

BOOK REVIEWS



***The Regiment: Let the Citizens Bear Arms!* By Harry M. Kemp. Nortex Press, 1990. 395 Pages. \$24.95.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

This is a fine battle history of one of the 196 combat infantry regiments that served in the European Theater of Operations during World War II—the 109th Infantry Regiment.

A National Guard regiment from Pennsylvania, the 109th was one of three organic infantry regiments of the 28th Infantry Division, officially nicknamed the “Keystone” division, unofficially referred to as the “Bloody Bucket” division. (Both nicknames refer to the division’s shoulder insignia; the subtitle of this book is the regiment’s motto.)

Harry Kemp served with the 109th throughout its war years, first as an enlisted man, later as an officer. In fact, his service with the regiment dated from January 1937, when he enlisted in Company M, a heavy weapons company. He remained with that company—commanding it when the 109th went into battle for the first time in Normandy in early August 1944—until early February 1945 when he was promoted to major and assumed command of the regiment’s 2d Battalion.

Kemp remained in the Army after the war, transferred to the Regular Army, commanded an infantry battalion during the Korean War, and served in various other command and staff positions before retiring in 1971.

Despite his transfer to the Regular Army, Kemp is a staunch defender of the National Guardsmen who served in the 109th and the division during World War II. A few, like him, served with the regiment throughout and were noted for their bravery and leadership abilities. At one or two points in his book, Kemp can’t resist taking a dig at Regular Army officers.

He traces the regiment’s activities from its pre-World War II days through the hectic days of federalization in 1941, its training at various places in the United States, its move overseas to Wales in late 1943 and then on to England in 1944, its combat experiences, and finally its time as an occupation force and eventual return to the U.S., and its demobilization in late 1945.

Based on his personal experiences, inter-

views with survivors from the regiment, and official and unofficial records, Kemp’s battle narratives are well done. For me, at least, they brought back many memories, since I commanded an infantry rifle company in Europe in 1944 and 1945. I was particularly pleased to see him recognize the regiment’s three heavy weapons companies, units often overlooked by other writers. I do wish he had moved his sketch maps into the appropriate chapters instead of grouping them at the back of the book.

The 28th Division spent a total of 196 days in combat and suffered 24,840 battle and non-battle casualties, many of them in the hell of the Huertgen Forest and the ice and snow of the Bulge. Yet only one soldier from the division was awarded the Medal of Honor—Technical Sergeant Francis J. Clark, Company K, 109th Regiment. Kemp places the blame for this neglect mainly on Major General Norman D. Cota, who commanded the division during most of its combat days. As Kemp puts it, “...Major General Cota, and the Division Awards Board (mostly, if not all, non-combat types) believed that the risks of death in war were all-pervasive and those who lost the gamble were just statistics regardless of how they performed as individuals.”

Kemp is also critical of Cota and other senior commanders, up to and including General Dwight Eisenhower, for the Huertgen Forest debacle that cost the regiment and division so dearly.

Of considerable interest is Kemp’s account of the actions, trial, and execution of Private Edward (Eddie) Donald Slovik, one of 14 replacements assigned to the Regiment’s Company G late on the evening of 25 August 1944. Slovik was gone before daylight, an apparent deserter. Eventually found, he was tried and sentenced to death “by musketry,” and the sentence was carried out by a firing squad from the 109th on 31 January 1945. Here again, I wish Kemp had put the Slovik story all in one place, possibly as an appendix, instead of scattering it throughout the book.

Kemp notes that during the war, 2,864 members of the U.S. armed forces were tried for desertion, and 49 received death sentences, but only Private Slovik was executed. (The 95 other U.S. executions of military person-

nel in the European Theater were for “heinous crimes,” not for desertion.)

The book does contain a few minor errors, but they are harmless. For example, we did use smokeless powder in our ammunition (pages 13-14), and the M1 rifle had an eight-round clip, not a five-round. And it was P-47 fighter-bombers, not P-45s (page 280).

I recommend this book to infantrymen everywhere as a fine example of men in battle. It also offers great examples of the way a unit goes about the business of fighting a war despite the loss of key leaders and combat-experienced soldiers. The 109th’s strength turned over several times during the course of its fighting days. The way the survivors met the challenge and went on to win battles is a story in itself, a grand story that men like Kemp can point to with pride.

***Secret Army, Secret War: Washington’s Tragic Spy Operation in North Vietnam.* By Sedgwick Tourison. Naval Institute Press, 1995. 389 Pages. \$32.95.**

***Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise.* By Ronnie E. Ford. Frank Cass & Company (distributed by International Specialized Book Services, 5804 N.E. Hassalo Street, Portland, OR 97213-3644), 1995. 218 Pages. \$16.00, Softbound.** Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

These two books, by authors whose knowledge of the language allows them to use Vietnamese sources, are important early works as the veil begins to lift on clandestine operations and intelligence successes and failures against Hanoi. The first focuses heavily on the controversial intelligence activities of the Gulf of Tonkin event in 1964, the other on the equally controversial intelligence questions surrounding the Tet Offensive of 1968.

“Wick” Tourison spent eight years in Southeast Asia, where he became the U.S. Army’s first interrogation warrant officer. He later served with the Defense Intelligence Agency on prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) issues and finally on the staff of the Senate Select Committee on the subject.

His first book, *Talking with Victor Charlie* (1991) discussed interrogation operations in Vietnam. *Secret Army, Secret War* relies on

interrogations and interviews to recount a more tragic saga. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began insertions of South Vietnamese commandos into the North in 1961, and by 1964 judged that most of the operatives were killed, captured, or under Hanoi's control. Still, a renewed effort begun in 1964 by the Studies and Operations Group, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), met with no greater success. By 1968 more than 500 agents had been lost in the North. The families of the commandos were told that they were dead, yet 20 years later more than 300 of them were released from Hanoi's prisons.

This book is the story of the ill-fated South Vietnamese, some of whom spent 30 years in captivity. It reveals the poor conceptualization, planning, and conduct of the operations, and the indifference, if not perfidy, of U.S. intelligence officials who continued to send agents to their tragic plight long after it was known that the program had been compromised.

The book also raises questions about the real meaning of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, including whether the U.S. may have been engaged with Chinese PT boats rather than North Vietnamese. The author asserts that the pre-1964 operations were to protect CIA activities in Laos and had little to do with North Vietnam itself. Finally, the account treats the commandos' captivity experiences and the United States' record of distancing itself from its former allied operatives, who paid heavily for their association with U.S. covert activities.

The book will raise some degree of controversy, and the claims are difficult to verify, but it is an interesting read in a part of the story of the Vietnam war that is just beginning to open up.

While Tourison reveals a covered-up tragedy, U.S. Army military intelligence officer Ronnie E. Ford challenges the argument that the U.S. experienced a disastrous intelligence fiasco during Tet 1968. He uses newly available North Vietnamese documents to reinterpret Hanoi's military strategy and the so-called "intelligence surprise" of the Tet Offensive.

Ford contends that the U.S. intelligence was aware that the North Vietnamese planned a major offensive during Tet and also that the American concentration on Khe Sanh was not ill-placed. Westmoreland's pounding of the People's Army of Vietnam there prevented them from initiating a second wave into the South. The U.S. intelligence failure was limited to the fact that MACV misinterpreted the extent of the attack, its level of coordination, and its purpose. Also, they expected the offensive to begin after the Tet holidays. But

they were not entirely incorrect since Hanoi's original date was pushed forward when Westmoreland refused to extend a Tet truce. The change caught both the U.S. and National Liberation Front forces by surprise and resulted in significant military failures on both sides.

Ford concludes that the intelligence failure that did occur was created by the diffusion of military, political, and diplomatic intelligence in Vietnam; bureaucratic infighting, especially between MACV and CIA analysts; and undue political pressure to show quantitative progress in the war. The study is a very useful addition to the literature.

Neither of these books is the definitive word; both barely scratch the surface of larger issues. But they are intriguing works that raise important questions and whet our appetite for further opening of the records on important subjects.

***Mobile Guerrilla Force: With the Special Forces in War Zone D.* By James C. Donahue. Special Warfare Series. Naval Institute Press, 1996. 205 Pages. \$28.95.** Reviewed by Michael F. Dilley, Davidsonville, Maryland.

The mission codenamed Blackjack-31 is very reminiscent of the one assigned to Merrill's Marauders in Burma. The plan was to send a Special Forces A-team and more than 200 Cambodians into an area controlled by the Viet Cong to conduct guerrilla operations for at least a month, being resupplied by air every four or five days.

When he first heard the plan, Captain James Gritz told his commander it wouldn't work, that the force would be discovered and wiped out within a few days. Ten days later, Gritz was given the mission and told to recruit his force and make the plan work. This is the story of that mission, told by one of its participants.

Author James Donahue was the assistant platoon leader of 3d Platoon on Blackjack-31. The mission was significant because it took the war to the enemy on his terms, that of a guerrilla operating deep in "Indian country," hitting and running, then fading back into another part of the vast, almost endless forest of the Viet Cong "secret zone" known as War Zone D, where U.S. forces had not operated before.

Just as Gritz's force was completing its training and preparing for insertion, a U-2 reconnaissance plane crashed in the jungle south of Song Be, and someone had to recover its classified "black box" device. Colonel Francis Kelly, commander of the 5th Special Forces Group, decided to send Blackjack-31,

and his trust was well-placed. Gritz and his company found the device in four days—an auspicious beginning for their mission.

In early January 1967, the force entered War Zone D to establish ambushes, booby-trap base camps, reconnoiter specific areas, check out a former French fort to see whether it was suitable for a Special Forces camp, and to conduct bomb damage assessments of air strikes it called in. During the mission, one of the Special Forces soldiers received a direct commission; Gritz held an appropriate ceremony in the jungle, complete with a small flag, a pocket Bible, and the oath of office.

Donahue writes about this mission in a straightforward, first-person account, telling how it unfolded from the viewpoint of 3d Platoon. To keep the reader informed of the progress of other elements when the entire company is not together, he uses radio reports of their activity to "Swamp Fox," Captain Gritz. This is an interesting and effective device, one that makes the reader feel he is there with the 3d Platoon, moving through the humid, triple-canopy jungle, catching snatches of conversation over the radio hand-set. Donahue tells what he sees, hears, tastes, feels, and smells, whether he is on patrol, crawling in a small tunnel pushing a dead VC body in front of him, establishing a security force for a river crossing, or ambushing an enemy base camp.

This book is sweaty, gritty, yet human. The men of Blackjack-31 are real and alive, eating, sleeping, and fighting. The book is hard to put down. I highly recommend it for those who will plan operations and especially for those who will lead others into combat.

***Divided Waters: The Naval History of the Civil War.* By Ivan Musicant. HarperCollins, 1995. 473 Pages. \$30.00.** Reviewed by Dr. Charles E. White, Infantry School Historian.

Without question, the United States Navy played a pivotal role in the preservation of the Union during the U.S. Civil War. The Navy had a threefold mission: Blockade the Confederate coast and capture its ports; support the Army in riverine and amphibious operations; and protect seagoing commerce from Confederate raiders. While the Navy accomplished all of its missions during the war, its story remained largely untold until now.

Ivan Musicant's *Divided Waters* is a comprehensive study of the U.S. Navy during one of the most challenging periods of its history. On the eve of the American Civil War, the Navy was a "drowsy, moth-eaten organization." Its institutional memory reached

back to its last great endeavor, the War of 1812, during which several senior captains of 1861 had fought as mere child midshipmen. Navy leadership in 1861 was "largely uninspiring," with no admirals (an aristocratic title shunned by a service born of the Revolution), and "virtually devoid of promotion opportunities." To make matters worse, one-fifth of its officers had left to organize and command the new enemy, the navy of the Confederate States of America.

Four horrific years later, at the end of the war, the U.S. Navy had become "arguably the most powerful sea force in the world." In 1865 it totaled 670 ships, a number not remotely seen again until the massive buildup programs of World Wars I and II. Led by an impressive fleet of turreted, ironclad monitors (equipped with 8-inch rifles and 15-inch smoothbore cannon), the Navy in 1865 was "unmatched afloat." In 1861 it had 1,500 officers and 7,500 enlisted men. By 1865 these numbers had increased sevenfold, the rank structure had been expanded, and eight admirals headed the Navy Register.

Foremost among the men who transformed the Navy is Gideon Welles, who served as Secretary of the Navy for eight years. Welles was a brilliant man, a ruthless administrator, a good strategist, and an excellent judge of talent. It was Welles who broke with tradition and began to buy the best for the Navy. He established the tradition of feeding sailors fresh, wholesome food. He also began the practice of comparative testing before spending large sums for clothing and equipment. Additionally, he demoted clerks who could not do their arithmetic, and demanded regular, accurate reports and audits from the department. More than any other person, Gideon Welles was the driving force behind the modern U.S. Navy.

This book is a captivating history of the Navy during the Civil War. Musicant, recipient of the Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Naval Literature, recounts the Navy's epic struggle in an era that changed forever the face of naval warfare. He draws upon personal diaries, letters, and combat journals to bring his story to life. No longer will the Navy's contribution to preserving the Union during the Civil War be a mere footnote in history.

Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense. Edited by Stephen J. Cimbala. Praeger, 1996. 216 Pages. \$55.00. Reviewed by Colonel George G. Eddy, U.S. Army, Retired.

In this book, Stephen Cimbala will surely raise some eyebrows among military personnel when he writes that "Clinton's intellec-

tual failings in defense were not the product of ideological leftism, as critics mistakenly have charged, but of inexperience in setting priorities and in picking spots." The only one here who is mistaken is Cimbala, for the President's written and spoken words leave little doubt about his perceptions concerning the role of the military.

Cimbala contends that "Clinton is hardly on the left-liberal end of the security spectrum," and further says, "That he is so perceived among many military officers may tell more about the conservative drift of the American military, since the advent of the all-volunteer force, than it does about Clinton's alleged anti-militarism." Readers of this book may conclude that Cimbala is somewhat less than totally unbiased.

For those who want to chance a look at them, however, some of the book's essays are worthwhile. With budget reductions, the ability to respond quickly and effectively in the expected unconventional warfare environment ahead (witness Somalia, Haiti, and now Bosnia) will be seriously challenged if military readiness is predicated upon preparing for the type of campaigns that characterized the World War II European conflict, and most recently the Gulf War, with massed formations of tanks and artillery.

In view of all this, authors Don M. Snider and Andrew J. Kelly note in their essay "Causes for Concern," "The administration's failure to properly address the interrelationships between strategy, forces, and budgets threatens to produce the worst possible trade-offs in both dimensions—a force that is unready today and that will enter the twenty-first century unready for the future." In basic agreement, Sam C. Sarkesian concludes that the U.S. remains ill-disposed and ill-prepared to respond to unconventional conflicts. He believes that the United States should not be involved in operations other than war "unless the issues are clear and the political and military objectives well defined, and there is a certainty that the U.S. will win."

Given the clearly biased viewpoint of the editor, and despite sensible arguments from some of the authors, prospective readers should find a worthwhile book, such as *America's Armed Forces: A Handbook of Current and Future Capabilities*, edited by Sam Sarkesian and Robert Connor, Jr. (Greenwood Press, 1996; reviewed in March-April 1996 issue of *INFANTRY*).

Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West. By Stephen Ambrose.

Simon & Schuster, 1995. 511 Pages. \$27.50. Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingsced, U.S. Army.

The Lewis and Clark expedition was the greatest expedition of discovery in American history. Exploring the uncharted regions of the newly acquired Louisiana Purchase, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, together with their patron, President Thomas Jefferson, made an invaluable contribution to the development of the American West. *Undaunted Courage* brings Lewis, the captain of the expedition, to life in a brilliantly told narrative that confirms Ambrose as this country's premier biographer.

The unsung hero of this book is Thomas Jefferson, whom Ambrose calls the greatest empire builder of all. In an age of imperialism, his mind encompassed the North American continent. Concerned about foreign encroachments upon the unexplored wilderness, Jefferson summoned Lewis, his private secretary, and commissioned him to command an expedition to the Pacific. His specific instructions were to explore the Missouri River and its tributaries and to determine the "most direct and practicable water communication across this continent for the purposes of commerce."

Lewis's first task was to ask fellow officer William Clark to join him in this enterprise, and Clark accepted. Lewis left Pittsburgh on 31 August 1803, and when Clark joined him in mid-October, the most famous partnership in American exploration began. Ambrose speculates what it must have been like when the two adventurers shook hands and discussed the plan to explore the continent. Unfortunately, there is no record or description of that meeting.

From the spring of 1804 until their return to St. Louis on 22 September 1806, Lewis and Clark explored the West. They brought back a treasure of scientific information and introduced new approaches to exploration and systematic record-keeping. They were the first to explore the vast expanse of the north central plains and the Pacific Northwest from an easterly direction.

For Lewis, however, the expedition also brought disappointment. He had failed to find an all-water route across the continent; there was no Northwest Passage. Additionally, many Indian tribes, notably the Nez Perce and the Sioux, remained enemies of the United States. Moreover, Lewis was not up to the task of publishing his journal, nor was he particularly adroit in the administration of the Territory of Louisiana, of which he was appointed governor in March 1807.

His remaining years brought none of the success and fame that had accompanied the

expedition. Malaria, coupled with deep depression, left him in misery. On 11 October 1809, after several failed attempts, he committed suicide. In Jefferson's view, Lewis's death had deprived his country of one of her most valued citizens, and it was left to others to publish the journals from the expedition.

The disillusionment of Lewis's final years and his premature demise should in no way detract from his great achievement. Inspired by Jefferson, he had filled in the broad outlines of the previously uncharted northwestern part of the continental United States. Although he may have regarded his expedition as a failure during his lifetime, by the end of the century his dream of continental empire had been fulfilled. To Stephen Ambrose, Meriwether Lewis remains the greatest of all American explorers and in the top rank of the world's most adventurous.

***This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga.* By Peter Cozzens. University of Illinois Press, 1992. 675 Pages. \$39.95.**

***Chickamauga and Chattanooga: The Battles That Doomed the Confederacy.* By John Bowers. HarperCollins, 1994. \$28.00.** Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, U.S. Air Force, Retired.

The major two-day battle of Chickamauga—fought in August 1863 along the northern Georgia creek of the same name—and the associated battle at Chattanooga have garnered recent attention from two Civil War historians.

Peter Cozzens' *This Terrible Sound* is especially noteworthy because it is the first comprehensive work ever published on that battle and is likely to hold that distinction for many years to come. The only previous work of any note is Glenn Tucker's *Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1961).

Cozzens, a State Department foreign service officer, received a great deal of critical acclaim for his first Civil War history on the battle of Stones River—*No Better Place to Die* (University of Illinois Press, 1994; reviewed in *INFANTRY*, July-August 1995). This current work is an even more worthwhile historical effort.

Cozzens describes in detail the numerous unit movements and actions between the armies of Braxton Bragg and William Rosecrans in the dense forests of Georgia. During the night after an arduous first day of

battle, James Longstreet's corps from Robert E. Lee's Virginia army arrived to aid in Bragg's continued efforts against the Northern army. The second day's conflict ended in a Northern rout and would have resulted in a complete Union disaster except for General George Thomas's stand at Snodgrass Hill, which earned him fame as the "Rock of Chickamauga."

The Union army retraced its steps to Chattanooga after the defeat and soon found itself under siege on the banks of the Tennessee River. Rosecrans was soon replaced by Ulysses Grant, who eventually lifted the siege and led his army to victory in the battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge.

John Bowers's coverage of the two battles in *Chickamauga and Chattanooga* is acceptable, although his narrative is somewhat superficial in details. This shorter work would serve as an excellent overview of the Chickamauga-Chattanooga campaign and provide the background for more detailed reading on the individual battles. Cozzens' book is a major Civil War history, and anything else pales by comparison.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

***Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond.* By James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia. William Morrow, 1995. 320 Pages. \$23.00.**

***Barons of the Sky: From Early Flight to Strategic Warfare.* By Wayne Biddle. Simon and Schuster, 1991. 366 Pages. \$22.95.**

***Fighting for Air: In the Trenches with Television News.* By Liz Trotta. Simon and Schuster, 1991. \$22.95.**

***The Commandos: The Inside Story of America's Secret Soldiers.* By Douglas C. Waller. Originally published by Simon & Schuster, 1994. Dell Publishing, 1995. 469 Pages. \$5.50, Softbound.**

***Incredible Victory: The Battle of Midway.* By Walter Lord. Published in hardcover by Harper & Row, 1987. Harper Perennial, 1995. 331 Pages. \$12.00, Softbound.**

***Guadalcanal: Starvation Island.* By Eric Hammel. Pacifica Press, 1995. 526 Pages. \$32.00.**

***Company C: The Real War in Iraq.* By John Sack. William Morrow, 1995. 241 Pages. \$23.00.**

***Top Sergeant: The Life and Times of Sergeant Major of the Army William G. Bainbridge.* By William G. Bainbridge and Dan Cragg. Ballantine Books, 1995. 352 Pages. \$23.00, Hardcover.**

***Fatal Victories.* By William Weir. Avon Books, 1995. 272 Pages. \$12.50, Softbound.**

***Chickamauga and Chattanooga: The Battles that Doomed the Confederacy.* By John Bowers. Originally published by HarperCollins, 1994.**

Avon Books, 1995. 266 Pages. \$12.50, Softbound.

***The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket—the Campaign that Should Have Won World War II.* By Martin Blumenson. Published in hardcover, 1993. William Morrow, 1995. 288 Pages. \$14.00, Softbound.**

***A Connecticut Yankee in the 8th Gurkha Rifles: A Burma Memoir.* By Scot Gilmore with Patrick Davis. Brassey's, 1995. 288 Pages. \$24.95.**

***VE Day: The Album.* (Photographs from the Imperial War Museum.) By John Delaney. Ebury Press, 1995 (distributed by Trafalgar Square, North Pomfret, VT 08053). \$29.95.**

***Ride of the Second Horseman: The Birth and Death of War.* By Robert L. O'Connell. Oxford University Press, 1995. 305 Pages. \$25.00.**

***The Official Price Guide to Civil War Collectibles.* First Edition. By Richard Friz. Ballantine, 1995. 496 Pages. \$17.00, Softbound.**

***That Dark and Bloody River: Chronicles of the Ohio River Valley.* By Allan W. Eckert. Bantam Books, 1995. 810 Pages. \$27.95, Hardcover.**

***Arctic Convoys 1941-1945.* By Richard Woodman. (First published in 1994.) John Murray, 1995 (distributed by Trafalgar Square, North Pomfret, VT 08053). 532 Pages. \$34.95, Softbound.**

***Fighter Wing: A Guided Tour of an Air Force Combat Wing.* By Tom Clancy. Berkley, 1995. 331 Pages. \$15.00, Softbound.**

***Dirt Behind Our Ears: An Infantryman's Life in World War II as Related in Letters He Wrote Home.* By PFC Arthur N. Wilkins. Vantage Press, 1995. 210 Pages. \$17.95, Hardcover.**

***Biographical Dictionary of the Union: Northern Leaders of the Civil War.* Edited by John T. Hubbell and James W. Geary. Greenwood Press, 1995. 696 Pages. \$99.50.**

***American Battlefields: A Complete Guide to the Historic Conflicts in Words, Maps, and Photos.* By Hubbard Cobb and Stanley Cobb. Macmillan, 1995. \$21.95, Softbound.**

***An Immigrant Soldier in the Mexican War.* By Frederick Zeh. Translated by William J. Orr. Edited by William J. Orr and Robert Ryal Miller. Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 117 Pages. \$35.00.**

***Collective Insecurity: U.S. Defense Policy and the New World Disorder.* By Stephen J. Cimbala. Contributions in Military Studies, Number 162. Greenwood Press, 1995. 240 Pages. \$59.95.**

***Walking the Line: Scenes from an Army Childhood.* By Kevin T. Brophy. Mainstream, 1995 (distributed by Trafalgar Square, North Pomfret, VT 08053). 189 Pages. \$29.95.**

***Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia.* By Jonathan Stevenson. Naval Institute Press, 1995. 208 Pages. \$24.95.**

***Daring to Win: Special Forces at War.* By David Eshel. Sterling, 1996. (Published in hardcover by Arms & Armour Press, 1992.) 218 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.**

***Witness to War: Vietnam.* By Maurice Isserman. Berkley, 1995. 211 Pages. \$12.00, Softbound.**

***Death in the Jungle: Diary of a Navy SEAL.* By Gary R. Smith and Alan Maki. (Originally published by Paladin, 1994.) Ballantine, 1996. \$5.99.**