

# TRAINING NOTES



## Combatting Terrorism at Home Mobilization for Stability and Support Operations

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With the tragic events of September 11, 2001, many U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units were activated in support of Contingency Operation *Noble Eagle*. (Both will be referred to here as RC units.) This mobilization was directed to increase the protection of vital assets within the United States, including airports, utilities, ports, and military platforms for the projection of forces in support of Operation *Enduring Freedom*.

There were multiple types of missions, both state and federal. The state missions required the mobilization of Army National Guard units to supplement security forces within the state boundaries. Most of these missions remained under the control of the State Area Commands to establish an increased security presence to facilitate worldwide commerce and control of local utilities. Infantry forces were activated to supplement security forces at federal installations and conduct force protection/anti-terrorism (FP/AT) missions. These forces were assigned to various commands that do not normally host combat arms units. Units deployed within the United States under contingency operations face additional challenges in comparison to traditional deployment scenarios.

The intent of this summary is to help

light infantry company commanders plan for potential mobilizations, as well as to help gaining units understand the challenges faced by gaining a combat arms unit instead of a military police unit for a force protection mission.

Traditionally, an infantry company works as part of a battalion organization that provides support through staff sections, direct support assets, and equip-

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***During a contingency operation, the company may be assigned to a U.S. Army garrison. In this case, the leaders should be assigned additional duties to resolve administrative issues.***

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ment. In operational environments, the infantry company is attached to the battalion or under the battalion's operational control to provide this support. As part of a garrison, an infantry company may be able to use the administrative clerks of the headquarters company, but it will have to coordinate most S-1, S-3, and S-4 functions, including the maintenance of vehicles and weapons.

A reserve component infantry company activated under a contingency mission in the continental United States (CONUS) faces multiple challenges that

include pre-deployment training, alert, mobilization, garrison life, and stability and support operations (SAS).

**Pre-deployment Training.** Regardless of the type of mission, critical to the success of the infantry unit's deployment is continued focus on infantry mission essential task training in accordance with ARTEP 7-10 MTP. With the limited time that an RC unit can concentrate on mission essential tasks, a minimum of six months should be directed to those tasks, culminating in a collective training event or an external evaluation. Use of the combat training centers is essential in rehearsing critical tasks, soldier readiness, and team building.

On September 8, 2001, my company returned from a rotation at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Germany. Only a few months earlier, several of the same soldiers had completed training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk. These training scenarios proved essential in the mobilization process because of the pre-deployment records review before departure. During the rotation, the unit was able to integrate into a regular Army unit and conduct both combat and security force missions.

Although the Army's CTCs are primarily designed for combat mission training, they provide the operational

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realism associated with any of the missions for which an infantry unit can be mobilized. The combat focus is necessary if a unit is to respond to a real-world terrorist incident that it may encounter during contingency deployments. This focus also works to hone the "warrior ethos" (FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*) and strengthen the command climate. During the training at CMTC, I had an opportunity to supervise and coach leaders in applying tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from previous training events and to refine them during operations, all of which applied during the mobilization and SASO.

One of the challenges RC soldiers face is professional development training. They must maintain physical fitness without the benefit of daily scheduled unit PT as conducted by Active Army units. This is crucial to their individual readiness to attend U.S. Army schools and participate in missions. The units manage fitness by frequent fitness testing, bayonet PT, combatives, and road march training. Throughout the year, most soldiers continue their professional development by using such resources as Army Knowledge Online (AKO), Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP), and distance education centers that are sponsored by Army National Guard units. Many RC soldiers use their home station libraries throughout the month to study and prepare for the monthly unit training period. This training is conducted primarily on a volunteer basis and is in addition to the soldier's civilian employment.

Prior to deployment, the company established an Expert Infantryman's Badge (EIB) training program to sustain the basic soldier skills as well as increase opportunities for soldiers to test for and earn the EIB. Tied with an aggressive weapon training program, this enabled the company to be prepared for deployment. The remaining months of training should be focused on other training opportunities such as combat lifesaver programs, records reviews, mobilization planning, and family readiness events.

Family Readiness Groups (FRGs) in

the reserve components are fundamentally challenged by the distance of the members from the unit. In the RC, these groups are primarily designed for the brief family introductions and to recognize them for their support throughout the year. Units find it difficult to schedule time to organize the families unless it becomes a part of the training schedule. Before deployment, our unit scheduled at least one family readiness or morale, welfare, recreation (MWR) event quarterly. The unit must meet the requirements outlined in AR 600-20 and DA PAM 608-47, but it should not over-plan family readiness activities or groups. The FRGs are a support mechanism for the families and should not become regimented.

Unlike the Active Army, RC Family Readiness Groups often do not have the same exposure to the Army. The fami-

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lies can live at great distances from the unit's home station, and rarely have the same exposure to the Army way of life and the shared experiences of other families. Prior to mobilization and deployment, only about 60 percent of our unit's soldiers and families had previous active duty experience. Although identification cards are an inspection item for soldiers, many RC families do not have these and have not been included in DEERS. The unit must obtain specific information about benefits for family members and how to enroll them during the absence of the soldier.

All soldiers are critical to the success of an RC unit. Unlike an Active Army unit, an RC light infantry company must make the most of its flexibility through the qualifications and skills the soldiers have gained from their civilian employment. Although the soldiers have individual military qualifications that match those of their Active Army peers (airborne, air assault, pathfinder, ranger,

and sniper), the unit often relies also on the master electricians, carpenters, engineers, and computer programmers to complete the mission. Active Guard Reserve (AGR) soldiers are key to managing this complex organization. The relationship between the command group and the AGR soldiers is critical in keeping track of all information. Some leaders over-task these AGR soldiers and over-rely on them. Each commander should keep in mind that these AGR soldiers are part of the support channels, but that a strong chain of command must be maintained to develop a proper command climate.

**Alert.** The unit leadership maintains accountability for soldiers throughout the month with frequent calls and e-mail correspondence. It is essential that the leaders update the unit alert roster monthly and conduct periodic test alerts to verify its accuracy. Unlike Active Army soldiers, reservists frequently change residential and civilian employment, which often makes it difficult to maintain accurate contact information. If a unit does not closely monitor this information, it may not be able to alert the soldiers rapidly enough.

Minutes after the first attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, several soldiers automatically contacted the unit to get information on unit status. Within a few hours, several soldiers volunteered to provide local security until the extent of the attacks could be determined. Many of these soldiers remained on duty in a force protection role until the entire unit was put on alert.

Initially, the company was put on alert for possible participation in an airport security mission. At this point, a unit commander is faced with the challenges of managing the force protection of the unit, managing local media contacts, and addressing the concerns of families and community leaders. Approximately 65 percent of the soldiers live and work in the local community. Strong relations with Employer Support of Guard and Reserve (ESGR) and the American Red Cross are important in the civilian employment status of the soldiers as well as emergency notification from the families.

Information is critical at all command levels. Once the airport mission was cancelled, the eventuality of a federal deployment became obvious. Although it appeared federal activation was inevitable, no information came directly to the activated companies. Units must maintain operations security (OPSEC) of the deployment mission, but it is critical to soldier preparation to notify the unit as soon as possible. Prior to the official distribution of the alert, training support battalion (TSB) personnel began to contact the company about reporting requirements to the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). The TSB team may not be branch qualified or trained on the task that it will assume during a unit mission. The TSB as a mobilization assist team is designed primarily to document the unit's progress through the mobilization for FORSCOM. Only a few days before the alert, the company received notification of activation, but nothing about the final destination. Then the company issued an alert notification, and all soldiers were called in for mobilization. The actual alert process took only a few days, rather than weeks.

Leaders should encourage the soldiers to maintain detailed and current family care plans, wills, legal and medical powers of attorney, and financial plans. The financial plans should consider the difference between the cost of living on a military installation and that in a civilian community. These plans should also consider the decrease in pay that many mobilized soldiers will have, compared to that of their civilian employment.

**Mobilization.** During the initial mobilization, the company did not obtain any official written orders of deployment; these were secured later at the mobilization center. Before leaving for the mobilization center, the unit conducted soldier readiness processing. This internal pre-deployment check helped soldiers gather the correct documents to take with them to the mobilization center. Many soldiers' files had been updated before the deployment to CMTC. Unfortunately, about 35 percent of the mobilizing soldiers did not have the benefit of these records

checks because they were assigned to the unit after the alert. Several soldiers had recently joined the Active Army unit as part of their in-service enlistment. Others were assigned to augment the company to meet the required manning numbers for the mission. Some soldiers were initially disqualified for the mission because their terms of service were scheduled to end, while others had only recently enlisted and had not completed one-station unit training. FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, FORMDEPS, Volume III, is an important tool in understanding the requirements in preparing the soldiers for mobilization.

The unit will not leave the mobilization station without completing common task testing. Even though we were

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current, we started the process over and were 100 percent complete prior to movement. A unit should also review NBC training. It will most likely go through all tasks of NBC training and testing as a separate event during the mobilization. This testing will include using an NBC chamber. Company personnel should be familiar with ammunition forecasting as well as the submission of ammunition request documents which will be required during the process and normally submitted by the S-4 section of a battalion.

For a number of reasons, the unit experienced major difficulties with the administration of personnel records. Each component maintains a separate personal data and finance system. Even after activation from a Title 32 status to a Title 10 status, the Active Army is unable to correct errors and gaps in the personnel records due to the differences in systems. In addition to the fundamental differences in records management, a light infantry company does not have soldiers assigned who have the personnel data management experience. In some instances, security clearance

requirements within the RCs differ from those of the Active Army. Leaders must rapidly identify the requirements for security clearances and have the appropriate personnel submit the necessary information through the security division.

Our company quickly conducted consolidation and re-organization to battle-roster the soldiers in accordance with ARTEP 7-10 MTP. This created some dissention among the soldiers, some of whom had come from other units. My goal was to re-establish the chain of command and the general military authority (FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*) of the leaders; this was difficult because several soldiers were assigned in excess. As a light infantry company (minus) we needed to establish three platoons. Instead of having nine squad leaders, we were forced to battle-roster 16 staff sergeants into various positions throughout the company, including positions as team leaders and riflemen. Upon arrival at the unit of assignment, the battle roster allowed the company to occupy assigned missions rapidly and to account for and maintain assigned equipment. Prior to the company's arrival, the gaining installation was using borrowed military manpower (BMM) from tenant units on the installation to conduct force protection missions. The BMM provided manpower but were untrained on FP/AT and had no task organization, which made it difficult to conduct consistent security force operations.

The unit deployed to the mobilization station with minimal organizational equipment. By regulation and direction of the higher headquarters, the company transferred organizational equipment back to the originating unit. The light infantry company's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) does not authorize vehicles or computers, which hampered the unit's mobilization and deployment. Fortunately, the company was able to obtain authorization for limited equipment at the mobilization station.

At the station, the unit validated on FP/HD (force protection/homeland defense) (Stability and Support Operations-SASO). The mobilization station

had worked quickly to design training documentation and construct training areas. Although the training scenarios were primarily geared to "worst case," the unit was well prepared for both a combat deployment and an FP/AT mission. The unit completed a variety of pre-deployment checks, including equipment, issue of cold weather equipment, and conducted final deployment preparations.

During the initial screening at the home station, 20 percent of the unit did not meet Army dental readiness standards in accordance with AR 40-501. The failure to meet this standard was largely attributable to a lack of preventive medicine and in some cases the lack of civilian insurance. The critical dental deficiencies were corrected before movement. Having coordinated with the gaining installation, we obtained approval to continue movement without completing the dental work. The gaining installation worked with the local medical and dental clinics to spread out the appointments instead of incapacitating such a large percentage of the unit at one time.

**Garrison Life.** While the combat training centers help train the soldiers on the "warrior ethos," they do not help develop an understanding of how an Army garrison works. The main challenge is to keep the soldiers focused on the mission, since the greatest threats are complacency and boredom. RC soldiers largely train on their combat skills but not on the other responsibilities of being members of an Army Community. In today's Army, many RC soldiers are not familiar with programs such as MWR, Army Continuing Education System (ACES), and Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers (BOSS), while others are not familiar with duties such as post clean-up and staff duty NCO. The challenge of integrating a true citizen-soldier into an AC environment has been documented for hundreds of years; the leaders are challenged with implementing steps to acclimatize them quickly without losing focus on the mission.

Our first challenge at the gaining installation was completing a mission analysis followed by implementation.

The key to victory for a light infantry company is unity of command. Maintaining accountability and responsibility is extremely important. Although all Army branches have the same basic organization, some task their soldiers independently. Upon our arrival, the installation (which does not normally have combat arms units assigned) wanted to break up the company to schedule each individual soldier to maximize coverage. With a good mission analysis and the support of the garrison chain of command, the company was able to maintain its chain of command to complete the assigned missions as a unit.

The soldiers are challenged daily, simply because of their component affiliation. In several cases, situations have been unnecessarily escalated due to the failure of some personnel to recognize the regulations that govern the mission completion and the soldiers charged with completing it. Although FM 1 defines the complex roles and the intense dedication it takes to serve in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard, such soldiers are often stigmatized by false perceptions of readiness and standards. History has proved that RC soldiers and units have served proudly in every major conflict and are currently participating in a variety of roles in today's operational Army.

In traditional deployment scenarios, units are mobilized and deployed to theaters of operation or to CTCs to prepare for deployment. In the current operation, the units are sometimes deployed within hours of their homes. This creates additional stress on the soldiers by putting them close to the daily stresses of home life but not close enough to do anything about them. Although the proximity to home gives the unit an opportunity to allow the soldiers to take time off with their families, it strains the mission focus and sometimes works against the order and discipline of the unit. In several instances, family members and the units from which the soldiers were assigned have taken basic soldier issues out of context, causing disruption in unit operations. Although the home-station units have the soldiers' best interests in mind,

some problem soldiers use this relationship to take the focus off their need for retraining. Combined with the frequent distractions of media and visitors, this causes major distractions from mission readiness.

For several months, the unit continued to manage with limited logistical assets. Critical during this period was the ability to obtain vehicle and computer support. In some instances, the unit members resorted to using personal assets to complete mission essential tasks. While deployed in an installation in CONUS, the unit was tasked to complete traditional binders, policy letters, and training schedules with minimal computer assets. The unit obtained a few transportation motor pool vehicles to help with daily operations. With the confusion of multiple personnel, logistic, and support systems, the deployment orders should be improved to specify the roles and responsibilities of the gaining and losing command authorities. Ongoing dialogue between the different command groups is essential in keeping personnel management and finance operations separate from operational control.

**Stability and Support Operations.** SASO is defined as "the use of military capabilities for any purpose other than war" (FM 101-5-1, *Operations Terms and Graphics*). This includes force protection and anti-terrorism missions. With security force operations as a core competency of a light infantry company, the unit is perfectly designed to take on additional missions to supplement security forces and, in some cases, to operate as an infantry/military police company.

The standard MTOE of the light infantry company does not allow for rapid integration into a CONUS-based installation security mission. Communications equipment is critical to the successful completion of the mission. Generally, either military police or Department of Defense civilian police secure host installations. These units often use commercially purchased communications equipment that is not compatible with Infantry tactical communications systems. The unit must obtain the necessary communication

equipment and schedule training before the occupation of the mission.

For an SASO mission, the gaining command must specify the legal and tactical responsibilities of the light infantry company. In traditional infantry missions, the unit briefs specific rules of engagement for combat engagement and disengagement. For security force operations, within the rules of use of force (RUF), the soldiers remain engaged with increasing levels of force until the situation is resolved. Soldiers must use the minimum force necessary and proportional to the threat, with deadly force being the last resort. The steps can be categorized by the following (TRADOC Command Guidance AR 190-1):

SHOUT: Verbal warnings to halt.

SHOVE: Non-lethal physical force.

SPRAY: OC Spray (when trained and certified).

SHOW: Intent to use weapon.

SHOOT: Deliberately aim shots until threat no longer exists. (Warning shots are not permitted.)

FM 3-90, *Tactics*, defines a reaction force as “offensive in nature and conducted as either spoiling attacks or counterattacks.” These guidelines do not necessarily apply to a reaction force in SASO. The reaction force may be activated to respond to critical situations

that have already escalated beyond the initial RUF stages. In CONUS, the reaction force can be used primarily to supplement the existing forces of the perimeter defense, but cannot be employed on the attack. A reaction force commander must move cautiously to pursue, detain, or become involved in an escalation of the RUF. Many of these roles and reactions must be defined by local authorities. A relationship with the Staff Judge Advocate is essential in ensuring that the activation of the reaction force does not violate the rule of law.

To reinforce vigilance and defeat complacency, the infantry company must develop a plan to sustain the company on both its SASO mission and its mission essential tasks. For sustainment on security force missions, the unit must be creative in designing an area that allows for training on the daily mission tasks as well as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive reaction drills. For leaders, this training should include intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) from various sources to include open media sources, which help develop the tone and realism of the training. A commander can schedule these rehearsals and training events in a variety of areas, including traditional situational training

exercise lanes. Local fire, rescue training centers, and civilian police training areas are excellent in reinforcing the SASO skills without requiring modification.

To prepare for the mobilization and employment of a light infantry company in a SASO environment, leaders must design specific plans to reduce the confusion associated with deployment in an unconventional environment. The integration of the unit into the daily operations of a garrison is critical to maintaining high morale and mission focus. Effective combat units must maintain balance between the traditional roles of an infantryman with those of a peacekeeper and a citizen. As a citizen of the country patrolled, the soldier must remain vigilant to all threats to ensure the protection of vital U.S. assets, while ensuring that the laws of the country are enforced so that basic civil rights are protected within the area of operation.

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# Modernizing to the M2A3 Bradley

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In the midst of the Army Transformation, the heavy force has been the object of some criticism. With the introduction of the future combat system and proposed full fielding by Fiscal Year 2010, one might think the M2A3 Bradley is a waste of taxpayer's dollars. I disagree.

I do agree with one goal of the Objective Force to maintain the lethality of the Legacy Force while increasing strategic responsiveness, but during the

transformation, the Legacy Force is responsible for handling emerging threats. The M2A3 brings a combat vehicle that provides increased lethality and survivability to meet those threats.

Before I begin, I must disclose some information and explain the limits of my experience. My opinions are based on my experience as a company commander from January 2000 to May 2001. During those months, I commanded the first company to field the

M2A3. I participated in the initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) of the M2A3, during which it was tested against the M2A2 Operation *Desert Storm* (ODS) version. Additionally, I took the company to the division capstone exercise (DCX) at the National Training Center (NTC) from 1 March 2001 to 1 May 2001. I have completed new equipment training (NET) and the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) training. I have