

BOOK REVIEWS



INFANTRY has received several excellent reference volumes that readers will find interesting and useful:

Jane's Battleships of the 20th Century. By Bernard Ireland. Illustrated by Tony Gibbons. HarperCollins, 1996. 192 Pages, 125 Profiles, 260 Photographs. \$30.00.

Jane's Tank and Combat Vehicle Recognition Guide. By Christopher Foss. HarperReference, 1996. 510 Pages. Black and White Photographs and Diagrams. \$19.95, Softbound.

Jane's Warship Recognition Guide. By Keith Faulkner. HarperReference, 1996. 541 Pages, Black and White Photographs. Color Ensigns and Flags of the World's Navies. \$19.95, Softbound.

The Biographical Dictionary of World War II. By Mark M. Boatner III. Presidio, 1996. 736 Pages, Glossary, Bibliography. \$50.00.

The World Factbook, 1996-97. Central Intelligence Agency. Brassey's, 1996. 576 Pages, Maps, Appendixes. \$32.95.

Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy. Edited by L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr. Westview Press, 1995. 290 Pages. \$32.95. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army.

The "turning point" of this book's title supposedly refers to the Gulf War and its impact on U.S. military strategy. Considering the contents of the volume—and the significance of actual international events—the real turning point in determining the future of U.S. defense policy and military strategy was the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the world's sole superpower.

This anthology, therefore, belatedly capitalizes upon the euphoria (and publicity) generated by the Gulf War. It provides wide-ranging perspectives—from a number of prominent strategic thinkers, analysts, and commentators—on the future nature of warfare and its role in international politics. The 14 essays are grouped in four main sections headed: The Context for Military Strategy, The Gulf War and Its Lessons, Elements of Future Strategic Thought, and Summing Up.

Edward N. Luttwak's essay, "The Global Setting of U.S. Military Power," suggests that geopolitics has been replaced by "geoeconomics," in which "the greatest states in the central arena of world affairs are preoccupied by a new struggle for economic leverage and industrial supremacy" (page 5). This may result in a conflict between northern rim and southern tier states, or internal conflicts within the former Soviet Union and other areas. General Norman Schwarzkopf's planning to achieve the coalition's political objectives on the ground in the Gulf War is criticized in John H. Cushman's "Implications of the Gulf War for Future Military Strategy." Other excellent essays focus on, among other topics, the role of nuclear weapons, deterrence, force projection, information warfare, and U.S. military strategy in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Martin van Creveld, in "summing up" this volume, says that large-scale, conventional wars between nations may be coming to an end, to be replaced by so-called low-intensity conflict, often conducted by nonstate entities.

The thought-provoking essays in this book will help the reader understand the possible causes of, reactions to, and strategy employed in such future conflicts.

Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos. By Kenneth Conboy with James Morrison. Paladin, 1995. 453 Pages. \$49.95. Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

The Laotian theater of the war in Indochina has remained an obscure, secretive, little-understood aspect of that long conflict. Only a few books have addressed the secret war in Laos, and most of those have touched on just a part of it: Jane Hamilton-Merritt focuses on the Hmong; Christopher Robbins on Air America and the Ravens; others on activities of MACV-SOG (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam-Special Operations Group), air rescue, MIAs/POWs, or other topics. Aside from this study, the only ones that undertake full-scale treatment of all aspects of the conflict are Timothy Castle's relatively brief *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam* (1993) and Roger Warner's *Backfire: The CIA's Se-*

cret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam (1995).

Conboy spent six years as the Southeast Asia policy analyst and deputy director of the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center in Washington, D.C. He is the author of seven books on Southeast Asia, including works on the war in Cambodia and the People's Army of Vietnam. He has worked toward this large-folio reference volume for more than a decade. The result of documentary research and more than 600 interviews, it represents an enormous undertaking and an invaluable contribution.

Conboy traces the origins of the Laotian conflict; the various theaters; the many players, including the different indigenous ethnic constituencies in Laos as well as the Thais, Nung Chinese, North Vietnamese, Soviets, Chinese, and others; the different American players—the Ambassador and the State Department, CIA, Air Force, the U.S. Agency for International Development, MACV-SOG; and the clandestine activity and technology in the country. The volume includes numerous photographs, wonderful maps, a necessary glossary, and a useful index.

Although much could be said about this book, it will suffice to say that it is a first-rate reference source, dispassionate and as comprehensive as possible, given the complexity and continuing secrecy of the topic. Moreover, it is fascinating reading. It is the place to start for anyone interested in the clandestine war in the Land of a Million Elephants.

Forgotten Summers: The Story of the Citizens' Military Training Camps, 1921-1940. By Donald M. Kington. Two Decades Publishing (Box 167, 3739 Balboa Street, San Francisco, CA 94121), 1995. 239 Pages. \$18.95, Softbound. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

Many pre-World War II "brown-shoe" Army soldiers will remember the Citizens' Military Training Camp (CMTC) program, for they probably took part in training those young men (initially 16 to 35 years of age and, after the first year, 17 to 25) in the rudiments of military training. All branches of the service

were represented, but the enrollees received basic infantry training in the first year.

Interested young men volunteered freely, and while they were not paid, they were clothed, housed, and fed, and received transportation expenses to and from the camps. Two to three times more applications were received than the Army could accept. Generally, to save travel expenses, the Army assigned the applicants to the nearest camp; all of the camps were on active Army posts, and most of the training was conducted by the regular soldiers on those posts.

Although the CMTC program had its genesis in the National Defense Act of 1920, the concept was not a new one in this country. For many years, militia units had conducted training camps that offered at least a modicum of military training to interested civilian men. The idea behind these camps, as well as the later, more formal camps, was to prepare men to take their places in the ranks, or to serve as officers, in the event of a national emergency or mobilization. At the time the CMTC program began (around the same time as the ROTC program on college campuses), the United States had few men with any sort of formal military training. It was hoped that those who completed even one year of the four-year program (initially, three years) would enroll in a reserve component unit.

No man could attend more than four summer camps; if he wanted a commission after his four years, he had to be a member of one of the Army's components, pass a complete physical examination, and convince a board of officers he was suitable. (One example: Former President Ronald Reagan, while working as a radio announcer in Iowa in the 1930s, took cavalry training in the program at Fort Des Moines, where he earned a commission.)

During the 1920s, only white enrollees were accepted into the program. By the mid-1930s, the Army had opened several camps for black Americans: during the summer of 1936, at Fort Riley, Kansas, and Fort Howard, Maryland, and the following year at Fort MacArthur, California.

Author Donald Kington, a retired Army officer, draws on numerous primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews with men who attended all or part of the program, to present an easy-to-read account of this almost forgotten military training program. (He wonders if such a program could be conducted today.) As he points out, too many Americans confuse the CMTC program with the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps) movement. Many of his chapters contain the personal experiences of men who represented all 20 years of the program.

He points out that an estimated 370,000 men attended at least one of the summer camps, and that the program had a high attrition rate. Only some six percent of the men entering the program completed all four years, and only slightly more than 5,000 graduates were appointed second lieutenants during the life of the program.

Despite these statistics, the author believes that "although now a relic of the past, during its 20-year existence Citizens' Military Training Camps surely made a positive contribution to America."

I certainly agree with Kington and urge all infantrymen to read this book. The old brown-shoe Army had more to be proud of than many people seem to believe; its conduct of the CMTC program certainly goes into the plus column.

***Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945.* By David Reynolds. Random House, 1995. 544 Pages. \$30.00. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Alan C. Cate, U.S. Army.**

As the well-known British appraisal of the U.S. military's World War II "occupation" of the United Kingdom had it, the American GIs were "oversexed, overpaid, overfed, and over here." David Reynolds explores this "friendly invasion" in his splendidly researched and engagingly written volume. While the sardonic British complaint may have reflected a partial truth, Reynolds reveals that relationships between the Yanks and their hosts were considerably more complex and nuanced than any of the glib characterizations or stereotypes invoked on both sides of the Atlantic. In so doing, he extracts rich military social history from a subject too often shrouded in nostalgia and myth.

Reynolds emphasizes that the U.S. presence was highly dynamic in terms of both time and space. The number of GIs in the British Isles between early 1942 and the war's end fluctuated according to operational rhythms. Commencing with initial deployments in January 1942, U.S. troop levels steadily rose until commitments to the North African campaign caused them to dip in late 1942 and early 1943. Then came the enormous buildup for the cross-channel invasion and the subsequent rapid drawdown of U.S. forces as they were introduced into northwest Europe beginning in the summer of 1944.

While U.S. bases and personnel flooded certain parts of Great Britain, particularly in the south, other regions experienced little or no direct contact with the Americans. The author also reminds us of the often fleeting nature of the American sojourns. Many of the

three million U.S. servicemen and women who passed through wartime Britain measured their stays in weeks or a few months. Yet Reynolds does not neglect those whose stays were generally more permanent—U.S. Army Air Force and Army Service Forces members. Indeed, the treatment of two important subsets of these organizations makes up some of the most fascinating portions of the book: combat aircrews, daily "commuter combatants" between a semblance of normality and savage air battles; and African-American GIs, at large in a society unaccustomed to U.S. racial practices.

Further, Reynolds details the way a host of physical, economic, and social factors stemming from wartime conditions in Britain shaped relationships between Brits and Yanks. By the time the first Americans arrived, the British had been at war for more than two years. Air raids and their associated damage, blackouts, severe rationing or the complete absence of consumer goods, and the "liberation" of unprecedented numbers of women to support the war effort were all features of the Britain the GIs discovered. These unique conditions affected perceptions on both sides. Likewise, the military socialization process undergone by the GIs—"regimented tourists" overwhelmingly young and abroad for the first time—obviously colored Anglo-American encounters.

Managing those encounters was of some concern to both U.S. and British policy makers, whose responses Reynolds categorizes as either "negative" or "positive." The former—favored by a majority of U.S. commanders, who wished simply to get on with the war—sought to avoid inevitable friction by minimizing contact. The latter—espoused by Churchill and the Foreign Office with a view to nurturing a post-war "special relationship" between the English-speaking peoples, and by Eisenhower to a certain extent in the interest of inter-Allied understanding—looked to capitalize on opportunities to forge Anglo-American bonds. Neither was ever a coherent strategy, and the evidence in the book leads to the conclusion that events unfolded largely on the basis of local circumstances and individual inclinations.

Readers will find *Rich Relations* chock-full of interesting facts, humorous anecdotes, and poignant episodes, as well as keen analysis. Drawing on a wealth of official and unofficial British and American sources, Reynolds has crafted a superb account at the intersection of military and social history. The result provides fresh perspectives on our World War II armed forces, the society from which they

were drawn, and the society that hosted such a sizable portion of them during an extraordinary time.

***Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War.* By Lieutenant Colonel Robert Leonhard. Praeger, 1996. 179 Pages.** Reviewed by Captain Robert L. Bateman, U.S. Army.

First the bad news—this book costs \$47 at the post exchange. This is unfortunate. It means that there will be a lot of money flowing out of professional pockets because this is *the* premier theoretical work of the past 40 years and is destined to become a classic of this century.

The author, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Leonhard, is the U.S. Army's most prolific and outspoken theoretician. His first book, *The Art of Maneuver*, established his reputation as an original thinker, although it did begin by following in some rather well-established footsteps. This book not only introduces an entirely new perspective of how we should think about war, it also provides us with the conceptual tools we will need to do this.

The premise is deceptively simple: "The most effective way to perceive, interpret and plan military operations is in terms of time, rather than space." This, in itself, is not a difficult concept for the average professional to grasp. Yet it is in his rigorous analysis of the implications of how a shift from a spatial to a temporal outlook might affect the conduct of war that Leonhard truly breaks new ground.

Introducing concepts such as "Leveraging Temporal Asymmetry" and using terms borrowed from physics (operations within war have a "frequency" and an "amplitude"), this is not an easy or light read. With almost every page, the reader must put the book down, digest what he has read, decide whether he agrees or disagrees and actually think about the nuances of our profession. This alone justifies the cost of the book.

Despite his newly coined terminology, or perhaps because he uses concepts "borrowed" from other disciplines, Leonhard's book allows readers to open their minds to the potential new methods of executing war that he proposes. In the past, Leonhard has been accused of using history out of context as a justification for his theories. Yet in this book (which is not a history), his use of historical examples in support of his thesis rings true and helps greatly in his explanation of a new method of understanding warfare.

Although this book is expensive, it is also important. To read it is to think hard about our profession. Casual soldiers and leaders

should leave it on the shelf; professional warriors should go out and buy a copy today. Read it. Argue about it. Make notes in the margins.

***The General's General: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur.* By Kenneth Ray Young. Westview Press, 1994. 711 Pages. \$20.00, Softbound.** Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army.

In this biography of Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur, father of Douglas MacArthur, Kenneth Young has produced what is likely to remain the definitive work on the senior MacArthur, who received the congressional Medal of Honor for his heroic action at the head of the 24th Wisconsin Volunteers on Missionary Ridge during the Civil War. By the time he died in 1912, during the 50th reunion of his regiment, MacArthur had concluded an illustrious career that spanned 46 years of commissioned service.

Surprisingly, no biography of this distinguished officer had been written before this study. The author gives several reasons for this, not the least of which is that Arthur MacArthur was a reserved man who was most comfortable in the company of other military men and, unlike his more flamboyant son, never dallied with self-promotion. Another reason may be that MacArthur's personal papers were destroyed in World War II. Fortunately, extensive official reports, diaries, letters, and autobiographies of his principal subordinates provided enough material for an examination of this remarkable officer.

Since MacArthur's career spanned the period from the Civil War to the Philippine Insurrection, any study of his life serves as a microcosm of the Army at the turn of the century. His achievements included the foundation of the modern army post exchange system, the return of a promotion system based on merit, and a new policy of awarding medals to officers as well as enlisted men.

His greatest contribution, however, was as a warrior. He joined the 24th Wisconsin Volunteers in August 1862 at the age of 17. He fought in 18 major battles in Tennessee and Georgia, served on the Indian frontier for 20 years, commanded a brigade and a division with distinction in the Philippines, and eventually served as the military governor there.

Unfortunately, MacArthur was not adept at dealing with his civilian contemporaries. His feud with William Howard Taft, when Taft served as president of the second Philippine Commission, cost him any chance of serving as the Army's chief of staff. Taft, now Secretary of War, had no intention of nominating an officer whom he considered irascible and

troublesome. MacArthur also alienated Secretary of War Elihu Root, and he was a vocal opponent of the Root reforms that brought the army into the modern age. Embittered at not attaining the prestige associated with the position of Army chief of staff, MacArthur retired in 1907, having reached the mandatory retirement age of 64. Like his son, Arthur MacArthur never forgave the powerful Washington politicians who denied him his place in history.

Long after his death, Arthur MacArthur exerted a powerful influence on his son Douglas. In his own career, which spanned half a century, Douglas MacArthur looked up to only one man, his father. The junior MacArthur's every act of defiance, his every display of conspicuous bravery, his insatiable ambition were calculated to earn his father's respect and to achieve what Douglas considered his rightful inheritance. After reading this book, it is easy to understand the motivation that drove Douglas MacArthur to his own rendezvous with destiny.

***J.E.B. Stuart.* By John W. Thomason, Jr. Originally published by C. Scribner's Sons, 1929. Bison Book Reprint. University of Nebraska Press, 1994. 512 Pages. \$14.94.**

***The Night the War Was Lost.* By Charles L. Dufour. Originally published in 1960. Bison Book Reprint. University of Nebraska Press, 1994. 427 Pages. \$14.95.**

***General Lee: His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-1865.* By Walter H. Taylor. Originally published in 1906 by Nusbaum Books, Norfolk, Virginia. Bison Book Reprint. University of Nebraska Press, 1994. 314 Pages. \$12.95.**

***Hayes of the 23rd: The Civil War Volunteer Officer.* By T. Harry Williams. Bison Book reprint of 1965 Alfred A. Knopf hardcover. University of Nebraska Press, 1994. 324 Pages. \$13.95.** Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, U.S. Air Force, Retired.

If you have been actively seeking out and reading books about the Civil War during the past five years or so, you are probably aware of an interesting and welcome trend—the continuing and even increasing interest in the history of the war throughout the United States. Not only has there been a high level of publication of new Civil War history works (as evidenced by the book reviews found in INFANTRY), but there has also been such a renewed interest in the war that several publishing houses have been reprinting some of the great classics of Civil War history long out of print. The University of Nebraska's Bison Book series has been especially responsible for bring-

ing back many of these histories.

While Emory Thomas's 1986 biography of Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart, *Bold Dragoon*, is probably the best biography on that cavalry leader, John Thomason's 1929 work is a welcome addition to the volumes about this Confederate cavalier. Although Thomason's work provides a lot less analysis and interpretation of Stuart's service and use of the cavalry in support of the Army of Northern Virginia, it is still a worthwhile study. The maps are mediocre in quality and presentation of their graphic information, but the pen-and-ink drawings of cavalymen in action provide some interesting illustrations.

Charles Dufour's *The Night the War Was Lost* is an excellent study of the Confederacy's loss of New Orleans and how the Union's military forces brought about that feat. His thesis is that the loss of New Orleans resulted in the failure of both England and France to recognize the Confederacy as an independent, sovereign nation, and thus the title of his book. This work is an interesting examination of that early campaign to begin regaining control of the entire Mississippi River.

Walter Taylor's *General Lee: His Campaigns in Virginia* is an intriguing look at the Confederate commander from the perspective of the man who worked and fought most closely with him throughout the war. Taylor was Lee's adjutant for nearly the entire conflict. The book has its biases, as one might expect, but it provides the kinds of insights that could be wished into the service of more great military leaders throughout history.

T. Harry Williams's *Hayes of the 23rd* is not only a book by one of our greatest military historians but also a military biography of Rutherford B. Hayes, a future President of the United States, who served as a Union general during the war. His service included the West Virginia campaign in the early days of the war, South Mountain, and the Shenandoah Valley with Sheridan in 1864. It is an excellent example of the politician who entered military service and was able to demonstrate competence as a military leader. Certainly not every politician who donned the Union (or Confederate) uniform could make that claim for himself.

There is no way of knowing how long this positive trend in Civil War publishing will continue. If you're interested in studying the military history of that war, take advantage of it. For those who want to study the campaigns and battles, this is an excellent time to stock your shelves with some of the historical classics. Some of these works were originally published during the period of the Civil War Centennial in the early 1960s and have

not been readily available since that time, except in libraries that have managed to keep them on the shelves.

Guns of the Elite: Special Forces Firearms, 1940 to the Present. Second Edition. By George Markham. Arms & Armour Press (distributed by Sterling), 1995. 176 Pages. \$27.95. Reviewed by Michael F. Dilley, Davidsonville, Maryland.

I've changed my mind about this book. When I first looked it over, I thought it was probably superficial and a quickly put-together hodge podge about rifles, with "special forces" tossed in to help it sell. I was wrong.

This is an interesting, well-written history of weapons. It is not a quick or easy read. The subject is, admittedly, dry. Some of the material is available elsewhere, even in Government publications that might be easier for military units to obtain. None of this, however, means you should pass this book up.

Author Markham spends almost the first third of the book on a history of firearms. He begins his history not in 1940, as the title suggests, but in the 17th century, with the development of the early musket. This background provides the perspective for his theme, the search for functional weapons for special purpose use. To better understand that context, Markham contends, one must understand the process of procuring conventional weapons—establishing requirements, examining alternatives, conducting competition among the proposed designs, selecting a manufacturer, and reviewing performance under actual conditions. The same basic process is used for special forces weapon procurement but with major, obvious differences in the requirements and actual conditions.

Markham's writing style is not pedantic or heavy-handed. He is straightforward and matter-of-fact. Each time he discusses the needs of a different country's forces, he has to shift gears a little. While we may be used to the way the design and procurement process works in the United States, it is done differently elsewhere. If we understand how it works, we may better appreciate how a different outcome somewhere else makes sense. Markham's discussion of weapon testing provides the framework for the occasional charts he uses to illustrate results. The real meat of the book is the photographs and exploded weapons views. If you are wondering what is so different that this book requires a second edition, it is because of a new chapter on shotguns and complete rewrites on the chapters detailing handguns, sniper scopes, and

compact submachineguns as well as updated performance data.

Although this is not an easy book to read, I recommend it. It is a worthwhile addition to most military libraries both for its history and for its discussion of current techniques.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

Brown Water, Black Berets. By Lt. Cdr. Thomas J. Cutler, USN. (Published in hardcover by Naval Institute Press, 1988.) Pocket Books, 1996. 416 Pages. \$6.99, Softbound.

Practical Martial Arts for Special Forces. By William Beaver. Paladin Press, 1996. 102 Pages.

The Lessons of Modern War, Volume IV: The Gulf War. By Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner. Westview Press, 1996. 1,022 Pages. \$98.00.

Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers Over Japan During World War II. By Kenneth P. Werrell. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996. 350 Pages. \$39.95.

Immediate Action. By Andy McNab. Dell Publishing, 1996. 528 Pages. \$5.99, Softbound.

A Quick and Dirty Guide to War: Briefings on Present and Potential Wars. Third Edition. By James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay. William Morrow, 1996. 640 Pages. \$27.50, Hardcover.

Victory and Deceit: Dirty Tricks at War. By James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi. William Morrow, 1996. 400 Pages. \$16.00, Softbound.

The Black Infantry in the West, 1869-1891. By Arlen L. Fowler. University of Oklahoma Press, 1996. 190 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

Korea: Frozen Hell on Earth. By Boris R. Spiroff. Vantage Press, 1995. \$12.95, Hardcover.

Naked Warriors. By Francis Fane. St. Martin's, 1996. 310 Pages. \$5.99, Softbound.

The Complete Art of War: Sun Tzu/Sun Pin. By Ralph D. Sawyer. Westview Press, 1996. 304 Pages. \$25.00.

G Company's War: Two Personal Accounts of the Campaigns in Europe, 1944-1945. By Bruce E. Egger and Lee MacMillan Ott. Edited and with Commentary by Paul Roley. University of Alabama Press, 1992. 304 Pages. \$29.95, Hardcover.

Four Years with General Lee. By Walter H. Taylor. Edited by James I. Robertson, Jr. Indiana University Press, 1996. 224 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

Witness to War: The Civil War 1861-1865. By Harold Holzer.

Witness to War Series. Perigee, 1996. 206 Pages. \$12.50.

The Nightingale's Song. By Robert Timberg. Originally published by Simon & Schuster in 1995. Touchstone, 1996. 543 Pages. \$14.00, Softbound.

That Dark and Bloody River: Chronicles of the Ohio River Valley. By Allan W. Eckert. Bantam, 1996. 880 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

On Brave Old Army Team: The Cheating Scandal That Rocked the Nation: West Point, 1951. By James Blackwell. Presidio, 1996. 336 Pages. \$27.50.

Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944. By Paul Adair. First published in 1994. Arms & Armour (distributed by Sterling), 1996. 208 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.