



MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

CAPTAIN REN ANGELES

The need to measure the effectiveness of a campaign plan against an enemy is important on all levels of war but primarily at the operational and tactical level where tactical operations and close combat against the enemy are conducted. It is important to validate and measure the effectiveness of the courses of actions being employed against the enemy to find out what is working and what is lacking in order to defeat the enemy decisively. The primary goal or objective for a measure of effectiveness is to illustrate and validate the effects of a current course of action being employed to try to provide a picture of what works by asking questions such as:

- How is it working?
- How effective is it?
- What are the desired effects?
- What does not work?
- What is the local population's perception?


The military decision-making process (MDMP) is a good tool to employ in creating courses of actions against the enemy. It may provide a glimpse of the effects of the plan of action, but it will not fully lay out the result to provide a panoramic view of what is working on the ground and how it is being perceived by the local population. For this you would have to come up with a measure of effectiveness chart or scale that lays out and measure the courses of action, plan of actions or focus areas and their effects.

A key and effective tool in measuring the current progress or success of a campaign plan against an enemy is to have a measure of effectiveness (MOE) scale or chart that outlines courses of action and

or focus areas measuring or validating their effects. It is hard to quantify or validate in a measurable form the accuracy of the data using scientific methodology, but it is a good tool to employ as an azimuth check or measure of the effects of current operations against the enemy. The use and employment of such a chart may not be scientifically based due to the constraints and limitations on the battlefield. It is not feasible or achievable to quantify or validate the data scientifically, although site survey and local survey can be employed to validate some of the information, but the intent here is to gauge the local population's perception and the effects of operations and plan against the enemy. Given this data, units at the operational and tactical level can make the necessary changes and implement plans that will work against the enemy.

A gauge or an azimuth checks to see how effective the current plan is working or not, and will allow for making changes or improvement on current plans. It is really hard to quantify progress and success in the contemporary operational environment in Iraq. Those who have been there can attest to the fluidity of the situation, but there are measurable gains that can be quantified. Progress is being made on many fronts, but the obvious inability to put an end to the violent attacks is keeping the coalition forces and Iraqi government from creating a momentum of measurable progress. It is difficult for sustainable progress to take hold when the key ingredient for its growth — namely security — is not present.

Currently, the COE in Iraq has coalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces fighting an insurgency whose primary goal is to prevent the creation of a stable and unified government. The enemy's methodology is simply to terrorize and incite sectarian violence in order to prevent the organization of a unified government that is hoped to bring about change, freedom, and democracy in a land long bereft of hope. It would also serve as a beacon for the greater Middle East of what is possible in a free and



CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

Desired effect:

MOE:

Focus Areas:

Job Programs (S5):

Current Projects (S5):

Local Leaders engagement (S5):

Medical Outreach Programs (MEDO):

Future Projects (S5):

democratic society. So far the enemy has been effective in its goal of hindering measurable sustained progress by inciting violence, inflicting heavy casualties, and creating fear. The enemy has been effective in implementing its plan of projecting instability and uncertainty. It is not hard to quantify the enemy's effectiveness; the enemy has been successful in creating a perception of capability that is probably less effective or unsustainable in the long run, but because of its violent effects, he is able to mask his true capability, to be perceived as more effective than it may otherwise be. The enemy has a monopoly on the perception category due to his relentless violence.

Fighting against this type of enemy is very difficult to say the least, but it is not impossible to win. The employment of both lethal and nonlethal targets in the targeting process proves to be effective in fighting this type of warfare. The lethal targets are effective in neutralizing the enemy's capability to do harm against coalition and ISF forces, but they do not fully eliminate the threat as other individuals in the organization will move up to assume the mantle of leadership and continue with the fight. They can be effective in delaying enemy activity, but ultimately the enemy will reorganize and fight another day. The key is focusing on the nonlethal targets as well, engaging the Mukhtars, Imams, Sheiks, community leaders, business owners and local government officials. Establishing a relationship and fostering good will with local leaders and the populace at large goes a long way towards winning hearts and minds. The simple meet and greet while conducting daily combat patrols and cordon and knock operations with ISF forces goes a long way in building relationships and the perception of security. These operations not only help build the process of legitimization for ISF forces, but they can allow coalition forces to engage the population and find out firsthand the issues and concerns of citizens. Future Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Information Operation (IO) campaigns can be derived out of these engagements. The value of local leaders, particularly the secular ones, cannot be underestimated in the Iraqi society or Muslim society in general. Knowing what the Imams are preaching in their mosques can provide good indications of the current threats or situations in a particular neighborhood. Knowing the key players in the area of operations is helpful in providing answers to questions that have bearing on the daily life of the local population.

Issues such as electricity, fuel, and food shortage are problems that might need to be addressed. The impact of fixing these issues and concerns has a direct bearing on the overall success of the campaign. There is more than just one aspect to winning the fight against an insurgency. The tactical aspect and lethal targets help in the security aspect, but to win the war you have to succeed in winning the hearts and minds by providing hope for a better future.

IO and CMO are on equal footing with the tactical aspect. Success depends on these operations as much as any other aspect or phase, more so at times than the tactical aspect. Information Operations directed at countering the enemy's propaganda bear a lot of weight in the overall scheme of things. IO products such as hand bills, posters, billboards, banners, radio talk shows, TV and radio spots, and TV shows can be employed. The ability to shape and change the perceptions of the local populace is very important; putting out messages and themes to the public proves crucial, especially in the Iraqi culture where perception is almost everything. CMO projects that have immediate impact on the daily life of the local population have a measure of effectiveness that can be easily seen. Fuel, electricity, water and food distribution, job/work programs, key infrastructure reconstruction/upgrade, school supplies, heater distribution, medical outreach and neighborhood clean up are some projects that can be implemented that will bring desirable effects that can be easily verified. The combination of all has direct bearing in the overall success. Success on these aspects is critical towards achieving lasting success. Post-combat operations of IO/CMO are critical in the success of all operations directly influencing the fight.

Measuring or validating the effectiveness of a campaign plan provides an azimuth check on what is working and effective, facilitates change in the course of action and provides focus to changing conditions on the ground; without this it is hard to measure and sustain progress being made to defeat the enemy decisively.

SECURITY OPS

Desired effect:

MOE:

Focus Areas:

Iraqi Army (ISF cell):

Iraqi Police (PMO):

AIF attacks against IP stations (S2):

AIF attacks against TCP's (S2):

Intimidation against Government Officials (S5/S2):

Captain Ren Angeles is currently attending the Infantry Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. He previously served as a battle captain for Task Force 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), during the unit's deployment to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom III.