
time, as well as time and ammunition later on the range. In support of this notion, sustainment data collected recently by the 84th Division showed that LMTS-trained soldiers from the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry (the USAR's only infantry unit) took 50 percent less time and ammunition than normal to group and zero, and also raised their first-run qualification rate from a historical 60–80 percent to 98 percent. As a result of these positive findings for both initial and sustainment training, the Infantry School's device-based marksmanship training strategy now endorses the use of LMTS.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the delivery strategy's prediction table provides a reliable set of live-fire qualification probabilities (Columns 3–5 in the prediction table) that can be used to set record fire standards on LMTS in the form of cutoff scores (Column 1 of the table). A soldier would have to achieve 30 hits on LMTS, for example, to ensure an 80 percent chance of first-run, live-fire qualification. Thus, when adequate range facilities are not readily available, LMTS scores fired at home station can be used in place of scores fired on the range for purposes of yearly qualification or validation. Of course, the notion of shooting record fire on a device instead of on the range is still controversial. But when the time comes for its adoption Army-wide, the RC will have already laid the groundwork,

thereby saving time and ammunition without compromising the intent and outcome of the marksmanship qualification process.

Although the POI is now far enough along for implementation purposes, we still have a few things to do to make it even better. One of these is to add the option for shooters to engage pop-up targets and to practice fire on a simulated Remote Electronic Targeting System (RETS) range in preparation for standard qualification firing. Right now, the POI benefits technically extend to stationary, known-distance target engagements fired on ALT C. Recently, however, a pop-up target engagement capability and a mini-RETS qualification course have been developed. We have not yet developed the LMTS prediction table that needs to go with it to support pre-testing and post-testing.

Assuming that the option to conduct qualification fire on LMTS is just around the corner, we need to determine how often soldiers need to qualify on the range as opposed to on the device. Should device-based qualification be allowed every year, every other year, every third year, or what? Over the next year, we plan to gather the data needed to answer this question, as well as to develop the table for predicting pop-up target qualification. We'll keep you informed of our progress.

In the meantime, the USAR is plan-

ning distribution to all reserve centers, and the 84th Division already has an instructor certification course in place. So unbox your LMTS equipment and POI support package as soon as they arrive; get your instructors certified on the LMTS; and start down the road to more effective and efficient rifle marksmanship training and evaluation—without ever leaving home station.

Any questions or comments about the research conducted to support the development of this POI can be directed to the Army Research Institute field office in Boise, Idaho, by telephone (208) 334-9390, or e-mail jhaman2@email.boisestate.edu. Questions about LMTS fielding plans and instructor certification training should be directed to MSG Donald Riley at (414) 535-5850 or rileydo@usarc-emh2.army.mil.

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AC/RC Battalion Command

A Superb Opportunity

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KEVIN J. DOUGHERTY

I am getting toward the end of a two-year tour as commander of the 2nd Battalion (TS) (IN), 393d Regiment at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and can say that this has been one of the best assignments in my career. I also think that these Active

Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) battalion commands are among the best-kept secrets in the Army. So this article is designed to provide some information about the job. It's certainly not intended to be a "how

I did it" war story—just an effort to share what I think is a really good deal.

Background. The AC/RC program stems from the difficulties experienced during the Persian Gulf War in deploying the Army National Guard's "round-

out brigades” and high-priority combat arms units. The old methods and criteria for reporting readiness showed that the units were combat ready, but when the units arrived at their mobilization stations, their readiness reports were viewed with suspicion, and some units were put through an extensive train-up period that included National Training Center rotations. Three of the National Guard’s combat brigades—designed to go to war with active Army combat divisions—were mobilized and trained, but were never deployed to the Persian Gulf War. The entire mobilization and train-up process revealed numerous problems with the units’ readiness, readiness tracking and reporting, and AC interaction with the RC.

These experiences led Congress to push for a new system of training and evaluating RC units. In 1995, the Army responded to Congressional legislation by developing the Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) program, which dedicates extensive personnel and material resources to ensure that RC units can adequately train and prepare for deployment. The program directed the realignment of the AC support to the RC with a focus on selected high-priority RC units, principally the 15 Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESBs). The Congressional legislation and subsequent GFRE program resulted in the dedication of 5,000 experienced AC soldiers to train and evaluate RC units. Although AC/RC embraces the Reserve Components as a whole, my experience has been primarily with the National Guard rather than the Army Reserve, and my comments here are based solely on that part of the program.

The program consists of centrally located AC observer controller/trainer (OC/T) battalions such as the one here at Fort Chaffee, and resident trainer battalions made up of AC officers and NCOs who live and work at the armories with selected priority units every day. The OC/T and resident trainer battalions work together as a team in improving RC readiness. I really didn’t know the difference between the two when I signed up for the job, but I’m glad I ended up with an OC/T battalion. All my soldiers are with me here at Fort

Chaffee, while the resident training battalion is spread out in armories all over the state. I’m sure someone else might tell you the resident trainer battalion is the better assignment, but I like the tactical focus, OC/T emphasis, and command and control environment of the OC/T battalion.

A Chance to Command. Of course most of us would prefer to be centrally selected (CSL) battalion commanders, and an AC/RC battalion is not a “real” battalion command in that sense. However, a limited number of CSL commands are available, and for those of us who are ready to command, these AC/RC battalions are a good opportu-

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nity to make a contribution to the Army.

The AC/RC battalion commander has almost all the things his CSL counterpart has—UCMJ authority, a staff, a budget, a mission essential task list (METL), personnel issues—albeit in more manageable and less demanding doses. The AC/RC battalion commander will issue training guidance, develop a training strategy, make decisions at training and command and staff meetings, counsel and mentor younger officers, and reward and punish behavior. Don’t get me wrong. I’m not saying an AC/RC battalion command is identical to a CSL battalion command or that the jobs are in all respects equal. All I’m saying is that if you are looking for an alternative to a staff assignment and want the responsibilities and challenges of command, being an AC/RC battalion commander is a viable option.

Autonomy. I am stationed at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and my brigade commander is stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. He has responsibility for 13 battalions—infantry, armor, field artillery, engineer, resident trainer, and CSS (which consists of Army Reservists)—spread out over four states. He

stays on the road quite a bit in order to maintain a command presence, and of course we keep in touch by phone and e-mail, but the reality of the situation is that the factors of geography and multiple demands make it essential for the brigade commander to trust his battalion commanders and empower them to do their jobs without a lot of supervision. That was a welcome change from my previous assignment as one of the cast of thousands on a joint headquarters staff.

Of course the flip side to being away from the flagpole is that you are isolated from the usual post support structure. Things like personnel actions take longer because of time and distance, and there was some mission degradation involved with not having direct access to the brigade staff and a post support structure. Then again, we didn’t have many post taskings either.

The biggest impact for me was on my family. When given the chance, we’ve always lived on post, and in many AC/RC battalions there is no post. (Fort Chaffee is an Army National Guard post without a whole lot of structure, except for a very small post exchange.)

It certainly wasn’t a big deal, but you should know (and your wife should too) that you will have to deal with the vagaries of TRICARE, the hassles of buying or renting a house, and your children being among a very small group of new kids at the local school, etc. That was a bigger adjustment for us than I had anticipated, but then again we’re not the most adventuresome of families. Others might find the total immersion in the civilian community welcome. Just know that it comes with the job in many cases.

Mission and Men. One of the really great things about the assignment is that there is seldom a conflict between accomplishing the mission and taking care of the men. Because the mission is focused on the National Guard, the calendar revolves around the National Guard’s yearly planning cycle. Because of this long-term planning requirement, it’s all fairly predictable and steady. Seldom, if ever, do you get “jerked around” by some unanticipated re-

quirement or last-minute change. We did do some short-notice mobilization assistance as a result of September 11, but even that was entirely manageable.

Relatively speaking, the summers are fairly busy supporting annual training (AT), but no busier than any other time a battalion goes to the field and, for being in the field, an OC/T's standard of living is pretty high. Our support to weekend drills was much less often than I expected and frequently did not involve the entire battalion. I'd say we had an average of maybe one weekend activity of some sort each month.

The job is truly what you make of it. If you have a rather minimalist interpretation and think your mission is only in effect when you are in direct contact with the National Guard, you're going to find yourself with a lot of extra time on your hands. We tried to be a little more proactive; using a *push* versus *pull* method of providing support and spending a fair amount of effort on our internal professional development, but still time available was never a constraint in our operational tempo.

One of the best things from a soldier care standpoint was that any officer or NCO who wanted to attend college could do so—sometimes even during the duty day for the NCOs. There was plenty of family time, and we had a generous compensatory time policy when we did work on weekends.

I will say that this novel luxury of time presented the biggest challenge to my finite leadership abilities. Many members of the battalion favored the minimalist interpretation of the mission, and I was constantly fending off accusations of "making work." The demographics of the battalion (all staff sergeants and up) are such that many NCOs will retire out of this assignment. A certain number of soldiers had made a premature transition to a retirement mentality. There was a disappointing attitude of entitlement, even among those who were still several years short of retirement ("I've worked hard in all my other assignments and the Army owes me a break here."). That was the sole disappointment of my tour, and combating that phenomenon was my biggest challenge and involved my

greatest expenditure of energy. My experience was that mission-type orders only go so far in an AC/RC battalion. I'm willing to entertain the notion, however, that other commanders might not have that problem. I only report what was my particular experience.

Peers. I was very impressed with the other battalion commanders in the brigade. In and of itself, AC/RC battalion command is not a dead-end job. There were nine AC battalions in the brigade. One of the OC/T battalion commanders had previously been a CSL battalion commander, and he was selected for colonel and the War College after his

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assignment here. One resident trainer battalion commander was selected for a CSL battalion command, and another made the alternate command list. These three were infantrymen. The engineer OC/T battalion commander was selected for colonel. The armor OC/T battalion commander was selected below-the-zone. It was an honor for me to work with such a quality group, and I really enjoyed their company.

Working with the National Guard. The OC/T battalion is called a Training Support battalion, and that is important to remember. It is our job to support the National Guard. At the end of the day, you have the final say in that you give the evaluation, but in most other aspects the National Guard battalion you are supporting makes the decisions, including what to do with your evaluation. You make your money by unity of effort, consensus building, and cooperation. You get to make recommendations with regard to training objectives; scheduling; and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to use, but in the final analysis, the National Guard chain

of command makes the decisions and that's the way it should be. You are there to assist the chain of command, not to be the chain of command.

Consequently, the job requires a certain amount of people skills. The biggest mistake you can possibly make is to come across with a superior attitude. For me that wasn't a problem, because I never felt superior to my counterparts. They were all hard-working, talented, dedicated, patriotic, and eager to learn. If I had any advantage over them it was that I had more time to devote to the military profession—I had only one job and they had two. I was very impressed with my counterparts and enjoyed every minute we spent together.

Because the National Guard is so constrained in the time available, it is very important to focus the training objectives in order to get the most bang for the buck. The battalions I worked with tended to be fairly ambitious in what they tried to accomplish during a given drill. One of the biggest contributions an AC/RC battalion commander can make is to encourage the National Guard to pick a few high-payoff training objectives and then teach, coach, and mentor them to a "T" status in those focus areas instead of paying lip-service to a laundry list of training objectives.

Job Satisfaction. Working closely with the National Guard and being able to share TTPs with them was a great experience. We tried to use a very hands-on approach in our battalion that included making sure the standard was understood and modeling the desired outcome. For example, instead of just saying "do targeting meetings," we taught our counterpart battalion how to do one, modeled a sample for them, led them through their first iteration, and actively taught, coached, and mentored them as they ran their own. As good fortune would have it, the battalion's first attempt at a targeting meeting during an AT search-and-attack mission resulted in the destruction of an enemy mortar squad. It was great to see the unit master this task, and of course the fortuitous combination of the unit's first targeting meeting attempt and immediate tactical success solidified OC/T credibility with the unit and validated trust

trust they had given us. Such moments of direct teaching, coaching, and mentoring were the most rewarding parts of the job.

Another rewarding experience was helping units mobilize for Operation *Desert Spring*—the Patriot guard mission in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. We had put a lot of effort into the mission, translating guidance into measurable training objectives and creating a Mission Training Plan we could use to evaluate the lane training. The unit really seemed to appreciate our efforts, and we still get e-mails from the soldiers thanking us for the training and telling us they are putting it to good use

in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Such sincere appreciation was a common strength among the National Guardsmen we worked with and really made us feel good about what we were doing.

A word of caution is necessary, however. The success of the AC/RC program has been built on time. Don't expect instant gratification. You might not feel that you see a lot of results on your watch, but in the long run, the program has greatly improved National Guard's readiness.

Give It A Try. I really didn't know what I was getting into when I signed up for the job. I had been an O/C when the JRTC was at Fort Chaffee, so I

knew I would like the area. I knew the job title was battalion commander, and I knew that couldn't be all bad. Beyond that, I figured there had to be a catch. There wasn't. I can't think of anything else I would rather have done for the past two years. I'll bet that you would like it too.

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Ammunition Management/Resupply For the Light Infantry Mortar

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS BRIAN A. HAMM

The integration and effectiveness of the light mortar is only as good as the ammunition plan, management, and resupply procedures. The amount of ammunition available is an important consideration in the attack of targets. When this is low, missions should be limited to those that contribute to mission accomplishment. When the controlled supply rate (CSR) is high, missions fired may include targets that require the massing of fires without adjustment. The CSR is designed to limit the number of rounds per weapon per day.

CSRs are imposed for two reasons—to conserve ammunition and to avoid a shortage for a tactical operation. During the fire support planning, ammunition requirements must be considered. Thus, it is very important for the mortar section leader to be present to recommend the types and amounts of ammunition that will be required. Combat

experiences in World War II and Korea have shown that an on-hand mix of 70 percent HE, 20 percent WP or smoke, and 10 percent illumination ammunition is the most flexible. The basic load of a light infantry company should be approximately 245 HE, 60 WP, and 45

The basic load of a light infantry company should be approximately 245 HE, 60 WP, and 45 illumination, for a total of 350 rounds, which can be in any combination to best support the mission.

illumination, for a total of 350 rounds, which can be in any combination to best support the mission. The percentage of ammunition used by the unit should be modified by the commander on the basis of the mission. The expenditure of mortar ammunition must be based on

the tactical priorities and ammunition availability.

How do we manage 60mm ammunition at company level (that is, How do we know what we have on the ground at any one time.)?

It is difficult for the commander to keep track of the availability of on-hand mortar ammunition. The primary responsibility should fall on that section sergeant and the FSO/FSNCO for knowing exactly how many rounds are currently carried by the company, where in the company, and what type of rounds. To make it easier for the commander to know what is on the ground, recommended ammunition breakout is as follows: 1st and 2nd squads carry HE pure (2 rounds per man = 36 HE per platoon), and 3rd squad carries illumination and WP (A Team illumination [8 rounds], B Team WP [8 rounds]). This amounts to a basic load of 60mm—not carried by the mortar section—as 108