

BOOK REVIEWS



***D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II.* By Stephen E. Ambrose. Simon and Schuster, 1994. 656 Pages. \$30.00.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, United States Army, Retired.

Stephen Ambrose—a professor of history at the University of New Orleans, and Director of the Eisenhower Center and President of the National D-Day Museum in New Orleans—does what no other acknowledged military historian (to my knowledge, at least) has ever done: He heaps praise on the World War II United States infantryman. For this he has been roundly criticized by several reviewers.

True, in putting together this intensely personal story of the events of June 6, 1944, Ambrose does go overboard in his praise in spots (pages 262 and 360, for example). But the men who fought in Normandy—U.S., British, Canadian, and French soldiers, sailors, and coastguardsmen; fighter pilots and bomber crewmen—deserve Ambrose's praise and probably more. This is their story, told in their own words, a story that Ambrose ties together into a coherent whole.

Although Ambrose's main concentration is on the events of D-Day itself, including German actions and reactions at several levels, he does include several preparatory chapters in which he discusses the opposing forces, their commanders, and the planning and preparation phase of one of the great battles of the war. He also injects himself into the Montgomery controversy, which lingers to the present day.

Unfortunately, there are a number of errors in his narrative that simply should not be there:

- There were four, not two, U.S. divisions in England in early June 1944 that had seen combat—the two not mentioned were the 9th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions (page 48).

- His brief discussion of the Sicily campaign (page 60) is inaccurate as it pertains to the number of divisions involved on both sides.

- The 16th Infantry Regiment (page 140) belonged to the 1st Infantry Division and had seen action in North Africa and again in

Sicily. It moved with the division to England from Sicily early in 1944; it was far from being a johnny-come-lately regiment.

- The discussion of black units in World War I (page 147) is inaccurate.

- Colonel George Taylor commanded the 16th Infantry Regiment, not the 116th (page 404).

- The commander of the 1st Infantry Division was Major General, not Lieutenant General, Clarence Huebner (page 405).

- It was the Orne, not the Oran, Canal in the British sector (page 549).

Despite these errors, this book should be required reading at all levels of the Army's service school system, and at the higher level schools as well. If jointness is the name of the game today, there is no better publication than this one to point out the need for our services to work together for the common good. There are other lessons in its pages, particularly in the matter of leadership and the need on a battlefield to pick up the pieces and get on with the mission when things don't go right. The U.S. assault forces that landed on Omaha Beach suffered heavy losses; the assault forces of the 3d Canadian Division Juno Beach lost almost as heavily. But the survivors pressed on and, as a result, Stephen Ambrose had a great story to tell.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Audio tapes of this book, read by the author, are also available from Simon and Schuster. Six hours, four cassettes, \$25.00.)

***Abandoned by Lincoln: A Military Biography of General John Pope.* By Wallace J. Schutz and Walter N. Trenerry. University of Illinois Press, 1990. 243 Pages. \$32.50.** Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, U.S. Air Force, Retired.

The authors of this book claim Union General John Pope as the only commanding general of a major Union army who has not had a biography written about him. Although this is not true, it is a small inaccuracy in an otherwise good Civil War history.

John Pope, a graduate in the 1842 class at West Point, spent most of his pre-Civil War Army career on the frontiers of the Army's

enterprises. Commissioned as a topographical engineer, Pope participated in numerous explorations of the West as well as the active combat experiences of the Mexican War. Interestingly, the young officer had a bad habit of writing rather outspoken letters to high level civilian and military leaders outside his normal chain of command, which earned him unwanted attention on more than one occasion.

The Civil War saw Pope's first noteworthy success at the battle of Island No. 10 in the Mississippi River. Highlighted as an apparently successful general in an otherwise lackluster line of Northern military leaders, Pope was brought east to take up the fight in that theater. This Pope biography provides insights into the amazing role the political and strong personal affiliations of Northern military leaders played in the Civil War. For example, when many of General George McClellan's Army of the Potomac troops were taken from him on the Virginia Peninsula and sent to Pope's Army of Virginia, some of the subordinate leaders essentially refused to fight for Pope.

This book covers the eastern battles of Cedar Mountain, Groveton, and Second Manassas in which Pope led Union troops. After his failure in the East, Pope was sent back into the western theater where he spent the rest of the war and the rest of his 44-year Army career.

The book is supplemented by two appendixes—one on Fitz-John Porter's courts-martial for his refusal to fight under Pope at Second Manassas and the other on Pope's generalship.

Abandoned by Lincoln is a very worthwhile, compact biography on one of the succession of generals who fought in the Virginia theater of operations before Lincoln finally identified Grant as the man for the job. Pope's life story offers an interesting perspective into the Civil War as well as nearly half a century of the Army's history on America's frontiers.

***Imperial Warrior: The Life and Times of Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.* By Lawrence James. Weidenfeld and**

BOOK REVIEWS

Americans, whose "defeat" in Southeast Asia he assesses in rather simplistic terms. More than two dozen interesting photographs illustrate the text, but the sole map is inadequate and poorly drawn.

The experiences of Cross, one of the few British soldiers in Indochina after the end of World War II and probably the very last to leave the region three decades later, make interesting and thought-provoking reading. This well-written book is highly recommended.

DESERT STORM: The Gulf War and What We Learned. By Michael J. Mazarr, Don M. Snider, and James A. Blackwell, Jr. Westview Press, 1993. 207 Pages. \$33.00. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, United States Army, Retired.

The authors, all with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, state that their goal in writing this book is "to examine the lessons of the Gulf War from a high-level, strategic defense perspective." In general, they have met their goal. (One of the authors, James Blackwell, had already examined the war from a lower level in his 1991 book titled *Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War*, which was reviewed in *INFANTRY*'s May-June 1992 issue, page 49.)

They do subject a reader to a rather lengthy discussion of deterrent theory, after which they point out how the United States "bungled deterrence in classic fashion." They also devote a number of pages to a discussion of U.S. foreign policy, the debate in this country over the war, and "the failure of compellence"

Eventually, the authors do present their thoughts on the war itself and the lessons we learned from it. They discuss U.S. efforts to assemble a coalition of forces to drive Iraq from Kuwait; the air campaign; and the ground campaign. They conclude with a discussion of "the Gulf war and military strategy." Along the way, they point out lessons the U.S. learned as it went about the business of preparing for and then fighting the war. Among those lessons are the following:

- "There are real limits on what can be expected of guard and reserve forces. . . . Guard and reserve forces cannot be expected to be as deployable as active duty forces, and including them as part of rapid-deployment forces is a mistake."

- "The United States will be unable to perform any major contingency operation

without a substantial degree of assistance from other nations"

- "This war confirmed that the United States is the world's preeminent military power, politically and economically, however, it remains dependent on allies for legitimacy and assistance"

Considering the authors' goal, perhaps the most important chapter in their book is the last one, in which they list 10 "guiding principles for future U.S. defense policy." It alone may be worth the price of the book.

I have only one minor criticism to offer. The authors wrote this book sometime in 1992 and therefore used what I consider less than fully documented figures to determine losses inflicted on the Iraqis, particularly by coalition air forces. For example, they credit the air forces with "destroying 100 to 150 Iraqi tanks per day before the ground war started" (page 107) and destroying, overall, in six weeks, "thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces" and killing "perhaps tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers" (page 99). I don't believe these figures would hold up under closer scrutiny.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

Military Intelligence, 1870-1991: A Research Guide. By Jonathan M. House. Greenwood Press, 1993. 184 Pages. \$55.00.

Leading the Way: How Vietnam Veterans Rebuilt the U.S. Military: An Oral History. By Al Santoli. Ballantine, 1993. 448 Pages. \$23.00.

The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Selected Campaigns. By Herman L. Gilster. Air University Press, 1993. 138 Pages.

Mantle of Heroism: Turawa and the Struggle for the Gilberts, November 1943. By Michael B. Graham. Presidio Press, 1993. 376 Pages. \$24.95.

Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War I. By Leonard V. Smith. Princeton University Press, 1994. 274 Pages. \$35.00.

Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. By Rick Atkinson. Houghton-Mifflin, 1993. 595 Pages. \$24.95.

The Persian Gulf After the Cold War. Edited by M.E. Ahrari and James H. Noyes. Praeger Publishers, 1993. 264 Pages. \$57.95.

The 1,000 Hour War: Communication in the Gulf. Edited by Thomas A. McCain and Leonard Shyles. Greenwood press, 1993. Contributions in Military Studies, No. 148. 232 Pages. \$49.95.

No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War. By Rudi Tomedi. Wiley, 1993. 259 Pages. \$24.95.

Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challenge After the Cold War. Edited by Phebe Marr and William Lewis. Westview Press, 1993. 253 Pages. \$16.95, Softbound.

American National Security: Policy and Process. Fourth Edition. By Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb. Originally published in 1981. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. \$21.95, Softbound.

Security Studies for the 1990s. Edited by Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and Ted Green-

wood. Brassey's (US), 1993. 528 Pages. \$50.00.

Joint Military Operations: A Short History. By Roger A. Beaumont. Contributions in Military Studies, No. 139. Greenwood Press, 1993. 264 Pages. \$55.00.

Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder. Edited by Max G. Manwaring. Westview Press, 1993. 198 Pages. \$37.50, Softbound.

Sieges: A Comparative Study. By Bruce Allen Watson. Praeger Publishers, 1993. 192 Pages. \$49.95.

For Country, Cause & Leader: The Civil War Journal of Charles B. Haydon. By Stephen W. Sears. Tichnor & Fields, 1993. 371 Pages. \$25.00.

The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. By Robert Smith Thompson. Simon & Schuster, 1993. 344 Pages. \$14.00, Softbound.

How to Make War: Third Edition: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare in the Post-Cold War Era. By James F. Dunnigan. William Morrow, 1993. 622 Pages. \$15.00, Softbound.

The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982-February 1984. By Eric Hammel. A reprint of the 1985 hardcover edition. Pacifica Press, 1993. 448 Pages. \$17.95, Softbound.

The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War. By William V. Kennedy. Praeger Publishers, 1993. 184 Pages. \$45.00.

Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare From the Middle Ages to the Present. By John A. Lynn. Westview Press, 1993. 326 Pages. \$44.50.

Voices from Captivity: Interpreting the American POW Narrative. By Robert C. Doyle. University Press of Kansas, 1994. 370 Pages.

They Had a Dream: The Story of African-American Astronauts. By J. Alfred Phelps. Presidio Press, 1994. 304 Pages. \$24.95.

Commanding an Air Force Squadron. By Colonel Timothy T. Timmons, USAF. Air University Press, 1993. 126 Pages.

Convoy! Drama in Arctic Waters. By Paul Kemp. Sterling, 1994. 256 Pages. \$24.95.

Sky Battles: Dramatic Air Warfare Actions. By Alfred Price. Sterling, 1994. 176 Pages. \$24.95.

The War in the Mediterranean, 1940-1943. By Bernard Ireland. Sterling, 1994. 224 Pages. \$24.95.

The First World War. Eyewitness History Series. Facts On File, 1992. \$40.00.

The Vietnam War. Eyewitness History Series. Facts On File, 1992. \$40.00.

American Daughter Gone to War: On the Front Lines with an Army Nurse in Vietnam. By Winnie Smith. Pocket Books, 1994. 352 Pages. \$12.00.

1794: America, Its Army, and the Birth of the Nation. By Dave R. Palmer. Presidio Press, 1994. 312 Pages. \$24.95.

Let the Tiger Turn Tail. By Russell Spurr. Mainstream, 1993 (distributed by Trafalgar Square, North Pomfret, VT 05053). 203 Pages. \$34.95.

Soldiers of Misfortune: The Cold War Betrayal and Sacrifice of American POWs. By James D. Sanders, Mark Sauter, and R. Cort Kirkwood. Avon Books, 1994. \$5.50.

Voices from Captivity: Interpreting the American POW Narrative. By Robert C. Doyle. University Press of Kansas, 1994. 386 Pages. \$35.00.