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locations. Short counts were conducted periodically through the night. All vehicles would run their engines for half an hour to charge the batteries and then use the thermal sights to sweep their section of the perimeter to pick up anything the guards may have missed with their AN/PVS-7s. After half an hour, all the vehicles were shut down and passive security was reestablished. To further enforce noise discipline, radio watch was conducted with the volume turned down as low as possible and the guard listening only to the hand mike.

Using these techniques, we lost no vehicles to the OPFOR while in an assembly area. Subsequent after-action reviews revealed that OPFOR assets had moved through the area of operations all night, often vainly attempting to find our vehicles. The OPFOR that did try to penetrate our assembly areas were soon identified and caught by the designated quick-reaction force.

**Force Sustainment and Logistics.** Refueling and resupply could not be conducted in the traditional way. Sel-dom was the entire company together

often enough for the executive officer and the first sergeant to bring logistical packages (LOGPACs) out in quantity. Differing mission requirements often dictated that platoons resupply whenever they could. They would meet at a company LOGPAC site, resupply, and then return to their separate missions. When such service station resupply operations were not possible, tailgate resupply had to be performed at various locations. Under such circumstances, the platoon leader or platoon sergeant who was not with the company main body had to coordinate directly for resupply. Convoy escort or road security missions would often take a platoon by the brigade support area (BSA), where it would enter and resupply directly from the source.

Since distances in a light infantry environment are compressed, from a mechanized infantry viewpoint, a Bradley platoon under the operational control of a light unit could coordinate to move back to the BSA and resupply there. Since most of the vehicle maintenance assets were there, the BSA was

also often an ideal location in which to perform maintenance. Under the conditions imposed by a LIC battlefield, platoon level initiative and flexibility are the keys to sustaining the ability to fight.

As light and heavy infantry units work more closely, there may be less separation between them in the near future. Many mechanized units are already changing their focus as they add operations in urban terrain to their METLs, rotate through the JRTC with a light brigade, or deploy on peacekeeping missions to various parts of the world. For the Bradley platoon, this means a nuts-and-bolts reassessment of the way it will fight—one that takes into account more independent operation, new types of missions and taskings, and closer working relationships with soldiers of other branches and specialties.

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# The Battalion Maintenance Officer In Civilian Support Operations

**CAPTAIN KURT A. SCHLICHTER**

In recent years, natural disasters and civil disturbances have shown that both Active Army and Reserve Component units must be prepared to carry out civilian support operations (CSOs). These are typically operations in which military forces are called upon to assist civilian emergency service personnel.

In recent years, both Active and National Guard units have deployed to

quell riots and to help in areas devastated by hurricane, flood, or earthquake. The units of the California Army National Guard were deployed throughout Los Angeles during the riots of 1992 and again following the earthquake in January 1994. (See previous *INFANTRY* articles, "The Los Angeles Riots: A Battalion Commander's Perspective," *January-February 1994*, and "Earth-

quake '94: Operations Other Than War," *November-December 1994*, both by Lieutenant Colonel William V. Wenger.) In each of these cases, units had to operate in an environment that was quite different from the traditional battlefield.

Like all the other staff officers, battalion maintenance officers (BMOs) have to adjust to this nontraditional battle-

field. Having served as BMO in the 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry, during the riots and after the earthquake, I would like to share a number of special considerations for the BMO in such operations:

**Dispersed Units.** Units are typically spread across a vast area, often in teams or squads, providing security at such places as banks, shopping malls, and relief centers. In this kind of environment, a battalion's support assets are stretched thin. During the mobilizations in Los Angeles, for example, units of my battalion were spread over hundreds of square miles at literally dozens of locations.

The BMO may be called upon to repair or recover vehicles in outlying positions 20 or 30 miles from the location of his maintenance assets. Maps are essential, even when Guardsmen are fairly familiar with the area of operations. Every vehicle must have a street map before it rolls.

**Combat Service and Combat Service Support.** The support elements a BMO normally relies on for support may not be available. Sometimes there are no Reserve or Active Army support forces in the area, or the first units mobilized are those that can have an immediate effect on the situation, such as infantry and military police, with support units to come later. Meanwhile, the BMO must rely on his own organic assets.

For this reason, the BMO must see that the basic parts load is always be up to date. Parts may be hard to get through normal Class IX channels. He may have to buy such common items as bolts and screws from civilian auto parts stores, either through authorized purchase or out of his own pocket. One alternative when the regular system is not responding is the state National Guard's technician maintenance system. With coordination, both Guard and Active units can use this valuable resource. One problem is that higher Class IX priorities may not be immediately authorized for units mobilized for CSOs. In an emergency, this authorization should be one of the first actions for

the command's logistics staff.

**Communications.** Communications are as critical to the BMO as to anyone else in a unit. The traditional FM communications equipment may not function well in an urban environment, and early in an emergency, civilian wire telephone systems are usually overloaded, if they are operating at all. After the earthquake, our battalion found that most of the phone lines in the area of the major damage were completely out. Many civilians were calling to check on relatives, including those serving at our armory; it was two days before someone trying to call back to the soldiers at the armory could be confident of getting through in only two or three tries. Maintenance assets operating from armory facilities have the same problems.

Cellular phones belonging to the soldiers themselves, along with civilian radio systems from the county government, provided the battalion with invaluable communications capabilities. But everyone wants access to such equipment when it becomes available, and the BMO must make sure he has at least one set for himself and one for a recovery team, making his case directly to the commander if necessary.

**Location of Maintenance Assets.** Doctrine clearly lays out where on the battlefield the maintenance assets should be located, but CSOs require more flexibility. The command post system changes dramatically, and rapidly changing areas of responsibility keep the staff constantly on the move. The BMO must do his best to select a stable, central location from which to operate.

During the earthquake mobilization, most of my maintenance assets remained at our armory, about 25 miles south of the battalion's main area of operations, using the organizational maintenance shop (OMS) facilities. Forward was a recovery team consisting of a wrecker, a parts truck, and my HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle), all with FM radios for short-range communications. The battalion maintenance technician and the communications repair sergeant also

came forward. I located the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) in the parking lot of a devastated shopping center that also served as a rally point and feeding point for troops rotating in and out of security missions. With most of the vehicles rotating past us at some point during each day, the recovery team could make small repairs or help operators with their own maintenance in the huge, empty lot. The battalion commander and the S-3 also used the lot as a command post, and being face to face with them made our communications considerably easier.

**Operator Maintenance.** Operator maintenance was critical to equipment readiness. Understanding that only proper preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) procedures and a strict adherence to regulations would ensure that readiness, the battalion commander ordered random checks of daily Department of the Army (DA) Forms 2404 (to ensure that PMCS was being done), DA Forms 1970 (to ensure that proper dispatch procedures were being carried out), and spot checks of operator licenses. Again, having the maintenance unit at the site eased this critical inspection process.

Local National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve armories may also have OMS facilities. Police and other municipal agencies often have motor pools with repair shops, and civilian facilities may be available as well. Garages and gasoline stations offer the advantage of state-of-the-art equipment and also such facilities as toilets, phones, and running water. Many owners are more than willing to have the soldiers in their facilities for the added security. In fact, many property owners came to us offering the use of their facilities during both activations.

**Recovery.** Our recovery missions generally came in by civilian radio or by messenger. Upon receipt of a request for support, we would evaluate the repair requirement with a view toward fixing the vehicle as far forward as possible. A contact team would then be dispatched with the tools and parts that might be required. In cases where evac-

uation was necessary, the vehicle would be returned by wrecker to the UMCP or to the OMS for more extensive service. This system helped put deadlined vehicles back on the road as soon as possible.

Later, when armored personnel carriers were pre-positioned at local armories in anticipation of a possible riot situation, the maintenance section made arrangements to use the transport trailers if recovery became necessary. Although it may seem obvious, a BMO must ensure that he is prepared to recover any equipment his unit might use; if buses are used, for example, a civilian wrecker may be needed, and such details should be worked out before mobilization.

The most difficult recovery operations take place in civil disturbance

operations. At some point, a vehicle may have to be recovered amid hostile civilians; television pictures of a military vehicle being burned may have a dramatic effect on public confidence and contribute to further lawlessness. Getting inoperative vehicles back to secure areas is therefore critical.

In our battalion, elements of the battalion scouts and mortars operated as a quick reaction force (QRF) under the control of the S-3. In anticipation of such contingencies, the QRF platoon leader and I created a tentative plan in which a recovery team, with security provided by elements of the QRF, would move in quickly and recover a damaged vehicle. The BMO should ensure that the forces selected to perform such a mission make this part of their CSO mission essential task list and train on it

before the need arises.

The keys to successful maintenance in civilian support operations are creativity on the part of the BMO and a dedication to proper maintenance on the part of every leader in the unit. The best repair is one that never has to be made, but when the maintenance section does have to swing into action, a little advance planning and coordination will pay off in terms of both safety and readiness.

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# Parallel Planning

## Managing the Information Flow

**MAJOR ANTHONY R. GARRETT**

The "information war" has been a subject of much discussion recently. To prepare for that war, the Army has implemented a strategy that will provide command, control, communications, and intelligence systems that are reliable in terms of the timeliness of information and the ease and speed of maintenance.

Viewed from a small-unit planning perspective, this strategy suggests that the decision making process will be compressed and the operational tempo accelerated as information becomes more readily available, thereby permitting faster analysis and execution. By implication, the time available under the one-third, two-thirds rule associated with sequential planning will decrease

without a corresponding reduction in requirements. In addition, information flow is likely to become continuous, in effect relegating sequential planning to a secondary role, except in the early stages of operations when enough planning time is available.

Given this situation, it is critical that the battalion commander and his staff implement a planning process that takes into account the implications of the information war. I believe a parallel planning process will be critical to success on tomorrow's battlefield.

Because parallel planning seeks to take advantage of the time available, all planners must proceed from a common understanding of a clearly

defined, achievable goal—the task and its purpose. The commander's intent establishes this common ground: It articulates the commander's vision of success, the effect of the operation on the enemy, and the end state following the operation; and it concludes by establishing the criteria for success and providing direction to leaders and planners.

Parallel planning, by both design and necessity, is continuous. It must have efficient communications and staff procedures to ensure a continuous exchange of information, both vertically and horizontally. The obvious danger of such a system is that the staff will flood the battalion and company commanders with information that is not critical to parallel