

commander is not willing to commit several assets to this requirement, it remains an IR. The G-2 now determines that indications the enemy will plan an alternate river crossing site would be ferries and pontoon bridges in the staging areas north of the river. The G-2 then analyzes where likely locations would be and, based on the enemy composition, what equipment is likely to be there. When this is done, he asks the specific question (an SIR): "Are there vehicle launched bridges and other bridging equipment near NAI 10?"

The formulation of the intelligence collection plan begins immediately after a mission analysis is conducted, and it continues throughout the estimate process. Typical early information requirements are focused on the battlefield environment and the battlefield effects such as the trafficability of a section of restricted terrain or the usability of a landing zone or drop zone. This information is used to refine the division's modified combined obstacle overlay. As the estimate process continues, however, the focus of intelligence requirements moves toward information that may confirm or deny friendly and enemy courses of action.

Even later, information requirements may be oriented to support the commander's decision support template. Examples include surveillance of decision points, or observing a trigger line, or observing the friendly side of a TAI or deep engagement area to confirm the effectiveness of a deep close air support strike (battle damage assessment). Other possible LRS missions in support of division operations include observing TAIs and using laser designators to assist target acquisition. Target acquisition missions obviously occur after a COA has been decided and is being executed.

We know that the SIRs form the basis for directing collection assets. Information is more accurate when the collector understands the indicators, the PIRs, and the friendly actions tied to the collection effort, whenever possible.

The LRS leaders must understand that TLPs, the estimate of the situation, and the IPB are continuous processes that generate information requirements throughout the planning and execution of a military operation. LRS missions can be generated at the following times:

- After the mission analysis.
- During the initial phases of the IPB

to determine certain battlefield effects.

- Continuously throughout the IPB process to confirm or deny enemy COAs.
- Throughout the estimate process to assist in the formulation of the best friendly COA.
- After a plan is completed and is being executed.

Because operations are often fast-paced and complex, an LRS unit may employ teams in support of the final phases of one division operation, while also employing teams in support of the initial phases of the next operation. When the LRS leaders understand this—along with the way they fit into the big picture and the source of their given SIRs—the information and intelligence they provide will be accurate and much more useful to the commander.

Major Kevin A. Hyneman is assigned to the 4th Ranger Training Battalion (Long-Range Surveillance Leaders Course), Ranger Training Brigade, at Fort Benning. He previously commanded Company D of the 4th Ranger Training Battalion, served as a small-group instructor for the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and commanded the 6th Infantry Division's long-range surveillance detachment. He is a 1983 ROTC graduate of the University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point.

Let's Reorganize The Light Infantry Division

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARTIN N. STANTON

During the past few years, light infantry units have played a tremendous role in low-intensity conflict or peace operations around the world. In Somalia and Haiti, the strategic deployability and relative combat power of the light divisions have made them our tool of choice for sustained operations of this kind.

At the same time, however, we should not allow the success of light infantry units in these operations to blind us to continuing problems with the J-series table of organization and equipment (TOE).

The light infantry organizations in both Somalia and Haiti had to be augmented

with transportation and communications assets. While these cross attachments were readily available, and relatively inexpensive in terms of the Army's overall resources, they reminded us once again that the division TOE is just a bit too austere to operate effectively for long periods of time or over extended distances.

This austerity results from the original concept of a 10,000-man division that could be moved in 500 C141 aircraft sorties. This may have made sense in the 1980s, when the Army had 18 divisions and the Warsaw Pact countries to worry about. Now, however, the reason for holding the line at 500 sorties is no longer valid. Light units in the future will most often deploy in battalion or brigade task force packages and operate over great distances for months or years—something they can do now only with augmentation. This augmentation, in turn, reduces the ability of the transportation battalion and other division support command units to perform their main functions of sustaining the division. Light division maneuver units do not have enough support assets to deploy and sustain independent operations. If these units are to succeed in a long-term stability and support environment, the light division must be reorganized.

In addition, several tactical organizations in the light battalion need to be changed. The company mortar section has too few resources to fully accomplish its mission, and the organization of the TOW systems in the brigade does not lend itself either to massed antiarmor fires at the higher end of the spectrum of combat or to flexible operations at the lower end.

Fortunately, some relatively minor modifications to the TOE would greatly improve the ability of the light units to conduct sustained operations across the spectrum of combat. To do this in many cases, we need only to go back to the previous H-series TOE.

We can make the J-series light infantry organization more effective by implementing four changes:

Increase the battalion sustainment structure. The light battalion has a ridiculously austere combat service support structure, and this problem is compounded by unrealistic design assumptions. For example, the support platoon almost invariably gives up a HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) to each company for use as a company truck, although the TOE does not reflect the need for such a vehicle. The loss of the HMMWV reduces the platoon's ability to conduct its own sup-

port operations. (The other prime example of vehicles performing functions other than those specified by the TOE is transfer of the ammunition carriers from the mortar platoon to serve as command and control vehicles.)

As a result of this siphoning off of transportation platoon assets—of which it has too few to begin with—the battalion depends on coordination with the transportation battalion for missions that were handled in H-series units by organic transportation assets. While experience in Somalia and Haiti clearly has shown that the unaugmented light infantry battalion is limited in the tasks it can perform, this experience has also shown that these units can perform quite well with only a small increase in their transportation assets.

A good place to start would be to increase the size of the support platoon by going back to a modified H-series TOE.

We should not allow the success of light infantry units in Somalia and Haiti to blind us to continuing problems with the J-series organization.

Using 5-ton trucks instead of 2½-ton will greatly increase the battalion's ability to sustain itself and to shuttle rifle companies using its own vehicles. We should also give the support platoon a light transportation section of four to six HMMWVs to use in resupply operations over terrain that 5-ton trucks can't negotiate.

In addition, the number of water trailers in the battalion should be increased to provide one per company. This would be especially useful in low-intensity conflict environments, in which companies are often given responsibility for their own sectors and operate out of separate base camps many miles apart. In addition to changes to the battalion support platoon, we should create a battalion maintenance platoon with a wrecker and maintenance contact teams. In addition to its maintenance function, the wrecker has all sorts of uses in peacekeeping or stability and support operations. It can be used to remove derelict vehicles from city streets

(as the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, did in the town of Marka on the coast of Somalia), remove roadblocks, and use its winch to assist in the construction (or destruction) of local buildings. The addition of the maintenance platoon would give the battalion more control over its maintenance program than it now has. Each battalion should also have its own prescribed load list.

We should consider providing two HMMWVs, by TOE, to each rifle company. The H-series had three jeeps and two 2½-ton trucks, as well as the weapons platoon vehicles. If we added two trucks to the light infantry company, it would still be light, but its normal operations would be easier. Furthermore, we would not need to strip the support platoon by continually doling out trucks for company administrative missions (such as posting or checking guards). By going back to what is essentially the old organization, we would greatly increase the light battalion's ability to conduct sustained operations without the large augmentations that were necessary in Somalia and Haiti.

Resource the light infantry battalion command and control organization. To begin with, the command group needs to be given two more HMMWVs, one each for the S-3 and the executive officer (XO). Most units take these vehicles from the heavy mortar platoon. Since the senior leaders have a clear requirement for these vehicles, we may as well make it official.

The communications platoon also needs a second HMMWV with an additional retransmission capability. Because of the distances over which units operate, the battalion relies quite heavily on retransmission. In Somalia, for example, units often maneuvered up to 40 kilometers away from their battalion tactical operations center (TOC) and communicated on retransmission. One battalion task force operated in the Marka humanitarian relief sector, an area bigger than Connecticut. Another battalion task force operated in an area just as big in the vicinity of Kismayu and Jilib to the south. In similar situations, wide-ranging, dispersed operations are the norm rather than the exception.

The battalion TOC itself needs to be

combined with the combat trains command post so the two staffs can conduct sustained operations. Although this may sound odd at first, the light battalion TOC was not designed for sustained operations over a period of months. Only by combining and cross-training personnel can we have enough people for sustained TOC operations while still providing adequate security, equipment maintenance, and sleep. Both the S-2/S-3 vehicle and the S-4 vehicle should be HMMWV four-passenger ambulances reconfigured for command and control.

Form a weapons platoon in each company from the antiarmor and 60mm mortar sections, and increase the manning of the mortar section. The H-series TOE had a weapons platoon consisting of a mortar section of three 81mm mortars and an antiarmor section of two TOWs. Although I don't advocate going back to that platoon's equipment, its organization made a lot of sense. The weapons platoon leader and platoon sergeant added considerable experience and command and control to the employment of the mortars and the antiarmor systems as well as another layer of supervision to the sections' training.

The light company mortar section has not been a great success. This has not been the fault of either the weapons or the soldiers but of our unrealistic expectations of the 60mm mortar crew. Forty years ago, a 60mm mortar squad with a lighter M19 mortar consisted of five

Some fairly minor modifications to the TOE will greatly improve the ability of the light units to conduct sustained operations across the spectrum of combat.

people. Today the mortar section has only six soldiers to man two M224 mortars. This number needs to be increased by at least one man per mortar as well as a section leader and a radiotelephone operator for a total of 10. Ideally, two more soldiers should be added as a fire direction center (FDC) section (computer and check computer), but 10 men should be the minimum. This would reduce the load on the individual mortar section

members and enable the section to keep up with the rest of the company during foot movements.

Having the antiarmor section also fall under the weapons platoon would simplify administration and put antiarmor weapon training (Dragon or Javelin) under the direct supervision of a platoon leader. (It is now a function of the section sergeant with the oversight of the company XO.) Additionally, with the advent of the Javelin system, the antiarmor section is more likely to be used as a separate maneuver element. Having a platoon leader to direct and assist the section sergeant in emplacing antiarmor systems would greatly improve the efficiency of overwatch and other antiarmor employment tasks.

In situations with no armor threat, the soldiers in the antiarmor section could be used as additional ammunition bearers for the mortars. This would reduce the immediate requirement for the mortar section to collect mortar ammunition being carried by the rifle platoons. Another possibility for antiarmor section employment in these situations would be to equip it with four 7.62mm machineguns and use it as a company machinegun section—again under the control of the weapons platoon leader or platoon sergeant. This would increase the number of 7.62s in the company to 10 and give the company commander a formidable section to augment his overwatch or support-by-fire elements. The addition of four machineguns to the company TOE—along with their tripods, traversing and elevation mechanisms, and accessory bags—would cost very little but would greatly increase the company's firepower in situations where—as in Somalia—suppressive fire may be imperative.

Consolidate the TOW systems in a single company organization at brigade. The organization of the brigade TOW company should be similar to that of the Delta companies in the airborne TOE, with five platoons of four TOW antiarmor systems each, for a total of 20.

This simple change would offer several benefits:

- It would consolidate TOW training under one command within the brigade.
- It would mass all the TOWs in a

single tactical element that would allow the brigade commander to allocate his TOWs (with a company command structure) to the battalion (or battalions) on the most likely armor avenue of approach. It would allow the TOWs to be under a single company command when providing overwatch for movement. It would not preclude the occasional cross attachment of TOW platoons to battalions when

The light battalion has a ridiculously austere combat service support structure, compounded by unrealistic design assumptions.

required by an analysis of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time); but it would increase the probability of achieving massed TOW fires through improved command and control.

- It would give the brigade commander a fourth organic maneuver element. This element would be especially useful on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, where the TOW company would be reconfigured with a mix of 50-caliber machineguns and MK 19 40mm grenade machineguns. In Somalia and Haiti, convoy security and mounted security patrolling were among the most common and frequent operations for TOW platoons. We can expect to see more of the same in future operations of this kind. Dedicating the TOW company to these missions would free more line companies and platoons for dismounted patrolling.

- It would allow the division commander to cross-attach antiarmor companies to a single brigade for deployment to a higher-intensity environment. A light brigade with three antiarmor companies (one organic, two attached) would have the same antiarmor firepower as an airborne infantry brigade.

Although we should strive to keep light infantry as light as possible, the lessons of Somalia and Haiti—and the augmentation that was necessary in both places—clearly show that the J-series TOE needs to be modified. The character of light infantry operations would not change. Light infantry would still attack on foot at night or conduct air assault operations. Light infantry would still fight the low-

intensity war with relentless dismounted patrolling.

We can augment the light infantry organization to make it more self-sustaining without greatly increasing the number of C141s required to move it. The ceiling of 10,000 men and 500 C141 sorties is no longer sacrosanct. We must in-

stead look at making the light infantry division more powerful. By making these relatively small changes to improve its sustainability, its communications, and the tactical flexibility of its key weapons, we can greatly increase the light division's usefulness across the entire spectrum of war.

Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton served in the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, in Somalia. He previously served in the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, at Fort Lewis, and is now assistant J-5, U.S. Central Command. He is a 1978 ROTC graduate of Florida Technological University.

FIFTY YEARS AGO IN HISTORY

May-June 1946

By the late spring of 1946, the political lines of demarcation that had been taking shape since the end of World War II had become even clearer. In China, Nationalist and Communist factions had clashed openly in spite of intensive international efforts to establish a unified and lasting government. The question of Korean unification also remained a matter of debate, as the Soviet Union insisted upon conditions that would lead to a Korea whose government was dominated by the Communists. In Germany, divergent political interests among the former Allies continued to hamper efforts to reestablish commerce, while in California, United States Marines were called upon to suppress a prison riot.

These and other highlights of the postwar years have been provided by Mr. Bud Hannings, in preparation for his upcoming chronology of the Korean War.

- 1 May** The joint United States-USSR Commission is unable to decide which Korean organizations should be included in the formation of a provisional government. Only the Communists support the proposal—surfaced at the Moscow Conference—that a five-year trusteeship governed by four powers be set up. The United States calls upon the United Nations to discuss the issue during a future session.
- 2 May** President Harry Truman sends Major Albert Arsenault and a contingent of Marines to Alcatraz prison to reinforce civilian police who are attempting to quell a prisoners' riot. The riots are stopped, at a cost of five dead and fourteen injured.
- 26 May** The Allies are unable to arrive at a mutually acceptable plan to permit commerce among the four zones of occupation in Germany. The U.S. Secretary of State finally proposes a plan that will permit the Americans and the British to integrate their zones for purposes of commerce, although the French and the Russians have chosen not to participate.
- 28 May** Special Representative George C. Marshall reports that Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek appears to have accepted the Communist occupation of Manchuria, and that he may be willing to permit a team of observers to oversee Peiping, now also in Communist hands. Chiang Kai-shek later meets with his general at Mukden and rejects any such compromise.
- 6 June** The Marine garrison on Guam assumes responsibility for the discipline, care, and feeding of the Japanese who have been imprisoned there as convicted war criminals. Some prisoners who have been sentenced to death are executed by the Marine garrison.
- 7 June** Marshall is able to persuade Nationalist and Communist Chinese forces to agree to a temporary cease-fire of 15 days in Manchuria. In spite of many threats and counter-threats, the truce is extended for an additional 8 days.
- 15 June** The Korean Department of National Defense is renamed the Department of Internal Security, in response to Russian concerns over the term "national defense." The Bureau of Armed Forces and its subordinate Departments of the Army and Navy are abolished and replaced respectively by the Constabulary and the Coast Guard.
- 25 June** Major General Edward M. Almond arrives in Japan. He will eventually serve as Chief of Staff, Far East Command, under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, and will command the U.S. X Corps during the Korean War.