

### BRIGADE METL

Execute training POIs.  
Develop permanent party.  
Conduct support operations.  
Provide training opportunities to Reserve Components.

### BATTALION METL

Execute BCT POIs.  
Execute permanent party training programs.  
Conduct administrative and logistic operations.  
Advise and evaluate Reserve Components.  
Care for soldiers and families.

### IET COMPANY METL

Conduct soldierization.  
Conduct BRM training.  
Conduct physical fitness training.  
Train soldiers on combat skills.  
Train and develop permanent party.  
Certify drill sergeants.  
Plan, document, and coordinate training.  
Initiate personnel actions.  
Maintain and account for equipment and facilities.  
Maintain a positive command climate.  
Integrate new soldiers and families.  
Operate a family support group.

ing effort and resources to improve their units' proficiency in a given mission essential task.

The development of subtasks and standards for company METL tasks is straightforward where explicit regulations and such documents as the BCT POI apply. For a number of mission essential tasks, however, either there are no guidelines or the regulations are broad and do not prescribe evaluation standards. One such task is the integration of new families and soldiers. The company task *Integrate new soldiers/families* is also a battalion battle task, and supports the battalion mission essential task *Care for soldiers/families*. Here, subtasks and standards are derived from the portion of the company standing operating procedures that governs in-processing and sponsorship.

Since the Infantry School is the proponent for both IET and ARTEP 7-10 MTP, we used the MTP's definitions of T, P, and U for consistency. We designated certain subtasks as critical. Failure to accomplish any critical subtask to standard results in an untrained (U) rating, while failure to accomplish one or more noncritical subtasks to standard means a unit needs practice (P rating). With this written assessment tool, IET company commanders, for the first time, can fully focus their training efforts and resources on improving their units' proficiency in a mission essential task.

Although we have come a long way in

IET training management, we have not resolved every issue. Leader and soldier tasks as well as platoon collective tasks have not been determined. Once we meet this challenge, however, our framework for fully successful training management will be complete. Common sense must always apply; the standards a commander sets must be achievable and consistent with what actually occurs in his company. As long as he remembers these tenets, formulating subtasks is not difficult, and the product obtained will be an accurate assessment tool for his unit.

These METL training objectives provide a yardstick by which all companies in 3d Brigade can be measured. This, in turn, enables the battalion commanders and ultimately the brigade commander to accurately assess readiness trends within the command.

No matter what unit we are a part of, our tactical doctrine is underwritten by successful training management. With an effective assessment tool in place, companies within the 3d Brigade can now perform their missions more successfully.

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
# Light OPFOR Infantry Platoon Security

MASTER SERGEANT BRENDA BLOOMER  
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The light infantry platoon is the foundation of many nations' maneuver forces. Its composition and weapons enable the platoon to occupy terrain, and—in conjunction with its fellow platoons of the

rifle company—it can present a formidable hindrance to an enemy's scheme of maneuver, forcing the enemy to dismount or deploy earlier than he had intended. The purpose of this article is to discuss


security operations of an opposing force (OPFOR) light infantry platoon using as models light infantry platoons of the infantry-based OPFOR, North Korea, and Iraq.



Light OPFOR Infantry platoon outpost

This article discusses three types of OPFOR infantry platoon outposts. The information can be used to help train infantry units in how to recognize and attack enemy outposts. Units can either

wargame how to deal with these types of positions, or they can actually construct them for force-on-force or live-fire exercises.



North Korean combat security outpost

## Light OPFOR Infantry Platoon Security

As a rule the light OPFOR infantry platoon defends as part of a company, but under certain conditions it may perform an independent mission as a combat security outpost or strongpoint.

The creation of a platoon strongpoint requires that wire and other obstacles be emplaced ahead of the platoon's forward positions. Platoon personnel dig one-man and two-man foxholes, connect them into squad entrenchments, and then prepare a continuous trench to unify the platoon strongpoint. The platoon provides its own security by sending out two or three soldiers as an observation post (OP). The weapon squad would support the front line squads.

An infantry platoon in the defense would normally cover an area of up to 400 meters wide, 50 to 300 meters deep, and up to five kilometers in front of the forward edge of the main battle area. Within 24 hours after occupation, they usually complete fighting positions with 18 inches of overhead cover. The positions are normally six to eight meters apart with the squads up to 50 meters apart. The third squad is 100 to 200 meters behind the forward fighting positions. The platoon leader establishes a squad-size bunker. The OPs are positioned 200 to 400 meters forward of the front fighting positions. In positioning obstacles, the three-strand wire is 40 meters forward of the front fighting positions with concertina wire and mines at a depth of 40 to 100 meters directly in front of the wire.

For positioning of weapons in fighting positions, antitank weapons and riflemen would cover mounted avenues of approach; machineguns and riflemen would cover dismounted avenues of approach; and grenadiers (BG-15), supported by riflemen, would cover dead space.

This type of outpost is employed at the Joint Readiness Training Center, and the circular defensive position is common for a combat security outpost. In addition, it reflects a training standard established by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command for an infantry-based OPFOR.


## North Korean Infantry Platoon Combat Security Outpost

The North Korean combat security outpost has the mission to draw the enemy to a place apart from the main defensive area and to a dummy FEBA (forward edge of battle area), block enemy infiltration and give early warning, prevent surprise attack and confuse enemy reconnaissance while deceiving the enemy as to location of the main defense, and protect obstacles. A portion of the personnel occupy a concealed OP, if necessary. It is reinforced with mortars from higher. The combat security outpost will have individual foxholes of various kinds, connection between the foxholes (trenches), cleared fields of fire, a prepared obser-

vation post for the platoon leader, constructed obstacles, personnel shelters, reserve trenches, ammunition dumps, and traffic gangways (trenches).

The outpost covers an area up to 500 meters wide, 50 to 300 meters deep, and is normally one to two kilometers in front of the forward defensive area. Individual foxholes are six to 15 meters apart. The platoon leader's OP is 25 to 100 meters behind the frontline positions. Obstacles for the platoon defense are 40 meters forward of the firing positions and 40 to 100 meters in depth.

The advantages are that Korea is a potential major regional area of conflict and North Korea's combat outpost is manned by a reinforced platoon. It is designed for mountainous terrain and is not nor-



Iraqi Infantry platoon in defense.

mally a circular fighting position, thus limiting 360-degree security.

### **Iraqi Infantry Platoon in Defense**

Iraqi infantry platoons defend with their infantry in forward trench lines unsupported by armored vehicles. Each squad digs five two-man fighting positions with overhead cover flush to the ground and well camouflaged. The squad positions are connected by communication trench lines. The platoon will defend with two squads forward and one back. The platoon leader is located in the vicinity of the rear squad position.

Each platoon will have an OP behind the protective obstacles, and the OP will stay in position throughout the battle. Each platoon is armed with three RPG-7s and reinforced with two SPG-9s. Each squad will have one RPG-7. The SPG-9s will be located to the rear of the platoon position for effective use of the weapon's range. The platoon's antitank weapons will have overlapping fires that cover the

tactical obstacles. The protective minefields will be protected by final protective fires, automatic weapons, and RPG-7s. The long-range antitank systems also provide protection to the flank of the position.

The Iraqi platoon in defense covers an area 350 by 350 meters. Squads are 60 to 70 meters apart with the reserve squad 50 to 100 meters behind the frontline positions. Squad positions are 75 meters deep. The OP is up to 200 meters forward of the front lines.

The advantages of this position are that it offers overhead cover flush to the ground for fighting positions, and each position is connected to others by communication trenches.

The diagrams and descriptions of these outposts will help small-unit leaders and soldiers plan and train the way they can recognize and attack enemy platoon outposts. These are the doctrinal plans, which can be modified on the basis of terrain, enemy, and weather.

These security outposts are designed

to provide early warning, to prevent U.S. reconnaissance from targeting company positions, and to cause the U.S. forces to deploy. The outposts will normally receive direct and indirect fire support from the battalion. In OPFOR doctrine, once the enemy begins to deploy for a major attack, the security forces will withdraw, but this will not be the case with the North Koreans.

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### **FIFTY YEARS AGO IN HISTORY NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1946**

*Eighteen months after the end of World War II, the former Allies had yet to arrive at a consensus on the rebuilding of Germany, the future of Korea, or a resolution of China's political future. In the meantime, Korea continued to train and expand the fledgling defense force that had assumed many of the duties formerly carried out by U.S. Military Police. Concurrently, the U.S. Marine Corps began reviewing its amphibious operational doctrine in light of the capabilities revealed in atomic bomb testing.*

*These and other highlights of the postwar years have been provided by Mr. Bud Hannings, in preparation for his upcoming chronology of the Korean War.*

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| <b>4 November</b>  | <i>The United States welcomes a Council of Foreign Ministers, in an attempt to reach a compromise among the four occupying powers on the rebuilding of Germany. Due largely to Russian intransigence, the conference will remain in session for two months without reaching an agreement.</i>                      |
| <b>15 November</b> | <i>Although the Chinese National Assembly convenes, the communists—asserting that power should have been transferred to the State Council before convening the National Assembly—largely boycott the meeting.</i>  |
| <b>30 November</b> | <i>The Korean Constabulary now numbers 143 officers and 5,130 enlisted men and has established another garrison, on the island of Cheju-do. Much of their training, still based on the Japanese or Chinese models, will require modification to more closely follow U.S. tactics.</i>                              |
| <b>16 December</b> | <i>General Vandegrift, the Marine Commandant, receives a detailed report on the likely effects of a nuclear attack on an amphibious landing force. The report contends that as a result of this technological advance in the art of war amphibious landings as seen in World War II are now obsolete.</i>          |
| <b>31 December</b> | <i>The Council of Foreign Ministers adjourns, agreeing to meet again in Moscow on 10 March 1947. No progress has been made on the issues of demilitarization, the number and status of German POWs held by the Russians, or the open inspection of manufacturing plants by members of the quadripartite teams.</i> |