

# BOOK REVIEWS



*MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader.* Edited by William M. Leary. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2001. 522 Pages. \$40.00, Softbound.

*MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero.* By Stanley Weintraub. Simon & Schuster, 2001. 385 Pages, Softbound. Audio tape (ISBN: 0-7435-0535-2), \$25.00. Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army, Retired.

No American general in the 20th century has generated more controversy than General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur. In a military career spanning five decades, MacArthur was the preeminent combat general of World War I, the resourceful commander of the Southwest Pacific theater in World War II, and the enigmatic Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan at the outset of the Korean War. Following his abrupt dismissal from command by President Harry S Truman, MacArthur returned to the United States amid a tumult reminiscent of that of a Roman emperor two millennia ago. Two recent books explore the contentious general who was both reviled and deified by millions of his fellow soldiers and countrymen.

In *MacArthur and the American Century*, editor William M. Leary has compiled a comprehensive anthology of essays that address virtually every phase of MacArthur's remarkable career, with World War I being the notable exception. Contributors include renowned historians: Stephen E. Ambrose, D. Clayton James, and Russell Weigley, as well as the general himself, whose essays and speeches provide contemporary insight into the man and his times. To his credit, Leary also includes a separate section that not only places MacArthur's illustrious career in perspective, but also takes his numerous biographers to task for presenting MacArthur in an overly subjective light, virtually ignoring the general's frequent lapses into egotism and insubordination. Still, one cannot read this anthology without reaching the conclusion that Douglas MacArthur imprinted his personality, for better or worse, on both the U.S. Army and the American century.

One essay merits special scrutiny. Barton F. Bernstein of Stanford University reex-

amines American policy during the Korean War in light of new documentary evidence, and concludes that the relationship between MacArthur and Truman was far more complex than originally viewed. Given recently declassified documents concerning the Truman Administration's position on bombing across the Yalu, the attitude of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations toward atomic war in the Pacific, and the Eisenhower Administration's uneasiness about the armistice, Bernstein demands additional scholarly research into the conduct of the Korean War. Discussion concerning the use of the atomic bomb, for example, is clearly revealed in Joint Chiefs of Staff documents as early as November 1950. Bernstein also states that despite Truman's claim that he despised MacArthur long before the spring of 1951, he hesitated to remove him from command; he was deterred chiefly by his fears of provoking a political battle at home that would further aid the Republican Party in attacking the administration's unclear China policy.

In contrast to Leary's balanced assessment of MacArthur, Stanley Weintraub joins an increasing number of historians who paint a highly unflattering portrait of his controversial subject. In an attempt to remember the Korean War's first eleven months, which he dubs "MacArthur's war," Weintraub begins his study of the war with MacArthur's triumphant return to the United States following his abrupt dismissal from command by Truman, then back-pedals to the events foreshadowing North Korea's premeditated attack on its southern neighbor on 25 June 1950. The MacArthur who emerges from these pages is an egotistical field commander, unwilling to consult with the Pentagon; an indecisive general reluctant to confront bad news; and an imperial shogun, completely out of touch with the combat readiness of the troops entrusted to his command.

Like Michael Schaller's *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*, Weintraub leaves no stone unturned in his attempt to discredit MacArthur. "More glorious than the Cote-de-Chatillon in 1918 or Leyte in 1944 was Inchon," which Weintraub credits as much to luck and prior con-

tingency planning as to MacArthur's alleged military genius. Particularly galling to the author is MacArthur's efforts to run his war, except for photo-opportunity flying visits, from 700 miles away in Japan.

Weintraub is equally critical of MacArthur's principal subordinates, the "unsteady" Walton Walker, commanding Eighth Army, and the "incompetent and abrasive" Ned Almond, commanding X Corps, as well as the senior Army leadership at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. Both Chairman Omar Bradley and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins seem weak and unwilling to confront MacArthur, who had been Army chief of staff when Bradley and Collins were junior officers. Only Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway receives high marks from Weintraub for his success in restoring Eighth Army's fighting spirit after the disaster on the Yalu and its subsequent retreat south of the 38th Parallel.

What Weintraub does do well is his analysis of MacArthur's removal from command. Giving little heed to restrictions imposed a hemisphere away, and deliberately setting himself on a collision course with the Truman Administration, MacArthur courted dismissal by "intimating to sympathetic listeners that a limited war fought to sustain a semblance of the status quo failed to justify the sacrifices" already made in the field. Such talk about ideological war was treachery in Truman's eyes and left the President no recourse but to relieve the insubordinate MacArthur.

In the final analysis, both Leary and Weintraub have provided readers with an in-depth look at America's most controversial general. In some sense, the real MacArthur remains wrapped in mystery. Borrowing Lord Clarendon's description of Oliver Cromwell in his own consideration of Napoleon Bonaparte, David Chandler ponders whether "the 'Man of Destiny' was a good or evil man—or both—a 'great bad man'." Perhaps. But Napoleon indelibly marked History. The same can be said of Douglas MacArthur.

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*Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide: May 1965 to October 1966.* By John

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**M. Carland. U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000. 410 Pages. \$43.00.** Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

The United States Army Center of Military History produces excellent work, and this eighth volume in the Vietnam series is another outstanding contribution. The volume focuses on the first 18 months of action as the United States changed its mission from advisory to combat operations. Chronologically, it is the first of four Vietnam battle histories.

By March 1965, Communist forces were posed for a military victory. Only a major U.S. commitment could prevent it. General William Westmoreland sent in American infantry units to engage the enemy and blunt their offensive until enough troops could arrive to effect a more positive military situation in the country. The initial response to the emergency was successful. As the U.S. attempted to take the war to the enemy, search and destroy missions became the means. U.S. forces prevented the communists from massing for a major assault, demolished supply caches and base camps, disrupted infiltration into the South, and thwarted attempts to seize harvests. Despite the escalating growth of American troops during the period, however, the U.S. remained essentially on the defensive throughout 1966. Much of the American commitment was devoted to providing security to protect the building of an American infrastructure to conduct larger warfare. And the enemy maintained the ability to control the pace and intensity of combat. To a large extent, the communists decided when to engage the Americans and to what degree.

The multi-dimensional nature of the war, as both a large unit conflict and a counterinsurgency effort, demanded a complex strategy and the elusiveness of the enemy called traditional war-making doctrines into question. The helicopter literally changed the nature of ground warfare, but it had negative as well as positive impacts.

The conflict in 1965 and 1966 was Westmoreland's war. President Johnson allowed his commander full authority to develop strategy and battlefield tactics, albeit under strict geographical constraints and with limited American manpower. In the elusive quest for a means of determining success, attrition became the goal of military operations. Although a "strategy in disrepute" since World War I, Westmoreland argued that there was no alternative and that despite the horrible costs, it would prove successful. At least through 1966, Westmoreland and the rest of the command structure

believed that they had a successful formula that needed only greater tempo and mass.

Whether Westmoreland was ultimately proved wrong or whether the events of 1968 substantiated his belief is beyond the scope of this particular volume. Carland does address the question of whether search and destroy or pacification should have taken primacy when adequate manpower did not exist to seriously attempt both. In the early period, the limited and inconsistent American efforts on the pacification front were not particularly successful. The issue and the problem would continue to grow throughout the war.

An extensive literature exists on the decision process to undertake the combat role in 1965. Among the best recent studies are the works of Brian VanDeMark, H.R. McMaster, and Frederick Logeval. But for the war on the ground during this crucial period, *Stemming the Tide* is an essential source. Well researched, clearly written, and supported with exceptional pictures and combat maps, this is an extremely valuable resource.

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***Hitler's Traitor. Martin Bormann and the Defeat of the Reich.* By Louis Kilzer. Presidio Press, 2000. 307 Pages. \$29.95.**

***Inside Hitler's High Command.* By Geoffrey P. Megargee. University Press of Kansas, 2000. 327 Pages.** Reviewed by Colonel Christopher Timmers, U.S. Army, Retired.

As one might expect, Adolf Hitler is the central character in both of these excellent studies. Louis Kilzer painstakingly establishes a convincing case that Martin Bormann, the Fuehrer's top advisor and confidant, was actually a spy working in the service of Russian intelligence. Geoffrey Megargee advances the not implausible theory that the German general staff was of the collection of military intellectuals most of us have commonly accepted. In fact, after reading these two works, one is almost moved to remark, sarcastically, that it was a miracle (and a tribute to the German fighting man) that the Reich lasted as long as it did, especially after Stalingrad.

Hitler's casual regard for intelligence security made him and his staff almost blind to the machinations of a mole, "Werther" was his code name, and ultimately brought the Reich to grief on the battlefield. Kilzer's tale of network spies operating from Switzerland, Germany, and the USSR, and feeding Russian intelligence critically important details of German high command plans and intentions (often disregarded by Stalin) is proof that fact is often stranger

than fiction. To help us understand all the players in this drama, Kilzer provides a compendium of 28 spies, networks, and abbreviations at the opening of his book. This is a needed feature as it is difficult to follow the narrative without a listing of the players who were part of this intelligence effort. At first, one cannot tell these players without a program.

The Red Army sometimes knew movement orders to German units in the field within hours of their release to German commanders. Stalin's paranoia at times prevented him from trusting these reports, and Kilzer offers the often repeated example of Stalin's mistrust of his subordinates that justified his purges: The fact that there was no evidence of a conspiracy against him was absolute proof that there was a plot to depose him. Indeed, Stalin doesn't come off much better than Hitler in terms of his inability to differentiate valid information from misinformation or propaganda. The Wehrmacht's initial successes on the Russian front, as both authors point out, was due in no small part to Stalin's liquidation (read: mass execution) of many top officers in the Soviet army during the late 1930s. Without experienced leaders and competent staff officers in the field to lead and guide Russian soldiers, the Red Army was a fruit ripe to be plucked by German forces.

While scholars have speculated on a highly placed traitor within Hitler's inner circle, Kilzer is the first to come out and identify him. His case is as compelling as it is complete. Megargee, on the other hand, also breaks new ground in a way that may dismay fans of the vaunted German General Staff. For his contention is that Hitler's generals, far from being detached intellectual soldiers who only followed the Fuehrer out of loyalty—or in some cases fear—were themselves frequently complicit in the schemes launched by the Wehrmacht that frequently ended in failure (Stalingrad comes to mind). The generals might have been hesitant in various campaigns, but had an undying faith in their soldiers, not entirely misplaced; this faith clouded their judgments, especially in regard to the fighting ability and sheer tenacity of the Russian soldier. A contempt of one's enemies can often be the precursor to defeat.

Both books are highly readable and, in publishing terms, are "page turners." Buy both, read both, and be enlightened.

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***With Alex at War: From the Irrawaddy to the Po, 1941-1945.* By Rupert Clarke. Leo Cooper, 2000. 242 Pages. \$30.00.**

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired.

“General Alex’ or ‘The Chief,’ as we all knew him,” wrote Rupert Clarke about British Army General Sir Harold Alexander, “was a man in a million.” To be sure, Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, as he later became known, was one of the outstanding British military commanders of the 20th century. Professional, optimistic, and self-confident, “Alex” played a significant role in virtually every theater where British troops fought during the Second World War.

Clarke served as aide-de-camp and personal assistant to Alexander from April 1941 to early 1945, and recorded in this book his interesting and insightful observations of and experiences with Alexander. In a short preface, the author chronicles the early life of Alexander from his birth in 1891 until 1941. He was commissioned in the British Army in 1911 and during World War I commanded in frontline action at every echelon from platoon to brigade. Alexander emerged from the crucible of combat with an enhanced reputation for courage, sound leadership, and imperturbability.

When Clarke reported for duty with him in April 1941, Alexander had already commanded a division in France (and the rear-guard at Dunkirk) and subsequently a corps, and was serving as General Officer Commanding Southern Command. Alexander’s mission was to prepare defenses to thwart a possible German invasion of England. Two months after the Japanese attack in December 1941, Alexander became Commander-in-Chief, Burma. It was virtually impossible to halt the Japanese onslaught and save Burma. Only by conducting a difficult retreat—the longest retreat in the history of the British Army—was Alexander able to save his force.

Although the defeats of Dunkirk and Burma would have ruined the career of an ordinary general, Alexander became Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, shortly after returning to England in July 1942. Fighting against Rommel, Alexander accomplished his mission of clearing North Africa of enemy forces by May 1943. Alexander then commanded the 15th Army Group during the invasion of Sicily, then became commander-in-chief of the polyglot Allied armies in Italy during the difficult advance up the well-defended peninsula. The apex of Alexander’s military career was the capture of Rome on 4 June 1944, for which he received his field marshal’s baton. On 12 December 1944, Alexander was appointed Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, and the following month Clarke returned to

regimental duty. After the success of Alexander’s Po offensive and the capture of a million German prisoners, Alexander, as narrated by Clarke, accepted the first unconditional surrender signed by the Germans on 29 April 1945.

This enthralling, easy-to-read book is lavishly illustrated, with more than 70 photographs of Alexander spread throughout the text. There are five excellent appendices, including the delightful “Alex: Family Man,” which includes copies of letters Alexander wrote to his family and illustrated with drawings and cartoons.

Clarke’s memoirs open a unique window, hitherto closed, on Alexander’s generalship, and more importantly, on Alexander the man. The image that emerges is of a man with great inner strength, character, integrity, and concern for the welfare of his soldiers, and a superb fighting soldier.

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***A Youth in the Meuse-Argonne: A Memoir, 1918-1919.* By William S. Triplett. Edited by Robert H. Ferrell. University of Missouri Press, 2000. 326 Pages.**

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

Veterans of World War II and particularly those who fought in northwest Europe in 1944 and 1945 have been publishing their memoirs in seemingly ever-increasing numbers. I have a feeling that many of those veterans took their cue from Stephen Ambrose’s many writings on the war in Europe.

In recent months I have read at least a half-dozen such memoirs. And with one exception, they were published by infantrymen. The main theme of all of them seemed to me to be a reiteration of that old adage: “War may be hell, but infantry combat is worse.” Much gore, shrapnel decapitations, and “88s”, which, to those individuals at least, was the only artillery piece the Germans had.

And so I was pleasantly surprised to receive this book for review. True, it was written by a combat infantryman, and true, the author stresses the difficulties of infantry combat. But it is not about World War II; it is about World War I. Memoirs from that war, which has gone on our list of “forgotten wars,” are seldom seen today even though there has been a slight resurgence of interest in “the war to end all wars.”

I have always thought our Army’s lack of interest in WWI, and particularly at The Infantry School, was strange. For it was the School, after all, that published *Infantry in Battle* in May 1934 and revised it for a second edition published in September 1938.

There is a story behind this book, of course, but that is best told somewhere else. Suffice to say, George Marshall wrote in the first edition’s Introduction: “This book treats of the tactics of small units as illustrated by examples drawn from the World War. It checks the ideas from peacetime instruction against the experience of battle.” (*Infantry Magazine’s* book, *Infantry in Vietnam*, 1967, followed the same general design used by its predecessor.) I still believe today’s infantrymen could learn from the WWI doughboys.

I was quite pleased with Triplett’s memoir. He served as an enlisted man (platoon sergeant) in WWI, attended West Point after the war, graduating with the class of 1924 and going into the Infantry. He had at least three tours at Benning before the outbreak of WWII, but eventually commanded an armor combat command in Europe during the closing months of the war. He retired in 1954 and died in 1994.

His memoir was readied for publication by Robert H. Ferrell, a professor emeritus of history at Indiana University in Bloomington. Ferrell discovered the memoir, which was in xeroxed form, while searching through the Army Military Institute’s archives at the Army War College.

He became interested in having Triplett’s manuscript published, because he believed its “literary quality was remarkable.” Triplett’s surviving family members (two daughters) gladly gave their permission. Ferrell decided to publish the manuscript in two parts, one covering Triplett’s WWI career, the other his WWII experiences. (The second part was published in 2001 by a different university press.)

In the book under review, I found it historically sound, well written, and indicative of a sure hand at the other end of the pen. It is as much an account of an Army National Guard division (the 35th), called to active duty and struggling to find itself during a chaotic mobilization period, as it is about Triplett. Leaders were hard to come by and the author, despite his youth, (17 when he enlisted, falsifying his age). He soon found himself the platoon sergeant of the 2d Platoon, Company D, 140th Infantry Regiment, with which he remained until wounded. He returned to the company before the Armistice, and remained with it until it returned to the States in 1919.

Triplett learned much about the U.S. soldier, the men he led, his weapons, and above all else, leadership qualities, sometimes the hard way. He had an uneasy relationship with his company officers but worked his way through these times. For me, person-

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ally, I was happy not to have to read page after page of blood, guts, and tears—and 88s.

I put the book down, impressed with the similarities between my WWII company's experiences and those endured by Triplet's unit. He had one problem we were happy not to have faced—poison gas. He worried Hitler would turn loose everything he had left in order to do as much damage as he could to the Allied armies on both fronts.

The book contains a good introductory note and an equally good bibliographical essay. It has footnotes, although these are few in number and used sparingly and effectively, and a useful index.

This memoir should go a long way toward rekindling our interest in WWI and in one of our Army's all-time major combat engagements.

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***Broken Soldiers.* By Raymond B. Lech. University of Illinois Press, 2000. 330 Pages. \$27.95.** Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Davino, U.S. Army.

The conduct of American prisoners of war in Korea left much to be desired. Shortly after the conclusion of the Korean War, the United States adopted the Code of Conduct to make it clear exactly what was expected of servicemen captured by the enemy in some future conflict. This was necessary because, unlike previous enemies, the Chinese and the North Koreans continued their war effort in the prison camps. Not satisfied with simply mistreating American prisoners, this new type of enemy relentlessly sought to indoctrinate them on the benefits of the Communist system while simultaneously encouraging them to commit numerous disloyal acts and undermine the U.S. war effort.

*Broken Soldiers* examines this disturbing episode of American military history in great detail. Using the transcripts from the courts martial of the 14 soldiers tried for collaboration and other crimes, Raymond Lech covers the comprehensive program of mistreatment these men received from their captors as well as the way their own government dealt with them when they returned from captivity.

It is not a pleasant story. Tortured mentally and physically by sadistic enemies, hundreds of American servicemen collaborated with the enemy and mistreated their fellow prisoners. Discipline broke down in the camps as many leaders failed to exercise their authority. Even more puzzling is that 21 Americans chose to refuse repatriation and remain with their Chinese captors.

Lech also details the seemingly arbitrary

treatment the prisoners received on their return to the United States. The Air Force centralized the decision-making process and handled all cases administratively. The Army, on the other hand, left the court martial decision to the three-star commanders of the armies in the United States. This resulted in significantly different treatment for the accused soldiers. Many soldiers were discharged before any disciplinary action was possible and, incredibly, the 21 turncoats who eventually returned to the United States escaped prosecution on a technicality. The Navy conducted a single court of inquiry to examine the conduct of one Marine Corps aviator.

This book presents an excellent account of the behavior of U.S. soldiers under extremely trying conditions and of their subsequent treatment by their own government. Lech based his research on more than 60,000 pages of official documents produced mainly by the Army and the Navy. Because of what the author characterizes as a lack of cooperation from the Air Force, he was not able to examine the conduct of airmen in the same detail as the other services. Additionally, he specifically chose not to conduct any interviews to supplement the official record. It would have been interesting to find out what happened to these prisoners later in life.

For readers who are interested in the Korean War and its aftermath, *Broken Soldiers* is an excellent book. It also can provide some valuable insights to other readers on how the Chinese and North Koreans chose to treat American prisoners.

### RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

***Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations.* Foreign Relations and the Presidency Series. By Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. 287 Pages. \$34.95.**

***An Attack on Duffer's Downtown.* By Russell W. Glenn. Rand Corporation, 2001. A booklet on the challenges of urban combat. 38 Pages. Free for military personnel; \$12.00 for others. To order, call 1-877-584-8642; FAX: 310-451-7002; or e-mail: [order@rand.org](mailto:order@rand.org).**

***Hidden Heroism: Black Soldiers in America's Wars, from Colonial Times to Today.* By Robert B. Edgerton. Westview Press, 2001. 296 Pages. \$25.00.**

***Through Ordinary Eyes: The Civil War Correspondence of Rufus Robbins, Private, 7th Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers.* Edited by Ella Jane Bruen and Brian M. Fitzgibbons. Praeger, 2000. 248 Pages. \$39.95.**

***Leadership for NCOs.* By J.D. Pendry, Command Sergeant Major, USA Retired. Presidio, 2000. 256 Pages. \$17.95, Softbound.**

***The Infantry Soldier's Handbook: The Classic World War I Training Manual.* By Major William H. Waldron. Lyons Press, 2001. 256**

**Pages, photos, illustrations. \$12.95, Softbound.**  
***Americans Behind the Barbed Wire: World War Two Inside a German Prison Camp.* By J. Frank Diggs. Vandamere Press (P.O. Box 5243, Arlington, VA 22205), 2000. 176 Pages, \$24.95.**

***Strike and Hold: A Memoir of the 82nd Airborne in World War II.* By T. Moffatt Burriss. Brassey's, 2000. 218 Pages. \$24.95.**

***The Korean War.* By Peter Lowe. St. Martin's Press, 2000. 147 Pages. \$15.95, Softbound.**

***The Korean War. Volume 1.* By the Korean Institute of Military History. University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 941 Pages, photos, maps. \$29.95, Softbound.**

***The Korean War. Volume 2.* By the Korean Institute of Military History. University of Nebraska Press, 2001. 821 Pages, photos, maps, charts. \$39.95, Softbound.**

***Land of Tears: In Vietnam 1967-1968.* Harry C. Graham. Burd Street Press, 2001. 109 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.**

***On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy.* By John Lehman. The Free Press, 2001. 436 Pages. \$35.00.**

***German Boy: A Child in War.* By Wolfgang W.E. Samuel. Broadway Books, 2001. 445 Pages. \$15.95, Softbound.**

***An Uncertain Trumpet: The Evolution of U.S. Army Infantry Doctrine, 1919-1941.* By Kenneth Finlayson. Greenwood Press, 2001. 208 Pages. \$62.50.**

***A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943-1945.* By David W. Hogan, Jr. Center of Military History, 2001. 360 Pages. \$40.00, Softbound.**

***Yanks: The Epic Story of the American Army in World War I.* By John S.D. Eisenhower. The Free Press, 2001. 252 Pages. \$26.00.**

***Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti.* By Col. Lawrence E. Casper (U.S. Army-Ret.). Lynne Rienner, 2001. 277 Pages. \$35.00, Hardcover.**

***Desert War: The North African Campaign, 1940-1943.* By Alan Moorehead. Originally published in U.S. as *March to Tunis*, by Harper & Row, 1965. Penguin, 2001. 653 Pages. \$19.00, Softbound.**

***Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad.* By William Craig. Originally published by Readers Digest Press, 1973. Penguin, 2001. \$14.00, Softbound.**

***Long Day's Journey Into War: Pearl Harbor and a World At War—December 7, 1941.* By Stanley Weintraub. First published in 1991. The Lyons Press, 2001. 736 Pages. \$19.95, Softbound.**

***The Navy Times Book of Submarines: A Political, Social, and Military History.* By Brayton Harris. Berkley, 2001. 405 Pages. \$15.00, Softbound.**

***Burnside's Bridge: Antietam.* Battleground America Series. By John Cannan. Leo Cooper, 2001. 155 Pages. \$16.95, Softbound.**

***Flags of Our Fathers.* By James Bradley with Ron Powers. Bantam, 2001. 384 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.**

***Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the National Security Agency From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century.* By James Bamford. Doubleday, 2001. 721 Pages. \$26.95**

***War and Our World.* By John Keegan. Vintage Books, 2001. Originally published 1998. 102 Pages. \$10.00, Softbound.**