

should consider conducting combined officer professional development sessions, focusing on equipment capabilities and unit SOPs. Also, brigade level FTXs where both units are working together or against each other in a realistic force-on-force environment, will greatly enhance mutual understanding of unit capabilities.

**Conduct heavy/light combined arms live-fire exercises (CALFEXs).** The best way for light and mechanized infantry units to learn more about each other's capabilities and limitations is to conduct them together. These exercises allow leaders to incorporate different weapon systems and equipment not normally under their MTO&Es into mission planning. Light and heavy units also learn how to employ each other's assets and maximize combat power.

Live-fires teach weapon capabilities, showing exactly what different systems can or cannot kill. The more realistic and innovative the live fire, the better. All available ammunition and weapon

systems need to be employed. They teach the control measures that are key in controlling fires. In addition, leaders learn the support requirements (Class III, V, IX) to sustain the readiness of various systems. Light and mechanized leaders will also learn each other's internal SOPs and valuable tactics, techniques, and procedures.

It is important for both company commanders to work together to create a heavy/light live-fire concept. This will allow each to incorporate his specific capabilities into the live fire and achieve pre-determined training objectives for both. The S-3 sections should conduct the initial planning, but the detailed planning should be left to the company commanders. Battalion commanders will need to provide guidance to ensure that the CALFEX meets his intent.

In summary, heavy/light operations sound great in a classroom but are virtually useless unless company commanders train together and understand each other's capabilities. An under-

standing of heavy/light operations should not remain at higher levels of command, but should be common knowledge to the leaders who are actually on the ground. A properly task organized unit that can work in synchronization is a powerful force that can overcome any obstacle on today's battlefield. Heavy/light operations are the future of our profession. Company commanders who have a clear understanding of how to integrate the two infantry forces will succeed on the future battlefield, where they will be able to move fast, strike hard, and seize the day.

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# Leadership Training In Tomorrow's Army

MAJOR KEITH Q. MCGUIRE

Our national security strategy entrusts the Army with global responsibilities that can be met only through force projection. Yet force projection remains caught in the classic dilemma of force design—light, heavy, or mixed? America's threats range from asymmetrical to heavy conventional forces backed up by weapons of mass destruction. We can deploy light forces quickly but possibly without significant maneuver and firepower. Or we can take months to deploy heavy forces, with the necessary logistics arriving too late to influence geopolitical events accelerated by telecommunications and reactions gener-

ated by media coverage.

The Army leadership has long struggled with this issue. For smaller interventions such as Grenada, Panama, and Haiti, these compromises have proved acceptable. We should be thankful that Saddam Hussein is a dysfunctional military leader; otherwise our light divisions on the ground might have sustained serious losses in the summer of 1990. Gratefully, his strategic myopia allowed us to bluff him into taking that fateful five-month pause in the deserts of Kuwait. But such past success does not guarantee the same for the future; a more sophisticated opponent using con-

ventional heavier forces in an unconventional manner could lead to disaster for light forces. An unconventional mob relying on relatively simple technology and small arms inflicted such losses on Task Force Ranger in Somalia. That tactical bloody nose led directly to a strategic defeat that has affected American policymaking ever since. That fact is not lost on the potential enemies of the United States. We can assume the U.S. will not forego superpower status. The Army will continue to seek a balance that marries rapid deployability and the ability to fight a sustained operation. The latest

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effort in this search is called the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), but this is largely a technical and doctrinal answer to what is a more holistic military problem. If the SBCT is to become a world class unit, it will need world class leaders.

Army doctrine in the form of Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Military Leadership*, defines leadership as the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. The success of a combined arms leader should be judged by how well he can combine those three things to accomplish his mission, whatever it may be. In today's "peacetime" Army, that mission can be broad indeed, and it is easy to concentrate on the periphery rather than the core. We must examine how we train our leaders to succeed on an ever-changing battlefield. The goal is to produce thinking warriors who can meet the wide challenges that future missions might offer. Tomorrow's junior leaders will be required to make decisions that will have more political ramifications than ever before. That means leaders who embrace both a warrior's spirit and a warrior's intellect. Artificial divisions between fighters and thinkers are a luxury of the past. In a force projection military service, there is no time to replace one with the other.

The most lethal weapon on the battlefield is a thinking human being. Technology is there to enhance that lethality. If our military is to survive and grow stronger, I believe that the warrior ideal has to be brought into the forefront of military training. In Vietnam, we saw our complex technology and weaponry beaten by an enemy who relied on small unit tactics, simplicity, and the intangibles of esprit, dedication, and cohesion, summed up in the modern sports term as *heart*. The other half of that equation is the intellect required to make that heart work. General Omar Bradley is quoted as saying, "Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designated can replace it." That axiom is even more true today in the information age. Leadership is the most essential element of combat power because it focuses our will and ability to fight. With the synergy of maneuver, fire-

power, and protection, we can effectively dominate the battlefield if we have the leadership to guide that synergy.

Leaders are now developed around three pillars—experience, schooling, and self-development. In today's Army of reduced manning, reduced training time, and reduced training dollars, experience is hard to come by. Today's junior officer may get out to the field three or four times a year in the Army's schedule of three six-week cycles devoted to collective training, individual training, and support. All too often, support requirements replace the six weeks individual training. With other constraints, units may spend more than two thirds of their time out of training for their mission essential task list. The lack of experience and training shows at

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the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) where too many combat leaders fail to meet the expected standards. These deficiencies manifest themselves in decreasing skill in planning and conducting sustained operations under duress. A baton of tactical ignorance is also being passed on to junior leaders. Many of these future commanders simply do not know the right way of doing things because no one has ever taken the time to show them. The military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) site at the JRTC provides a prime example. Time and again, junior leaders fail to set the conditions or plan direct fire control measures encompassing the city. Those measures are the thinking portion of MOUT, the magic that effective leadership provides. Others include failure to properly place and use the M240 machinegun, the platoon's greatest casualty producing weapon, during the defense or how to properly plan and conduct rehearsals.

One incident of failed leadership ob-

served on the JRTC battlefield was the unilateral surrender of a platoon leader in the brigade combat team to the opposing force (OPFOR) at Shughart-Gordon. The reason was the lieutenant was cold and wet. In another situation, a platoon leader, after having several of his troops wounded in a firefight, was pressed by his command to continue the mission. Under this simulated duress, he committed simulated murder, deciding the most efficient way to handle his casualties and get on with the mission was to kill them. Fortunately, the chain of command did the right thing. He was arrested for obvious breach of military conduct. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon to observe young platoon leaders who literally cry and later on confess that they did not expect the JRTC, being a platoon leader, or combat leadership to be this difficult. These leadership failures could be addressed through training focused on expected standards coupled with demonstrations of what right looks like.

That kind of training is not happening and the consequent decline in warfighting ability is obvious. Units and leaders do not train with the battle-focus and necessary frequency to sustain full combat readiness. More important, leaders are not effectively training their subordinate leaders first, the basis for the Train as We Fight ideology. Senior leaders must take more of a hands-on approach to training subordinates so junior officers are taught the "How To" of fighting. Lieutenants spend minimal time as platoon leaders before they are moved to executive officer or staff positions. FM 101-5 says that tactics are battlefield problem-solving. Try solving a problem when you have never seen a correct solution—and do it in a hurry. That is the training dynamic of today. Only commanders who take a personal interest in training their junior leaders can alter that trend. To do that, the commanders must have the benefit of their own experiences.

Army doctrine states that leading and following are an integral part of being a soldier. But we have produced leaders who have not suffered through the same hardships that face their soldiers. After all, pain shared is pain divided. The

Army wants leaders to be dynamic and bold. That requires taking risks in the tactical realm. But such risks should not threaten the military careers of those leaders. Otherwise, officers remain cautious, worrying too much about what their superiors think instead of about doing what is right. Achieving great goals often means taking greater risks. Instead we reward mediocre performance rather than excellent failure. The trend does not encourage the “thinking outside the box” that is needed to meet the threats in today’s world.

Even when training takes place, we put too many artificial restrictions upon how it is conducted. There is no “kinder, gentler enemy” on the battlefield. Sensitivity training, consideration of others, and other similar programs do not prepare soldiers for the streets of Mogadishu. Doing that means challenging leaders and soldiers with training that is mentally and physically demanding. They need to be pushed almost to the point of breaking, and then pushed a little bit more. Something is wrong in our society when a high school football coach is allowed to be harder on his players than a drill sergeant is allowed to be on his soldiers in basic training. Stress in training is necessary for both players and soldiers. Stress plays a role in both child development and team building. Yet the Army—an organization whose mission requires it to kill—is not allowed to admonish his soldiers, verbally or physically, to motivate them in teaching the skills that will save their lives.

There is an old saying that practice doesn’t make perfect; perfect practice makes perfect. And like everything else in life, even the lessons once learned as a leader are perishable skills. Leadership is like muscle. In order to grow bigger and stronger we must apply stress, fatigue, and a little discomfort, which yields scar tissue. And through that rebuilding process the muscle will become bigger, stronger, and able to do more with less effort. Now-retired Major General David Grange understood that dynamic. He used a lesson from the past to incorporate that process in training today’s leaders. The Magundai was the leader of 13th century warlord

### PHASES OF THE OPERATION

- Phase I
  - Officer Professional Development
- Phase II
  - Preparation for Combat
    - A. Instruction
    - B. Planning
    - C. Troop Leading Procedures
    - D. Rehearsals
- Phase III
  - Combat Operations
    - A. Training Area I
      - Insertion
      - React to Contact
      - Assault Objective
      - Defeat Counterattack
    - B. Training Area II
      - Air Assault
      - Combat Search and Rescue
      - React to Contact
      - Casualty Evacuation
      - Assault MOUT
- Phase IV
  - Recovery/After-Action Review

Genghis Khan’s elite forces. The Magundai would take his troops out into the wilderness for several days, deprive them of food and sleep to wear down their bodies and their brains, and then present them with physical and mental challenges. He could then observe how those possible leaders adapted to stress. General Grange put his officers into a similarly unexpected training environment, with little sleep and even less food, stressing them by having them experience the hardships their soldiers faced. “Just because you’ve done it once 15 or 20 years ago doesn’t mean you remember how hard it was,” said a battalion commander under Grange’s tutelage.

The training focus for a Magundai program is to enhance the skills, willpower, and teamwork of all leaders to fight on any battlefield. The exercise also strengthens the leaders’ understanding of basic battle drills. An example is shown in the accompanying box:

Most leaders lament the shortage of good hard training routinely provided. General Grange’s Magundai-trained leaders were introduced to an art that is hard, and sometimes painful to master. The entire point of the program is to test a leader’s mettle and simulate “operations outside the box” as a means for improving that leader, the unit, and the Army. Unfortunately, too many offi-

cers—senior and junior—fear the damage that such an unvarnished view of their abilities under stress might do to their careers, for the Magundai methodology does focus on fatigue and physical duress. Exacting execution is not as important as placing the officer under the worst, most extreme conditions. General Grange used this training model to create friction during execution of multiple daily operations. Other successful commanders have also used the technique, notably Brigadier General McChrystal and Colonel Keen as 75th Ranger Regiment commanders. Both have used the program as an effective training and evaluation tool within their conventional and unconventional organization.

There are alternatives to the Magundai. One is the “Omega,” or TACOPD (tactical officer professional development), in use within Colonel Hon Lehr’s 1st Battalion, 327th Airborne (Assault). Now-retired Colonel W.C. Ohl started the program within his first battalion in the early 1980s. He used the rifle platoon as the training vehicle for officers. With Colonel Ohl as platoon leader and now-Major General Vines as the platoon sergeant, the platoon conducted a series of missions such as the point ambush and the classic linear defense. Lieutenants served as squad leaders and team leaders. Company commanders carried the crew-served weapons. A mission cycle usually began early on the first day, with the battalion commander leading officer physical training. Immediately following personal hygiene and breakfast chow, the battalion commander briefed the perfect platoon operations order, followed by a confirmation brief. Afterwards, the platoon sergeant inspected equipment and began to prepare the rehearsal site. Using the *crawl-walk-run* methodology, the platoon then rehearsed the prioritized tasks in daylight. The remainder of the day was spent in a back brief rehearsal and final inspection. After the evening meal, the platoon ran a full-force, full-speed rehearsal before going into a couple of hours of rest. Late the same night, they would be inserted and execute the mission. Afterwards, they always con-

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ducted either an escape and evasion course or a foot march of moderate length—4 to 10 miles. The difference between the Omega methodology and the Magundai was the Omega's focus on exacting execution. Although the amount of physical duress was at the medium level, mistakes were not taken lightly.

Another great leadership training program was established by the 7th Infantry Division, which mandated that all soldiers in the ranks of noncommissioned officers and above attend a leader's course before assuming any leadership position. The Combat Leadership Course and the Light Fighters Infantryman Course were excellent programs that established a division standard for its leaders. The courses reacquainted them with the hardship and stress that their soldiers endure. These programs should be Army-wide. Magundai, Omega, or Light Fighter programs that challenge soldiers produce more-satisfied soldiers than those who

answer to politically sensitive issues. The best demonstration of a commander's concern for his soldiers is in the quality of their training. The best force protection method is better training.

Leaders must constantly practice their art. For emerging doctrine and technology to succeed on the new battlefield, we have to focus on leadership development by encouraging free thinking outside the boundaries of the absurd. Commanders need to seize every opportunity to develop subordinates, teaching them *how* to think instead of *what* to think. For example, as a commander receives brief backs from subordinates, he should use the process to add mental rigor, forcing these junior leaders to address unforeseen problems. This not only addresses the individual problems, but also teaches the leader how to mentally wargame a plan.

The Army does not get to choose its missions, but it is expected to defeat an enemy in battle or conduct peacekeep-

ing humanitarian operations. It should, however, be able to develop leaders who can meet those challenges—and guide our soldiers through them. The soldiers remain the ultimate guarantors of American interests. The infantryman cannot be a policeman one minute and locked in mortar combat the next, unless we bear the cost of preparing him. Only effective leadership can offset that cost. Soldiers are not pawns; they are America's sons and daughters. Mentally and physically rigorous training will help bring them home. Diamonds are made from the application of intense pressure over long periods of time, and so are effective combat leaders.

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# The Cadre Platoon

## Turning a Challenge Into an Opportunity

LIEUTENANT DANIEL SCHEERINGA

The Army, at its core, is a group of people with a job to do. Everyone's job gets harder when the Army doesn't have enough people to do all the work. During the past several years, the Army, both active and reserve components, has struggled with the challenges caused by low recruiting and retention.

Company B, 1st Battalion, 178th Infantry of the Illinois National Guard was no exception. Recruiting was suffering. A booming economy with numerous job opportunities made the monthly drill check seem less attractive. Retention was also difficult. While high school graduates joined the National Guard for the attractive educational benefits, relatively few stayed

after their initial enlistments. All of this left the unit with a shortage of privates and with serious turnover at corpo-

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***Many capable, motivated young soldiers worked for years to become team leaders, only to find themselves with no teams to lead.***

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ral/specialist and sergeant levels.

Many junior NCOs decided not to pursue military careers after their initial enlistments. Many more, who did not want to be career NCOs, left when faced with the frustration of having no troops to lead. Many capable, moti-

vated young soldiers worked for years to become team leaders, only to find themselves with no teams to lead. Young squad leaders would look to their left and see only a fire team's worth of troops.

It was part of the company's command philosophy to delegate as much responsibility as possible to these junior NCOs, including training. But there were still limits to what they could do. These corporals/specialists and sergeants were well prepared to train soldiers on battle drills and other tasks. Squad leaders and platoon sergeants still needed to prepare and conduct this training. Senior NCOs needed to take great responsibility for training and for