

# Commandant's Note

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## MODULARITY

The transformation on going in the Army is part of the evolutionary process which all armies must undergo if they — and the nations they serve — are to survive. History is full of examples where the nation that adapted the fastest to change won the war. Well before Rome's legions had dominated their known world and imposed a period of peace and stability that would endure for over two centuries, armies of earlier cultures learned that adaptability means survival. This adaptability allows armies to train, sustain, and fight more efficiently and more effectively, and sustains warriors' confidence in themselves and in their leaders. Five centuries before the birth of Christ, Greece and Sparta were already adapting the way they fought, and defeated adversaries whose methods of fighting had hitherto been unbeatable. Within 10 years, they had inflicted crushing defeats on the Persians at Marathon and at Salamis by learning their tactics and adapting their own to counter them. Centuries later, beginning in 1618, the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus emerged as the dominant military leader of the Thirty Years' War when he abandoned the massive, unwieldy formations that dominated European warfare, and transformed his army into one of smaller, more maneuverable infantry units, cavalry, and field artillery.

Prior to America's entry into World War I, we transformed a 108,000 man Army of regulars and national guardsmen into what would be a two-million man expeditionary force. At the same time we had to learn and train this force in the techniques of 20th Century warfare, and the Army did it by studying the tactics and techniques, and the successes and failures, of our allies and our enemies. The lessons of the First World War were not forgotten; since then the U.S. Army has continually evolved new tactics, techniques, procedures, and organizations to better respond to potential or current threats, and today's transformation which includes reorganization into a modular force is a continuation of that process.

We are a nation at war, and the global war on terror has revealed the diversity and resourcefulness of the enemy. He will mass forces only to the minimum extent necessary to strike, and then immerse



himself in a population whose lives he endangers by his very presence. To anticipate and counter such an enemy, we must be able to deploy lethal, effective, sustainable units with the right capabilities anywhere in the world, and we must be able to do it even faster than we have in the past. The division-based organizations of our earlier force projection have required us to deploy sometimes hastily task-organized brigade-sized units — that may or may not have extensively trained together — for the missions they were about to undertake.

We are now moving to a brigade-based tactical fighting organization which is to some extent analogous—but not identical — to the Army's earlier separate brigades with which we are familiar. Each had its own mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support elements that enabled it to fight and sustain itself. The modular brigade combat team (BCT) is designed to be a complete, combat-ready organization that receives additional task organized capabilities as needed, in country. Some of the five types of supporting brigades (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition; Aviation; Sustainment; Fires; and Maneuver Enhancement) have relatively fixed organizations while others have core command and control (C2) and support capabilities that are augmented by specialized battalions or companies based on mission analysis. All are able to assimilate additional task organized elements as needed. Joint capabilities are absolutely essential to the success of modularity, and the BCT organizational design has been built to capitalize on this through C2 networks, intelligence gathering capabilities, and better integration of tactical air control parties (TACP). The new modular organizations provide a mix of land combat power that is task organized for any combination of offensive, defensive, stability or support operations as part of a joint campaign. Success in tactical operations is based upon securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy. A core concept for the modular force is to organize, train, deploy, and fight as a combined arms team that is inherently joint.

The division, corps, and army headquarters are being condensed

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into two more flexible headquarters, currently called the UEx and UEy. The UEx will have no fixed organizational structure outside of its requirements to man and equip the command posts and provide support for the commander. The UEx gives up some of the tactical warfighting responsibilities to the BCTs, while gaining some Corps responsibilities. BCTs are associated with a home station UEx for training, and deployment reach back, and will often deploy with this UEx as the higher headquarters for combat. However, they are just as likely to deploy with BCTs and supporting brigades from various locations. In the cases where BCTs deploy separately from their home station UEx they are task organized to a UEx or JTF HQs designated for a given area of operations, based on a regional combatant commander's METT-TC analysis.

The Army is moving from multiple types of ground maneuver brigades to just three Tables of Organization and Equipment organizations: the Stryker BCT (SBCT), the Infantry BCT (IBCT), and the Heavy BCT (HBCT). While we will not fully discuss the details on the significant changes we are seeing within the Heavy and Infantry BCTs in this note, it is important to highlight some of the organic combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities. These units are no longer task organized to a brigade; they are assigned to the BCT. (Task organization still occurs, both within and from outside the BCT; however, this will not be as common as it was before the transformation.) The modular brigade yields big benefits in teamwork, cohesion, and effectiveness, but requires additional focus and effort in individual, crew, and small unit collective training. As an example, an air assault brigade of today has roughly 60 military occupational specialties (MOS) in it, while the IBCT has over 100. More is to be expected of our leaders! I recognize that to support this we at the Home of the Infantry must develop better training methodologies, both within the Institution and for home station, to include distance learning and Mobile Training Teams.

Although organized with different equipment and MOS's, the two BCTs look essentially the same. Each has a staff with increased functional capability and a deputy commanding officer (DCO). Each has a brigade support battalion (3 companies plus an HHC), a Fires Battalion (2x8 105 or 155), a reconnaissance battalion or squadron (3 companies/troops) and two maneuver battalions. (A third maneuver battalion is projected in the future.) The infantry battalion consists of 3 rifle companies, a weapons company, and an HHC. The combined arms battalion has 2 armor, 2 Bradley, 1 engineer, and an HHC. Each maneuver battalion also has a 10 man sniper section within its HHC. Each of these battalions has a dedicated forward support company (transportation and maintenance) which, although assigned to the BSB, will habitually train, deploy, and fight with a specific battalion.

The two BCTs also have a new organization called the brigade troops battalion (BTB). The BTB has the separate companies and platoons assigned to it for administrative and logistics support, plus individual and collective training responsibilities. Sub units include the battalion HHC, MI Company, Network Company, MP Platoon, and Chemical Platoon. The IBCT BTB also has an organic Engineer Company. All assets within the BTB (minus the BTB HHC) work for the BCT; however, the BTB commander and staff give the BCT commander more options on how he organizes the battlefield. A core function of the BTB is to provide

logistical support to any element of the BCT that is not task organized to a BCT battalion. The BTB also assumes other roles, such as monitoring assigned areas of operation, conducting security operations if task organized with additional combat power, co-locating with the main command post or acting as an alternate CP, to name a few.

The HBCT has a three-troop reconnaissance squadron (M3/HMMWV mix) and the IBCT has a three-company reconnaissance battalion (HMMWV, mounted and dismounted capability). This gives the BCT Commander a tremendous capability to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, and reflects the shift of some of the old division capabilities to the BCT. We see the threat sooner and more precisely from units organic to the BCT. When coupled with higher joint and national intelligence feeds, we verify, synchronize efforts, and, if required, engage the enemy more quickly with internal, UEx, or joint assets. Additionally, we have redundant means to get an accurate battle damage assessment. The capability for fast and accurate sensor to shooter information sharing is better enabled by the modular design.

The BCT staff now contains assigned expertise that in the past was nonexistent or had to be task organized to the brigade. Examples include the addition of MP, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, PA, and IO personnel, plus the staff has formalized cells to perform functions that in the past were ad hoc, at best. These include an Air Defense Airspace Management (A2C2) cell, a Brigade Aviation Element, and a Fires and Effects Cell. The XO will be able to focus on staff integration and synchronization, while the DCO can focus leadership in other areas as directed by the Commander. The BCT Commander will have more flexibility in how he sets up his Main CP, TAC CP, and Command Group. A command and control system that includes networked information systems, combined with advanced sensors and better analysis and information management, will allow the Commander to see, understand, and share tactical information more rapidly.

We are going through a significant change across the entire Army, not simply within the Infantry. Our entire structure of systems is being reevaluated to determine how we can better support the Warfighter. We are updating doctrine and developing better training methodologies, refining the TOE organization to give the Commander what he needs to accomplish the mission, changing POIs for leadership development, and stabilizing the force so units can train as a team and remain in a high state of readiness for extended periods of time. As new technologies and materiel become available, BCTs will be gradually upgraded over time.

The Army is changing for the better, and support of modularity efforts complements my priority of supporting the global war on terrorism. History has repeatedly taught us that wars are won and nations preserved by capably led, quality Soldiers who are trained to standard. The individual Soldier and his leaders have always been the key to victory, and will continue to be as long as freedom endures. This is where the Infantry excels and where we strive for continuous improvement. The success of our modularity initiatives requires focus, discipline, and dedication, three areas in which the Infantry has consistently led the way. I am proud of you and our Army; we are setting the standard. Follow Me!