

BOOK REVIEWS



***Hazardous Duty.* By David H. Hackworth, with Tom Mathews. William Morrow, 1996. 350 Pages. \$27.00.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

In this book, the author writes "soldier talk"—simple, direct, earthy, and often profane. He is a retired Army colonel of Infantry with a chestful of combat awards earned in two wars, Korea and Vietnam.

Many readers may be turned off by his writing style, and rightly so. With them, I believe he could have made his points without the amount of profanity he apparently felt he had to use to impress his young military readers and to emphasize the points he was trying to make.

This is his second major book. In the first, *About Face*, which was published in 1989, he tells of his early life, his military experiences, and his 17-year self-imposed exile in Australia. He is considered our most decorated living combat soldier, and there is little question he earned each of his 27 awards.

He begins this book where he left off in *About Face*, with his return to the States by way of Hawaii in 1989 and his eventual employment that same year with *Newsweek* Magazine as a roving war correspondent.

Hackworth came back carrying a lot of mental baggage from his Vietnam War years. He tells us, "Vietnam left me full of bitter anger and disappointment, mainly with the military but also with my country and how it treated the warriors who fought there." He says he is over that anger and disappointment, but I don't think he is or ever will be. It's buried too deep in his soul.

He detested many of the Army's senior leaders in Vietnam—for example, General William Westmoreland was "a reckless butcher." And he detests just as many of today's senior Army leaders, whom he refers to as "Perfumed Princes." He believes that, in the Army today, "once you get beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel very few real war fighters are left....They become politically correct....All that counts is getting the star and moving on up the galaxy."

If there is one central theme in this book, it is Hackworth's desire to protect the "grunt" from the Perfumed Princes, "to make sure our

soldiers on our battlefields are well trained, well equipped, well led—and not sent to hot spots on missions that don't make sense."

Hackworth is even-handed, one must give him that. He has equal regard for our political leaders—from the President on down the line, and probably to the lowest level GS employee in the Pentagon—and for defense industry executives—members of the "Military Industrial Complex."

For *Newsweek*, he covered the Gulf War; the Balkans, at two different times; Somalia, also at two different times; Haiti at the beginning and for several weeks thereafter; and Korea, in 1994 when it appeared a shooting war might break out. In between, Hackworth managed to get to Vietnam, where he visited several old battlefields and met some of his opponents. Along the way, he developed an intense dislike for many of today's journalists, and at one point during the Gulf War even threw a punch at one of the TV "Stars" who had cursed him. (The man's producer, fortunately, stepped in and took the brunt of the blow.)

In his last three chapters, Hackworth discusses his role (a minor one, to be sure) in the suicide of Admiral Boorda; Washington as he views it today; and ways to improve our defense structure. Here are only a few of his suggestions for improvement: "consolidate all our fighting forces into one unified service"; "merge the Army and Marine Corps"; "put the Navy in charge of all strategic missiles"; and "merge the National Guard and the Reserves into one streamlined organization."

He tells us he intends "to keep sniffing around like an old coyote, chewing on the Military Industrial Congressional Complex and "calling 'em as I see 'em." I have no doubt he will do just that.

Lots of folks won't like Hackworth's book, and I don't think he will be welcome at the White House or the Pentagon in the near future. But there will be other people, in and out of the military services, who will say to him, "Right On!"

***Decisive Force: The New American Way of War.* By F.G. Hoffman. Praeger, 1996. 160 Pages. \$52.95.** Reviewed by Colonel

George G. Eddy, U.S. Army, Retired.

In this concise book of 133 pages with many footnotes, the author attempts to analyze the concept of decisive force in relation to Vietnam, Beirut, Panama, and the Gulf War. In only the latter two of these engagements has the concept applied. While the military services were basically satisfied with their relative freedom of action to apply a preponderance of force, we must ask whether such conflicts will prevail in the future, or whether the military will find itself increasingly involved in operations other than war. The military must both recognize the likelihood of more such operations and adjust its doctrine and tactics accordingly. It must also learn how to deal appropriately with civilian authorities and the attitudes and concerns of the American public. Basic conflicts exist between decisive force and OOTW. Therefore, the military must heed the admonition of Robert Connor in *America's Armed Forces* that it must develop a pervading theory of war.

As author Hoffman notes: *The U.S. military shows a marked predisposition for strategic offensives supported by full national mobilization, employing the economic and technological assets of the nation, to bring to bear a preponderance of power in the most direct and decisive manner possible.* Aiming for a quick conquest is a prerequisite to this concept of going to war. In essence, this is the American Way of War perhaps first enunciated by Russell Weigley. In other words, decide, commit all necessary resources, get in, meet the objectives as rapidly and decisively as possible with minimum casualties, get out, and come home. By contrast, we have Beirut, Somalia, Haiti, and now Bosnia—operations that stray far afield from this Way of War.

Essentially this is the Powell Doctrine of decisive force, subsequently retained as a concept in revisions to the next iteration of the National Military Strategy. As the author observes, "The principle of Decisive Force is now firmly rooted in the U.S. military lexicon and culture." The critical goal is to overwhelm the enemy as rapidly as possible and, above all, strive to ensure that the conflict does not deteriorate into a long-drawn-out affair with increasing casualties and rising public dissatisfaction and criticism. Getting out

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quickly was always in General Powell's mind. He was the brakeman—quick to stop the ground war in the Gulf and remove our troops. As Hoffman relates, "Other reports have General Powell looking to end ground combat as early as the second day of the ground phase."

The relationship between the military and civilian authorities is complex enough, but since 1992 the military has been confronted with an administration faced with increasing domestic commitments. As a result, the military has been required to undertake missions and roles contrary to the traditional decisive approach to war. Today's deployed forces face greater constraints on the use of force than ever before, and will be challenged to train and execute missions with ever-diminishing resources.

The author observes: *The lack of clarity between military objectives or political objectives is also a criticism of the military's leaders. It does not speak well of the military if over 100 generals admit to having sent 500,000 men to combat (in Vietnam) in a sense of confusion. Nor does it say much for the leadership to have fought a conflict that claimed 58,000 lives, without any clear sense of purpose.*

When the use of military force is being contemplated by the President and his top civilian advisors, it is the duty of the military, as the author believes, to speak up forcefully about the most appropriate use of the military to achieve political objectives.

Read this book.

Imprisoned or Missing in Vietnam: Policies of the Vietnamese Government Concerning Captured and Unaccounted for United States Soldiers, 1969-1994. By Lewis M. Stern. McFarland & Company, Inc. (Box 611, Jefferson, NC 28640), 1995. 191 Pages. \$32.50. Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

Much of the literature on the Vietnam MIA issue is inflammatory and ill-informed. This excellent book is dispassionate, comprehensive, and informed.

Lewis Stern was involved in Department of Defense policy-making on the POW/MIA issue from September 1989 to early 1994 as country director for Indochina in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He made at least eight trips to Vietnam with delegations, participated in technical sessions with the Vietnamese, provided analysis and policy papers, and advised various officials. He has done research in the documents and literature on the subject, and he knows and has interviewed most of the major players in this field over

the years. The resulting book is an important contribution to our understanding of this complex and emotional issue.

Stern approaches the topic chronologically with chapters on the various time periods from Hanoi's negotiating position on the issue during the Paris peace talks in 1971-1973 through the U.S. decision to lift the trade embargo against Vietnam. He weaves a complex story of the various periods of Vietnamese response to U.S. probing of the POW/MIA issue—from their uncooperative and inflexible stance in the late 1970s, to limited breakthroughs in the 1980s, to the significant steps forward in the early 1990s. The U.S. and Vietnam had very different points of reference and perspectives on the issue and its relationship to the normalization of relations.

In addition, Stern demonstrates that the Vietnamese position was not monolithic. The various ministries—foreign affairs, national defense, and interior—had very different agendas and often subverted each other. The internal struggle between various personalities within the government played a large role. Moreover, technicians and mid- to low-level bureaucrats often worked at cross purposes with higher ministerial policies.

Beyond the specific topic it addresses, the book gives valuable insights into the workings of the Vietnamese political system, a typical example of a system in which reality is often far removed from organizational structures and policies.

An incredible amount of information is crammed into this slim volume. It provides the background needed to understand the difficulties and accomplishments in POW/MIA affairs over the years, and it vividly points up the simplicity of most of the inflammatory writings on the issue. Although this may not be the definitive source, it is a most valuable one.

White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea. By Ben S. Malcolm with Ron Martz. Brassey's, 1996. 241 Pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Michael F. Dilley, Davidsonville, Maryland.

Ben Malcolm was a lieutenant in January 1952, assigned to the 3d Infantry Division in Korea. During his in-processing in Japan, he was told to report for "an interview...for another assignment." He was selected and reassigned to the 8240th Army Unit as an advisor to a North Korean partisan organization. This book is the story of Malcolm's year in the Korean War and, briefly, his contact with guerrilla war and special operations after the war.

In early 1952 the U.S. Army had no policy or doctrine dealing with unconventional war.

Furthermore, most commanders didn't want anything to do with guerrilla activity, seeing it as not real combat and not in the larger strategic concept of how to fight a war. Following World War II, the few organizations that had any experience in unconventional fighting or working with partisans (such as the Office of Strategic Services, the Alamo Scouts of Sixth Army, GALAHAD, MacArthur's Allied Intelligence Bureau, and the 5217th Reconnaissance Battalion, to name a few) were all disbanded and any residual expertise the Army may have had almost disappeared in the winds. On the other hand, there were thousands of North Koreans who were not followers of Kim Il Sung (or Syngman Rhee, for that matter) and were willing to fight "to liberate their country and to free their families and homeland."

Malcolm worked with Donkey-4, a bold partisan unit that operated from two islands in the Yellow Sea—Paengnyong-do and Wollae-do—actively recruited new members from a western coastal province, Hwanghae, and regularly conducted operations in North Korea. Although he brought to his assignment no formal training in unconventional warfare, Malcolm had spent a year as a training officer in a basic training company at Fort Knox. He knew how to train and motivate troops.

The combination of his talents and Donkey-4's aggressive spirit made for an explosive mix. Malcolm was not afraid to accompany his partisans on operations. Despite a standing order he had only "heard about" that prohibited American advisors from going into North Korea, he regularly went on operations behind the lines with his "White Tigers." One of these operations turned out to be a trap set by the North Koreans.

Malcolm and Martz tell this story in a fast-paced, first-person narrative organized by theme rather than chronology. Although this may sound confusing, it actually works very well. In addition, they weave into the narrative the background facts that help clarify the maze of organizations, professional rivalries, and petty jealousies that made up the command and control of partisan operations during the Korean War. The highlights of the book are the two chapters, six and seven, that describe the preparations, training, and conduct of a Donkey-4 raid on a North Korean coastal gun.

I recommend this book highly, especially for all leaders. This is the story of a leader who understood his mission, cared for his troops, thoroughly prepared them for their operations, and then led them into combat. Malcolm's story should be a basic text for all who would do likewise.

***Lethal Glory: Dramatic Defeats of the Civil War.* By Philip Katcher. Arms and Armour Press, 1995. 224 Pages. \$24.95.**

***In Their Own Words: Civil War Commanders.* Collected and Edited by T.J. Stiles. The Berkley Group, 1995. 327 Pages. \$14.00.** Reviewed by Dr. Charles E. White, Infantry Branch Historian.

The U.S. Civil War continues to fascinate people. With the publication of *Lethal Glory* comes an interesting attempt to find some new and relevant contribution to the plethora of works on that war. Unfortunately, it adds little to our understanding of our nation's greatest tragedy.

This book recreates 15 so-called "Dramatic" defeats: the Surrender of Fort Sumter; the Battle of Ball's Bluff; the Defense of Fort Henry; the Loss of Fort Donelson; the Campaign in New Mexico; the Assault on Fredericksburg; Pickett's Charge; the Assaults on Battery Wagner; the Capture of the USS *Satellite* and USS *Reliance*; the Siege of Plymouth, North Carolina; the Defense of Fort Pillow; the Battle of the Crater; the Raid on Centralia, Missouri; the Battle of Cedar Creek; and the Battle of Fort Stedman. None of these were actually either "lethal" or "glorious"; in fact, the selection of these particular engagements demonstrates just how desperate the author and publisher were to produce yet another title on the U.S. Civil War.

Philip Katcher seeks to show that all 15 "defeats" were catastrophic in the eyes of the losers. Some, he contends, turned the tide of the war, while others had no impact on the outcome whatsoever. For the most part, Katcher argues, all 15 were hollow victories for the winners. None of the winners exploited their victories, although Grant certainly wanted to pursue the Confederates after capturing Fort Donelson.

What the reader finds is a series of poorly selected "defeats," about which the author then tries to write something glorious. But where is the glory in telling of a psychotic, homicidal maniac like "Bloody Bill" Anderson and his murderous raid on Centralia, Missouri? Additionally, there was no defense of Fort Henry. When the Confederate commander saw the Union gunboats approaching his position and realized the futility of any stand, he sent his troops to Fort Donelson. With a small rear guard, he then fired a few rounds before surrendering the fort to the U.S. Navy. Was this dramatic? Furthermore, Pickett's Charge should not be listed as a separate entity but as part of a larger battle called Gettysburg. There are better Civil War histories than this book.

On the surface, *In Their Own Words* appears to lie in the same category. But closer inspection reveals that it is an abbreviated ver-

sion of the four-volume *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, a beautiful collection of thought-provoking, first-person accounts of the decisive events of the Civil War. Originally published in 1886, *Battles and Leaders*, remains a classic of Civil War literature.

This book is intended to be the first in a series of books that "aim to bring the drama of first-person accounts of American history into the hands of today's readers." In this respect, it is certainly a fine compendium for readers unfamiliar with the Civil War. Author T.J. Stiles includes excerpts from the battle reports of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, McClellan, Farragut, Porter, Longstreet, Mosby, Johnston, and many others.

This is no mere anthology; it reads like a narrative of the Civil War from the military point of view. For those looking for a short military history of that war, told through the eyes of the actual participants, *In Their Own Words* is a good starting point.

***A Rising Thunder: From Lincoln's Election to the Battle of Bull Run.* HarperCollins, 1994. 413 Pages. \$13.00, Softbound. \$30.00, Hardcover.** Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, U.S. Air Force, Retired.

This book, the eleventh in author Richard Wheeler's series of Civil War "eyewitness histories," follows the style of his earlier works on such campaigns as Vicksburg, Gettysburg, the Peninsula Campaign, the 1864 Virginia battles, and Sherman's march to the sea. In each, he combines a well-written historical narrative with extensive first-person accounts by those who actually participated in or observed the events of the war as they occurred. This provides an immediacy to the portrayal period, which is often missing from many normal historical works.

This book covers the period leading up to the war, opening with Lincoln's election in 1860 and closing with the battle of Bull Run in July 1861. One of the most interesting perspectives shown during this period is the way in which both the North and the South viewed the prospects of conflict and how they each thought the war would transpire. The views of some on both sides were highly idealistic and romantic, predicting a short war full of pomp and ceremony. The reality of the long four years of war, which a few wiser heads had forecast, was of course something altogether different from the expected.

Fort Sumter is a well-known part of this story, as were the lesser known actions at Rich Mountain, Big Bethel, and the guerrilla warfare in the border state of Missouri. Some military leaders such as Generals Robert

Anderson and Irwin McDowell make their appearances and then fade from the historical scene while other such noteworthies as George McClellan and Thomas J. Jackson play only the first of their more significant roles in the unfolding war.

This book will be an excellent place to begin in reading some of Wheeler's earlier volumes, which will give the reader a good comprehensive overview in preparation for studying more detailed, technical historical works on the specific battles and campaigns.

***Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War.* Edited by Stanley I. Kutler. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1996. 711 Pages. \$99.00.** Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army.

The Vietnam war was the United States' longest war, far eclipsing its participation in either of the world wars or the Korean conflict. Twenty years after the fall of Saigon, that war still fascinates us, and its principal architects remain as controversial as ever. Not surprisingly, it has taken two decades for this country to come to grips with the Vietnam experience. In this encyclopedia, editor Stanley I. Kutler has accumulated 564 original essays and sketches outlining myriad topics of the Vietnam war. In the process, he and his contributors have placed the conflict in the historical perspective.

What makes this particular anthology so informative is not the topical entries that address the people and events of the war, but the ten interpretive essays that provide in-depth analyses of leading experts of the conflict. Subjects include the media and the war, diplomacy, colonialism, art and literature, the antiwar movement, the prelude to U.S. combat intervention, and the strategy and tactics employed by the American and Vietnamese combatants. Annexes also provide the texts from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Paris Peace Accords. The names of all 237 Medal of Honor recipients, by rank and year, further enhance the text.

In addition to the most updated information available, this encyclopedia provides both the historian and the general reader with a superb reference that is likely to be the definitive research source for the next decade. To the editor's credit, he has been mindful of non-Western perspectives. The result is a fairly balanced assessment. In this regard, Ngo Vinh Long's essay on Vietnamese perspectives and the legacies of the war is particularly insightful. So is William J. Duiker's article on Vietnam and its history.

In the final analysis, this book is the most thorough compilation of essays and articles on the Vietnam war to date. There is virtu-

ally no important aspect of the conflict that this encyclopedia does not address. Though most readers will find the cost prohibitive, I highly recommend this book to any student of the Vietnam war.

***The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army.* Edited by David Chandler and Ian Beckett. Oxford University Press, 1994. 493 Pages. \$39.95, Softbound.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army.

Eminent British military historian David Chandler, assisted by Ian Beckett (both formerly of the Department of War Studies, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst), has edited this superb volume. It is truly "an examination of the development of the British Army as an institution."

This book consists of 20 chapters, arranged in general chronological order, beginning with "The English Medieval Army to 1485," by Michael Prestwich, and concluding with Michael Yardley's insightful "Towards the Future." The remaining chapters, all of which can be read as self-contained essays, were written by authorities in their respective fields. While many of the chapters naturally focus on the most significant war or operations of its respective era, others highlight special, related topics—notably Alex Danchev's "The Army and the Home Front, 1939-1945"; T.A. Heathcote's "The Army of British India"; and Beckett's "The Amateur Military Tradition."

One of the most significant themes of the British Army, as reflected in this book, is that of continuity. Other recurring themes, which further illuminate that army's roles and responsibilities, include the arguably ironic antimilitarist tradition of the British; the existence of friction between soldiers and civilians despite the British Army's small size and frequent overseas postings; an interdependence between the British Army and society; and the general apolitical nature of the British Army.

This study offers, in separate side-boxes, 42 special subjects including details of weap-

ony, key individuals, and specific battles. The volume is lavishly illustrated with more than three dozen color plates. Numerous other contemporary illustrations, photographs, and 15 well-drawn maps enhance the text. An excellent 12-page chronology of the British Army, listing key events from 1066 to 1993, adds immeasurably to the volume, as does the ten-page bibliography, arranged by chapters.

The chapters in this superb volume highlight the traditional military concerns of British Army battles and leaders, and the editors have attempted to place them within their proper political, economic, and social context. In doing so, they have endeavored to recount "the story of the British army in a fresh way that will both entertain and educate." Drs. Chandler and Beckett have definitely accomplished their mission.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

***Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues.* Edited by Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter. Studies in National Security No. 3. Air War College, 1995. 279 Pages.**

***Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace Campaigns in 2010.* By Jeffery R. Barnett. Air University Press, 1996. 169 Pages.**

***Global Security Concerns: Anticipating the Twenty-first Century.* Edited by Dr. Karl P. Magyar. Air University Press, 1996. 327 Pages.**

***Cambridge Illustrated Atlas of Warfare: The Middle Ages, 768-1487.* Edited by Nicholas Hooper and Matthew Bennett. Cambridge University Press, 1996. 192 Pages. \$39.95.**

***Cambridge Illustrated Atlas of Warfare: Renaissance to Revolution 1492-1792.* By Jeremy Black. Cambridge University Press, 1996. 192 Pages. \$39.95.**

***Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy and America's Future in Asia.* By Kent E. Calder. William Morrow, 1996. 253 Pages. \$25.00.**

***Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency.* By Stephen F. Knott. Oxford University Press, 1996. 258 Pages. \$27.50.**

***Listening In: Intercepting German Trench Communications in World War I.* By Ernest H. Hinrichs. Edited by Ernest H. Hinrichs, Jr. White Mane Publishing Co. (P.O. Box 152, Shippensburg, PA 17257), 1996. 148 Pages. \$19.95.**

Crisis in the Pacific: The Battles for the Phil-

***ippine Islands by the Men Who Fought Them—An Oral History.* By Gerald Astor. Donald I. Fine, 1996. 478 Pages. \$27.95.**

***Lapham's Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines, 1942-1945.* By Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling. University Press of Kentucky, 1996. 304 Pages. \$24.95.**

***Timelines of War: A Chronology of Warfare from 100,000 B.C. to the Present.* By David Brownstone and Irene Franck. Little, Brown, 1996. 576 Pages. \$1995, Softbound.**

***The Army Medical Department, 1865-1917.* By Mary C. Gillett. Center of Military History, 1995. (GPO S/N: 008-029-00326-1.) 517 Pages. \$34.00.**

***The Colonial Wars Source Book.* By Philip J. Haythornthwaite. Sterling, 1996. 384 Pages. \$39.95.**

***The United States Army and the Motor Truck: A Case Study in Standardization.* By Marc K. Blackburn. Greenwood, 1996. 136 Pages. \$49.95.**

***Civil War Uniforms: A Photo Guide.* By Philip Katcher. Sterling, 1996. 128 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.**

***Sky Battles—Sky Warriors: Stories of Exciting Air Combat.* By Alfred Price. Sterling, 1996. 384 Pages. \$19.95.**

***World War II Cavalcade: An Offer I Couldn't Refuse.* By John L. Munschauer. Sunflower University Press (1531 Yuma, Manhattan, KS 66502-4228), 1996. 200 Pages. \$18.95, Softbound.**

***Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland.* By James A. Connolly. Edited by Paul M. Angle. Originally published in 1959. Indiana University Press, 1996. 400 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.**

***U.S. Army Cadet Command: The Ten Year History.* By Arthur T. Coumbe and Lee S. Harford. Office of the Command Historian. U.S. Army Cadet Command, 1996. 357 Pages.**

***Top Sergeant: The Life and Times of Sergeant Major William G. Bainbridge.* By SMA William G. Bainbridge (U.S. Army Retired) and Dan Cragg. Published in hardcover by Fawcett, 1995. Ivy Books, 1996. 322 Pages. \$5.95.**

***Masters of Battle: Selected Great Warrior Classes.* By John Wilcox. Sterling, 1996. 224 Pages. \$24.95, Hardcover.**

***Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot.* By Howard R. Simpson. Published in hardcover in 1994. Brassey's, 1996. 224 Pages. \$17.95.**

***Foregone Conclusions: U.S. Weapons Acquisition in the Post-Cold War Transition.* By James H. Lebovic. Westview Press, 1996. 197 Pages. \$57.00.**

***The Devil's Adjutant: Jochen Peiper, Panzer Leader.* By Michael Reynolds. Sarpedon, 1995. 320 Pages. \$27.50, Hardcover.**

