


Riot Control for the 1990s



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In the past five years, U.S. soldiers and marines have been called upon to conduct riot control and quell civil unrest in five different countries, including our own. The injury of almost 200 soldiers by Cuban detainees in Panama is only one in a series of particularly violent riots involving military forces.

Unfortunately, most of our riot-control doctrine is still based on the 1960s civil disturbances in the United States. In these riots, military force (when it was used at all) was seen as an adjunct to civil authority. Some were merely large political demonstrations that got out of hand; others were more spontaneous acts of rage and anarchy, but they were only peripher-

ally violent toward the forces of authority. In the Third World of the 1990s and beyond, this may not always be the case.

The following characteristics are likely to influence riot control in the future:

Riots will normally be massive in scope. In our recent experience in Somalia, we faced riots consisting of thousands of people, if not tens of thousands. And in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, literally whole communities took part in resistance to riot-control forces. The fighting between the Zulus and supporters of the African National Congress is another example of the scale of many Third World riots. Situations in

which rioters significantly outnumber riot control forces are the norm rather than the exception.

Riots will be more lethal. Unlike many of the U.S. riots in the 1960s, and even the Los Angeles riots of 1992, many Third World riot situations involve masses of people who are clearly out to do each other harm; what looks like rioting is, in fact, a form of warfare. These conflicts can be between political factions (as in northern Ireland), tribal factions (Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi), religious factions (India, Pakistan), or any combination of these. Quite frequently, the ire and lethal intent of all factions is redirected when our forces try to intercede.

If experience in the past five years is any indication, forces deployed to low-intensity conflict or operations other than war (OOTW) situations are likely to participate in both riot control and some level of guerrilla warfare, often at the same time and place.

Units will have to react to both lethal and non-lethal acts of violence toward them. In Somalia, for example, soldiers had to contend with gunmen as well as rioters who were throwing rocks and attacking them with hand implements. Troops more than once found themselves pushing and butt-stroking their way through rioting Somalis to catch gunmen who had attacked them. The combination of lethal and non-lethal violence on the same riot scene makes response much more complex.

Riots will be more organized. Instead of being spontaneous outbursts of popular rage, many riots will be well organized by factional leaders, with designated chains of command and specific instructions to subordinate elements. Command and control among them is accomplished by runners, or through local telephones, cellular phones, or hand-held radios.

Rioters can be broken down into three basic groups: armed fighters, semi-armed rioters, and unarmed supporters:

Armed fighters are made up of a relatively small cadre of men with small arms and various hand-held antitank or anti-aircraft weapons. They can also have heavier weapons (as do General Aideed's militia in Somalia or the Bosnian Serbs). These fighters often display a high degree of sophistication in their tactics and should not be underestimated.

Semi-armed rioters, which constitute the majority of rioters encountered, normally consist of younger men, older boys, and some women, normally armed with non-lethal weapons—clubs, sticks, and tools—as well as knives and spears. These are used to attack or harass other factions and riot-control forces and to create gaps or find weaknesses through which gunmen can move.

Unarmed supporters, in numbers equal to or greater than the semi-armed group, act as a living screen around their armed and semi-armed fighters. They are not normally active in the fighting, other than to throw rocks. They will scatter if fired upon, and their presence in the riot causes confusion—which is the intent.

It cannot be overemphasized that all three of these groups normally operate through an identified and accepted chain of command, whether it is familial (tribal), religious, or political.

Riots may involve large numbers of women and children. Many of our potential adversaries—understanding only too well our reluctance to injure women and children (or even to search

or detain them)—often capitalize on this by using women and children to screen the movement of fighters or gunmen.

Factions in Somalia, for example, used large groups of women and children among their supporters to screen the movement of gunmen or grenade throwers. A group of 200 or so women could hide up to a dozen gunmen, as shown in Figure 1. We can expect this tactic to be used in the future in other places in the world. Urban guerrillas also use women to plant bombs, transport guns to assassins, and reconnoiter.

Riots will occur where there is no government and no law. Even a riot as massive as the one in Los Angeles in 1992 eventually yielded to the rule of law. To be sure, not all rioters were caught and prosecuted, but many were. They were apprehended by law enforcement, National Guard, and active duty military personnel and turned over to local authorities for detention. The rule of law, although challenged, still existed. In a failed nation, however, there is no rule of law.

One of the greatest problems in Somalia was what to do with an apprehended gunman or rioter once he was in custody. Who took charge of him? Neither of the major UN headquarters in Somalia had enough detention facilities to keep more than a fraction of the rioters or gunmen they captured. Often, there was nothing to do but let them go. At best, they could be taken to another town and dropped off in the hope that it would take them a few days to get back and start their mischief again.

Coalition forces involved in riot control will have differing standards. U.S. forces will often be involved in riot situations alongside the forces of other nations. Many of our coalition partners will not have the same perspective on riot control that we have—minimum or non-lethal use of force—and this can have awkward results. For example, if a youth throws a rock at a truck or a checkpoint, we would ignore him or, at worst, subject him to a little pepper spray (if he's close enough) or maybe some rubber bullets. Our rules of engagement (ROEs) do not normally consider a single rock-thrower a threat that merits lethal response. In other nations, however, throwing a rock at a soldier can get a person shot. Soldiers from these




Figure 1

other nations therefore may feel no constraint in applying the same rules to people of other countries when deployed as part of a coalition force. This inconsistency of national response can be disruptive to the coalition effort.

A set of coalition ROEs must therefore be developed and closely followed. When agreement cannot be reached on certain aspects of the use of lethal force, it is better to use one nation's soldiers to conduct riot-control missions in a given area while the other nation's soldiers are used for other tasks—reaction force, perimeter guard, or convoy security.

Organizing to Meet the Threat

Since many Third World riot situations involve lethal and non-lethal violence at the same time, the most important weapons and other items of equipment are those that apply in both spheres of conflict. Rifles with fixed bayonets are an example of this, as are barbed wire, riot-control agents, and body armor. And these are all things that we would normally include when deploying to a low-intensity conflict environment anyway.

I have included riot-control agents in this list because few guerrilla movements have access to enough protective masks, and the use of chemical agents can reduce rioters' effectiveness, especially in situations where they have been trapped in a specific area and need to be flushed out. And we cannot be blind to the possible application of riot-control agents to lethal (combat) situations.

Some items that are used in riot control in the United States have no place on the streets of Third World cities. Obviously, the riot baton and shield have limited utility in an environment that could, at any moment, present deadly combat with small arms. Nor would face shields be useful, because they would interfere with firing and individual movement. Although the

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helmet protects against rocks, blows, and bullets, the improved body armor worn by the Rangers in Mogadishu is not as effective in hand-to-hand fighting as the older body armor with the collar and the shoulder plates. The new version stops bullets much better but doesn't cover as much body area.

Ideally, we should (at least initially) stick to equipment that has practical application in both lethal and non-lethal force situations: Rifles and bayonets instead of shields and riot sticks; barbed wire and chemical riot agents. Small specialty items such as the M33A1 and M5 dispensers might also be deployed initially when space is available. A good rule-of-thumb when task organizing a force is always to address the *lethal* threat first, even if it is significantly smaller than a non-lethal threat.

In more specific riot situations (those with a lower level of lethal threat but a high degree of physical violence), special-

ized equipment that has a violent but non-lethal effect on rioters can be useful. The following are some examples of this type of equipment:

Water cannons. High-pressure water streams have frequently been used in riot control in this century. As a non-lethal weapon, it has many advantages: It is powerful enough to knock people over, but its chances of doing permanent injury are relatively small (smaller than the chance of injury from a blow by a rifle butt, anyway).

Films of riots in Europe and Korea frequently show large water pumper trucks specifically designed for riot-control operations. These trucks shoot a stream of water that will easily knock over a grown man more than 50 meters away. The trucks normally have shatterproof glass and run-flat tires, and the water stream can be manipulated from within the cab. These trucks would be especially useful to riot-control forces in dealing with unrest in detention camps or in other situations in which the rioters do not have access to firearms.

A cheap but less sturdy substitute for water cannon trucks would be Air Force crash rescue trucks, which also have high-pressure hoses but are not hardened against thrown missiles. Another possibility would be fire trucks with high-pressure hoses operating off the city's fire mains (if it has any). Still another would be water pumped from a nearby source and sent through a high-pressure hose in the same manner as the high-pressure hoses used by Egyptian engineers to breach the Bar-Lev line along the banks of the Suez Canal in 1973. In these last two cases, employment would probably be limited to site defense because of the requirement to stay near a water source. The exposed hoses would also be subject to puncture by either thrown missiles or knives and would have to be guarded.

Rubber bullets or beanbags. These non-lethal projectiles, fired from specialized projectors, can knock a grown man down. They are extremely hard and travel at a pretty good clip; occasionally, people hit in the head die of their injuries.

The real drawback to rubber bullets is not that they are on the more extreme end of non-lethal violence but that the rate of fire is too slow. Against a mass of dedicated, charging rioters, troops firing rubber bullets could not discharge enough to avoid coming into physical contact. Their only real deterrent value is against rock throwers. In effect, rubber bullets are the riot-control force's "rock" and are best kept in vehicles accompanying the troops and brought out when the troops encounter a threat that warrants their use.

Pepper spray. These individual aerosol cans of highly unpleasant chemical agent are excellent for general issue to troops. In Somalia, they were perfect for keeping thieves from climbing onto trucks, and they can be used to repel annoying or threatening individuals from guard posts or checkpoints.

In addition to the old standbys—bayonets and rifle butts, concertina wire, chemical riot agents, water cannons, and rubber bullets—several new non-lethal weapons are being developed. These weapons take advantage of emerging technology in an attempt to broaden the scope of possible non-lethal response to riots. The following are examples of these new technologies:

Antitraction technology—Includes Teflon-type environ-




Figure 2




Figure 3

mentally neutral lubricants that make foothold or traction exceedingly difficult.

Sticky foam—an incredibly adhesive foam product that immobilizes people and makes them less effective.

Anesthetics—tranquilizers that can be used to put people to sleep, dispensed with either gas or darts.

Infrasound—low-frequency sound generators that incapacitate people by causing nausea, disorientation, and bowel spasms.

Microwave transmitters—directional devices that heat the skin of rioters to an unbearable degree as they move closer.

In theory, all of these things sound pretty good. Some of them (such as sticky foam) were fielded in the recent development of the U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Group to cover the withdrawal of UN elements from Somalia, although none were used. But these non-lethal technologies also have a few drawbacks. Sticky foam, which has been touted as a way to subdue violent people without injury, has serious drawbacks for large riot situations: It is short-ranged, and the dispenser is rather large and bulky. Worse still, it is an indiscriminate weapon that, once dispensed, will stick to anything or anyone, friend or enemy.

This brings up the unpleasant prospect of troops spraying sticky foam on a front rank of rioters and having those people propelled into physical contact with them by the momentum of the unfoamed rioters in the second rank. The prospect of troops and rioters glued together in such a situation is not a pleasant one.

Sticky foam is better suited to police work against the occasional fighting drunk than in a mass riot situation. The potential for getting your own people “foamed” is too great. It might be useful for blocking small secondary avenues of approach (which you know you are not going to want to use anytime

soon), but why bother? Concertina wire can serve the same purpose, and it’s easier to clean up.

Antitraction technology (“slick-um”) has better application in riot control, but it is also a two-edged sword: It creates a *slow-go* or *no-go* area that the rioters have trouble traversing, but it does the same thing to troops. A key rule-of-thumb is to avoid using this stuff on any area you need to traverse any time soon. This will limit its use, since most riots take place in populated areas with important economic, political, religious, or military significance. Riot-control forces and the governments they represent can seldom afford to have key thoroughfares in a city turned into tropical skating rinks for days or weeks. Also, the antitraction material is not as effective on dirt streets, which is where most of the rioting in Somalia took place.

This technology could have limited application as a rapidly dispensed obstacle to crowd movement, sort of a riot-control FASCAM (family of scatterable mines). It would be a more defensive weapon in this case, quickly put down as an obstacle on avenues of approach to a critical site (Figure 2). It could also have limited application in offensive riot-control missions as a flank guard obstacle to prevent crowds of rioters from flanking riot-control forces (Figure 3). Whether it is used in the offense or the defense, if antitraction technology is used in riot control, the forces using it should have breaching methods available in case they have to cross the area.

Anesthetics also have drawbacks that could limit their employment in large riot situations. The principle of an anesthetic control method is, of course, to put a person or group of people to sleep quickly. These anesthetics would have to be extremely potent and capable of subduing people instantly or in no more than a minute or two. It does no good to anesthetize rampaging rioters with agents that don’t take effect for

half an hour. Riot control forces will not be able to follow the rioters until the drug takes effect. The effect must be immediate and dramatic.

Unfortunately, this also limits practical use. In a chemical agent vapor form, an anesthetic agent would be dangerous and unpredictable. Unlike CS or CN gas or pepper spray, it would incapacitate its targets instead of causing extreme physical discomfort that causes them to flee the scene. An anesthetic cloud that is blown from a riot scene to a place where people are going about their own business could have lethal consequences in some cases, affecting vehicle drivers, mothers bathing infants in streams, and the like. It would also have an anesthetic effect on any troops who were not masked. The ten percent who didn't get the word would then be anesthetized, instead of just getting a good whiff of CS or CN gas before masking. The evacuation and protection of these men would complicate matters for the riot-control forces.

Dart anesthetics would have the same friendly fire considerations as any direct-fire weapon. Darts of this type would be most effective before physical contact between riot-control forces and rioters. If the dart guns were accurate enough, they could be used to target specific instigators. When evaluating the effectiveness of such a weapon in a riot situation, volume of fire would be the greatest concern. Could you shoot enough darts to make a difference? Having an anesthetic dart weapon within a range of 100 meters and a rate of fire of less than 10 rounds per minute would do little good against a crowd of thousands of people. The best projector for this type of riot-control weapon would probably be vehicle mounted and have a rate of fire of hundreds of rounds per minute. Care should be taken to aim at lower body extremities; even then, some eye injuries might be unavoidable.

The other problem with the mass anesthetization of rioters is what to do with them once they're unconscious. Leave them alone until they come to? Remove them to detention? (Each

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rioter takes at least two men to carry, and how many can you stack in trucks without injuring them?) Do you flex-cuff them while they're sleeping?

Infrasound devices that induce nausea would be useful if rioters and troops can be separated by some sort of obstacle system. The key consideration with this type of system is that riot-control troops would be just as susceptible to it as the rioters. Any misdirection of the infrasound could incapacitate the riot-control forces. Many of the same considerations for infrasound devices would also be true for microwave emitters.

As forces spend more time in a country and gain a better idea of the lethal and non-lethal threats, more specialized riot-control equipment may be brought in and used. First and fore-

most, a commander must protect his own men. There can be nothing more damaging than a soldier dying with a riot stick in his hand and a shield still on his arm—or a water cannon truck hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). We must not put our soldiers in the position of “taking a club to a gunfight.”

Task Organization

In organizing for a high-risk riot-control environment such as this, units should strive to maintain as much of their combat organization as possible. The problem with current riot-control organization, as outlined in Field Manual (FM) 19-15, *Civil Disturbances*, is that most of the formations are based on a four-squad platoon, specially organized for riot control. These formations are based on experience from the U.S. riots of the 1960s. They require units to re-task organize for riot control. And they do not take into account today's combined lethal and non-lethal threats.

The four-squad platoon organizations reflected in FM 19-15 are ad hoc and need to be replaced by platoons organized as for combat. All riot formations should be based on the three-squad organization for each platoon. The platoons must have all of their normal weapons, in addition to selected specialized riot-control equipment. Vehicles to carry this equipment should be assigned to each platoon, if possible.

Another key consideration is to keep as many men as possible involved in either riot-control formations or overwatch. This means using forces that cannot be employed in their normal functions, either because there is no need for that function or because the rules of engagement prohibit it.

In light, airborne, or air assault infantry units, company troops such as antiarmor and mortar sections might be armed with specialty riot gear (riot agent dispensers or rubber bullet projectors) when they cannot use their primary systems (there are no Dragon targets or a rule of engagement prohibits indirect fires, for example). The line platoons can then keep more people “up front” facing the rioters.

Battalion troops such as antiarmor and mortar platoons will also find the use of their primary weapons restricted. The antiarmor platoon's TOW HMMWVs (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) can be removed with 50-caliber or Mk 19 machineguns for this kind of combat; they can then bring large riot-agent dispensers quickly into place in their cargo compartments. The battalion heavy mortar platoon will most likely find employment in its primary mission of indirect fire (chiefly providing illumination) or will be used to employ riot agents or other riot-control equipment such as rubber-bullet projectors. The platoon might also be used as an obstacle emplacement team.

Troops should generally be organized into four elements:

Riot control—the forces actually deployed in riot-control formations facing the rioters. This element should consist of no more than two-thirds of the available force, less if possible.

Overwatch—the forces employed in overwatching the riot-control element and protecting them from a lethal threat. This element can be up to one-third of the available force; it should have snipers and automatic weapons as well as binoculars and observer telescopes.




Figure 4

Reserve—units held out of contact in reserve to react to emergencies.

Special-purpose—units task organized to serve a specific function, such as mortar platoons organized to use riot agent dispensers or specific non-lethal technology weapons.

An example of this organization for an infantry company is shown in Figure 4.

Tactical Considerations

Although tactical considerations will vary considerably with each specific situation, some are universal to these types of operations:

Do not come to physical blows with the rioters if you can avoid it. Limit physical contact through the judicious use of obstacles or riot-control agents. Even if the troops in physical contact with the rioters are protected by body armor and have better weapons than the crowd, the sheer number of rioters may make this a losing proposition. Physical contact with rioters is one of the most dangerous things troops will face. Rioters will be able to hit them with tools, clubs, and farm implements, stab out with knives or shield gunmen carrying pistols or sub-machineguns who can get close enough to touch soldiers before bringing up their weapons to attack. In addition to all this, there is the danger of being knocked down and trampled.

Sometimes, physical contact is unavoidable. If troops must be sent in to push rioters out of an area, that area must first be softened up by riot agent dispersal, the use of water cannons or high-pressure hoses or perhaps one of the new non-lethal technology weapons. Then, troops must move swiftly and in large numbers, using vigorous but non-lethal physical violence to propel the rioters out of the area.

Use large forces for riot control. A company is the small-

est force anyone should even consider using for riot control, and this size should be used only for limited disturbances involving a few hundred people around a single installation. There were instances in Somalia in which several battalions were not enough to quell or even channel rioting, and the riots were just left to burn themselves out. Brigade-sized units should be the smallest used for riots in major metropolitan areas. (The troop strength in the National Guard, Active Army, and U.S. Marine Corps deployed to the 1992 riots in Los Angeles totaled almost two divisions.)

The principle is to quell the riot quickly by a massive infusion of forces to the affected area before it can spread. The more troops you use, the less likely you will have to react with lethal violence to a non-lethal assault. (For example, a detachment of 50 troops pressed by 1,000 rioters might have to shoot some of the rioters to keep from being trampled. A battalion of 400 troops would not have to resort to such extreme acts of self defense.)

Maintain overwatch of your forces at all times. To be effective in riot control, troops must sometimes do things that would be tactically unsound in an environment that had armed opponents—stand in blocking a street, for example. Although these troops can take cover quickly if fired upon, there is no doubt that they will be exposed initially.

Forces in riot-control formations must be protected by overwatch elements consisting of both automatic weapons and snipers. These overwatch teams and squads must be on the lookout for armed opponents that may be a threat to the troops in riot-control formations. The overwatching elements must stay in close radio contact with the troops and warn them when they are beginning to move beyond the overwatch team's ability to do its job. One of the greatest challenges to maneuver commanders in this type of riot control is coordinating the displacement of overwatch elements with the movement of riot-control forces.

The overwatching element can range from a few sniper teams up to one platoon out of every company, depending on the intensity of the lethal threat. Ideally, the overwatch would be broken down into at least two elements to conduct leapfrog displacement—one overwatching while the other moves.

Be prepared to move instantly from the non-lethal to the lethal. All troops must be armed for lethal combat—rifles with bayonets fixed and loaded magazines inserted, rounds chambered, on safe. No one knows when simple riot control can erupt into a close-quarters gunfight. Grenadiers and M249 gunners must also have rounds for their weapons.

The transition to lethal response is a lower-level decision, often made by the soldier himself when he sees the flash of a gun at close range. Soldiers and junior leaders must be well trained in the rules of engagement and in *shoot-don't shoot* situations. Leaders must also be alert enough not to overreact. A gunfight that erupts in a small part of a riot must not precipitate a wider, indiscriminate use of firearms in other sectors that have not yet escalated to lethal violence.

Use CS early. Using riot-control agents on groups of people forming in the streets helps break up riots before they gain momentum. Using a riot agent in this manner is better than

waiting for a full-blown riot to form and become lethal. Although gas does not deter organized urban guerrillas, it keeps rank-and-file supporters off-balance.

Use armored vehicles when they are available. Bradley fighting vehicles are ideal for riot control. They are large, hard to climb onto, and able to break down most street barricades. They also have a gun system that is ideal for engaging snipers in buildings, using accurate wall-penetrating fire that minimizes collateral damage. In addition, they can be used to carry specialized riot gear as well as first aid equipment and other mission-specific items that must accompany troops, especially heavy items that are too awkward to carry for more than a short distance.

Bradleys can also be used to evacuate casualties. Although M113 armored personnel carriers are also useful, they lack the protected gun capability of Bradleys. Tanks are useful for crushing barricades and for countersniper work, but they cannot carry internal stores. All armored vehicles must be protected by dismounted troops.

Armored vehicles should not be deployed in less than platoon strength for riot-control missions. The diagrams in FM 19-15 showing the use of armor in riot-control formations apply to most situations, but all the armored vehicles should not be put out in the middle of the street as shown in the field manual. Some should remain in overwatch to react to fire from the upper stories of buildings along the avenue of advance or approach (Figure 5).

Consider roadblock clearing. One of the standard tactics of rioters throughout the Third World is to build street-blocking barricades, often of flammable materials. Forces involved in riot control have to breach these barricades quickly while also maintaining security.

If none of the rioters are armed, breaching can consist of simply running an armored vehicle through the barricade. Unfortunately, armed persons may be positioned to cover the barricade, and an RPG team picking off a Bradley that has been sent forward to break the barricade could inflict needless casualties and encourage the mass of rioters.

Barricade clearing has to be a battle drill much like obstacle breaching. This drill would be different from the SOSR (suppress, obscure, secure, reduce) tenets of normal obstacle clearing. But it would still have four basic steps:

Overwatch—emplacing forces to observe well beyond the barricade and place accurate fires on buildings or other terrain features that dominate the barricade.

Eject—using non-lethal force to drive the mass of non-lethally armed rioters from the barricade.

Secure—occupying the barricade with troops and deploying troops beyond the barricade. (This phase also includes checking the barricade for booby traps or mines.)

Reduce—using armored vehicles, bulldozers, or engineer equipment to clear the obstacle and restore trafficability.

Training

Much of the training we do is already good preparation for riot-control operations. Squad and platoon battle drills and training in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) are




Figure 5

especially important. Units should also continue their emphasis on live fire, especially in close-range snap shooting techniques and *shoot-don't shoot* scenarios, as well as MOUT live fires. In addition, the following training techniques should be considered:

Pugil-stick training. This archaic hand-to-hand combat training technique is perfect for Third World riot control. It gets troops used to hitting people hard; more important, it teaches them how to take such blows and still keep their balance. Groin and shin pads should be included so that the combatants can also kick.

Chemical munitions employment. Throwing a few CS canisters to simulate chemical agents is as far as we get in most units, but all leaders down to squad level need to know the principles of employing riot agents as specified in FM 19-15. This is one of the best parts of the manual, and its doctrine is still valid, even in the extreme situations in which we may find ourselves.

The order or alert process that precedes the proper discharge of chemical munitions is just as important. Chemical agents cannot be randomly dispersed; they should be dispersed simultaneously on command after all units that may be affected by the discharge have had a chance to take protective measures. This should be especially stressed to coalition units from nations that may not be as strict about the discharge of such agents. Every precaution must be taken to avoid degrading or incapacitating riot-control forces with the undisciplined discharge of riot agents.

Troops must also be given target practice with pepper-spray dispersers to familiarize them with the containers and avoid accidents. Soldiers need some training and familiarization with pepper spray itself, as with any other weapon.

Concertina wire emplacement. Soldiers need to practice setting up and anchoring triple concertina fences. Barbed wire is such an important combat multiplier in riot control that a task force wire team should be created (normally out of the

engineer platoon but out of the mortar or antiarmor platoon if no engineers are available).

It should take no more than 15 minutes to block a four-lane street with a triple concertina fence. Engineers can link the wire to speed its off-load from trucks: The rolls are linked standing in the truck bed, the end staked down, and with the truck rolling and dispensing wire. Once the wire has been laid, pickets are pounded in to increase the wire's resistance. Ideally, two single strands should be laid side by side. This can be accomplished over several city blocks in a matter of minutes. The third layer can quickly be put on top. Provisions must be made for freeing people or animals that may be caught in the fence.

Water-cannon training. Since water cannons are not in the tables of organization and equipment of any U.S. Army unit, considerable training is needed before they are issued. Units can get an idea of the constraints of employing these and other high-pressure hose systems by training alongside their post fire departments or airfield crash teams. Timelines should be worked out for getting hoses into action, the range and flexibility of fire hoses, and what it will take to guard them. The soldiers should also gain an appreciation of the most effective ranges for employing high-pressure hoses.

Formation training, moving with overwatch. Obviously, the large-scale medieval-battle aspect of riot control cannot be replicated in training. But units can train on riot-control formations, in both moving and stationary situations, working with vehicles and overwatch. Most MOUT facilities are fine for stationary site protection riot control, but they are not big enough to include a movement drill. Units can practice movement in their cantonment areas, or along the streets leading to the MOUT site if these streets are built up enough. Leaders must practice the command and control of multiple overwatch teams as well as the riot formation itself.

The key benefit of this training is developing a feeling among the soldiers for their position and role in the formation and developing among the leaders an appreciation for how fast they can move and still maintain overwatch.

Many different battle drills can be developed; the following are some possibilities:

- Engage gunman at close range.
- Employ rubber bullet.
- Prepare for riot agent.
- Employ riot agent.
- Train teams to seize key rioters.
- Evacuate casualties.
- Reduce barricades.

Leaders deploying for operations that may include riot con-

trol would pick drills for the situations they were most likely to encounter.

Sniper training. Snipers must learn to scan for armed personnel in crowds, windows, rooftops, and doors and then to engage those personnel under less-than-ideal circumstances (for example, surrounded by a sea of moving people). Training techniques must be modified for this unique tactical environment: target identification using photographs of large crowds to begin teaching scanning techniques and target identification; shooting at moving target arrays consisting of E-type silhouettes superimposed upon each other, only one of which has a rifle. The emphasis of this training should be on observation and overwatch emplacement instead of ghillie-suit stealth.

Snipers should also be able to relay intelligence quickly and directly to the riot-control forces they are over-watching—such items as crowd activities and strength; descriptions and last locations of gunmen they have seen and not been able to engage; and locations of roadblocks. Sniper and overwatch teams often have a better view than the forces deployed in riot-control formations, and they must be thoroughly trained in their reporting responsibility.

Armored vehicle riot employment. The biggest challenge in training armored forces to work in this type of extreme riot-control environment is coordinating their movement with that of the dismounted troops detailed to protect them—that is, neither outrunning them nor lagging behind them. Other tasks should include breaching roadblocks to ensure that drivers are trained in doing so without getting hung up. Crews need to practice techniques for scanning the upper stories of buildings and also engaging point-type targets in particular areas of a building.

Future U.S. deployments in support of operations other than war will see an increased emphasis on riot-control operations. We must come to grips with the fact that our riot-control doctrine is largely outdated and there is a new and rising anarchy in parts of the world that we are now ill-prepared to deal with. In Somalia, we had only a glimpse of that anarchy.

I have offered here a few observations and some possible solutions that should help units better train for such situations as our Army prepares to meet the challenges of the next century.

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