best-trained 60mm mortar crews can perform their required minimum ARTEP missions. In most cases, the problem is not a lack of training but a six-man crew that has too many tasks to perform at the same time. For example, the 60mm mortar section sergeant is required to perform the duties of both a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant, act as squad leader, fire direction center (FDC) chief, and radio telephone operator for the section, and operate an FDC

computer. It is obvious that in a challenging combat environment of continuous operations, or training replicating that environment, no single NCO can be expected to perform all of those tasks to ARTEP 7-92 Mission Training Plan (MTP) standards.

In addition, live-fire training both in peacetime and in combat presents a serious safety concern. Most installations require one sergeant per gun to act as safety officer; two sergeants are required to operate two like items of FDC equipment and compare data to ensure that the correct data is sent to the guns. Under the current TOE, all the requirements are normally met, but safety is somewhat compromised with long-term operations. It is easy to see the probability of error when a sergeant is simultaneously supervising a gun, communicating with the forward observer (FO), operating the ballistic computer or plotting board, communicating with the squad leader by phone, and ensuring that the entire gun-line receives correct and safe fire commands.

Another significant challenge to a light company commander's employment of his 60mm mortar squad is getting ammunition to the mortars. The combination of over-tasked NCOs and poor internal logistical support has led to the less-than-ideal employment of the section and sometimes to outright abuse of the section's enormous capabilities.

The obvious solution is to increase the size of the mortar section at company level, and I propose increasing it

OLD TOE	
<b>ONE GUN</b> SSG, Section Sergeant/Computer SP4, Gunner PFC, Assistant Gunner	<b>TWO GUN</b> SGT, Squad Leader/Computer SP4, Gunner PFC, Assistant Gunner
PROPOSED TOE	
<b>SECTION HEADQUARTERS</b> SSG, Section Sergeant/Computer SGT, Computer/RTO	
<b>ONE GUN</b> SGT, Squad Leader SP4, Gunner PFC, Assistant Gunner PV2, Ammunition Bearer	<b>TWO GUN</b> SGT, Squad Leader SP4, Gunner PFC, Assistant Gunner PV2, Ammunition Bearer

---

from six men to ten. Two of the four additional soldiers would be privates and two would be sergeants. The privates would be ammunition bearers, one sergeant would act as squad leader, and one would be an FDC computer and radio telephone operator (RTO). The accompanying tables show the comparison between the old and new TOEs.

This TOE change would increase the requirements for MOS 11C soldiers throughout the Army, adding about 578 soldiers Army-wide. This is certainly a significant stress on an already over-burdened personnel system, but when the time came to employ the mortar in support of light infantry engaged with the enemy, I think our leaders would find the change well worth the personnel investment.

THOMAS R. WOODHAMS  
SFC, U.S. Army  
Battalion Mortar  
Platoon Sergeant  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

---

## WHY NOT LEGITIMIZE OOTW TRAINING?

In introducing the chapter on operations other than war (OOTW), Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 1993, states, "The Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nation's wars. However, Army forces and soldiers operate around the world in environments that may not involve combat" (page 13-0). The implication here is obvious: The nation does not have to be at war to have soldiers in combat. Therefore, the Army is entirely justified in awarding combat patches and Combat Infantryman Badges (CIBs) for such OOTW operations as those in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, northern Iraq, and Somalia. This is a good first step, but what it must also do is train its soldiers specifically for OOTW.

Proficiency in this area is supposed to be gleaned through the tenet of versatility, which requires not only that units not focus on OOTW but that they be able to transition to such operations

"without loss of focus" (page 2-9). Without loss of focus from what? If I'm receiving sniper fire or even just having rocks thrown at me in Mogadishu, I sure don't want to be preserving focus for anything other than the problem at hand. And I hope I didn't waste my training time learning how to fight tanks in an engagement area instead of thugs in a courtyard. The problem boils down to the fact that, in spite of the misleading title, many operations other than war are clearly war at the tactical level, and no one would dispute the need to train for war at the tactical level.

But from here emerges the standard school of thought that normal battle-focused training and soldier discipline will meet our needs in these types of conflicts. After all, the argument continues, the tasks are the same; only the conditions have changed. Such reasoning is akin to the true but overly simplistic "daylight attack under different conditions." Likewise, the MOPP IV defense is just a MOPP 0 defense under different conditions. True enough, but no one would dare suggest that we don't need to train specifically for night attacks or for defenses in chemical environments.

The conditions in OOTW can be radically different from those for which our normal battle-focused training has prepared us. FM 100-2-1, *The Soviet Army Operations and Tactics*, 1984, teaches us to prepare to receive echeloned attacks. Thus, we have trained to fight a first echelon of two reinforced battalions, a second echelon of one reinforced battalion, and an antitank reserve (page 5-22). The 10th Mountain Division learned that the Somalis fight in echelons too—a first echelon of children throwing rocks, a second echelon of women with sticks, and a third echelon of men with AK-47s hiding behind the women and children (5 May 1994, JRTC briefing). The delta between these two types of echeloned attacks seems to me too wide to bridge without some specific attention to training.

But that special attention will not be forthcoming under the current policies against including OOTW in mission essential task lists (METLs). The doc-

trinal genesis of this policy appears to be in the statement in FM 100-5 that versatility will require "tactical units to adapt to different missions and tasks, some of which may not be on unit..." METLs (page 2-9). Taken at face value, this makes sense, but to expand it into a prohibition against putting OOTW tasks such as peace enforcement on a unit METL seems to contradict the basic training philosophy of "Don't have soldiers do something they are not trained to do" (U.S. Army Infantry School Assistant Commandant briefing to an Infantry Officer Advanced Course class) and the FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, 1990, injunction that "a unit must train as it plans to fight" (page 2-1).

The problem is that FM 25-101 defines a METL as "an unconstrained statement of tasks required to accomplish wartime missions" (page 2-2). Because OOTW operations are combat, not war, they seem to fall outside the realm of the METL. But OOTW is the war many units plan to fight, and hot spots such as Bosnia and Haiti seem likely sites for the OOTW role. I suggest, therefore, that we change the word "wartime" in the definition of METL to "combat." The whole thing is largely academic in any event because many light units have had noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), an OOTW activity, on their METLs for years, and nobody raised an eyebrow. Why is NEO the exception?

I think the issue is that the Army is reluctant to sign up for more stuff to put on a plate that is already overflowing. Putting even the combat-type OOTWs on METLs and specifically training for them might send a message that we want to get involved in places where we really don't. Unfortunately, OOTW is a reality, and it doesn't seem to be going away. If it isn't going away, we may as well learn to live with it, and part of living with it is training for it.

It is easy to talk about versatility, but the human condition is such that we can do one thing better than two things, two things better than three, and we certainly do things we've trained for better than things we haven't trained for. The U.S.

Army has been conducting operations other than war for 200 years, during which OOTW has been called a variety of names. As we entered the Vietnam era, the name was "situations short of war," and the 1962 edition of FM 100-5 stated that "all units whose mission and capability create a possibility of their employment in situations short of war should receive specialized training in antiguerrilla warfare and riot control."

I think this line of thought demands some representation as we come to grips with OOTW as we know it today. The conflicts in Vietnam, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti were, or soon may be, combat even if they aren't war. We owe it to our soldiers to train them for combat, whether that combat is in the form of World War III or a peace enforcement, NEO, or counterinsurgency mission in some "operation other than war."

NAME WITHHELD

*EDITOR'S NOTE: Although INFANTRY does not encourage letters submitted anonymously, this one is being published as an exception in the hope that it will lead to a useful discussion of OOTW issues.*

### UPCOMING COURSE

The 15th Annual Modeling, Simulation, and Gaming of Warfare course will be offered 6-9 September 1994 at the Georgia Institute of Technology, in

Atlanta, Georgia. The fee for the course is \$850.

This short course will provide a forum in which members of the military, industry, and academia can discuss the effects this emerging technology will have on the warfighter.

For further information, call (404) 894-2547.

DEPARTMENT OF  
CONTINUING EDUCATION  
Georgia Institute of Technology

### SMOKE/OBSCURANTS SYMPOSIUM XVIII

The Smoke/Obscurants Symposium XVIII will be held 22-26 August 1994 at the Eglin Air Force Base Conference Center in Florida. The symposium is being co-sponsored by the U.S. Army Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center and the U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center.

The theme is "Obscurants: The Smart Countermeasure." Topics to be presented include camouflage, concealment and deception, countermeasures, data analysis, assessment and evaluation, electromagnetic systems performance, health or environmental effects, modeling, natural and man-made obscurants applications, new and novel materials/system capabilities, nonmilitary applications, smoke systems and validation, verification, and accreditation.

Members of the Department of Defense, industry, academia, and allied nations are invited to attend.

Anyone who would like further information may call me at (804) 864-7604; FAX (804) 865-8721; or Van R. Jones, Technical Coordinator, commercial (410) 671-3668, DSN 584-3668, FAX (410) 671-3617.

LISA H. McCORMICK  
Symposium Coordinator  
Science and Technology Corporation  
Hampton, Virginia

### SHAEF/ETOUSA VETERANS ASSOCIATION

The 10th national reunion of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) will be held in San Diego, California, 7-10 October 1994.

SHAEF led the cross-channel invasion of Europe during World War II under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and ETOUSA was the Army's administrative headquarters during that war.

For additional information, write to me at 2301 Broadway, San Francisco, CA 94115; or call (415) 921-8322.

ALAN F. REEVES

# Our Address Has Changed!

## The new mailing address for INFANTRY is:

P.O. Box 52005

Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005