Brigade Targeting

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM E. HARNER

One of the most significant lessons the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, learned on its first visit to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) was the need to develop a targeting process for our task force. To a unit challenged by the tenacious opposing forces, a targeting process is essential. It ensures that all battlefield operating systems (BOSs) are synchronized and focused on defeating the enemy at the decisive point of the battle. In training a brigade battle staff, the targeting process is second in importance only to the tactical decision-making process.

The brigade learned what targeting is, how to conduct the targeting meeting, and what the brigade battle staff does with the resulting information, analysis, and decisions. We used several key training events to develop and improve our brigade targeting techniques—a division command post exercise, the 101st's battle command training program (BCTP), the leader training program sponsored by the JRTC, and finally a return trip to the JRTC.

Targeting is consciously focusing all lethal and non-lethal systems on the enemy. Field Manual (FM) 6-20-10, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process* defines it as "the process of identifying enemy targets for possible engagement and determining the appropriate system to capture, destroy, degrade, or neutralize the target in question."

Frequently, either targets cannot be serviced by systems within the brigade task force or they are outside the brigade's area of operation. These targets are nominated to higher headquarters for consideration at the division targeting meeting. The ultimate objective of targeting is a prioritized list of friendly force actions that disrupt, delay, or limit the enemy's initiative and activities on the battlefield that may interfere with brigade operations.

Targeting must be a collective effort by the key leaders of the battle staff to reexamine the commander's intent, resynchronize the tactical plan, refine both the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and the high-payoff target list (HPTL), and review and assign specific responsibilities for potential targets throughout the unit's area of influence. The key word is *resynchronization*—the resynchronization of the brigade fight. After an operations order (OPORD) or fragmentary order (FRAGO) is issued, it is the only collective process the staff uses in which all elements of the BOSs are focused and in concert with one another.

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Targeting is the maneuver force commander's process, in which leaders of the battle staff participate. The principal advisors to the commander on targeting are the brigade fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) and fire support officer (FSO). The rest of the battle staff must therefore have a thorough knowledge of how these two advisors think, specifically the targeting methodology of *Decide, Detect,* and *Deliver.* These three provide an active and responsive framework that enables fire supporters to see the battlefield and kill the enemy.

After the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, mission analysis, and target value analysis are conducted or updated for an operation, the commander's intent for fire support is given, and this is the key. In an ordinarily target-rich environment, the intent provides priorities for the engagement of targets. This is essential because of the limitation of time, the availability of engagement systems, and ammunition constraints.

Afterward, the three *Decide* products are prepared—the HPTL, the attack guidance matrix, and the collection plan. It is critical that all the members of the battle staff know what these products are and what they mean. They clearly communicate the commander's intent on what, where, when, and how targets are to be acquired and attacked.

The *Detect* function is the aggressive development and execution of the collection plan. It is essential to conduct a crosswalk between the PIRs, the HPTL, and the collection plan for each phase of the operation. In almost all cases, there should be a direct correlation between these three elements. The brigade S-2, on the basis of his experience and knowledge of the enemy, recommends to the commander the PIRs for the mission. The PIRs change and focus on indirect fire systems that can affect friendly units on the ground. The HPTL and the collection plan must follow the change in priority.

Finally, the collection plan should include a well-thought-out battle damage assessment (BDA) procedure and should be refined at each targeting meeting. If a target is serviced because it is important to *your* success, it is probably important to the enemy's success as well. Therefore, having a BDA on an engaged target can provide insight into changes in the enemy's most probable course of action.

The *Deliver* function is sending rounds down range and putting steel on target or, in the case of non-lethal systems, jamming the enemy's command, control, and communications systems. Through the completion of an attack guidance matrix in the *Decide* function, units already know the desired target effects—destruction, neutralization, or suppression—and the type of unit that will engage the target—artillery, mortar, or EH-60 Quickfix for jamming. Therefore, the *Deliver* function should be instantaneous upon identification of the target.

In 1st Brigade, we have two types of targeting meetings—deliberate and hasty. Our SOP calls for a targeting meeting immediately after the detailed wargaming of the course of action the commander selects at the decision briefing of the tactical decision-making process. The BOS representatives focus on the targeting meeting taskings in their annexes of the OPORD, and the S-3 puts unit taskings in the main body of the order.

During periods between OPORDs or major FRAGOs, a targeting meeting is conducted at least once a day, usually after the commander's update in the morning. It is ideal to conduct the meeting inside the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) in the vicinity of the plans area. This enables all the key players to stay close to their radios, telephones, and desks. But with the organized chaos of current operations, especially at the JRTC, we had great success conducting the meeting in the direct support artillery battalion TOC, hosted by the FSCOORD. There were fewer distractions from the battle staff's most important meeting; the FSCOORD had all of his key players attending; and we were only a few hundred meters from the brigade TOC.

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After the deliberate targeting meeting became routine in our TOC, the hasty targeting meeting seemed natural for the staff. A hasty meeting is conducted on the basis of targets of opportunity identified in the commander's critical information requirements or on the HPTL. The purpose of the meeting is to focus the entire battle staff and the assets the members control onto the target area of interest that must be correctly identified and destroyed.

Any member of the TOC can initiate the meeting, then the brigade executive officer (XO), S-3, or battle captain takes charge. For example, during the 101st's BCTP, the top high-payoff targets for the brigade were enemy rocket launch systems. When one was spotted by an aerial observer and reported to the TOC, the XO convened a hasty targeting meeting. As a result of each BOS representative's previous participation in the deliberate targeting meetings, they understood their role in the targeting process and the procedure for the hasty meeting. The XO quickly focused the battle staff on the enemy unit; the system was then engaged and destroyed.

Those attending the target meeting should be the senior BOS representatives on duty in the TOC. When the meeting is held after the commander's update in the morning, the "First Team" battle staff attends, without exception, but the "second team" must also be trained in targeting. The XO chairs the meeting, or when he is not available, the S-3 chairs.

Each player brings to the meeting a unique set of talents and experience in both friendly and enemy capabilities within their BOSs. The most important is the FSCOORD, who is the expert in all of the lethal engagement systems within the brigade task force and the acquisition systems within his battalion. When he is available, the direct support artillery battalion S-2 brings to the meeting the added benefit of another S-2 analysis specifically oriented toward reports from subordinate fire support elements (FSEs), the Q36 radar, and spot reports. At the JRTC, the artillery battalion S-2 briefed the pattern analysis of the enemy's mortar firing positions developed from Q36 acquisitions.

Another key player is the brigade engineer, who is the expert on terrain analysis, obstacle construction, and minefield operations, among other things. Our engineer recommends locations for minefield emplacement that tie terrain into tactical obstacles. He identifies the system that can best deliver the minefield—close air support for Gator minefields or FASCAM for artillery-delivered minefields. Additionally, he can help ensure the full integration of tactical obstacles with fires and maneuver forces.

An officer often overlooked but critical during low-intensity conflict scenarios is the staff judge advocate officer, who provides his knowledge of the rules of engagement. The scribe for the meeting is the targeting officer. He maintains records of previous meetings, updates two of the *Decide* products—the attack guidance matrix and the HPTL—as directed in the meeting. He passes notes of the meeting to the FSEs at both higher and lower headquarters for target nominations and taskings.

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Over a period of several months and several training events, we developed and refined a targeting meeting agenda that works well for a brigade task force.

- Roll call by the XO.
- Intelligence update by the S-2.
- Report of assets available by the S-3.
- Target nominations by the S-2.
- BOS crosswalk by the S-3.
- Summary and final taskings by the XO.

The S-2 in the intelligence update briefs the current enemy situation, provides an analysis of the enemy's most probable course of action and locations, and reviews his current collection and reconnaissance and surveillance plans. Additionally, the S-2 provides a BDA of targets previously engaged and the effect on the enemy course of action. He briefs changes to the PIR, for concurrence from the battle staff. Again, the PIR and HPTL should be nearly identical. In our meetings, if they were not, a discussion always followed, then ended with full agreement among the XO, S-3, FSCOORD, and S-2.

The S-3 informs the battle staff of the resources available for targeting and briefs future operations. We found that at the JRTC the assets we thought we had available were often non-mission capable for any number of reasons. For example, with all the activities in fighting the current battle, a report that the TLQ-17 was only 75 percent effective because the air conditioning unit was inoperable, or that a low-level voice intercept system was inoperable for want of a Class IX repair part, might go unnoticed in the TOC. But the loss of the jamming or voice collecting capability was totally unacceptable. Therefore, recognizing the relevance of these problems at this point in the targeting meeting greatly improved our system readiness and the emphasis on getting the right repairs done on the equipment.

The next two steps, target nominations and BOS crosswalk, are open dialogue periods and are essential for the success of the targeting process. This dialogue begins the actual resynchronization of the brigade fight. The S-2 provides his insight into the enemy order of battle for target nomination. The FSCOORD provides his experienced judgment for analysis and both target acquisition and servicing. The other BOS representatives provide their expertise and knowledge of friendly and enemy systems and capabilities. The XO or S-3 keeps the focus of the discussion within the possibilities of friendly unit operations. Subordinate unit commanders usually already have a plan for future operations, and the targeting process must fit into their decision cycle. More important, subordinate battalion commanders must have an understanding of and confidence in the brigade targeting process. At the conclusion of the meeting, the S-2 reviews the update to his collection plan, the S-3 confirms these taskings, and, back inside the TOC, the decision support template is updated.

The targeting meeting produces several required actions:

The targeting meeting record sheet is used to record taskings assigned during the meeting. These taskings must quickly be converted to a FRAGO with specific taskings to units. At the bottom of the sheet is a checklist to ensure that the taskings are assigned and executed. The FSO informs the artillery battalion S-3 of the meeting's results. Additionally, he sends the division FSE a record of the meeting as input to the division's next targeting meeting. We found it beneficial during BCTP to send a copy of the record sheet to our liaison officer in the division main command post. He ensured that brigade input, requests, and interests were heard and represented at the division's targeting meeting. The Air Force liaison officer nominates close air support targets up his chain of command for inclusion in the next air tasking order. Finally, the brigade S-3 updates the synchronization matrix and follows up on the FRAGO to ensure that the brigade fight is resynchronized.

Great plans frequently last as long as first contact with the enemy. Therefore, the key to success on the battlefield is the implementation of a process that continually updates the synchronization of brigade task force assets that mass all lethal and nonlethal systems on the enemy at the decisive point and works within the maneuver commander's intent. Clearly, the implementation of the targeting process is the most important step a brigade can take to maintain the synchronization of its units on the battlefield.

Lieutenant Colonel William E. Harner was S-3 of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and served as S-3 of the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry. He also served as chief of Strategy and Policy Branch, U.S. Forces Korea and now commands the 2d battalion, 39th Infantry, at Fort Jackson. He is a 1978 graduate of the United States Military Academy and also holds master's degrees from the University of South Carolina and Troy State University.

The Logistical Integration
Of Heavy and Light Forces

CAPTAIN DAVID B. HILBURN

As long as infantry operations include both heavy (mechanized and armor) and light (airborne, air assault, and light infantry) units, there will be a need to integrate the logistic systems that support the two forces. The differences found in the light-heavy combined arms team contribute to the flexibility of combat power, but they also challenge logistics and supportability.

The pertinent Field Manuals (FMs)—71-123, *Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company Team,* 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion,* and 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*—contain very little practical information on how to manage the heavy-light combat service support (CSS) environment. Once a system is in place, however, the process does not have to be difficult.