

mented on most military installations. The quality of the simulation will depend on the amount of time the unit spends in planning the simulation, as well as on the experience of the personnel actually conducting the simulation.

A simulation work-up may look like the following:

- Brigade alone: BBS staff planning command post exercise (CPX), two or three days.

- Brigade and battalions: BBS staff planning CPX, two or three days.

- Individual battalion: BBS staff planning CPX, two or three days.

- Individual battalion: one-day JANUS tactical/battlefield operating system synchronization exercise.

- Individual company: JANUS exercise with the commander and S-3 observing and assessing unit training needs, two or three days. (The program should take place over a period of 18 to 24 months for active duty units, and may take longer for Reserve and National Guard units.)

If properly identified, simulations can

complement any training program a unit develops. They give a commander an opportunity to train as a brigade staff without the usual distractions and restrictions.

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Firearms Training System: A Proposal for Future ROE Training

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The proper use of force is critical in a peacekeeping operation but the improper use of force to attain a short-term tactical success can lead to a long-term strategic failure. More and more military operations in the future will require U.S. forces to apply varying degrees of force, ranging from the individual decision of a soldier to pull the trigger to a company level response.

From peace operations to traditional force-on-force engagements, the operational tempo and rules of engagement (ROEs) can change quickly, and our forces need to prepare for this challenge. A significant part of their training needs to be focused on the use of force and ROEs for individual responses.

Changing political realities now place U.S. forces in situations that are more familiar to civilian law enforcement officers than to traditional warfighters, as soldiers find themselves in situations that require a more discriminating use of force. Even traditional force-on-force

conflicts, post-combat operations, and nation-building missions will require our soldiers to operate in environments with ROEs something less than those that apply to combat.

The Army's current use-of-force and ROE training can be improved to prepare soldiers for these new missions. The greatest void is in the development and

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implementation of a practical hands-on firearms training device for individual soldiers preparing for peacekeeping missions.

I propose that the Army adopt an interactive computer simulation firearms training device such as the one the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) already

employs in use-of-force training for its agents. Before analyzing the applicability of the FBI's device for military use, however, it is essential to understand the similarities between civilian law and policy and military ROEs. Civil law and policy require the "reasonable" use of force against imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Most modern military ROEs embrace the concept of the reasonable use of force with language concerning "hostile acts" and "hostile intent."

"Reasonableness," as demonstrated by case law, allows for a more forceful response than many would expect. This same standard of reasonableness applies to decisions on the use of deadly force in most military operations. Mission parameters, however, often complicate the application of a reasonable response. Unlike pre-planned attacks, raids, or ambushes, most peace missions do not clearly identify a "hostile force" before engagement. Therefore, the reasonable-

ness of a response is often predicated on identifying hostile acts or intent. This decision may have to be made by a young, frightened soldier whose actions are strongly based on training.

Behavior that constitutes a hostile act or intent often cannot be clearly defined under peacekeeping ROEs. Further, soldiers are generally not allowed to make a preemptive strike but must be ready to respond appropriately to hostile acts from an unidentified enemy. Under these circumstances, soldiers must quickly analyze facts that may or may not justify a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force is needed. Further, their analysis is affected by some physiological factors:

Action/Reaction Time. Like civilian law enforcement officers, soldiers will be forced to evaluate situations even while they must react quickly and appropriately. This could range from an isolated sniping incident by an individual to a military type of assault on a traffic control point or checkpoint. Unfortunately, once a hostile act is initiated, the party in the defensive posture may suffer casualties before the situation can be assessed and appropriate measures taken.

Neutralization of the Threat. The ability of an individual soldier to stop a hostile act is generally limited to small arms fire. Stopping an individual who poses a real threat requires the neutralization of the central nervous system—either by direct injury to the brain or upper spinal column, by hydrostatic shock, or by deprivation of oxygen through massive blood loss. Achieving these results may take seconds or minutes, which is often enough time for the individual to commit more threatening actions.

Sensory Distortion Phenomena. In extremely violent situations, the body's survival mechanisms focus on the threat, which often results in tunnel vision, scenario fulfillment, time compression, and stress-induced error. These phenomena usually occur when the mind is called upon to analyze in seconds events that usually take minutes of rational explanation or analysis. Historically, there are many examples of this. Winston Churchill, in describing his experience in the battle at Omdurman in 1898, said it was like watching a silent film. Police

officers under fire often completely discharge their firearms and later report that they cannot recall ever hearing a shot or feeling any recoil.

Despite these realities, U.S. forces are often deployed with minimal guidance on the use of deadly force, most often in the form of "last resort" language. This guid-

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ance may be improper for three reasons:

- It places U.S. forces at a disadvantage in action or reaction time.
- It is not required by international law or most strategic policy objectives.
- Commanders may be tempted to substitute "last resort" statements for essential training on how and when to respond with deadly force.

Furthermore, although lawyers, senior commanders, and planners may understand ROE "last resort" language, soldiers who have not had practical, realistic hands-on training may not understand it. As a minimum, they need lane training, role-playing, and other situational training exercises (STXs). Civilian law enforcement agencies recognize that personnel under stress react according to the manner in which they have been trained. Accordingly, much effort is spent on realistic use-of-force training for individuals.

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The FBI maintains an excellent law enforcement use-of-force training program. In addition to hands-on training facilities, the FBI also develops a historical, legal, and technical database for use-of-force situations. Perhaps the most effective device in the FBI's training inventory is the Firearms Training System

(F.A.T.S.), which was developed and manufactured to provide realistic law enforcement use-of-force training.

Unlike traditional target ranges, this system attempts to replicate the conditions of stress, time compression, and sensory deprivation that are prevalent in deadly force situations. It consists of a large training room with a full wall-sized screen, on which are projected differing scenarios from CD ROMs (compact disks, read only memory). The scenarios require an agent to make use-of-force decisions in accordance with FBI policy, which is analogous to operational ROEs. The scenarios are fast-paced, often innocuous, offered in varying degrees of illumination, and always subject to change.

An agent in training is equipped with a realistic simulated weapon that emits laser "bullets" that hit the target screen. The laser-sensitive screen instantly records the shots on the system's computer. Depending on the placement of shots, lack of shots, or verbal commands, the computer continues the scenario to its conclusion. The computer can then play the scenario back, showing the hits and misses. More important, the training staff can point out the appropriate or inappropriate uses of deadly force.

Before undergoing this training, FBI agents are briefed extensively in the classroom on use-of-force policy. In military scenarios, the appropriate use of force would be mission specific. The role of a judge advocate, therefore, would be to brief soldiers on the use-of-force policy for a specific mission, observe the training, then debrief the soldiers, forcing them to justify the actions they have taken. RAMP training and STX debriefings would go hand-in-hand with this type of training. (RAMP stands for return fire with aimed fire; anticipate attack; measure the amount of force; and protect with deadly force only the human life and property designated by command.)

The Army already has some basic F.A.T.S. hardware in its inventory, primarily for use in training military police units. There are significant differences, however, between the current Army systems and the FBI's systems:

- The FBI systems are capable of “branching.” That is, the program’s responses depend on the actions of the trainee. If the trainee issues clear and concise orders, the scenario may resolve itself without escalating into violence. Or if the trainee shoots poorly or merely wounds a subject, the subject may return fire. The Army systems, without this capability, continue regardless of the trainee’s decisions. They are therefore only marginally useful in initial *shoot-don’t shoot* training.

- The FBI scenarios are written specifically for FBI policy on the use of deadly force, while the Army systems are generic law-enforcement scenarios, not tailored to the Army’s military police policy on the use of deadly force. More important, none of the developed or implemented scenarios cover military operations.

The Army should develop a full range of ROE-dependent F.A.T.S. scenarios that would give the individual soldier realistic training. Since the Army has already fielded the hardware to support such a system, the cost of development would be primarily in the production of

the new scenarios.

When developing an Army system, the following factors should be considered:

- The classified nature of most ROEs would generate special production, storage, and utilization problems. This could be reduced if classification levels were reviewed and the use of truly classified

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scenarios were limited to smaller units (special operations, scouts, or long range surveillance detachments).

- Numerous scenarios would be needed to cover the spectrum of conventional and peacekeeping missions. Additionally, to achieve branching capabilities, each scenario would require that several iterations be recorded in production. Costs could be reduced through joint planning and scripting.

- The possibility of changes in inter-

national law or the political goals of the United States might make the programs prematurely obsolete. Updates and proper training of the trainers would be necessary. But the focus of the program would still be self-defense and the use of deadly force—areas of the law that are fairly stable.

In light of the volatile political situations in regions where most such missions will be conducted, effective individualized ROE training is essential. The uncertainties and “fog of war” can be greatly attenuated through realistic training. A system such as F.A.T.S. would provide effective use-of-force training under stressful conditions similar to those soldiers may face in peacekeeping or combat operations.

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