



INFANTRY CAPTAINS CAREER COURSE MOVES TO AN OUTCOME-BASED CURRICULUM

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As the United States Army and our sister services prosecute the global war on terrorism, the experience we gain and the tactics, techniques, and procedures that emerge are reflected in the way we do business. A fundamental part of that business is training, and I'd like to take a few minutes to update you on changes to the Infantry Captains Career Course (ICCC) that we present here at Fort Benning. Some of the changes are already accomplished and the remainder are ongoing.

A number of factors have led us to change ICCC. The main reasons include:

- The need to move from our traditional "input-based" program of instruction (POI) to an outcome-based program — more on this later;
- Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan and the need to remain relevant. In particular, the need to better incorporate the ambiguities and difficulties we face in the contemporary operating environment (COE) into the course;
- Increasing perceptions that ICCC had become somewhat rigid and that we were not putting enough emphasis on flexible problem solving and effective communications;
- External requirements to change, including TRADOC's increasing emphasis on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, COE, cultural awareness, and, most immediately, the impending merger of the Infantry and Armor Schools into the Maneuver Center of Excellence.

As we prepare to merge ICCC with its Armor counterpart into the "Maneuver Captains Career Course" (ICCC + ACCC = MCCC), Lieutenant Colonel Steve Russell, our chief of Tactics, and his small group instructors (SGIs) are working closely with their counterparts at Fort Knox. The initial step, nearly completed, is agreeing with the Armor School on what the course will look like. This is more than just the POI; it's also the way we will teach it — the culture of the course. Both commandants have enthusiastically endorsed our proposal, and we are ironing out the final details. The next step, underway now, is to begin teaching the new course at both ICCC and ACCC so that the two begin to converge. The third step, planned for later this year, is to run the initial pilot course at Fort Benning, with instructors and students from both schools learning together. We will adjust POI and methods based on the lessons we learn in the pilot and move quickly to the final step, a fully merged MCCC. Although the Maneuver Center of Excellence will continue to have both an Infantry School and an Armor and Cavalry School, MCCC

(and "Maneuver ANCOG") will remain under the Maneuver Center commander — responsive to both commandants, but subordinate to neither.

The most fundamental change (but one which has resulted in little real change in the classroom) is moving from a traditional TRADOC input-based curriculum to one based on outcomes. In other words, we are no longer beginning with "Provide 4.5 instructor contact hours on developing a unit physical fitness program (using the attached Training Support Package)," but rather defining what a successful graduate should know and be able to do, and then figuring out what needs to be taught and how we need to teach it. In this example, it would be that the graduate "Can develop and lead a successful company PT program, including combatives."

In the field Army, this is nothing new. We would not dream of assigning a battalion to seize an objective, and then direct exactly how the commander was to advance, where to establish a support by fire position, which company to use in the breach, etc. Instead, we tell the commander his mission, our intent, and the constraints under which he has to operate. We then require him to backbrief how he plans to accomplish it, to make adjustments as required to ensure it fits into the overall plan, and then we hold him responsible for achieving results. We believe this approach is best for our schools too, and that's how we've redesigned ICCC.

At the end of this article, I've included our initial cut at the course purpose, the "desired outcomes", and the "measures of effectiveness" (MOE) for each. These MOE both define the otherwise somewhat fuzzy desired outcomes and allow us to assess whether we are succeeding. Together, the desired outcomes and their MOE will also serve as the basis for all evaluations and assessments: student grades, peer evaluations, formal course feedback, surveys to you in the field, after action reviews (AARs), etc.

Other important changes:

■ Almost every scenario has a "mixed", task-organized TOE, more reflective of the real-world operations we're conducting. A light company will have a heavy platoon attached, for instance.

■ We have tried to incorporate contemporary operating environment into every scenario and every day students encounter a few of the most difficult realities we face daily in operations. Among them:

- Every scenario includes civilians that have to be dealt

with in a specific cultural context;

□ Every leader down to at least company commander is required to understand the political context of the operation;

□ Students are steered to think about long-term consequences of short-term actions. Our intent is to make sure each captain understands this not just intellectually, but at gut level. Our initial (primitive at this point) approach is to link tactical problems within a given “module”, allowing consequences to carry forward. For instance, if CPT Haskins takes an unwarranted brute-force approach to preventing local villagers from interfering with airfield operations on Tuesday, then on Friday, the situation he faces will be a much more difficult one than his buddy who used a bit more subtlety and finesse and therefore avoided provoking unnecessary hostility.

■ Grouping students by type of gaining unit. In the first half of the course (Company Phase), all the students will be jumbled together within their 16-man small groups. In the second half (Battalion/ Brigade Phase), we will resection the students by type of gaining unit: Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Heavy

Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), or Special Operations. All students will still train on how to become a maneuver battalion S3. All will wrestle with the same tactical scenarios and problems. However, this allows an opportunity for a slightly different focus within each group. HBCT students might spend extra time emphasizing development of engagement areas, for instance, while those going to Special Ops (Special Forces, Civil Affairs [CA], and Psychological Operations [PSYOP]) might focus a bit more on how best to employ PSYOP and CA assets in a particular type of operation and examine what problems typically arise. Again, though, I want to stress that we are creating maneuver battalion S3s, not specialists. We expect that we will sometimes get it wrong, and someone who went through the HBCT group will be assigned to an IBCT; we will still expect him to do just fine.

■ We have increased the emphasis on:

- Quick decision making;
- Analyzing, understanding, and being able to explain the important points of a given situation;
- Communicating effectively.

While Fort Benning has always done these things, and I think most of us regard them as strengths of infantry officers

generally, we are pushing even harder on developing them.

■ Adaptiveness and flexibility. The Army and TRADOC are devoting a great deal of effort to figuring out how best to develop these traits in Army leaders. Again, we think this is nothing new to the Infantry. In fact, our students arrive with a great deal of flexibility and adaptiveness. Over 90 percent are combat veterans who have learned to improvise and prevail under pressure. So, our concern is not to instill something that’s not there. Rather, it’s to teach them tactical planning in a way that magnifies these natural abilities instead of suppressing them or supplanting them with a preference for rigid doctrine. (For what it’s worth, we don’t believe our doctrine is rigid, but that it is often *applied* rigidly — we’ve all known doctrine zealots.)

■ Again, we’ve taken a simple, crude approach, which, so far at least, seems to be working. As they become more comfortable with the material, we begin throwing in “twists:” changed missions, FRAGOs changing the task organization, short-notice accelerated briefing requirements, incomplete or incorrect

Photo by Technical Sergeant John M. Foster, USAF

Soldiers watch for suspicious activity in Iraq. Cadre of the Infantry Captains Career Course are trying to incorporate ambiguities and difficulties that Soldiers face in Iraq and Afghanistan into the course.



information, insufficient resources, etc... just like we've all experienced in the real world. We are hoping to achieve two things. The obvious one is to develop captains who keep their cool and react well to change. Less obvious, but perhaps more important, we're trying to develop captains with an instinctive preference for creating courses of action that are flexible and can be adapted to changing circumstances, rather than perfectly optimized and synchronized plans tailored to a specific situation but which have to be thrown out if the circumstances change.

■ Encouraging experimentation. We have given the SGIs a great deal of latitude in how to achieve the course aims. Every group will begin and end each module on the same day, and they will all use the same scenario. All will have the same terminal learning objectives for the module. But standardization ends there. One SGI might require three full-up orders briefs. Another might mix quick-decision drills with one deliberate planning drill. Still another might choose to use historical vignettes and student-taught classes or a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT). Obviously, this type of decentralization requires increased awareness by the SGIs' chain of command, as well as some additional azimuth checks during the course. It also depends on our ability to continue selecting absolutely top-notch captains as SGIs. But we believe that it will enhance our ability to train adaptive and flexible leaders, and by sharing what works and what doesn't across the teams, we believe we will continuously improve the POI and our methods of instruction. Only the outcomes are fixed (and even they will be regularly reviewed and updated). Everything else remains subject to change. Results are what count. So far, we're pleased with the results.

■ Although ICCC is not a counterinsurgency course, we are all, obviously, very interested in COIN, and we have to address it in order to be relevant. We are taking two approaches. First, as described above, we've incorporated the most important elements of the COE into all aspects of the course. Dealing with civilians and their culture, the importance of an operation's political context, and careful consideration of long-term consequences of short-term actions all come to the fore in COIN operations. Indeed, at a company or even battalion level, many COIN operations are indistinguishable from operations in a more conventional framework. What differ are the principles guiding our thoughts and actions. Therefore, our second approach is to spend some time in the course examining the principles of COIN in depth, including how they differ from the conventional principles of war and how that difference will affect our overall operational pattern within a scenario.

None of the changes I have outlined is final. We have every expectation that we will continue to change ICCC, and then MCCC, in order to adapt to the implementation of Army force generation (ARFORGEN), to incorporate new TRADOC initiatives on cultural awareness and adaptive leader training — mostly, though, to adapt to the wars we're fighting and the perceived needs of commanders in the field. What we expect to keep is an outcome-based approach to designing and assessing the course. To that end, we will shortly be sending a quick e-mail survey to all Infantry, Armor, and Special Forces battalion and BCT/Group commanders who supervise our recent graduates. We

want their feedback on how well we're doing at meeting our desired outcomes, and whether we've gotten those outcomes right.

We also invite feedback on anything else, especially in the areas of tactical instruction, doctrine, and collective training products.

Listed next are the ICCC purpose, our desired outcomes, and the measures of effectiveness for each:

Purpose of the Course

- To prepare students for the leadership, training, and administrative requirements of a successful company commander.
- To prepare students to execute the tactical planning responsibilities of Battalion S3s. This includes mastery of company tactics.

Desired Outcomes

A graduate of the Infantry Captains Career Course will have:

- Demonstrated the ability to think critically;
- Demonstrated adaptability and flexibility in solving problems, including tactical problems;
- Demonstrated the ability to communicate in a way that is thoroughly understood and inspires confidence in subordinates;
- Demonstrated mastery of the "science" of tactical planning at company through battalion/task force level, and thorough understanding at BCT level;
- Practiced in the "art" of tactical planning; and
- Demonstrated an understanding of critical training and leader functions of company commander.

Desired Outcomes with their Associated Measures of Effectiveness

Desired Outcome: Demonstrated ability to think critically

Measures of Effectiveness: A graduate:

- Can summarize a situation briefly and simply, but thoroughly, in his own words;
- Uses logic, observed facts, and past experience to isolate critical factors and focus on them;
- Articulates how the factors in a situation have interacted in the past, and are likely to affect each other in a given course of action;
- Makes sound decisions using logical reasoning and evidence, and not just emotion or others' reasoning;
- Makes reasonable decisions in the absence of complete information and under time pressure;
- Is able to describe the strengths and limitations of doctrinal concepts;
- Does nothing without being able to articulate why he is doing it.

<p>Desired Outcome: Demonstrated adaptability and flexibility in solving problems, including tactical problems</p> <p>Measures of effectiveness: A graduate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Consistently succeeds despite conditions and requirements that change in the middle of solving a problem; ● Keeps a clear head, rapidly assesses the changed situation, and identifies impacts on the plan; ● Identifies critical shortages in resources and information and either resolves the problem or works around it; ● Develops doctrinally correct solutions that are not limited to “approved solutions;” ● Uses all available tools, not just the standard tactical ones; ● Develops plans that include built-in provisions for changed circumstances; ● Not so detailed and synchronized that commander is forced to “fight the plan;” ● Unexpected enemy action or unforeseen circumstances do not result in having to completely jettison the plan and “ad lib;” ● Accounts for the longer-term consequences of short-term tactical actions; ● Improvises while accounting for consequences of deviating from the plan; ● Takes “good enough” action now, rather than much better action later. 	<p>Desired Outcome: Demonstrated mastery of the science of tactical planning at company through battalion/task force level, and thorough understanding at BCT level</p> <p>Measures of Effectiveness: A graduate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Knows and follows the troop leading procedures, develops and sticks to timeline; ● Correctly articulates essential doctrinal concepts; ● Produces orders that are doctrinally correct; ● Correctly describes the significant capabilities and limitations of all units and major systems in a BCT; ● Is able to use the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process to produce necessary products; ● Employs all available units within their capabilities and limitations; ● Builds maneuver plans that are feasible, account for all available units’ capabilities, and are executable by real soldiers; ● Employs fire support correctly and doctrinally; ● Plans engineering support correctly and doctrinally; ● Integrates logistical support into maneuver plans correctly; ● Integrates prudent force protection measures into plan; ● Correctly plans the movement and employment of command elements; ● Synchronizes essential elements of combat power at key points of the battle.
<p>Desired Outcome: Demonstrated ability to communicate in a way that is thoroughly understood and inspires confidence in subordinates</p> <p>Measures of Effectiveness: A graduate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Briefs concepts and orders that are understood and able to be implemented by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Staff Sergeants unfamiliar with the plan (company phase); ○ Lieutenants unfamiliar with the plan (Bn/BCT phase); ● Conveys confidence in himself and his plan; ● Uses graphic aids to add to the audience’s understanding and does not allow them to distract from the points being conveyed; ● Answers questions concisely and uses them to his advantage; ● Writes in accordance with the Army Writing Style, so that his writing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Can be understood in a single, rapid reading; ○ Conveys all the essential information pertinent to the topic; ○ Presents the bottom line up front; and ○ Uses graphic control measures correctly and neatly 	<p>Desired Outcome: Practiced in the “art” of tactical planning</p> <p>Measures of Effectiveness: A graduate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Writes mission statements, commander’s intent, and concept statements that, taken together: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Correctly identify and focus on the key elements in the situation; ○ Are consistent and easily understood; ○ Could stand alone and result in probable success; ○ Create plans that are simple, flexible, and executable; ○ Identify and focus on exploiting enemy vulnerabilities and maximizing friendly strengths; ○ Incorporate key civil considerations into maneuver plans. ● Creates plans designed to set conditions for subsequent operations; ● Accounts for longer-term consequences of short-term tactical actions;

- Uses all units correctly and advantageously;
- Prefers sub-optimal but flexible courses of action to optimal ones that will likely fail in changed circumstances;
- Coordinates subordinates' activities without over-reliance on commander's decision points or central control;
- Ties control measures to tangible, visible terrain features.

Desired Outcome: Demonstrated understanding of critical training and leader functions of company commander

Measures of Effectiveness: A graduate:

- Understands the critical aspects of running a successful Family Readiness Group;
- Can explain correctly the key points of the training management system at company and battalion level;
- Can produce satisfactory and executable company training schedules;
- Can write and brief a satisfactory battalion quarterly training plan;
- Understands 350-1 training requirements;
- Can develop and lead a successful company fitness program, including combatives;
- Understands the legal considerations of combat operations;
- Understands key legal requirements and constraints of a company commander in garrison and in the field, and knows where to go for help;
- Has thought about and can articulate the importance of establishing a positive command climate, and techniques for doing so;
- Understands key administrative functions of a company commander, including supply accountability, maintenance, and personnel evaluations;
- Understands maintenance management and property accountability systems.

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THE OIL-SPOT TECHNIQUE

Tactical Approach Needed to Counter Insurgency


CAPTAIN JAMES SPIES

So what? Is this a justified response for a tactical commander after having a strategic counterinsurgency model explained to him? Although there appears to be a renaissance of counterinsurgency thought in the military today, there still exists a disconnect between conceptual answers at the strategic level and the practical tactics to achieve those goals. This article proposes a tactical approach based on the oil-spot technique.

The oil-spot is the best tactical solution to an insurgency because of its economical use of force. In this case, the oil-spot refers to the operational technique in which the counterinsurgent forces secure sectors in a methodical sequence. Through the expansion from a secure sector or base area, resources are efficiently marshaled to achieve social control of a fixed political space. Critiques of the oil-spot technique are found in Robert Taber's *War of the Flea: The Classical Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (Brassey's Inc.: Dulles, Virginia 2002). His critique revolves around the "oil slick" operations of the French in Vietnam, but this failure was due to French misapplication. Correctly contrasting this view is Andrew Krepinevich's proposal to use this technique in Iraq, which he discussed in his article "How to Win in Iraq" in the September-October 2005 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. This article proposes an operational cycle to maximize this oil-spot technique.

No single solution to insurgencies exists. Keeping this in mind, a

Figure 1 — Counterinsurgency Operational Cycle



tactical solution must be left sufficiently broad to accommodate varying cultural, ethnic, and socio-political differences while rigid enough for standardized implementation. The endstate for the counterinsurgency operation at the tactical level should always be to move from a posture of controlling the population to involvement by the population. The desire is to foster formal and informal social controls by the local populace so they can take over control of the oil-spot. This concept of social controls accentuates the critical fact that insurgencies are defeated by working through, with, and by the local population.

The tactical counterinsurgency cycle as described in Figure 1, relies on four phases with multiple operations and decisions within each phase. Disrupting the insurgency's OODA Loop remains at the core of every phase. The OODA loop is the *observe, orient, decide, and act* cycle developed by John Boyd, a retired Air Force colonel. This cycle describes how individuals or organizations determine their actions. Interrupting the enemy's OODA loop allows counterinsurgent forces time and space to maneuver within the local populace.

The first phase is to conduct the military decision-making process (MDMP). The MDMP for a counterinsurgency operation is decidedly different from that of a conventional military operation. Ideally, ethnographic intelligence would drive the decision process determining where operational boundaries are drawn. Currently, the military creates zones and sectors based on geographic markers. In a counterinsurgency operation, physical geography falls second in priority to the topography of the local populace. The people become the terrain; more specifically the social network makeup of the populace is the terrain.

Mapping, analyzing, and then describing the ethnographic topography to the commander is not an easy task for any staff. This is distinctly different than the cultural awareness currently observed. Operational boundaries based on this information are then developed by weighting decisions on the future needs of co-opting social network for security and intelligence purposes. The goal at the end of the first phase is a decision as to where

boundaries will be drawn for the cordoning of specific social networks and which networks are to be co-opted for use.

The intent of the second phase is to establish a cordon followed immediately by the conduct of saturation patrols. British forces successfully cordoned off portions of Yemen in 1965, creating both physical and psychological impact. The physical isolation of a community through checkpoints and patrols served to interrupt the logistical and intelligence operations of the insurgents, therefore hindering the insurgents' OODA loop. The cordon served as a means to provide security to the local populace, not intimidate it. Collective action on the part of the local populace in assisting the counterinsurgent fight is only possible if the local populace feels it is secure from insurgent retribution. U.S. military may conduct patrols regularly through an area, but when night falls, and the patrols go back to their forward operating bases, the local population is left to the coercion of the insurgency. Continuous saturation patrolling allows a level of security that inhibits the insurgents' ability to intimidate. Imagine a crime-ridden neighborhood that suddenly has a pair of police officers on every street corner. That is the intended psychological effect of cordoned zones with saturation patrols. This desired effect is also the reason an oil-spot is the only feasible technique. The resource intensive nature of the oil-spot precludes large-scale simultaneous operations of this sort. Isolation operations that prove to be both psychological and physically effective provide the sense of security for the population prerequisite to their involvement with counterinsurgent forces.

Successful isolation operations observed in the British counterinsurgency in Malaya and on a limited scale in the Strategic Hamlet programs during U.S. involvement in Vietnam moved populations into isolation. Large urban areas require bringing the isolation to the population versus the population into isolation. These unique population control measures serve



Petty Officer First Class Bart A. Bauer, USN

First Sergeant Robert Lillie of the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, detains a suspect during a raid February 23 in Baghdad, Iraq.

to reinforce the psychological sense of isolation for the enemy.

The intent of saturation patrolling is the very real effect of establishing control over the population. Studies of collective efficacy within inner city communities show that control is critical to providing a sense of security. For human nature, security is a necessity that precludes many other needs. Progress can only be effective once control is established. The saturation patrolling also allows for a means of initial census taking of the population. If the insurgents operate amongst the local populace, it becomes essential to track and identify the local population. Roger Trinquier in *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* addressed the critical nature of a census with identification cards. The counterinsurgent forces must develop a system to track resources and population movement. If an area is cordoned and proper vehicle registration techniques are applied, it is possible for counterinsurgent forces to determine if a vehicle belongs in a cordoned neighborhood. Impounding vehicles in inappropriate neighborhoods diminishes the insurgents' resource pool of vehicles while impeding their freedom of movement. A decision point to move to the next phase is based on the level of

control of the area. If counterinsurgent forces have positive control of the area through patrols and checkpoints, the third phase initiates. This is also the time confidential informants are developed along with recruitment of local constabulary. Previous steps of census taking and intelligence development provide positive linkages with social networks previously identified during the MDMP. (The conduct of a census also serves as an opportunity to reinforce conditional civil affairs. This is the time to explain to locals that telling the truth about residency and local activities ensures they receive the services they want.) This facilitates the active recruitment of local constabulary.

The third phase is the development of social networks. Initial steps look to develop Human Intelligence or HUMINT. This serves as an extension of the constabulary for intelligence collection. HUMINT networks should consist of confidential informants, pseudo-insurgents and community contacts. The endstate is to create a series of collection networks that can act as vetting sources for each other. Clandestine collection sources can confirm information provided through community contacts or walk-in informants. The most controversial of the collection sources, pseudo-insurgents, would rely upon the turning of captured insurgents, who are then reinserted into the operational area to make contact with, and collect on the insurgents in the sector.

Counterinsurgency is 90 percent intelligence. Gaining the trust of the local population is necessary to gain timely intelligence, and this is brokered on the ability to provide security. This security is only possible with a full understanding of what is happening within a sector and affecting it.

Co-opting the social networks is the next step within this third phase. Rather than attempting to create groups within the community to assist in policing, social networks should be co-opted to create self-policing networks, a community or neighborhood watch. According to the article "Neighborhood and Community: Collective Efficacy and Community Safety," which was written by Robert Sampson and appeared in the June 2004 issue of *New Economy*, studies of community groups in inner cities have shown that the individuals who make up community groups are motivated by selective, tangible incentives, while the leaders of the groups will most often be motivated by the respect and status gained by leading a successful group. The co-opting of these social networks requires realistic, attainable goals that are linked to desired civil affairs programs. The intent is to entice the most number of individuals in the community to participate in reporting incidents and not allow the insurgency to grow through their own passivity.

Combining intelligence from co-opted social networks and Human Intelligence networks to drive the targeting process is the fourth phase. This targeting process should not look at individuals, but entire networks of enemy cells. The best strategy for this targeting process today can be found in the Enterprise Theory of Investigation (ETI) used by law enforcement against organized crime. Just as proposed earlier, police agencies using ETI use overt and covert infiltration of criminal organizations to target and dismantle the majority of a network at one time. This requires a balance of tempo and patience to identify the most vulnerable areas of the enemy's activity before attack. Further determining the scope of the investigation, intelligence officers look to identify

new linkages from historical data and identify where further investigation is required. The intent is to predict trends and anticipate steps needed to counter these insurgent trends.

At the end of this targeting process, nominated targets and Civil Affairs projects are executed based on the desires of the social networks co-opted. Operations in this last phase should look to dismantle the majority of the insurgent enterprise at one time. Simultaneously the communities that assisted in the intelligence gathering and self-policing that made the direct action operations possible are rewarded with Civil Affairs projects they asked for in the previous phase. Rewards for assistance are based on the level of support from the local populace and the correlation between the level of CA and local support should be stressed to the local populace. These last steps of intelligence analysis, raids and contingent CA are repeated to eliminate the insurgent threat in the area. Once a constabulary is in place, and the local community shows support for the counterinsurgent forces while feeling safe, a move to next oil-spot is made.

The targeting process of this last phase is enemy oriented. Intelligence should drive the operational parameters, not the physical boundaries. The unique challenges of counterinsurgent operations require that operations follow the intelligence regardless of where it leads. Patience will be required to fully develop a target packet on an insurgent network. Similar to criminal investigations, counterinsurgent operations take a great amount of time to develop intelligence prior to acting. This may prove the hardest tenet to maintain.

The goal is to create formal and informal social controls in place of the use of suppressive force by counterinsurgent troops. Creation of a constabulary force from the local population provides security so the population feels free to speak while addressing their grievances. Civil Affairs projects will assist in the development of trust, but not in the normally misinterpreted manner of "hearts and minds." Civil Affairs should always be contingent of the assistance of the population.

A final note, that although the term phase is used throughout this article, the choice of the term phase is not intended to denote a lockstep methodology. The application of this tactical model will see the simultaneous conduct of every phase described above at one point or another. The driving concept behind the tactical cycle described above is the empowerment of the local population to act as a force multiplier. Heavy initial presence in a counterinsurgent operation may be required, but the intent is rapid growth of the social and intelligence networks so that operational effectiveness increases, while the counterinsurgent forces footprint decreases. The faster a counterinsurgent force can employ the local forces and co-opt social networks the faster a tipping point is achieved. With the success in one oil-spot, it becomes possible to move to the next, where word of initial success will already be spreading facilitating future successes.

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