

BOOK REVIEWS



INFANTRY recently received the following reference volumes, which readers will find useful:

***Jane's Infantry Weapons 1996-97.* Edited by Terry J. Gander. Jane's Information Group Ltd, 1996. 750 Pages. \$290, Hardcover. \$795, CD-ROM.** Because of the massive increase in infantry weapons around the world—many of which are being used for “irregular or unlawful” purposes—this edition includes some 150 new entries. It profiles more than 2,000 weapons and accessories, including pistols, rifles, machineguns, and antitank weapons, from more than 300 manufacturers in 69 countries.

Each entry offers detailed descriptions of items currently in service or under development and includes specifications, manufacturer information, a listing indicating whether the item is in production or development, and performance evaluations. Many entries also include photographs of the items.

The volume includes alphabetical and manufacturer indexes, a “National Inventories” section (listing the items owned by each country), a glossary, and data tables providing information on each piece of equipment or accessory.

***Jane's Land-Based Air Defence 1996-97.* Edited by Tony Cullen and Christopher F. Foss. Jane's Information Group, Ltd., 1996. 349 Pages. \$290, Hardcover. \$795, CD-ROM.** Land-based air defense systems continue to play a critical role in military operations, as has been shown in the former Yugoslavia, where ground forces have shot down French and U.S. fighter planes.

This directory provides a comprehensive look at anti-aircraft gun and missile systems now in service or under development around the world. It reviews more than 350 gun and missile systems from more than 97 manufacturers. Systems are listed by type and by the country in which they are manufactured and cross-referenced in alphabetic and manufacturer indexes. It also includes a section that lists the systems owned by each country.

Each entry provides a description of the system and operating specifications, including dimensions, range, speed, rate of fire, warhead, and propulsion. Many entries include photos of the systems, and all include manufacturer data and a section noting

whether it is in development, in production, or in service.

***Brassey's World Aircraft and Systems Directory 1996-97.* Edited by Michael Taylor. Brassey's 1996. 576 Pages. \$99.95, Hardcover.** This is the most comprehensive and up-to-date directory of current aircraft types available. It covers thousands of aircraft types in service, production, or development, along with their operating systems, design and production histories, performance figures, and manufacturers, and includes more than 1,000 photographs and drawings. Each entry offers a detailed description, with dimensions, performance, and production.

***General William C. Lee: Father of the Airborne.* By Jerry Autry, assisted by Kathryn Autry. Airborne Press (2824 Crestscene Trail, Raleigh, NC 27603), 1995. 224 Pages. \$35.00.** Reviewed by Dr. Charles E. White, Infantry School Historian.

On 25 June 1940, as the French were surrendering to the Germans in Marshal Foch's railroad car, Major William C. Lee was officially assigned the airborne project for the U.S. Army. For several years, Lee had been quietly advocating an American airborne force, but his superiors at Infantry Branch looked upon his ideas with suspicion.

Ironically, it was President Franklin Roosevelt who ignited the spark that launched the airborne concept. Roosevelt, watching newsreel footage of German paratroopers jumping into Holland, summoned his military liaison to find out about U.S. paratrooper capability. Shortly afterward, Major Lee's enthusiasm for the airborne received the blessing of Infantry Branch.

Without question, William C. Lee spearheaded the development of the airborne concept in the United States. His innovative and creative energy, coupled with his total dedication to the project, made sure the nation had the finest paratroopers in the world. Shortly after his promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1940, Lee took command of the newly formed Provisional Parachute Group at Fort Benning, Georgia. The group was charged with establishing a jump school, training paratroopers, and developing doctrine for the airborne force.

James Gavin, who later commanded the

82d Airborne Division during Operation Market Garden in 1944, was Lee's operations officer at the time. His description of Lee captures the heart and soul of the man:

[He was] a smart, patient, tolerant, considerate, intelligent, and kind man. He struggled with us—we kids wanted to rebuild the world right away. There were all sorts of things we were wild-eyed about and having a great old time doing, jumping every place under the sun. He let us try anything we wanted to do. And we did. But he applied a governing hand—and good common sense. There couldn't have been a better man for the job.

A few days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Lee was promoted to colonel and assigned to the War Department staff. He soon took Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall on an inspection tour of the airborne force. After reviewing the paratroopers in North Carolina, Marshall was convinced that an airborne capability was essential for the Army. In May 1942, he ordered Lee, now a brigadier general, to England to consult with the Allies on airborne needs for the invasion of France. Upon his return, Lee recommended the establishment of an airborne division.

On 17 August 1942, Lee was promoted to major general and given command of the newly activated 101st Airborne Division at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. For the next 18 months, he trained the division relentlessly, as the soldiers honed their combat skills. He was also instrumental in integrating glider training into the airborne concept. When the 101st deployed to England in 1943, Lee established a division jump school to sustain the skills of his paratroopers and to train additional volunteers. During this time, Lee was also intimately involved in the planning for the Normandy invasion. He wrote the airborne plan and selected the actual drop sites for the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions.

Unfortunately, a debilitating heart attack on 5 February 1944 put an end to Lee's brilliant career. At first, he expected to recover and return to command, but in March he had another attack and was sent home. After a short stay in Walter Reed Army Hospital, Lee was officially retired in December 1944. He later said that missing the Normandy invasion was the greatest disappointment of his life.

Lee is one of the most remarkable soldiers the U.S. Army ever produced. Incredibly private and uncommonly modest, he pioneered the American airborne concept. Virtually all personnel involved in the training of U.S. airborne forces during World War II were Lee's men. He rightly deserves the title, "Father of the Airborne."

Unfortunately, few in the Army today, and fewer outside the service, ever heard of him. Even the U.S. Army's official history of World War II fails to mention his participation. Fortunately, Jerry and Kathryn Autry have put together this splendid pictorial biography of and tribute to General Lee. It also contains more than 350 photographs and documents relating to Lee and the development of the U.S. airborne force. It also includes Lee's correspondence with Omar Bradley, Matthew Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor, and many others. Most of the material in this book was previously unpublished.

Anyone who wants to learn about the development of America's airborne capability and the man almost solely responsible for its creation should read this superb work. William C. Lee is truly one of the great unsung heroes of the U.S. Army and its involvement during World War II.

Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956. By Cole C. Kingseed. Louisiana State University Press, 1995. 166 Pages. \$22.50. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army.

The 1956 Suez crisis sounded the death knell of British and French imperialism in the Middle East, and ushered in a new era of significant U.S. involvement in the region. Taking place in the midst of the Cold War and almost concurrently with the Soviet invasion of Hungary, this crisis might have ignited a world conflict. Fortunately, it was defused, primarily through the effective leadership of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

It is important to place the Suez crisis within the context of the Cold War and the U.S. policy of containment of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. The United States, in tacitly accepting the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, misjudged the actual temperament of the Arab Middle East. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was the dominant figure in Arab politics, and after being rebuffed when he asked the U.S. to support Egypt's nationalization of the canal, he concluded an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia. The Eisenhower administration viewed this as Soviet encroachment, albeit by proxy, into the Middle East. The chain of events continued and escalated, with

Egypt's official recognition of the People's Republic of China, U.S. withdrawal of a pledge of financial support for the construction of the Aswan Dam, and Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal. For the British especially, the issue was perceived as one of national survival (and prestige); in collusion with the French and the Israelis, England invaded Egypt in November 1956.

The focus of this book is on the way Eisenhower managed the Suez episode, articulated a coherent national policy, and developed a national strategy to achieve his policy objectives. Eisenhower's success was due in large part to his skilled selection of able subordinates, frequent consultation with a small group of trusted advisers, centralized coordination of policy, willingness to accept responsibility, and reservation of policy decisions to himself. A vital component of his strategy was the skillful mustering of congressional support. The author's insightful analysis reveals that the balanced "interaction among the political, economic, and military dimensions of foreign policy marked Eisenhower as a skilled practitioner of crisis management."

In concert with recent revisionist historians, author Kingseed (an Army colonel and a West Point associate professor of history) is convinced that Eisenhower was a far more active and able chief executive than contemporary observers and early historians believed. Interesting, well-researched, and superbly written, this study deserves a wide readership.

The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Including the Art of War. Translation and Commentary by Ralph D. Sawyer, with Mei-Chun Sawyer. Westview Press, 1993. 568 Pages. \$29.95. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

In recent years, United States infantrymen have become more and more aware of and interested in ancient and modern military writings emanating from the Far East, and particularly from mainland China. This is all for the good, for we tend to forget the number of military contacts—friendly and otherwise—that we have had with Asian countries during the past 150 years.

Many of us are already familiar with Sun-Tzu's *Art of War*, which has been published in many Western languages since it was first translated by a French missionary some 200 years ago, and which has been studied by many Western military schools and academies.

Ralph Sawyer, the principal translator and commentator of this book, has been involved for the past 20 years in international consult-

ing work throughout Asia. In addition to Sun-Tzu's work, he also brings us six other Chinese military classics, all in new translations:

- T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings.
- The Methods of Ssu-ma.
- Wu-tzu.
- Wei Liao-tzu.
- Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung.
- Questions and Replies between T'ang T'ai-tsung and Li Wei-kung.

The first six of these writings were originally collected and edited during the Sung dynasty (960-1126 A.D.). The seventh was later combined with the others to make up the "Seven Military Classics" which, as Sawyer points out, "comprised the orthodox foundations for military thought and the basis for the imperial examinations required for martial appointment."

Sawyer adds that an early 1970s archaeological dig of a Han dynasty tomb unearthed a large number of valuable texts written on well-preserved bamboo slips. One was Sun Pin's *Military Methods*. A descendant of Sun-tzu who lived 100 years later, Sun Pin was considered an outstanding military strategist in his own right. (Sun Pin, or Sun Bin, was the subject of an article in the March 1991 issue of *Military Review* by then-Lieutenant Colonel Karl W. Eikenberry.)

Following a brief preface and a note on his translations and the pronunciation system he uses, Sawyer furnishes a chronology of approximate dynastic periods and a general introduction and historical background of the seven military classics. The book contains the appropriate notes, five appendixes, two indexes, a selected bibliography, and a glossary of selected terms with Chinese characters.

Since China seems again on the edge of becoming a great military power, U.S. military professionals need to learn as much as they can about that country's past military writings. What may strike Western readers at first is the stringent discipline, imposed on all ranks, that frequently called for execution. Still, we need to recall that the French Army of World War I (its 1-of-10 system) and the Soviet Army of World War II used execution to punish units and commanders for failing to carry out operations successfully.

There is much to be learned from these classics, and Sawyer's translations hold up well.

The Last Year of the German Army: May 1944-May 1945. By James Lucas. Arms & Armour, 1994. 240 Pages. \$16.95. Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army.

The 12-month period from May 1944 to

the unconditional German capitulation in May 1945 saw the Third Reich descend from the status of an embattled but still potent power to one of utter defeat. In his analysis of the decline of German fortunes, James Lucas examines the role the German Army played in the Nazi defeat. His study includes the military organization of the conventional military establishment, as well as the Nazi Party militias formed as Hitler's distrust of his generals grew in the aftermath of the July 1944 assassination plot.

In describing the principal weapons and vehicles in service during the war's final year, Lucas tries not to describe in depth all the military campaigns in the numerous theaters of war. He uses the operational campaigns only to highlight a specific weapon or to illustrate a specific incident during the campaign. By his own admission, such an approach leaves gaps in the recording of events and battles. The campaign in Normandy, for example, receives a scant six pages; the battle of Berlin is mentioned only in passing.

Like many other authors, Lucas maintains a grudging admiration for the discipline of the German Army. He says that Germany was still strong enough in May 1944 that it might have been possible for Hitler to fight the war to a stalemate. But his claim that unit cohesion and the command structure still functioned effectively in the closing month of the war is dubious. What he does best is to address the many factors that contributed to the German collapse. Unfortunately, his analysis lacks the depth needed for detailed scrutiny.

Written more for the novice than the military historian, this book merits mixed reviews. The chapter on organization and command structure is the best written. But subsequent chapters on weapons, opposition to Hitler, and the theaters of war do not live up to expectations. By far the most interesting is Joachim Peiper's account of the Ardennes counteroffensive.

On the debit side, there is little new material in this book. To Lucas, the one strategic blunder that more than any other changed the course of history was Hitler's declaration of war against the United States. The introduction of massive U.S. resources doomed Germany. Lucas's assertion that Hitler's interference with the armed forces resulted in disastrous consequences to the war effort is common knowledge and hardly enlightening. The lack of notes and bibliography also detract from the text.

In the final analysis, Lucas has produced a disjointed examination of the German Army in the last year of the war. Readers may find portions of the book informative, but the stan-

dard work on the German Army is still Matthew Cooper's *The German Army, 1933-1945* (published by Scarborough House, 1990).

***Connecticut Yankees at Gettysburg.* Kent State University Press, 1993. By Charles P. Hamblen. Edited by Walter L. Powell. \$22.00, Hardcover.** Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, U.S. Air Force, Retired.

Of all Civil War topics, the Gettysburg campaign is one of those written about most often. Despite the insistence of some that the Civil War has been "written to death," a steady stream of substantive historical studies continue to be published. One noteworthy lack has been regimental histories of specific units, and this book fills an important niche for Connecticut's role in the battle.

Charles Hamblen was a principal and teacher at Norwich Free Academy before his death in 1986. His book manuscript was then edited by Walter Powell, historical preservationist for the Borough of Gettysburg.

Hamblen's historical work details the involvement of five Connecticut infantry regiments—5th, 14th, 17th, 20th, and 27th—as well as a light artillery battery that participated in all major phases of the three-day battle.

The Connecticut regiments brought nearly 1,300 men to the fields and hills of Gettysburg and suffered 359 casualties by the end of the third day. The 17th Connecticut suffered most heavily in fighting on Barlow's Knoll the first day and East Cemetery Hill on the second. The 27th encountered heavy action in the Wheat Field, and the 14th saw combat on Cemetery Ridge. Hamblen closes his book with a full accounting of the units' casualties, listing by name those who were wounded or killed.

Augmented by some excellent battlefield maps, this book is an excellent recap of one Northern state's role at the battle of Gettysburg.

***Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective.* By Dave Richard Palmer. Originally published in 1978. Presidio Press, 1995. 277 Pages. \$14.95.** Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

The subtitle of the original paperback edition in 1978, "A History of the Vietnam War From a Military Man's Viewpoint," was an accurate description. Author Dave Palmer, a colonel at the time, offered a readable, popular-audience military account of the war with candid assessments of the limitations under which the conflict took place. Along with Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp's *Strategy for De-*

feat (also published in 1978), it was one of the most significant military retrospects of the early period when the literature on the military conduct of the war was still very limited. The book received good reviews in popular sources and military publications but attracted less attention in scholarly circles.

Many words have "passed under the bridge" since then. The literature today on the military conduct of the war, and particularly on strategy, is voluminous. The level of sophistication, the controversies, and the debates now are a central component of the Vietnam War bibliography. Harry Summers, Bruce Palmer, Philip Davidson, Andrew Krepinevich, Larry Cable, Mark Clodfelter, and several others have contributed landmark "military man" perspectives that have differed widely in interpretation and inspired intense debate.

Palmer capped his 35-year Army career with a five-year tour as superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy and retired as a lieutenant general. The book, reissued completely as it was in 1978 without even a new preface, remains a very readable popular history with some insightful comments and appraisals that have stood the test of time. It is a good overview for the novice, but serious students of the war will find it more of a period piece compared to the level of analysis now available in other sources on the war.

If a reader wanted to read only one book on Vietnam, I would recommend something with more analytical depth. But to gain an overview of what happened and why professional military men found the war such a frustrating disaster, this is not a bad place to start. It is still a very good read.

***Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War.* By Ed Evanhoe. Naval Institute Press, 1995. 193 Pages. \$25.95.** Reviewed by Michael F. Dilley.

Until recently, most of the books about special operations during the Korean War were classified. Ed Evanhoe was there as an active participant in these operations and therefore had his personal recollections for a sounding board to his research in the newly declassified archives and studies. *Darkmoon* is the exciting and fascinating result.

World War II saw the widest use of special-purpose, special-mission organizations in U.S. military history. Predictably, when the war was over, the military services disbanded most of these forces. In June 1950 the North Koreans stormed across the border, taking the south and the world by surprise, as they rolled steadily and inevitably toward the Sea of Ja-

pan. Attempts to use special operations forces began almost immediately. The planners realized early that any use first required establishing and training such forces, as there were none in the theater. And there were many petty jealousies among the services and various intelligence organizations that made the coordinated and effective use of special operations forces almost a war in itself.

Most of this book concentrates on the various missions in the first 18 months of the war, with the details from after-action reports richly supplemented by personal accounts. The author's narrative flows smoothly and is easy to read. He has included two chapters—one near the beginning and the other almost half-way through—to tell the larger story of how these special operations fit into the intelligence and strategic plans. He also uses these chapters to explain who the various players are and how they fit in. These explanations help keep the reader focused as well as understand the wealth of acronyms.

Evanhoe says in his preface that one book is not enough to do justice to the subject of special operations in the Korean War. Although he's probably correct, he has done an outstanding job in this work. He includes operations by all the services as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, detailing both successes and failures. Despite the jargon and acronyms, the story line grabs the reader and takes him with it, moving from one operation to another and from one part of the country to another.

Darkmoon is another book in the Naval Institute Press's Special Warfare Series. As with the others, it has been selected because little else is available on this aspect of special operations. It is an excellent book, recommended for special operators, infantrymen, and others who work with special operations forces or just have an interest in them.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa. By Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired). Naval Institute Press, 1995. 328 Pages. \$29.95.

A Short History of the Civil War. By James L. Stokesbury. William Morrow, 1995. 354 Pages. \$25.00.

Winfield Scott Hancock: A Soldier's Life. By David M. Jordan. Indiana University Press, 1995. 416 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

Senseless Secrets: The Failures of U.S. Military Intelligence from George Washington to the Present. By Lieutenant Colonel Michael Lee Lanning (U.S. Army, Retired). Carol Publishing, 1996. 324 Pages. \$24.95.

Days of Infamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill—The Shocking Truth Revealed: How Their Secret Deals and Strategic Blunders Caused Disasters at Pearl Harbor and The Philippines. By John Costello. (Originally published by Nimbus Communications, 1994.) Pocket Books, 1995. 452 Pages. \$14.00, Softbound.

Code Breaker in the Far East: How Britain Cracked Japan's Top Secret Military Code. By Alan Stripp. (Originally published by Frank-Cass & Company., Ltd.) Oxford University Press, 1995. 204 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

Civil War Medicine: Care & Comfort of the Wounded. By Robert E. Denney. Sterling, 1995. 408 Pages. \$19.95, Softbound.

Leader of the Charge: A Biography of General George E. Pickett, C.S.A. By Edward G. Longacre. White Mane Publishing Company (P.O. Box 152, Shippensburg, PA 17257), 1996. 242 Pages. \$29.95.

Blue Water Sailor: The Story of a Destroyer Officer. By Don Sheppard. Presidio Press, 1996. 352 Pages. \$24.95.

The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. By Michael R. Gordon and Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor. (Published in hardcover, 1993.) Little, Brown, 1995. 576 Pages. \$15.95, Softbound.

Bosnia: What Every American Should Know. By Arthur L. Clark. Berkley, 1996. 235 Pages. \$6.99.

Transportation and Logistics: One Man's Story. By Jack C. Fuson. U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995. 227 Pages. \$18.00.

Confederate Commissary General. By Jerrold Northrop Moore. White Mane Publishing (P.O. Box 152, 63 W. Burd Street, Shippensburg, PA 17257), 1996. 340 Pages. \$24.95.

Wahoo: The Patrols of America's Most Famous WWII Submarine. By Rear Admiral Richard H. O'Kane. Presidio Press, 1996. 376 Pages. \$15.95, Softbound.

On Celestial Wings. By Colonel Ed Whitcomb. Air University Press, 1996. 217 Pages. Softbound.

Solitary Survivor: The First American POW in Southeast Asia. By Lawrence R. Bailey, Jr., with Ron Martz. Brassey's, 1996. 240 Pages. \$23.95, Hardcover.

Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific. By Gavan Daws. (Originally published in 1994.) Morrow, 1996. 462 Pages. \$15.00, Softbound.

When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army

Stopped Hitler. By David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House. University Press of Kansas, 1995. 414 Pages. \$29.95.

Silent Warriors: A Memoir of America's 442nd Regimental Combat Team. By Jack K. Wakamatsu. Vantage Press, 1995. 279 Pages. \$17.95, Hardcover.

Guns: Who Should Have Them? Edited by David B. Kopel. Prometheus Books, 1995. 475 Pages. \$25.95.

Sergeant Major, U.S. Marines. By Major Bruce H. "Doc" Norton, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired) and Sergeant Major Maurice J. Jacques, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired). Ivy Books, 1995. 464 Pages. \$5.99.

Witness to War: The Civil War 1861-1865. By Harold Holzer. Witness to War Series. Berkley, 1996. \$12.50, Softbound.

The Story of the 116th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion. By St. Clair A. Mulholland. Edited by Lawrence Frederick Kohl. Fordham University Press, 1996. 480 Pages. \$27.50, Hardcover.

Over There: A Marine in the Great War. By Carl Andrew Brannen. Texas A&M University Press, 1996. 167 Pages. \$24.95.

A Cavalryman's Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth Century Army General. By Hamilton H. Howze. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996. 316 Pages. \$24.95.

War Dogs: Canines in Combat. By Michael Lemish. Brassey's, 1996. 256 Pages. \$22.95.

Fight or Flight. By Geoffrey Regan. Avon, 1996. 277 Pages. \$16.00, Softbound.

Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain. By William J. Spahr. (Originally published in 1993.) Presidio Press, 1995. 304 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

The Battle Book: Crucial Conflicts in History from 1469 BC to the Present. By Bryan Perrett. Sterling, 1996. 352 Pages. \$19.95.

The Biographical Dictionary of World War II Generals and Flag Officers: The U.S. Armed Forces. By R. Manning Ancell with Christine M. Miller. Greenwood, 1996. 720 Pages. \$95.00.

Call for Fire: Sea Combat in the Falklands and the Gulf War. By Captain Chris Craig. John Murray (distributed by Trafalgar Square, North Pomfret, VT 05053), 1996. 300 Pages. \$45.00.

The Red Orchestra: The Soviet Spy Network Inside Nazi Europe. By V.E. Tarrant. Wiley, 1996. 224 Pages. \$24.95, Hardcover.

On the Front Lines: The Experience of War through the Eyes of the Allied Soldiers in World War II. By John Ellis. (Published in Great Britain as *World War II: The Sharp End*, by Windrow and Green, Ltd., 1990.) John Wiley, 1991. 380 Pages. \$15.95, Softbound.

Bull's Eye: The Assassination and Life of Supergun Inventor Gerald Bull. By James Adams. Random House, 1992. 317 Pages. \$23.00, Hardcover.

