

platoon's capabilities and limitations. Commanders must emphasize their scouts' ability to fully understand the enemy's order of battle and TTPs. Then they can anticipate enemy actions and sense when something is unusual.

In addition, training must focus on developing other senses besides sight. The goal is to achieve the "gut feeling" and anticipate the enemy's next move. Leaders can develop this instinct through numerous rehearsals, war games, and sandtable exercises. For the OPFOR scouts, the terrain and missions have become second nature. Through monthly repetition and constant exposure to different units, these scouts can focus on and follow their

instincts while mentally analyzing their enemy.

Although incorporating these TTPs into traditional U.S. doctrine is not simple, it can be done, once units realize that doing so will enable them to operate more effectively against an adversary. The difficulties lie in training and testing scout platoons to reach and maintain the OPFOR scouts' level of proficiency. Overall, we must demand more from our scouts to provide timely and accurate combat information. We must also train our scouts to execute in-depth analysis of the enemy and terrain instead of just identifying and counting enemy equipment, vehicles, and personnel.

As leaders, we must learn to support our scouts with time, resources, and training (with guidance from S-2s). By incorporating these techniques, we can redefine the mission and training of our scouts and better focus our reconnaissance efforts.

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### **FIFTY YEARS AGO IN HISTORY SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1946**

*Events in China had captured world attention by the autumn of 1946. Nationalist and communist factions had already claimed portions of that immense land as their own, and the likelihood of conflict in contested areas was increasing daily. To the south, the role of U.S. forces in South Korea was being redefined as South Korean forces were becoming more self-sufficient. Meanwhile, U.S. Marines and their units returned from the Pacific Theater in increasing numbers as part of the postwar drawdown. In Germany, Soviet hopes for greater influence were dashed as communist candidates were defeated in the first postwar elections.*

*These and other highlights of the postwar years have been provided by Mr. Bud Hannings, in preparation for his upcoming chronology of the Korean War.*

- 6 September** *The Chinese Nationalist Army assumes responsibility for the protection of the coal fields and rails lines running between Chinwangtao and Peiping (Beijing).*
- 11 September** *Believing—one year after the end of the war and Japanese occupation—that South Koreans should become self-sufficient, General Lerch, the U.S. Military Governor of Korea, orders all Americans in the Korean government to cease their day-to-day responsibilities and act only as advisors.*
- 13 September** *Special Representative George C. Marshall informs President Truman that his and Ambassador Stuart's diplomatic efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution to the crisis in China have reached an impasse.*
- 2-5 October** *Frustrated by the intransigence of both the Nationalists and the Communists, Marshall informs President Truman that there appears to be no workable solution to the Chinese situation and requests that he be recalled. Learning of this, Chiang Kai-Shek proposes a ten-day truce to encourage further negotiations.*
- 9 October** *Marshall visits Shanghai to meet with the Communists' Chou En-lai in an attempt to arrive at a compromise between the two factions. Chou En-lai subsequently accuses Marshall of favoring the Nationalists, and Marshall withdraws from serving as mediator in future negotiations.*
- 20 October** *The people of Berlin go to the polls for the first postwar free elections. The Soviets have agreed to this move because they believe that the Soviet-backed Socialist Unity Party will sweep the elections. To their dismay, the party is able to gain less than 20 percent of the vote. This democratic victory means, however, that the Allies will find the Soviets much harder to deal with in future negotiations concerning Germany.*