

# BOOK REVIEWS



***Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf.* By Anthony H. Cordesman. Westview Press, 1994. 380 Pages. \$64.95.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army.

For almost two decades, Iran and Iraq have been the most significant source of friction and instability in the Middle East in general and the Persian gulf area in particular. Indeed, this threat does not appear to be diminishing.

It is therefore the responsibility of military planners, strategists, and soldiers to “know the enemy.” While this book enumerates and assesses many factors that constrain Iranian and Iraqi aggression in the near term, neither country acts as a “rational bargainer.” Religious and cultural strife, internal economic problems, and many other factors cause both countries to be unpredictable and potentially volatile and aggressive.

Author Cordesman is a recognized authority on the region and its military forces and capabilities. He is the author of, among others, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* (1984), *The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-1987* (1987), and *The Gulf and the West* (1988). His most recent study is *After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East* (1993), from which the current volume is derived.

This is a well-written and absorbing book that analyzes all facets of recent actions, military trends, and dynamic warfighting capabilities of Iran and Iraq. It examines in detail developments in conventional weapons and technology, as well as the risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the region, and how these may affect the military balance there. Numerous tables compare and contrast all facets of the Iranian and Iraqi armed forces. The 55 pages of excellent and detailed notes and the selected bibliography reflect the currency and depth of research.

The author concludes, “It is clear that the West and the southern Gulf must take every possible action to limit Iran and Iraq’s present war fighting options.” Four measures need to be taken in concert: arms control, technology and equipment transfer limits, strengthening the deterrent and defensive capabilities of southern Gulf forces, and enhancing Western power

projection capabilities. Without these measures, the potential for conflict in the region increases dramatically.

A reader of this excellent and informative book will certainly learn about and “know the [potential] enemy.” Unfortunately, because of the book’s high price, it is not likely to get the readership it richly deserves.

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***At War in the Gulf: A Chronology.* By Arthur H. Blair. Texas A&M University Press, 1992. 125 Pages. \$9.95, Softbound.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

The Gulf War of 1990-1991—our DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD/DESERT SABER operation (though the latter term is seldom used to delineate the air war from the ground wars)—is now more than four years in the past. But its effects are still being felt throughout the Gulf region, and we still have sizable military, naval, and air forces in the region to ensure a degree of stability.

Unfortunately, as time passes and we become more involved in other military operations such as Somalia and Bosnia, we tend to forget why and how we fought the Gulf War and the lessons we learned from it. Maybe it’s because we are just not interested in “past” history, and only the future counts in our doctrinal and tactical forecasts. Or perhaps it’s because we are sending our soldiers to places we have never gone before—Macedonia and Bosnia, for example, with the Golan Heights looming large in future calculations—and this tends to distract us from our history. But we really should not forget the Gulf War and all of its ramifications.

This smallish book, by a retired U.S. Army officer, gives a broad outline of the events leading up to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Then he tells of the invasion itself; the creation of a coalition of nations to oppose Iraq and its aggressive actions; coalition problems; the melding of the armed forces from 34 nations into a coherent whole; and the eventual eviction of Iraq’s armed forces from Kuwait.

His chronology begins on 28 February 1990, and he ends the book with a wrap-up chapter in which he discusses the war’s results. The chronology ends with 28 Febru-

ary 1991, but, as he points out, some actions occurred after that date. He stays pretty much with the facts as he understood them at the time he prepared his manuscript, and those facts have not changed over time.

The book does contain several annoying errors: It’s Erwin, not Edwin, Rommel (page 28); a mistake in one of the photo captions on page 73; Iraqi forces were to withdraw from Kuwait, not Iraq (page 31); and a failure to properly identify the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps (this organization is called the XVIII Corps in a number of places). Nevertheless, this is a worthwhile reference book for a reader to have in his personal library.

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***American Battlefields: A Complete Guide to the Historic Conflicts in Words, Maps, and Photos.* By Hubbard Cobb. Macmillan, 1995. 382 Pages. \$39.95.** Reviewed by Dr. Charles E. White, Infantry School Historian.

*American Battlefields* is one of the finest books of its kind anywhere. Hubbard Cobb has put together a handy and “user friendly” reference work of the existing battlefields of all wars fought on U.S. soil: the French and Indian Wars (1689-1763), the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), the War of 1812 (1812-1815), the Texas War of Independence and the War with Mexico (1836-1848), the Civil War (1861-1865), the Indian Wars (1622-1891), and the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941).

This book is ideal for those who are developing staff rides. Each entry begins with a good description of the conflict, including events leading up to it and an introduction of notable commanders on both sides. Once the stage is set, the author discusses the tactics employed by both antagonists, their troop strengths and dispositions, the terrain, and other matters. Maps of each battle (with the exception of Fallen Timbers) supplement the text.

Cobb also includes a number of special features in each chapter. For example, on the French and Indian Wars, he talks about fortification (the types of forts used, their construction, and methods of siege warfare). On the Civil War, he analyzes technological advances in weaponry and their effects on tactics and

strategy. The book also has three appendixes, a glossary, and a suggested readings section. These provide directions to each battlefield; the addresses and telephone numbers of national, state, and local agencies; military terminology; and notable publications on each conflict.

*American Battlefields* contains a wealth of information in one source. It is designed primarily for the novice, but it should serve as the starting point for anyone seeking to understand any particular conflict fought on American soil. Professional soldiers may be disappointed by the simplicity of the maps; nevertheless, Hubbard Cobb has done a magnificent job of researching and writing this book.

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***Davis and Lee at War.* By Steven E. Woodworth. University Press of Kansas, 1995. 409 Pages. \$29.95.** Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army.

In recent years Jefferson Davis has attracted an increasing number of critics for his role as commander-in-chief of the Confederate States of America. In this book, author Steven Woodworth concludes the analysis of Davis that he began with *Jefferson Davis and His Generals*. In the first book, he concentrated on the mismatch of strategy and policy in the western theater. Now he focuses on the critical eastern sector of operations, principally the Virginia theater, dominated by Robert E. Lee.

The central theme of this book is Davis's inability to find and direct generals in such a way that they would carry out his ideas in the operation of Southern armies. The Davis who emerges from these pages is a chief executive who fails to comprehend that his countrymen were not fighting for the idea of constitutional liberty but for a place and a social system. Consequently, Davis consistently overestimated the willingness of Southerners to continue the struggle; this perception, in turn, affected his relationship with his generals.

Davis's choice of Lee to command the Army of Northern Virginia was his best of the war. Lee presented him with an alternative strategy for winning. In contrast to Davis's own preference for waging a defensive war, Lee opted for an offensive strategy designed to win a quick, decisive victory before the North's military and economic strength could make Confederate victory impossible. Of course, the availability of the South's own resources would determine how long the struggle could be continued.

Confronted with two viable strategies, Davis vacillated, never giving Lee all the resources at his disposal for fear of precluding

the Confederacy's ability to go on, should the gamble fail. According to Woodworth, Gettysburg was the bitter fruit of mixed strategies. Lee, sensing the fading opportunity for decisive victory, moved with desperation into the worst-run battle of his career. That the Confederacy was able to endure for nearly two years after Gettysburg was a tribute to Lee's tactical acumen and Davis's steadfastness.

In the final analysis, the author remains ambivalent concerning Davis's effectiveness as commander-in-chief. On the one hand, he admires Davis for the resolute fortitude he demonstrated in the wake of numerous defeats. (Whether Davis was a "near military genius" as Woodworth opines is debatable.) On the other hand, he chastises Davis for indecisiveness, pride, and reluctance to change an opinion or admit an error. The product of these personal foibles was a failure to delineate and direct a consistent strategy. Therein lies the true tragedy of Jefferson Davis as a wartime leader.

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***Codename Mule: Fighting the Secret War in Laos for the CIA.* By James E. Parker, Jr. Naval Institute Press, 1995. 193 Pages. \$27.95.** Reviewed by Michael F. Dilley, Davidsonville, Maryland.

James Parker graduated from Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, and served a tour in Vietnam. After he left the Army, he attended college in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. While there, he was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to be a paramilitary case officer in the Special Operations Group, assigned to work with Hmong volunteers and Thai mercenaries in Laos. *Codename Mule* is the story of Parker's two years of work with the Laotian hill people to keep the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao out of Military Region II generally and the Plaine des Jarres area specifically.

Parker begins his story by describing his training at several CIA schools and ends by telling of a final dramatic gesture of defiance. In between, he talks about the details of the fights, describes the people with whom he worked (both American and Laotian), remembers the funny and not-so-funny stories of war, and even tells us about his personal life—his wife accompanied him to Laos and, while there, they adopted two children.

His affection for these children and for "his" Hmong soldiers comes through in his narrative. In his epilogue he briefly describes what has happened to the people since the end of the war in Laos. Those readers who have served with allied military units will appreci-

ate and understand his (and others') frustration when they were ordered to stand down because a political, and not a military, settlement had been reached in their (secret) war. Since several of the Hmong now live near him in Pinehurst, North Carolina, it seems logical to conclude that this proximity is no coincidence.

This book is one of six that introduce the Naval Institute's new Special Warfare Series. All are written by special operators who participated in the action, and five of them are original works. Parker's book is short but excellent, a straightforward telling of his story without unnecessary embellishments or side trips. The Foreword, written by William M. Leary of the University of Georgia, is an outstanding short essay on how the CIA became embroiled in the war in Laos and sets the stage perfectly for Parker's story.

I recommend this book to military history students and enthusiasts and also to soldiers who want or expect to serve with allied military forces.

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***The Hidden History of the Vietnam War.* By John Prados. Ivan R. Dee, 1995. 329 Pages. \$27.50.** Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

John Prados's eight books, including significant works on American activity at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and his study of Khe Sanh, establish him as one of the best popular scholars of intelligence activity and national security issues. This volume is an interesting addition to the Vietnam bibliography. The title at first seems to be a misnomer since much of the book is drawn from published sources, but it is really a play on words, since the topics deal with questions of intelligence activities and operations that were hidden aspects of the war at the time, and some remain clouded or neglected today.

Prados presents 24 vignettes or microcosms from which he debunks self-serving myths and draws "lessons" of the conflict. Examples of his topics include American POWs from the French-Indochina War, Op Plan 34-A activities, six mysteries of the Tonkin gulf, the Westmoreland-Sam Adams numbers controversy, intelligence prior to Tet, the Phoenix Program, the secret wars in Laos and Cambodia, and much more.

Although most of the vignettes do draw heavily from published works, some are original research by the author that make important new contributions. Some examples are his analysis of the officer corps of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, particularly the background of the South Vietnamese gener-

als, and his treatment of communications intelligence gathered by both the U.S. and the North Vietnamese. He has a unique ability to bring together the existing published sources augmented by his own archive research and interviews to shed new light on topics that have been treated by others. Moreover, Prados does a masterful job of weaving these isolated topics into a coherent whole.

Despite my kudos for the book, the lack of footnotes providing specific verification is disturbing. The book offers only general references indicating the source of the material for each chapter. I often wanted the specific source of a particular piece of information or assertion. Also, the final chapter on alleged government misdeeds against the Vietnam Veterans Against the War lacks the objectivity of previous chapters. Finally, I fail to be convinced by the argument in the conclusion that the conditions of the war made it impossible that any strategy could succeed.

This is not a book for the novice. It presumes a fairly sophisticated knowledge about the war, but for those with a basic grounding, it is insightful and provocative. Although I do not agree with all his conclusions, this is one of the most interesting contributions on the war that I have seen recently.

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***America's Armed Forces: A Handbook of Current and Future Capabilities.* Edited by Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr. Greenwood Press, 1996. 512 Pages. \$99.50. Reviewed by Colonel George G. Eddy, U.S. Army, Retired.**

This analysis is divided into two parts. The first deals informatively with the structure, strength, composition, deployment and stationing, weaponry and respective doctrines of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Reserves, and the state National Guards. The second part focuses on the various conflicts and contingencies from the Gulf War to operations other than war (OOTW), including unconventional conflicts, such as insurgency and counterinsurgency.

At the end of each section, the editors provide commentary and conclusions, attempting to project how well, or how poorly, the services may be expected to perform in the future. With the many indeterminate roles, missions, budgets, and attitudes of the present administration coupled with uncertain support of the American public in such engagements as Bosnia in the nebulous state of "new world order" international affairs, the military will be hard-pressed to develop enthusiastic cohesive, consistent, and effective responses. The editors assert that in Bosnia, for example, the

military is somehow expected to serve as ambiguous peacekeepers when there is no real peace and the American public is substantially opposed to the operation. Many regard it as a "lose-lose" affair that involves no genuine threat to U.S. interests, while some cynics—on the other hand—have attributed U.S. participation to political motives.

Overall, the dilemmas and stresses facing the military have become intense, and there will be compounding controversy as to "proper" roles and missions in the 21st century, compounding as editor Connor notes because the Army has no pervading theory of war. He concludes that theory "is indispensable to well-ordered military thought." Too little attention is paid to thought, and too much to technology. Connor stresses that chief among the intellectual projects that must be completed by the service heads is the establishment of a theory of war that in itself would unify the service staffs and bind them to a common view of war. Therefore, he contends, the first and most serious challenge facing the services, individually and collectively, is intellectual.

At the conclusion of Part II, the editors contend that in the long run conventional wars such as the Gulf War may be the least likely contingencies for the United States. "This does not mean that regional conflicts will necessarily diminish," they assert, "but it does suggest that U.S. involvement may be the least optimum strategy, and when the U.S. does become involved, it may have only a minimum amount of time to respond effectively, in contrast to the 1991 Gulf War."

The editors write that there is a dangerous misconception in the notion that involvement in a variety of "peace" missions establishes and maintains military relevancy in the eyes of the American public as well as the national leadership. Additionally, to presume that the military must replicate society by responding to a variety of domestic demographic and social issues is another dangerous notion, as the authors state. Moreover, the military may become engaged in a variety of operations that may have little to do with national interests. To some observers, this is already happening with consequences that may not be known for decades. Finally, despite what unknowns await the military both in the world at large and at home, the editors conclude "the highest levels of the military chain of command must retain a global perspective and strategic view not limited by microintellectual rigidity.

This is no mean task." Back to theory again? Buy this book, and put on your thinking cap!

***The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 October 1944.* By Thomas J. Cutler. (Published in hard cover in 1994.) Pocket Books, 1996. \$5.99, Softbound. Reviewed by Dr. Ralph W. Widener, Jr., Dallas, Texas.**

Cutler, a retired Navy officer, points out in the preface to his book that the Battle of Leyte Gulf was the "biggest and most multifaceted naval battle in all of history" because the area in which it was fought spanned more than 100,000 square miles, involved more ships than ever before, involved more men than ever before (nearly 200,000), introduced the largest guns ever used in a naval battle, and a new Japanese tactic that would eventually kill more American sailors, and sink more American ships, than any other used in the war.

Although the Japanese Navy had suffered greatly at the Battle of Midway (3-4 June 1942) and two years later at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-20 June 1944), it still had a formidable fleet, and it was expected, as Cutler points out, that the two navies would meet one more time, as the inevitable thrust of U.S. sea and land power into the inner sanctum of the Japanese Empire left no alternative. The Battle of Leyte Gulf would be the final naval struggle.

Cutler relates in vivid detail how three Japanese fleets converged on the U.S. vessels covering General Douglas MacArthur's amphibious landing on the Philippine island of Leyte, and how they nearly prevented the general from fulfilling his "I shall return" vow; not because the Americans did not have overwhelming resources to sustain the landing, but because of questionable decisions by one of America's greatest naval commanders.

U.S. aircraft and submarines stopped one Japanese fleet under Admiral Takeo Kurita on 24 October with sizable Japanese losses, but Admiral William "Bull" Halsey, with the greater part of the U.S. fleet, was lured away from the main area of the struggle by a decoy under Japanese Admiral Jishuro Ozawa, leaving unprotected the troops covering MacArthur's beachhead, and the smaller U.S. fleet there to cover and sustain their landing. However, as Cutler points out, the Japanese were unable to capitalize on this opportunity, in part because of the extraordinary valor on the part of the U.S. Navy force supporting the landing. And because Admiral Kurita, beaten on the 24th, turned his fleet westward on 25 October, when he might have thwarted the American success, because he believed he faced a larger force than was there.

Cutler questions Halsey's tactical decisions during the battle, and his later attempts, after the war was over, to deny he made any mistakes.

Cutler has provided the reader with the best account of that naval battle, which ensured U.S. victory in the Pacific. Mistakes were made on both sides, but as Cutler states, "I sincerely believe that only those who have never been shot at would disparage the actions of men under fire."

**Giap: The Victor in Vietnam.** By Peter Macdonald. Norton, 1991. 368 Pages. \$25.00. Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

Vo Nguyen Giap is one of the great generals and strategists of history. A good Giap biography is overdue, and one is being written. But this is not it.

Retired British general Peter Macdonald, a novelist and popular historian, offers a readable account of the long Vietnamese struggle with the French and later the Americans, with emphasis on the communist side. Throughout, he interjects Giap's public life, but the book is far short of a biography. Based on a few interviews and the incorporation of secondary works with no identification of sources, the book is a fast and enjoyable read; but it has been a great disappointment to serious students.

The best parts deal with the French-Indochina War with interesting portraits of the French forces, especially at Dien Bien Phu. The author spices the account with tidbits of quantitative information; for example, that 82,926 parachutes dropped in the Valley of Dien Bien Phu, that the French had 49,000 bottles of French wine and two mobile brothels of Vietnamese and Algerian prostitutes at the fortress, or that the record for portage on the Ho Chi Minh Trail was held by Nguyen Viet Sinh, who in 1,089 workdays carried 55 tons over 41,000 kilometers. This makes for lively reading, but substance is minimal.

The treatment of the American phase of the war is trite, cliché-ridden, and at times blatantly inaccurate. Although Macdonald tells us what Giap did, he fails to give us much insight into the man, as an individual, a strategist, or a political figure. The portrait is cardboard with little life or depth. The final chapter, entitled "Giap—An Assessment," is hardly that at all.

Although the engaging nature of the book is attractive for the layman, the superficiality of substance and interpretation does not make it one that the novice should count on for understanding of this long, complex struggle.

## RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

**Medal of Honor: A Vietnam Warrior's Story.** By Master Sergeant Roy P. Benavidez, with John R. Craig. Brassey's, 1995. 211 Pages. \$23.95.

**Aces Against Germany: The American Aces Speak.** By Eric Hammel. (Originally published by Presidio, 1993.) Pocket Books, 1995. 367 Pages. \$5.50.

**Dak To: America's Sky Soldiers in South Vietnam's Central Highlands.** By Edward F. Murphy. Originally published by Presidio Press, 1993. Pocket Books, 1995. 386 Pages. \$6.99.

**The Iron Cage.** By Nigel Cawthorne. Published by Fourth Estate, London, 1993 (distributed by Trafalgar Square, North Pomfret, VT 05053). 310 Pages. \$39.95.

**The House of Purple Hearts: Stories of Vietnam Vets Who Find Their Way Back.** By Paul Solotaroff. HarperCollins, 1995. 204 Pages. \$22.00.

**Never Fight Fair! Navy SEALs' Stories of Combat and Adventure.** By Orr Kelly. Presidio, 1995. 368 Pages. \$22.95.

**D-Day: June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II.** By Stephen E. Ambrose. (Hardcover edition published by Simon & Schuster, 1994.) Touchstone Books, 1993. 656 Pages. \$16.00, Softbound.

**Left to Die: The Tragedy of the USS Juneau.** By Dan Kurzman. Pocket Books, 1995. 339 Pages. \$5.99.

**Iron Bravo: Hearts, Minds, and Sergeants in the U.S. Army.** By Carsten Stroud. Bantam Books, 1995. 320 Pages. \$22.95, Hardcover.

**Submarine Commander.** By Paul R. Schratz. Pocket Books, 1995. 416 Pages. \$5.99.

**Crossed Currents: Navy Women From WWI to Tailhook.** By Jean Ebbert and Marie-Beth Hall. (Hardcover edition published in 1993.) Brassey's, 1995. 368 Pages. \$15.95, Softbound.

**Ships versus Shore: Civil War Engagements along Southern Shores and Rivers.** By Dave Page. Rutledge Hill Press, 1994. 410 Pages. \$22.95.

**War Slang: America's Fighting Words and Phrases from the Civil War to the Gulf War.** By Paul Dickson. Pocket Books, 1995. 336 Pages. \$18.00, Softbound.

**Suicide Charlie: A Vietnam War Story.** By Norman L. Russell. (Originally published by Greenwood, 1993.) Pocket Books, 1995. 240 Pages. \$5.50.

**At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government 1955-1975.** By Timothy N. Castle. (Hardcover edition published in 1993.) Columbia University Press, 1995. 210 Pages. \$15.00, Softbound.

**Ironclads: Man-of-War.** By Larry D. Names. Avon, 1995. 374 Pages. \$5.99, Softbound.

**P.G.T. Beauregard: Napoleon in Gray.** By T. Harry Williams. (Originally published in 1955.) Louisiana State University Press, 1995. 345 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.

**Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864.** By Albert Castel. University Press of Kansas, 1992. 688 Pages. \$29.95.

**Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy.** By Kent DeLong and Steven Tuckey. Praeger Trade, 1994. 144 Pages. \$19.95.

**An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861.** By William B. Skelton. University Press of Kansas, 1993. 480 Pages. \$45.00.

**Diplomacy.** By Henry Kissinger. Simon & Schuster, 1995. 912 Pages. \$17.50, Softbound.

**Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War.** By Staff of U.S. News & World Report. Time Books, 1992. \$25.00.

**Witness to War: Korea.** By Rod Paschall. Perigee Books, 1995. 212 Pages. \$12.00, Softbound.

**Seek, Strike, Destroy: The History of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion in World War II.** By Patrick J. Chase. Gateway Press, Inc. (Baltimore, MD 21202), 1995. 165 Pages. \$40.00.

**Persian Gulf War Almanac.** By Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. Facts on File, 1995. 320 Pages. \$35.00.

**Victory at Sea: World War II in the Pacific.** By James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi. William Morrow, 1995. 612 Pages. \$25.00.

**Flashpoint! At the Front Line of Today's Wars.** By Anthony Rogers, Ken Guest, and Jim Hooper. Sterling, 1995. 160 Pages. \$24.95, Hardcover.

**Hell on Wheels: The 2d Armored Division.** By Donald E. Houston. (Originally published in 1977.) Presidio Press, 1995. 466 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.

**Sun Pin: Military Methods.** Translated, with introduction and commentary, by Ralph D. Sawyer. Westview Press, 1995. 392 Pages. \$18.95, Softbound.

**Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare 1945-1991.** By Joseph H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett. Naval Institute Press, 1995. 242 Pages. \$32.95.

**At All Costs! Stories of Impossible Victories.** By Bryan Perrett. Sterling, 1995. 240 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.

**Life in the Confederate Army: Being the Observations and Experiences of an Alien in the South During the American Civil War.** By William Watson, with new introduction by Thomas W. Cutrer. (First published in 1887 by Chapman and Hall, London.) Louisiana State University Press, 1995. 456 Pages. \$16.95, Softbound.

**Lightning Joe.** By General J. Lawton Collins. (Originally published in 1979 by Louisiana State University Press.) Presidio, 1994. 462 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.

**Blue on Blue: A History of Friendly Fire.** By Geoffrey Regan. Avon Books, 1995. 258 Pages. \$12.50, Softbound.

**The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay.** By Harry A. Gailey. Presidio, 1995. 560 Pages. \$24.95.

**Old Ugly Hill: A G.I.'s Fourteen Months in the Korean Trenches, 1952-1953.** By Rudolph W. Stephens. McFarland (Box 611, Jefferson, NC 28640), 1995. 176 Pages. \$21.95, Softbound.

**From the Battlefield: Dispatches of a World War II Marine.** By Dan Levin. Naval Institute Press, 1995. 144 Pages. \$21.95.

**Aces Against Japan: The American Aces Speak.** By Eric Hammel. Originally published by Presidio Press in 1992. Pocket Books, 1995. 356 Pages. \$6.50.

**Marine Special Warfare and Elite Unit Tactics.** By Bob Newman. Paladin, 1995. 165 Pages.

**Codebreaker in the Far East.** By Alan Stripp. Published in hardcover by Frank-Cass & Co., Ltd, 1989. Oxford University Press, 1995. 204 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

**Nothing Less Than Victory: The Oral History of D-Day.** By Russell Miller. First published in Great Britain by Michael Joseph Ltd, 1993. Quill Paperback, 1995. 560 Pages. \$15.00.

**Marching with Sherman: Passages from the Letters and Campaign Diaries of Henry Hitchcock, Major and Assistant Adjutant General of Volunteers, November 1864-May 1865.** By Henry Hitchcock. Edited by M.A. DeWolfe Howe. Originally published by Yale University Press, 1927. University Press of Nebraska, 1995. 332 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.