
discoloration. Once this is done, move the furniture to the other side of the room and repeat the process. Then check all the walls the same way. Remove pictures, wall hangings, and rugs to check for holes. Look at the ceiling for openings to an attic or crawl space, and check these areas. Look for things that appear out of the ordinary. Once this is done, check the furniture, looking for false bottoms, ripped and re sewn areas in upholstery, and the like. Repeat these steps in each room of the target area. Take care not to dump items all over the place. This pollutes the area and makes it harder to search, and you might miss something or destroy property needlessly.

In some cases, the intimidation of the owner will lead him to "assist" you with the search. The MP dogs are good for this, as is finding the individual's most prized possessions and threatening to handle them roughly. Sometimes this is all it takes for the owner to show soldiers any hidden items.

When questioning individuals, know what you're looking for, and keep repeating the questions. Many Third World economies are based on a barter system in which transactions are conducted through involved conversations, and it should be no different in questioning a suspect. Although none existed in Haiti, sewer systems should not be overlooked in other countries.

Once the search is complete and all suspected individuals have been questioned or detained, U.S. forces should make every effort to return the location to the condition in which they found it. This includes replacing locks that have been cut. Because there is a potential power vacuum in OOTW situations, the interpreters and the PSYOPs team should warn the crowd not to take any action against the site owner's family and property. In these situations, our forces should cultivate as much good will as possible.

In many cases, a company team commander will not have all these assets available and will have to reshuffle the basic task organization to accomplish the mission. If there is only one mine detector, it should stay with the cordon team. If there is only one interpreter, he should remain with the security team, as should the CI team. If the company is lucky enough to have a sniper team attached, that team should be task organized with the security team. METT-T will dictate the best way to make up for any shortage of assets.

There is one other area that must be planned for: the news media. Positive control must be maintained so that their presence does not adversely affect the mission. Guidance from the SJA and the joint task force commander should help the team commander with this issue.

OOTW offers some interesting changes to the traditional cordon and search mission. The information we offer here can be used as a start point for commanders with no experience in this type of operation. Each commander can then modify it on the basis of his own IPB and analysis of METT-T.

In operations other than war, guidance from higher headquarters concerning the political and social situation should also guide the conduct of the operation. In Haiti, the mission was to promote a stable and secure environment, and properly conducted cordon and search missions did just that.

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Convoy Security

Using a Light Infantry Antiarmor Platoon

CAPTAIN JAMES SISEMORE

The current emphasis on operations other than war (OOTW) is appropriate. Convoy operations in OOTW has also attracted attention. (See "Convoy Plan-

ning," by Major Jeffrey J. Gudmens, and "Convoy Security Operations," by Major Martin N. Stanton in *INFANTRY*, January-February 1994.) The

need to transport food stuffs, medicines, and basic subsistence items safely has always been important, especially in a light battalion, where the

soldiers live off what they can carry and can't carry much.

To sustain the force, it is critical that supplies reach front-line units at least every three days. On today's battlefield, a light infantry battalion or brigade is often called upon to resupply itself from support areas well in the rear. In many units, the use of the antiarmor platoon in the convoy escort and security role has become the standard for resupply missions.

Unfortunately, the planning manual for platoon and company antitank operations—ARTEP 7-91-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Antiarmor Company/Platoon/Section*—does not offer any guidance for convoy security operations. After looking through several field manuals, I have identified a number of basic considerations for the conduct of such operations:

Upon receipt of the mission, the antiarmor platoon leader needs to conduct a mission analysis and task organize his platoon. The planning and preparation for the mission need to be approached in the same manner as for any other combat mission.

The number of vehicles in your platoon or company must also be considered. In my battalion, each antiarmor platoon has six vehicles with four M-966 armored or hardshell HMMWVs (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) and two M-998 cargo HMMWVs. The two cargo vehicles—the platoon leader and platoon sergeant vehicles—mount MK 19 automatic grenade launchers, while the four hardshell HMMWVs are broken down into two sections, with two of them mounting the M-2 .50 caliber machinegun and two mounting the TOW 2B missile launcher system with an M249 machinegun for support. Each section has one vehicle in each configuration.

The nature or type of the convoy you are assigned to secure, as well as the internal defense capabilities that the convoy may already have, will shape your plan for the mission. The standing operating procedure in my company has platoons broken down into three elements—the advance element, the

lead element, and the trail element. In an attempt to cross-load the firepower to support the convoy, platoons should be further broken down as follows:

The advance element is composed of one .50 caliber vehicle and one supporting TOW vehicle. It travels one to two minutes in front of the lead element to provide early warning. In this arrangement, the advance element has maximum firepower against a light or heavy armored threat. Although the TOW missile cannot always be fired accurately from a moving vehicle, the fact that a missile has been fired will distract the enemy and give the convoy time to maneuver to an alternate route if necessary.

The lead element, just in front of the first vehicle of the convoy, includes the platoon leader's vehicle with a MK 19 and the second vehicle with a .50 caliber machinegun. The lead element is mainly interested in navigating for the convoy and in defending the convoy against a dismounted threat. If the advance element detects enemy activity or makes contact, the lead element maneuvers the convoy to an alternate route.

The trail element of the convoy is

made up of the platoon sergeant's vehicle, mounting a MK 19, and the second TOW vehicle. This configuration enables the rear element to stall an armored or dismounted threat.

The next task after organizing the platoon is to conduct a route reconnaissance of the intended avenue of movement. The platoon leader designates a section (two vehicles) to conduct the reconnaissance. First, the platoon leader, with the assistance of his section leaders, conducts a map reconnaissance of tentative primary and alternate routes. During this map reconnaissance, he briefs the section leader on control measures, including checkpoints, phase lines, and planned indirect fires. Possible ambush sites at bottleneck points along the route (such as road and stream intersections) are also identified for inspection during the route reconnaissance. Any minefields or suspected minefields are marked and bypassed by the reconnaissance section. Alternate routes are also identified, marked, and briefed to the platoon leader when the reconnaissance element returns. Once the section leader has been briefed and all his questions have



The HMMWV's ability to mount a variety of weapons makes it an excellent convoy security asset.

been answered, he is released to brief his element and conduct the reconnaissance.

As the designated reconnaissance section prepares for its mission, the platoon leader can move the rest of the platoon to the pickup point for the convoy. It is here that the platoon leader can brief the rest of his platoon on the mission.

At the pickup point, the platoon leader should coordinate with the releasing unit commander and the convoy commander (often the support platoon leader or sergeant). The platoon leader briefs the tentative route (not yet confirmed by the route reconnaissance section), the march speed, the interval between vehicles, indirect fires available, actions on contact (including ambushes, indirect fire, and air attack), actions at planned and unplanned halts, and the communications plan (frequencies or fills to be used, or simple hand-and-arm signals when radio communications are not available).

When the reconnaissance element returns from its mission, the section leader and the platoon leader confirm or change the route, phase lines, checkpoints, and planned rally points. While on the reconnaissance, the reconnaissance section also identifies any road obstructions, possible ambush sites, suspected and confirmed mined areas, and an estimated driving time between pickup and release points. Any changes to the planned route are identified and briefed to the convoy commander. Time also needs to be allocated for dissemination to the convoy drivers.

If time permits, a rehearsal of actions at halts and upon contact should be conducted on the way to the release point. A final radio check should also be made during this period.

As the convoy moves out, the advance party (usually the reconnaissance section) should move out as planned. The distance this element moves depends upon an analysis of METTT (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). Even with the firepower the advance element has, it needs to maintain a position close enough to the main body to allow mutual supporting fires

from other vehicles in the escort platoon, if necessary.

During movement, the advance party needs to be prepared to identify and mark any minefields that may have been emplaced since the reconnaissance element went through the area. All minefields need to be marked, their locations radioed to the convoy main body, and then by-passed (an antiarmor platoon is not equipped or trained to breach a minefield). The security of the convoy is the platoon's primary concern.

If the advance element encounters a minefield, the element needs to establish a by-pass route and identify it to the main body of the convoy. Once the minefield has been confirmed, the platoon leader must notify his chain of command of its location, size, and composition.

Once the convoy has begun moving, the platoon leader, at the head of the convoy, sets the march speed. He also monitors the distance between the lead element and the advance element, using checkpoints and phase lines.

It is the platoon leader's responsibility to keep higher headquarters informed of the status and position of the convoy. Checkpoints and phase lines need to be radioed to headquarters, just as a rifle company reports its movement.

The platoon sergeant, at the rear of the convoy, maintains accountability for vehicles during movement. He is also responsible for ensuring that a proper interval is maintained between convoy vehicles and for the rear security of the convoy during movement. At all scheduled and unscheduled halts, the platoon sergeant makes sure that the escort element is maintaining overall security and that convoy vehicle drivers are maintaining local security. The platoon sergeant is also responsible for coordinating vehicle recovery operations with the dispatching convoy commander, if the assets are available.

As the convoy nears its destination, the platoon leader calls ahead to ensure that the receiving unit is alerted to the convoy's impending arrival. Once the convoy has arrived at the release point,

the platoon leader coordinates with the receiving unit and either sets up a planned security halt to displace cargo or turns over control of the convoy to the receiving unit representative.

Two other considerations will assist in the security and protection of a convoy: One is to conduct resupply convoys only at night. While this increases the stress on the drivers, who may not have worked together at night, it will increase the security for the move. The second consideration is to sandbag the floorboards of the vehicles. If a vehicle hits a mine, it will be damaged to some extent, but the crew is likely to sustain less serious injuries, depending on the type of mine.

Several manuals give a basic overview of convoy operations, including ARTEP 7-94-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the HHC and CS/CSS Platoons*, page 5-9; ARTEP 19-77-30-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Military Police Company*, page 5-61; and Field Manual 19-4, *Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations*, pages 33, 48, 62, 70, and 139-145. But these manuals do not give a security element specified tasks for conducting such an operation.

ARTEP 7-91-MTP contains no mission plan at all for convoy security operations. This appears to me to be a major deficiency in the antiarmor MTP, considering the extent to which a light infantry battalion calls upon its antiarmor assets to conduct these operations. Overall, ARTEP 7-94-MTP gives the best outline for the antiarmor platoon to follow in conducting convoy security operations, and with proper, timely planning, supply convoys can receive the degree of security necessary to let them accomplish their mission.

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