

# Commandant's Note

MAJOR GENERAL BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEY

## TRANSFORMATION: A FULL-SPECTRUM APPROACH

The challenges facing our leaders engaged in the Global War on Terror dictate that we constantly consider all eleven variables of the contemporary operational environment (COE). In my last note I wrote about cultural awareness and its impact on operations, but culture is only one of many factors and forces being considered by our young leaders in Theater. To help visualize these forces I've used a concentric circle diagram (Figure) in the classes we teach to our leaders here for the Career and Pre-command Courses. By diagramming out the forces involved in their Areas of Operation, commanders can see themselves, see the terrain (physical, civil, historical, social, etc.), and see the enemy. Lower tactical level commanders (e.g. platoon leaders and company commanders) are interacting with units, factions, and organizations to an extent unprecedented in our history. Within their battle space, they will interface with the media, coordinate with non-government organizations, and synchronize host nation and coalition efforts, while conducting their full spectrum tactical actions. Strategic considerations are driving changes in our formations as well. Therefore, the dilemmas facing our young leaders today are framed by the Modular Force and Stabilization initiatives on one end and the requirement to operate in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment on the other. With the problem defined, we must now come up with




ends, ways, and means to prepare our leaders to cope with factors and forces that confront them in the contemporary operational environment (COE). Furthermore, we must approach the COE in the full context of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). Therefore, the purpose of this note will be to highlight some gaps we have identified in our current effort to transform our brigades and their leaders.

Thus far, our approach to this challenge has been to focus on the O, M, and P of DOTMLPF. This initial focus is fine; however, we cannot ignore

the other key elements of this transformation. As far as the decision to focus on organizational, material, and personnel issues goes, nobody would argue that combined arms formations are not crucial to winning this fight. Nor would anyone argue that our Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) and in theater initiatives by the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) are not saving lives. The use of our

Reserves and our 30K plus up of personnel have relieved some pressure on our Army. However, I believe that we have not adequately resourced our concept and doctrine production in both our "How to Fight" and "Training" literature; this creates frustration in the Force. Likewise, our leadership development education and training have not yet fully evolved to prepare our NCO and Officer leadership to grow and maximize the effectiveness of our



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modular formations. Finally, we must take a hard look at whether we've given our installations and the tenant units the ranges, family support facilities/activities, and training support systems to support their reduced training timelines and continued needs once units have deployed.

First let me address our doctrinal deficit. As we travel with the Infantry Traveling Team and train our Infantry's next group of battalion and brigade commanders, there is a common request for doctrine on how the units they command, or are soon to command, are to fight. The Army has published a "White Paper" on how a given unit will fight. Moreover, our Combat Training Centers, our branch schools, and some recently retired combat experienced leaders have collaboratively developed some principle-based Interim Field Manuals and some initial drafts of our Modular doctrine. However, we still lack a common understanding of how the units will fight under their current configuration in the current environment. Just as we spiral equipment into the force based on what is technologically possible now; we must spiral our doctrine based on current capabilities. Like most of our doctrine, these manuals are principle-based, organizationally focused, and functionally organized. Although these initiatives are valuable, I would argue that we need something more.

Some of us can recall the first Bradley fielding to our organizations. In my opinion we got that fielding right. Along with the equipment came PLL and diagnostics. With the weapon systems came the ammunition and facilities to support and train our Soldiers and leaders. And most importantly, with the new organization came the experts to teach leaders how to train and fight with the supporting literature necessary to sustain that effort. Similarly, I have argued that our Army should invest in its collective training and fighting doctrine by fencing some of our combat experienced brigade commanders from OEF and OIF for a few weeks to write vignettes on how the new IBCTs, HBCTs and SBCTs should train and fight. Nobody knows the "how to's" any better or has as much credibility.

Secondly, allow me to frame our challenges in training our modular battalion and brigade commanders and staffs. In addition to fighting as a combined arms team, our commanders must now live and train as a combined arms team. Successful transformation begins in the mind of the leader and his Soldiers. The current transformation initiative must be embraced by the entire team and supporting infrastructure. By enthusiastically embracing the concept we can start this transformation in the mind as well as in the motor pool. Therefore, I submit that leader development efforts must open our minds to change. We must make our leaders confident and competent that they can lead these formations. As discussed in my introduction, these commanders are not only dealing with external forces and factors for which they have not been trained, but are also challenged internally to train more diverse formations, maintain more equipment, and develop leaders of disparate skill sets.

To accomplish this, I have asked Fort Benning and the Tri-

community area in which we live to help us train our commanders. Our commanders must understand the nuances of water treatment, electricity production, sewage removal, and the full spectrum of issues that they will likely encounter in theater, and any perspective they can gain on this while still at home station will prepare them for the dilemmas that many commanders of deployed units face today. We will also challenge our educational partners from our sister branches to send their experts here to Fort Benning to explain their roles and responsibilities, as well as to educate their commands on career development patterns for their own officers permanently residing in their formations. We are also working with the Combined Arms Center to give our BOLC, Officer Basic, and Career Course students a curriculum that immerses them in scenarios, tactical problems, and tactical decision exercises daily that will make them consider all the variables of the COE. By increasing tactical dilemmas, we feel that we can make our leaders more adaptable, agile thinkers. Finally, as our weapons systems, learning needs, and operational requirements change, so too must the infrastructure that supports them. The Chief of Staff of the Army will use BCTs like we have used divisions in the past. Accordingly, installations' missions will change. For instance, when a division headquarters and one of its brigades deploy, the installation will assume the role of trainer, maintainer, and readiness reporter for the remaining brigades. Moreover, it has reachback responsibilities for the deployed division and the brigade. The division and the installation will partner in preparing the next unit for its deployment and resetting the units as they return. Embedded in the training requirement is the requirement to look at how we train and where we train to ensure realism. Accommodating digital command and control and growing kinetic weapons effects will require more land, better targetry, and realistic simulations, both on the range and in the command posts. Exacerbating our challenges with facilities is the need for our life cycle units to rigorously train individuals, leaders, staffs, and units simultaneously under a reduced timeline. Specifically, life cycle units will have six months to train a unit from individual through "higher level" collective after reset. The unit will have turned over approximately 50 percent of its personnel in the meantime. We must help these commanders with a training strategy template and TADSS to prepare their units for their available cycle. We are working on a live, virtual, and constructive TADSS model and a strategy to do just that. Our team will give commanders a menu of compatible systems to choose from based on their timelines and specific needs.

In conclusion, let me applaud our leaders in the field and in Theater who are training and fighting these new formations every day. Your lessons learned are essential to our efforts as an Army to transform to meet the challenges of today. We want to partner with you to tackle and overcome these challenges. It is a team effort. Follow Me!