



# Lane Training in Haiti

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

On 24 July 1996, approximately 190 paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division deployed on a U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) emergency deployment readiness exercise to Haiti. These soldiers—most of them assigned to the 1st Battalion, 504th Infantry—formed Task Force 1-504 (TF 1-504).

The task force's deployment was designed to improve joint operations, validate selected portions of the contingency plans for Haiti, and increase force protection for deployed U.S. forces in Haiti. Those forces at the time consisted of 250 soldiers who made up U.S. Support Group Haiti. The support group consisted mainly of engineers doing public works projects, a security platoon, and other logistical personnel. Upon arrival in Haiti, the task force would fall under the control of the group commander.

The rules of engagement (ROEs), as disseminated by

USACOM, were a combination of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) memorandum number 3121.01 and the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) "red card" (Figure 1), then in use by U.S. security forces there. Most noteworthy were the rules that did not allow U.S. forces to intervene in Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Also, the rules limited the use of deadly force to circumstances of "hostile intent" (as defined in JCS Memorandum 3121.01) toward U.S. military, United Nations (UN), and civilian police (CIVPOL) personnel as well as U.S. citizens. The CIVPOL were police from other countries employed by the UN to train the Haitian National Police. Strangely, the operations order the task force received from higher headquarters did not contain the usual ROE annex or appendix.

The TF commander was given total autonomy in structuring his force from within his battalion, the only restriction



**Figure 1. ROE Card used by U.S. security forces in Haiti during deployment.**

being the number cap of 190. The task force was composed of two platoons of light infantry from Company B and two motorized platoons from Company D. (The modified tables of organization and equipment for the 82d Airborne include a Company D in each of its nine infantry battalions.)

Company D had five platoons of four M996 HMMWVs (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles)—which could be configured to carry the TOW missile system, the .50-caliber machinegun, or the Mk 19 grenade launcher—and an M998 cargo vehicle for resupply operations. Mobility would be at a premium, given the mission and the distances to be covered in and around the city, and the M998s would give the light infantry the mobility to respond as a quick-reaction force. The mounted .50-caliber machineguns would provide additional firepower and also serve as a highly visible symbol of U.S. commitment to the Haitian democratic process.

This mission differed significantly from the typical combat mission for which the task force soldiers had been trained. The soldiers' usual aggressiveness and individual initiative, so crucial to success in combat, could spell disaster for the mission in the friendly streets of Port-au-Prince.

In preparation, the brigade commander ordered the task force to conduct realistic training on the rules of engagement immediately upon arrival in Haiti. He wanted every soldier to understand the inherent right of self-defense, along with the responsibility to use deadly force only when it was authorized under the ROEs.

Having served as the operations officer (U-3) for the UN Command in Haiti, the brigade commander had experienced

success with the use of ROE "lane training." During his tour as the U-3, he had used lane training to familiarize many of the foreign forces that made up the multi-national force with the complexity of peacekeeping and nation building ROEs. The task force S-3, along with the brigade trial counsel, would develop the situational training exercises (STXs), implement their execution, and evaluate the unit in country.

The RAMP principles would be used to assist in the training. RAMP (Figure 2) is a simple memory device that encompasses much of the "soldier relevant" information set forth in JCS 3121.01. It provides a simple, user-friendly way for the average soldier to remember key concepts that help him accomplish the mission.

The Haitian mission presented unique challenges for fire discipline and the soldiers' understanding of when to use deadly force. In order to train the task force soldiers on the principles of RAMP, the brigade commander ordered lane training with scenarios specifically designed to approximate encounters that were possible in Haiti. The lane training would be conducted on the ground in Port-au-Prince.

As soon as the task force arrived in country, arrangements were made to implement the training. A suitable training site required open terrain with an unused road network for vehicles, and the site had to be away from the observation and possible interference of Haitian locals. A quick map reconnaissance revealed an abandoned airfield, once used by the Haitian military, which offered open training space and was surrounded by a 12-foot wall.

The job of creating the training scenarios fell primarily upon the battalion S-3 and the brigade judge advocate. Re-

lying heavily upon the brigade commander's input, they created seven separate scenarios. These scenarios used the traditional "task, conditions, standards" training approach of a line company and battalion mission essential task lists (METLs).

Some of the training scenarios involved crowd control or interaction with the local Haitians. All of the vignettes required capable actors for training. Without them, the soldiers would not receive realistic training.

Having a good opposing force (OPFOR) is always an important element of training, but it is particularly important in stabilization and support operations such as this one. Typically, an OPFOR only tests a soldier's ability to fire and maneuver. The TF commander wanted the actors to challenge his soldiers' ability to think and react in a non-hostile environment. The brigade trial counsel, who was already familiar with the training scenarios and the training objectives, was appointed as the officer in charge of the opposing force.

### Training Vignettes

The overall training objective was for the soldiers to employ an appropriate mix of initiative and restraint during operations other than war.

#### SITUATION #1:

**Task:** Soldier will adhere to an ROE; specifically, demonstrate an ability to measure the amount of force necessary to accomplish the mission.

**Conditions:**

- Scenario backdrop (briefed to soldier): *U.S. forces are deployed to a poor third-world country where only U.S. support troops have been operating. Although the country's military and police forces have some control, armed bands of thugs, radicals, and rebel militia units present a real threat to both the civil authorities and U.S. citizens. The President of the country has invited additional U.S. forces into the country. The National Command Authority (NCA) has determined that the re-introduction of U.S. combat troops into the country will have a stabilizing influence. The armed forces of the country have not been declared hostile. The UNMIH ROE card is in effect. Your commander has issued the additional guidance that deadly force is authorized for use against any attempt to steal any U.S. weapon or against any hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent against any U.S. national or UNMIH forces.*

• Training Requirements:

- 3 rolls of concertina wire (to simulate U.S. secure area).
- 1 foreign national in civilian clothing.
- 1 M16A2.
- UNMIH ROE card.
- 1 evaluator/briefer.

- Training Setup: The soldier is read the scenario backdrop; he is given the ROE card and allowed 10 minutes to study it and ask questions. He is told that he has been placed on guard duty inside a U.S. cantonment area and that the limits of his post are from point A to point B. The HMMWV is placed approximately 50 meters from the leftmost limit with the M16A2 leaning against the side that is visible to the soldier. There should be a small gap in the concertina wire near the vehicle. The soldier is given an M16A2 rifle with a magazine of blanks in his ammunition pouch and his selector lever set to *safe*.

- Training Execution: The foreign national, who is hiding, either in the HMMWV or in a nearby woodline, grabs the M16A2 and goes through the wire.

**Standards:** Upon observing the theft, the soldier should shout

### RAMP

**R**eturn fire with aimed fire. Return force with force. You always have the right to repel hostile acts with necessary force.

**A**nticipate attack. Use force first if, but only if, you see clear indicators of hostile intent.

**M**easure the amount of force that you use, if time and circumstances permit. Use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission.

**P**rotect with deadly force only human life and property designated by your commander. Stop short of deadly force when protecting other property.

### VEWPRIK

**V**erbal warnings.

**E**xhibit weapon.

**W**arning shots.

**P**epper spray.

**R**iot club/stick.

**S**hoot to **I**njure.

**S**hoot to **K**ill.

Figure 2. Memory devices.

warnings, give chase, and as a last resort fire his weapon. Alternatively, if the soldier determines that firing shots could put others at risk, he refrains from firing and only gives chase.

After-Action Review (AAR) Discussion: The evaluator should go through each bullet of the RAMP mnemonic, emphasizing the P (for *protect property designated by the commander*).

(References: FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*; JCS Memo #3121.01, *Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces*; FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*; 143 Mil L. Rev. 1, *ROE for Land Forces: A Matter of Training not Lawyering*; DA PAM 27-161-1, *Law of Peace*.)

#### SITUATION #2

**Task:** Same as for #1.

**Conditions:** Same as for #1, except that instead of an M16A2, an M42 protective mask is placed near the HMMWV where the soldier can easily see it.

**Standards:** When the foreign national grabs the mask, the soldier should shout *Stop* in Creole, and give chase, but should NOT use deadly force.

AAR Discussion: The activity the soldier witnessed does not rise to the level of authorizing the use of deadly force. The evaluator should go through the ROE card and the RAMP mnemonic. The "R" clearly does not apply because the soldier received no fire. The "A" does not apply because the soldier could hardly anticipate any kind of attack by the foreign national seizing the mask and running. The "M" requirement is met when the soldier shouts and gives chase. The "P" does not apply because the protective mask has not been declared property that is to be defended with deadly force.

#### SITUATION #3

**Task:** Soldier will adhere to an ROE; specifically, he will measure the amount of force necessary to respond to foreign national-on-foreign national violence.

**Conditions:**

- Scenario backdrop (briefed to soldier): Same as #1, except that the soldier has now been posted at the entrance gate to the U.S. secured area. The soldier is told that the only individuals allowed to pass through are UNMIH personnel or those bearing a U.S. military ID card. No foreign national is allowed inside the secured area without a U.S. escort. The soldier is told that if any foreign nationals try to gain entry through the gate or if a riot appears imminent, he is to use the factors of graduated response, with the mnemonic VEWPRIK.

- Training Requirements:

- 2 rolls of concertina wire.
- 2 actors playing foreign nationals armed with clubs.
- 1 evaluator.
- 1 female victim.
- Red ROE card.
- 1 TA-1 with wire.

• **Training Setup:** The soldier is given the red ROE card and 10 minutes to study it. The concertina wire is placed so that there is a 20-foot gap between the strands, representing a roadway entrance into a U.S. secured area. If he is confronted with any situations not covered in his general orders or his instructions, he is to use the TA-1 to contact higher headquarters for guidance.

• **Training Execution:** The "female victim," visibly upset and frightened, approaches the U.S. soldier on guard duty and attempts to draw him into conversation. Several seconds later, two foreign nationals approach the woman and start to drag her away. She pleads for help from the U.S. soldier.

**Standards:** The U.S. soldier does not interfere in the incident. He reports it to higher and requests reinforcements, and/or reports it to the proper authorities (CIVPOL/Haitian Police) to deal with a possible riot.

**AAR Discussion:** The red ROE card is clear on this—the U.S. cannot interfere with Haitian-on-Haitian violence. A leader goes through the RAMP factors with the soldier again. The use of deadly force is not authorized in this situation.

#### SITUATION #4

**Task:** The soldier will adhere to an ROE; specifically, demonstrating an ability to measure the amount of force necessary when confronted by a variety of threats.

**Conditions:** Same as above, except the soldier is equipped with pepper spray.

• **Training Execution:** Includes five variations:

- a. A foreign national in an unknown location begins firing at the soldier manning the checkpoint.
- b. A Red Cross relief worker approaches the checkpoint, says he thinks he is in danger, and requests safe haven.
- c. Two or three foreign nationals come within 50 meters of the checkpoint and throw rocks at the soldier.
- d. A civilian vehicle stops near the gate, shots are fired from the vehicle, and it speeds off.
- e. A civilian truck initially stops at the checkpoint, but speeds away when the soldier approaches to check IDs.

**Standards:**

- a. Soldier seeks cover and returns fire, in accordance with the "R" of the RAMP, if he can identify the position from which the sniper is firing; if not, he remains under cover and reports the incident.
- b. The Red Cross worker should be taken into the U.S. secured area, and higher headquarters should be contacted for an escort back to the CP.
- c. The soldier should seek cover from the rock throwing and report the incident to higher. None of the RAMP factors are met that would allow the soldier to use deadly force. The "M" factor would argue for the use of non-deadly force, but the soldier would have to leave his guard position to implement it (the range of pepper spray is five meters).
- d. The soldier should respond to the vehicle with deadly force. Both "R" and the "M" argue for returned fire.
- e. The soldier should respond to the civilian truck with deadly force. The "A" for "anticipate attack" strongly argues for deadly force—the truck may be headed toward the CP with explosives.

#### SITUATION #5

**Task:** The soldier will respond properly when asked questions by national news media.

**Conditions:** Scenario backdrop (briefed to soldier) is the same as in Situation #1. The soldier is placed on gate guard at the front entrance to the U.S.-secured area. He is informed that the press is

in the area and that he may talk to them if it does not interfere with his guard duties. He is given the "Dealing with the Media" reference guide, and 15 minutes to study it.

• **Training Execution:** An actor in civilian clothes (representing a reporter) approaches the soldier and asks one or more of the following questions:

- a. What are you doing here?
- b. What home town are you from, are you married, any kids?
- c. About how many U.S. soldiers came down with you?
- d. I've heard that you can't interfere in any Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Is that true? Why?
- e. What unit are you with? Do you enjoy it? What is the Army like?
- f. When are you leaving?
- g. Is that weapon loaded?
- h. I've heard that this unit was sent down here to make way for your Charlie Company, which will be staying for four months?
- i. Off the record. . . .
- j. Now you soldiers are airborne right? What does that mean?
- k. Some people back home are saying that the fact we've sent additional troops to Haiti means that the President's strategy has failed. What do you think?
- l. What if some Haitian starts shooting at you?
- m. Are you high-speed, elite soldiers really cut out for this type of peacekeeping mission?
- n. What do you think about Haitians? Do you think they appreciate you being here? After we leave, what do you think will happen?
- o. Isn't it true that you guys are down here because lots of stuff is being stolen by Haitians?
- p. I see you have pepper spray. When can you guys use it?
- q. If you could tell the folks at home one thing, what would it be?

**Standards:** The soldier should first ask the reporter for press credentials and picture ID. Soldiers will not answer any question dealing with operational security or national policy. Soldiers may answer questions about personal matters, such as those in b, e, j, and q. (Only talk about your area of expertise: Stay in your lane. If you own it, drive it, carry it, you can talk about it.)

#### SITUATION #6

**Task:** Soldier will adhere to an ROE; specifically, he will respond with graduated response to a civil disturbance or riot.

**Conditions:** Same as above, with the additional instructions that the soldier's team is escorting a humanitarian relief convoy.

• **Training Requirements:**

- 2 HMMWVs loaded with empty boxes.
- 20-30 Haitian actors.
- 1 evaluator/controller.

• **Training Execution:** A fire team leader is instructed to escort the convoy from point to point. As the convoy rounds a corner it is approached by 20 to 30 Haitians who surround the convoy and begin asking for food. They become more aggressive and start trying to enter the HMMWV to take food. Once the U.S. soldiers fire warning shots, the crowd disperses.

**Standards:** Soldier uses the graduated force measures (VEW-PRIK) to force the crowd back and resume the movement.

#### SITUATION #7

**Task:** The soldier will adhere to an ROE; specifically, the ability to measure the amount of force used in a situation where hostile intent is unclear.

**Conditions:** Soldier is placed on guard duty as in Situation #3 at the entrance to a U.S. secured area. He is given the same instructions as in situation #3.

• **Training Requirements:** Same as #3, with the addition of five or six foreign nationals in host-nation uniforms carrying rifles at sling arms.

• **Training Execution:** The foreign national police/military ap-

proach the U.S. soldier with their weapons at sling arms. After they are stopped by the sentry, the senior Haitian becomes irate and motions that he and his group should be allowed to continue down the road. After about 30 seconds of arguing between the senior Haitian and the U.S. sentry, one of the other Haitian soldiers/police attempts to move his rifle from shoulder arms to a firing position pointed at the U.S. sentry. If the U.S. soldier does not respond with deadly force, the senior Haitian orders his soldier to lower his weapon and they depart. If the U.S. soldier does respond with deadly force, the other Haitians run away.

**Standards:** This soldier can't lose. He is correct if he opens fire when the Haitian soldier moves his weapon from shoulder arms to the firing position. He is also correct if he holds fire when the foreign national moves his weapon.

**AAR Discussion:** Either response of the soldier is correct as long as it is done for the proper reason. If the soldier elects to open fire, his action is correct under the "A" (anticipate attack) requirement of RAMP. The "A" allows the use of force *first* against any element that displays hostile intent. The change in status of the Haitian soldier from *shoulder arms* to *at-the-ready* clearly demonstrates hostile intent.

The "A" of RAMP could also argue for the soldier to hold his fire. The police/soldiers are clearly of the host nation, which is still nominally neutral towards the U.S. force. The "A" element allows the soldier to assess the risk before using force. If the U.S. soldier believes the risk of the Haitian opening fire is remote, he is correct in not opening fire when the Haitian moves his rifle. The scenario calls for a subjective analysis by the sentry of what constitutes "hostile intent," with the benefit of the doubt going to the U.S. soldier.

### Evaluation

Since training without proper evaluation is unwise and often unproductive, the command decided to evaluate each soldier's performance using a modified grade-sheet from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter No. 96-6, dated May 1996. The modified version is reproduced in Figure 3.

Soldiers were evaluated on each of the tasks. Those who failed the performance measure were retrained and given another opportunity to excel. The evaluators used the after-action review discussion as a focus for their AAR with each soldier. Particular emphasis was placed on the explanation of the RAMP factors the soldier should have used in making his decision.

Perhaps the most surprising realization to come from the training was that U.S. soldiers were reluctant to use force even when hostile intent was clearly evident. It was a difficult transition from peacekeeper one minute to combat soldier the next. However, the paratroopers were quick to grasp and use the VEWPRIK graduated force measures. Another revelation from the training was the command's observation that many soldiers did not understand the proper way to use the pepper-spray.

The soldiers gave positive marks to the RAMP concept and compared it to the use of the SALUTE report for reconnaissance. They also agreed that the most useful training (perhaps because of its novelty) was that involving convoy escort instead of local crowd control. The crowd control or riot vignettes also helped team and squad leaders understand how difficult it would be to control their soldiers under such circumstances.

After the lane exercises, the soldiers of 1st Battalion,

### USE FORCE APPROPRIATELY

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	RESULTS
1. Returns fire from a hostile force with aimed fire. <i>Vignette #4a, 4d</i>	GO NO GO
2. Identifies clear demonstrations of hostile intent using the RAMP factors. Anticipates attack by firing first. <i>Vignette #4e</i>	GO NO GO
3. Identifies situation where hostile intent is unclear using the RAMP factors. Holds fire while maintaining or seeking a secure position. <i>Vignette #7</i>	GO NO GO
4. Responds with measured force when confronted with a potentially hostile force. Uses the scale of VEWPRIK measures. <i>Vignette #4c, 6</i>	GO NO GO
5. Omits lower level VEWPRIK measures if the threat quickly grows deadly. <i>Vignette 4e, 7</i>	GO NO GO
6. Declines to use deadly force when piece of property is snatched. <i>Vignette #2</i>	GO NO GO
7. Uses deadly force, if indicated, to protect comrades and persons under U.S. control. <i>Vignette 4b</i>	GO NO GO
8. Uses deadly force, if indicated, to protect key property. <i>Vignette #1</i>	GO NO GO
9. Responds correctly to members of the news media.	GO NO GO
10. Soldier correctly responds to foreign national on national violence. <i>Vignette #3</i>	GO NO GO

504th Infantry, felt better prepared to react to the many possible situations in the streets of Port-au-Prince. Thankfully, the task force was confronted with none of the situations for which they had trained during the brief deployment.

Although everyone agrees that ROE training is important, unfortunately, it is too seldom done. Hopefully, these scenarios and the experience of the task force in Haiti can provide a starting point for comprehensive ROE training, not only in our combat divisions but in the training base as well.

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**Captain Michael O. Lacey**, a Judge Advocate General officer, recently completed an assignment as Chief, Administrative Law, 82d Airborne Division, in which he also served as trial counsel and operational law attorney. He previously served in the 4th Battalion, 87th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. He is a 1987 graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a doctorate from the University of Illinois School of Law.