

BOOK REVIEWS



Over the past few months, *INFANTRY* has received several reference works that should be both interesting and useful:

Medal of Honor Recipients 1863-1994. Compiled by George Lang, Raymond L. Collins, and Gerard White. Facts on File, 1995. Two volumes, 896 Pages. \$99.00, Hardcover. Published in honor of the 50th Anniversary of the end of World War II, this two-volume work is organized chronologically by war, conflict, or campaign, and lists the name of each Medal of Honor recipient along with his rank and organization, place and date of birth, the date he entered the service, and the complete award citation.

These citations were originally published in a softbound edition that has been out of print for many years. In these volumes, that edition is updated to include the two recipients from Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia and printed in handsomely designed hardcover volumes.

Great Battles and Leaders of the Second World War. By Winston S. Churchill. Introduction by John Keegan. Edited by Giordano Bruno Guerri. Houghton Mifflin, 1995. 328 Pages. \$40.00. This volume gathers selections from Churchill's epic six-volume history, *The Second World War*. It covers battles and leaders in roughly equal proportions, contains 465 photographs and 24 maps, and provides behind-the-scenes details as only Churchill could have related them.

The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West. Edited by Geoffrey Parker. Printed in Great Britain by Cambridge University Press, 1995. 408 Pages. \$39.95, Hardcover. Editor Geoffrey Parker is Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University. As he says in his preface, "This volume follows the format of other Cambridge Illustrated Histories in that pictures and text both seek to tell the

same story in parallel." It is highly readable and contains numerous black and white and color photographs and maps.

Handbook on German Military Forces. U.S. War Department. Introduction by Stephen E. Ambrose. Louisiana State University Press, 1995. 635 Pages. \$29.95. This handbook was one of a series of studies of foreign military forces prepared during World War II, designated War Department Technical Manual (TM-E) 30-451, (1945). At the end of the war, a few copies were placed in military library collections and the rest discarded. The manual was originally printed in loose-leaf format with each chapter standing alone, so that additional material could be added. A publisher's note states, "The volume has been officially released from restricted status by the U.S. Army Center for Military History."

Handbook on Japanese Military Forces. U.S. War Department. Introduction by David Isby, and Afterword by Jeffrey Ethell. Originally published by Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal, Ltd., in 1991. Louisiana State University Press, 1995. 403 Pages. \$24.95. This handbook was printed as War Department Technical Manual (TM-E) 30-480 in 1941 and distributed to U.S. Army officers in the Pacific Theater. Throughout the war, additional information was included as it became available. Since that time, it has become the best single reference source on the wartime Japanese military available in English.

Japan's Secret War. By Robert K. Wilcox. Marlowe and Company, 1995. 268 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

This is the same book first published in 1985, except for a 27-page epilogue and a list of sources for the material in

the epilogue. It is the story of Japan's World War II efforts to develop an atomic bomb, or *genzai bakudan* in Japanese.

Using primary and secondary sources, plus interviews with both Japanese and U.S. scientists, Robert Wilcox, a journalist and novelist, weaves a most interesting and easy to read story. He describes the work of such well-known Japanese scientists as Yoshio Nishina, Japan's foremost physicist at the time; Bunsaku Arkatsu, a former pupil of Albert Einstein; and Tsunesaburo Asada, then head of Osaka University's physics department. Many more Japanese scientists are identified in the book as having worked on the atom bomb project.

The fact that Japan was trying to develop an atom bomb during the war is no secret, but Wilcox attempts to answer four specific questions in his book: How far had the Japanese effort progressed before the end of the war? Did Japan actually perfect and test an atomic bomb on 12 August 1945, as was reported in an Atlanta newspaper in 1946? Did they know about our Manhattan Project? And, finally, why did our government appear so reluctant to release information about the Japanese project in the years after the war?

In preparation for the reissue of his book, Wilcox hoped to find new sources of information, items that may have been downgraded in classification since his early research efforts. He did find a few items that corroborated parts of the earlier work, and this is the material in the epilogue to this book.

Wilcox concludes that while "there is not enough evidence yet to believe the Japanese made an atomic bomb" before the end of the war, they "went a lot farther in their program than those in the know, if they are still alive, have told the outside world." He also believes the Japanese "are not solely the victims of the bomb, as they have been portrayed for so

long. They were willing participants in its use, and only losers in the race to perfect it.”

In developing his thesis concerning what the Japanese knew about the Manhattan Project, Wilcox tells of the “TO” spy network in the United States, which was headed by a Spanish citizen, Angel Alcazar de Velasco—a former bullfighter and adventurer who hated the U.S., who had been trained in Germany, and who had worked as a spy for Germany in London. Wilcox believes this network did develop some information about the Manhattan Project and pass the information to Japan, for whom it was working at the time.

Finally, Wilcox believes the U.S. government deliberately covered up Japan’s atomic research efforts during World War II just as it had collaborated in keeping secret for many years Japan’s biological warfare research efforts during the war years. He attributes the beginnings of these efforts to General Douglas MacArthur. He says MacArthur was concerned with forging “a workable governing system in Japan while at the same time [lifting] his defeated subjects out of the postwar mire and into a bulwark against communism,” and that “he tried hard not to needlessly antagonize them.”

I recommend this book most highly. It certainly sheds new light on the realities of the world as they were in 1945, realities that resulted in our use of the first atomic bomb.

***A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Huertgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944-1945.* By Edward G. Miller. Texas A&M Press, 1995. 250 Pages. \$33.85.** Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army.

The battles in the Huertgen Forest and the Roer River dams were some of the most hard-fought of World War II. In the words of one veteran, the infantry combat was nothing less than “pure, unadulterated hell.” According to the author of this book, Edward G. Miller, the struggle was also characterized by inept operational planning by the leaders of the First U.S. Army and its corps, mental exhaustion throughout the ranks, and poor

communication and logistical services.

In what is sure to be a controversial analysis of the campaign in late 1944 and early 1945, Miller contends that the failure of American leaders to target the dams was “inexcusable.” In researching his topic, the author—himself an active duty Army ordnance officer—draws upon operational and unit reports, combat interviews, official records, and a host of additional primary sources. He freely admits that this book is a result of his desire to produce as complete an account as possible of the activities at company, battalion, and regiment levels.

In September 1944 elements of Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges’ First Army entered the Huertgen Forest on its way to secure crossing sites on the Rhine. To reach the Rhine, however, the Americans had to cross the Roer River and the forest was blocking access to it. What had begun as a continuation of the pursuit across France, however, quickly became a battle of attrition in terrain that favored the German defenders.

Nothing had prepared the American soldiers for the type of forest fighting they experienced. Tactical problems were complicated when commanders and staff members failed to recognize that the significant operational objectives were not the road junctions and towns but the Roer River dams that controlled the routes to the Rhine. Miller alleges that the tragedy of the ensuing battles was the Americans’ insistence on trading their tactical advantages in firepower and mobility for the wrong objectives.

It was two months into the battle before senior American commanders—chiefly Hodges and VII Corps commander J. Lawton Collins—directed the capture of the dams. By then, division after division of U.S. soldiers had entered a deadly battle of attrition, and casualties were appalling. Not until February 1945 was First Army able to secure the dams and with confidence put troops on the east bank of the Roer.

Miller’s analysis of the campaign will not sit well with the veterans of the Huertgen battles. His criticism of senior commanders echoes that of historian Russell Weigley who has charged Eisenhower, Bradley, and Hodges with “a pattern of uninquisitive headquarters plan-

ning.” Still, the reader should try not to be overly critical of the decisions made in the heady days of 1944. Hindsight has its inherent advantages, but it generally fails to take into account the pressures of battle and the physical and emotional strain of the operational commanders.

In the final analysis, Miller leaves little doubt that he considers the Huertgen battles an American failure and a German success. Miller states that, if there is a lesson for future leaders, it is the need to identify the critical objectives and to focus energy toward gaining them; the destruction of the enemy force should always receive greater emphasis than the seizure of terrain. Perhaps. But a more valuable lesson is still the requirement to train soldiers to perform effectively in all types of terrain and under a variety of circumstances.

***Osage General: Major General Clarence L. Tinker.* By James L. Crowder, Jr. Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, 1987. 394 Pages.** Reviewed by Dr. Ralph W. Widener, Jr., Dallas, Texas.

James L. Crowder, Jr.—Chief, Office of History, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma—has written a compelling biography of the man for whom the base was named.

Clarence L. Tinker, one-eighth Osage Indian, was born in 1887 north of Pawhuska in the Osage Nation, 20 years before Oklahoma became a state. He attended the Osage Boarding School in Pawhuska, where he quickly distinguished himself by his personal bearing and his membership in the school’s crack drill squad. In the Fall of 1906 he entered Wentworth Military Academy in Missouri and graduated 19th in a class of 34. His first assignment was to the Philippine Constabulary to help maintain law and order in that nation.

In 1912, he accepted a commission as a second lieutenant in the Regular Army of the United States and reported to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for a three-month “course of preliminary instruction” at the Infantry Center. He then joined the 25th Infantry—one of the black regiments re-

maining from those established by Congress in 1866—at Fort George Wright at Spokane, Washington; shortly thereafter, the 25th was transferred to the Hawaiian Islands, and Schofield Barracks was home for the next four years. At the end of that time, he received orders that would remove him from Hawaii for 25 years.

Although Tinker hoped for orders to a unit engaged in the war in Europe, it never happened. Because of his stellar performance as an infantry officer, he was promoted to the rank of captain in May 1917. Almost a year later, he was promoted to major and ordered to Camp Travis, Texas (a part of what is now Fort Sam Houston at San Antonio).

Various other assignments followed, but in the fall of 1920, he was detailed to the young Air Service (which had been formally made a combat arm of the U.S. Army in June of that year), completed flight schooling in California, and then reported to Fort Sill for the course of instruction at the Air Service Observation School. In January 1922, he was assigned to the 16th Observation Squadron at Fort Riley, Kansas, to work with the cavalry.

After graduating from the Army's Command and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1926, he served as a military attache in the U.S. embassy in London; as assistant commandant of the Air Corps Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas; and as commander of the new MacDill Air Base at Tampa, Florida. He received his first star in October 1940.

General Tinker was playing golf on the MacDill course when he was notified that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. Among those relieved of command as a result was Major General Frederick L. Martin, commander of the Army Air Corps there. Tinker was assigned to replace him on 14 January 1942 and gained his second star.

When intelligence cryptographers intercepted a secret Japanese message containing plans for an attack on Midway Island and part of Alaska's Aleutian chain, all available aircraft in the Hawaiian command prepared for the attack.

As the Marines and Navy prepared their defenses for Midway, Tinker's Seventh Air Force also made plans. Tinker put forward his own ideas for a U.S. offen-

sive raid, knowing he had four LB-30s ("Liberator" bombers) on the runway at Hickam Field. During the battle, according to Crowder, the Seventh Air Force "carried out 16 B-17 attacks (55 sorties) and one torpedo attack by four B-26s...[claiming] 22 hits on ships and 10 enemy fighters shot down."

After Midway, Tinker prepared to lead a flight of "Liberator" bombers in a pre-dawn raid on Wake Island. They would go to Midway first and take on as much fuel as possible "so they could fly the 2,500 miles to Wake and return." He reasoned that such an attack would disrupt Japanese stability in the Central Pacific. It was a calculated risk, but one worth taking.

In the late evening of 5 June, four bombers—with Tinker aboard one of them—took off on the first leg of their journey, landing on Midway early the next morning. The bombers were filled with fuel and equipment was checked and rechecked. When darkness came, the planes lifted off, needing every foot of runway, and flew into an overcast at 6,000 feet. About 40 minutes later, Tinker's plane lagged, lost altitude, nosed into the overcast, and disappeared. Neither the plane nor any of its crew was ever seen again.

Crowder's book belongs in the library of every military enthusiast who is interested in what garrison life was like on an infantry post or an air base during the first half of the 20th century. And both groups would profit from reading about what happened in the Pacific, especially from an Air Force point of view, between the attack on Pearl Harbor and to the first week in June 1942.

***Churchill's Deception: The Dark Secret That Destroyed Nazi Germany.* By Louis C. Kilzer. Simon & Schuster, 1994. 335 Pages. \$23.00.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army.

After Rudolf Hess's incredible and seemingly bizarre lone flight to Scotland on 10 May 1941, Adolf Hitler disavowed all knowledge of his deputy's action. He also said that Hess was "the victim of hallucinations" and his flight was the result

of "mental derangement."

But was it? Journalist and investigative reporter Louis C. Kilzer has shown—mainly through the synthesis of previously published items—that Hitler did everything possible to avoid war with Great Britain. One of the keystones of Hitler's political philosophy and foreign policy, as enunciated in *Mein Kampf*, was to coexist peacefully with Great Britain. Germany would allow Great Britain continued mastery of the seas and its colonies, in exchange for free rein to expand eastward in quest of *Lebensraum* (living space).

The September 1939 German and Soviet attack on Poland was followed by the "Phoney War" of inactivity. Behind the scenes, however, myriad negotiations took place involving neutral nations' businessmen, secret agents and soldiers, and Vatican representatives. After the May 1940 German blitzkrieg into France, Hitler apparently permitted the British Expeditionary Force to escape from Dunkirk as a sign of his continued willingness to make peace with Britain. Although the Germans bombed England, no serious invasion attempts were made. There was correspondence, purportedly between Hess and the aviator Duke of Hamilton, who was thought to be a leader of the British "Peace Party." (As the hereditary Lord Steward to the King, the Duke was thought to have special access to the monarch.) But Hess's letters were intercepted by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), which responded encouragingly.

This, according to Kilzer, was "Churchill's Deception." But all this is nothing new. Richard Deacon's 1969 book, *A History of the British Secret Service* (a source not listed in Kilzer's bibliography), describes this ploy in detail. Deacon attributes the SIS ruse primarily to Ian Fleming—Assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence and creator of James Bond—who masterminded an unofficial effort to supply Hess with bogus horoscopes. An unusual conjunction of planets was predicted for 10 May 1941, making this a highly propitious time for Hess to embark on his sanctioned peace mission.

Whereas Hitler undoubtedly knew of his protege's plans, there is much doubt that Churchill was privy to all the schemes

involved in luring Hess to England, as Kilzer asserts. The last German aerial blitz of England also took place the day of Hess's flight. With the apparent failure of Hess's mission, Hitler then turned his full attention to the east and attacked the Soviet Union the following month.

The book's dust jacket boasts that "Kilzer has uncovered documentation which exposes this great and untold story, adding a new dimension to the legacy of Winston Churchill." Although an interesting and fast-paced book, it cannot live up to this claim. Perhaps the greatest deception was one perpetrated upon the author himself, for believing—and wanting others to believe—that he was the first to reveal this "dark secret."

***Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds.* By Richard A. Hunt. Westview Press, 1995. 352 Pages. \$34.95** Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

Lyndon Johnson called it "the other war"; actually it was *the* war. Unless the government of South Vietnam could establish its legitimacy, provide security for the population and win the loyalty of the citizenry, the massive military effort was in vain. The various efforts over the years to "win hearts and minds" were referred to as "pacification." There are some excellent studies on the component elements of pacification or on the effort in a particular province, often by participants (such as the books by Eric Bergerud, Stuart Herrington, Orrin DeForest, Dale Andrade, William Colby, Robert Komer, John Cook, F.J. West, Jeffrey Race, and Thomas Scoville), but this is the first comprehensive study of the entire pacification effort.

The author of this book, Dr. Richard Hunt, served as an Army Captain with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and has been with the Army's Center for Military History (CMH) since then. Years of research in the extensive archives of CMH, the Johnson Library, and other centers are the basis of this exhaustive account. Hunt details the rise of

insurgency and early pacification efforts by South Vietnamese and American military and civilian agencies; the origins of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS); its struggles, successes, and failures; evaluations of the various allied programs such as Phoenix; the interplay with the military effort; the end of the experiment; and the heritage of CORDS' unique blending of military and civilian programs and personnel.

Throughout the book, Hunt's assessments are judicious and well supported. In line with the earlier works by Dale Andrade and Orrin DeForest, he accurately describes the Phoenix program as one that never reached its maximum potential rather than the sinister caricature depicted by other commentators. Hunt considers CORDS a success and, for all its problems, a model for the future. But the problems with which it grappled were too much to overcome: the systematic problems of the South Vietnamese political culture and process, the intractableness and relentlessness of the enemy, and the misconceptions of the allied military effort. The coordinated pacification effort came too late, and it would have taken too long to achieve ultimate success. Even if the conditions had been better, the patience of the U.S. populace and the political support for the war inevitably would have been exhausted before the pacification effort could have achieved ultimate victory.

Pacification is not a book for the novice, nor is it the most exciting treatise on the war. But for serious students of the conflict, it is a model study and one of the best, most essential books I have read on the Vietnam War.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

***Getting it Right: American Military Reforms After Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond.* By James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia. (Published in hardcover in 1993.) William Morrow, 1995. 320 Pages. \$15.00, Softbound.**

***Prisoners of Honor: The Dreyfus Affair.* By David Levering Lewis. (Published in hardcover in 1973 by William Morrow.) Henry Holt, 1994. 346 Pages. \$12.00, Softbound.**

Shooting Blanks: War Making That Doesn't

***Work.* By Nicholas Scibetta. (Published in hardcover in 1991.) William Morrow, 1995. 513 Pages. \$15.00, Softbound.**

***Inside Hanoi's Secret Archives: Solving the MIA Mystery.* By Malcolm McConnell. Simon & Schuster, 1995. 462 Pages. \$25.00.**

***Mike Force.* By Lt. Col. L.H. "Bucky" Burruss, U.S.A., Retired. (Originally published in 1989.) Pocket Books, 1995. 256 Pages. \$5.50, Softbound.**

***Women Marines in the Korean War Era.* By Peter A. Soderbergh. Praeger, 1994. 216 Pages. \$45.00.**

***The Great Raid on Cabanatuan: Rescuing the Doomed Ghosts of Bataan and Corregidor.* By William B. Breuer. Wiley, 1994. 288 Pages. \$27.95.**

***Military Leaders of World War II.* By Walter Oleksy. American Profiles Series. Facts on File, 1994. 160 Pages. \$17.95.**

***Encyclopedia of Modern U.S. Military Weapons.* By Colonel Timothy M. Laur and Stephen L. Llanso. Edited by Walter J. Boyne. Berkley, 1995. 496 Pages. \$39.95.**

***Nuts! The Battle of the Bulge: The Story and Photographs.* By Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, and J. Michael Wenger. Brassey's, 1994. 192 Pages. \$30.00.**

***Confederate Raider: Raphael Semmes of the Alabama.* By John M. Taylor. Brassey's, 1994. 336 Pages. \$24.95.**

***Out of Uniform: A Career Transition Guide for Ex-Military Personnel.* By Harry N. Drier, Jr. NTC Publishing (4255 West Touhy Avenue, Lincolnwood, IL 60464-1975), 1995. 256 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.**

***On Infantry.* By John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson. (Revised edition of the 1984 softcover edition by John A. English, originally published as *A Perspective on Infantry* in 1981.) Praeger, 1994. 216 Pages. \$18.95, Softbound.**

***Thrilling Days in Army Life.* By General George A. Forsyth. (Originally published by Harper & Brothers, 1900.) University of Nebraska Press, 1994. 198 Pages. \$8.95, Softbound.**

***Rudder's Rangers: The True Story of the 2nd Ranger Battalion D-Day Combat Action.* By Ronald L. Lane. (Reissue of the 1979 edition.) Ranger Associates, Inc. (620 Douglas Avenue, Suite 1312, Altamonte Springs, FL 32714), 1995. 201 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.**

***Through Hell and High Water: The Wartime Memories of a Junior Combat Infantry Officer.* By Lieutenant Colonel Leslie W. Bailey, U.S. Army, Retired. Vantage Press, 1994. 198 Pages. \$16.95, Hardcover.**

***Tail of the Storm.* By Alan Cockrell. University of Alabama Press, 1995. 248 Pages. \$24.95, Softbound.**

***United States Army Logistics: The Normandy Campaign, 1944.* By Steve R. Waddell. Contributions in Military Studies, Number 155. Greenwood, 1994. 216 Pages. \$55.00.**

***German Battle Tactics on the Russian Front, 1941-1945.* By Steven H. Newton. Schiffer Publications, Ltd. (77 Lower Valley Rd., Atglen, PA 19310), 1994. 272 Pages. \$24.95.**

***Richthofen: Beyond the Legend of the Red Baron.* By Peter Kilduff. John Wiley, 1994. 288 Pages. \$27.95.**

***When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944-January 1945.* By Keith E. Bonn. Presidio, 1994. 288 Pages. \$24.95.**

***MIA Rescue: LRRP Manhunt in the Jungle.* By Gregg P.J. Jorgenson. Paladin, 1995. 280 Pages. \$29.95.**