

FOCUSED OPERATIONS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME IN A MATURE PEACE OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT

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“Organized crime constitutes nothing less than a guerilla war against society.”

— President Lyndon B. Johnson

The Insidiousness of Organized Crime

Conditions in a peace operations environment allow for the robust application of conventional forces toward information collection. This collection could be focused against organized crime (OC) in a manner that allows the continual exploitation and reduction of OC as an obstacle to societal progress. While the daily activities against OC are typically police actions, the long term effect of OC poses a substantial threat to a safe and secure environment, and the growth of a stable government and economy. It is imperative that leaders in peacekeeping missions understand the nature, environment, and targeting of organized crime.

In peacekeeping operations, intelligence is the most vital of all commodities. It drives all operations, and all operations should be conducted, at least in part, to gain more of it. As conditions in both Iraq and Afghanistan evolve and move toward a future of peace operations the Army would do well to look forward and reexamine the conduct of such missions. Currently, the best example of how Iraq and Afghanistan may look in a few years is Kosovo. Admittedly, the cultural differences are many, but the multinational environment focused on maintaining the peace and assisting civil rebirth is likely to be very similar to an Iraq of the future. It is important for leaders at both the tactical and operational levels to understand some of the particular dynamics of that situation, which of these pose the greatest threats to civil instability, and how to combat them.

In peace operations the situation is often ripe for the success of OC. A number of particular conditions exist, beyond the obvious lack of police support and other corrupt individuals who would support OC. A fundamental understanding of these environmental conditions will prove helpful to commanders as they array their formations to enforce the peace.


OC is not a problem that

affects *only* the economics or politics, or legal systems, or reconstruction efforts of a region; it affects *all* of them. In the former Soviet states OC has become an integral part of the economy and is a tremendous hindrance to their emergence into the modern political and economic world. Pervasive OC has a number of effects. Fundamentally it prevents the growth of legitimate economy where legitimate businesses compete for business and the laws of capitalism and economics govern the market. This symbiotic relationship is the building block for many other functions.

Legitimate businesses establish a link of accountability with the government, according to Fareed Zakaria in his book *The Future of Freedom*. That linkage functions as such: businesses grow and generate revenues, these revenues have a multiplier effect, and all of that income generated is taxed by the government. By levying taxes the government then becomes accountable to the business class who can rightfully demand improved transportation networks, security, beneficial trade policy, and many other ways in which a government enables economic growth.

OC networks do not operate within this framework. OC proceeds are largely cash and are not taxed. They do not compete fairly, but rather contribute to the growth of markets that operate outside of honest capitalism. They contribute to instability and insecurity which discourages foreign investment (a staple of ignition for emerging nations). In order to protect their interests they can very easily corrupt the law enforcement and legal systems due to the meager wages often paid to public servants, and particularly so in emerging nations.

Without question an ineffective or corrupt judiciary prevents the function of legitimate rule of law. In addition to not meting out just punishment it brings discredit upon the local police. The average



citizen, who sees a wrongdoer arrested and then back on the street days or hours later, makes the connection that the government did not do its job. Oftentimes, the populace lacks a fundamental understanding of the particulars that govern the functioning of the system, and the laws by which the police must abide. A judicial system that cannot or will not prosecute offenders not only keeps dangerous individuals on the street, but lessens the power of the police in the public's eyes, according to Cesar Beccaria's 1764 work *On Crimes and Punishments*. This perception has a cumulative and negative effect on the perceived ability of the policing arm, and begins to make their job that much more difficult.

Oftentimes a judiciary fails due to internal corruption, or on a more practical level, because of the sheer caseload. Lack of experience in managing dockets, controlling evidence legitimacy, and enforcing distinctions between hearsay and testimony all contribute to the practical failings of emerging judicial systems. Societies emerging from upheaval and under control of international organizations or multinational coalitions are often at the behest of many masters, and are subject to complex processes and regulations. Additionally, political infighting, which often goes unchecked as outsiders try to either allow the process owners to solve their own problems or smooth political feathers, slows the appointment of judges or resolution of cases. The actions of the judiciary are often guided by other forces related to OC. It is possible for the OC groups to intimidate judges, or simply buy a favorable decision. Whatever the reason, the real result is a negative perception of the local police as the judicial system often struggles to keep up with the caseload and overcome the corrupting influences of OC.

When a government does not or cannot provide for its citizens, people will work outside the system. This is a fundamental breach of social contract theory. Social contract theory posits that individuals in a society subjugate their individual rights in return for security and a better society. This idea is an underlying premise in the governmental system of most developed nations. States in transition often function in a breach of this contract. For states that have been struggling to emerge out of the third world, even the average person is forced to commit minor crimes simply to get by; buying black or grey market goods, paying a police officer or official to process paperwork, or paying an inspector to overlook a minor deficiency are but a few examples. Thus, people become complicit in the corruption, and corrupt themselves. This activity becomes so ingrained in the daily fabric of life that "organized criminals" are often thought of as simply efficient and organized businessmen. Moreover, the populace becomes dependent on the black or grey market goods and services, and actions taken against organized crime negatively impact the populace's standard of living. While most of these same people would otherwise favor the rule of law, their need to maintain what is often a minimal standard of living trumps that preference. This type of corruption can be characterized as "functional corruption" wherein people pay for an illegal product or service. In emerging nations this is often viewed as capitalism. This is in contrast to "dysfunctional corruption" where officials are bribed or coerced into looking the

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other way while an OC violates a fellow citizen's personal or property rights. The key difference between functional and dysfunctional corruption is the introduction of a victim.

One of the hallmarks of a legitimate government and system of justice is the monopoly of the use of force to enforce law or government policy, according to the article "Mature Peacekeeping Operations as Facilitators of Organized Crime" by Irv Marucelj. A notable example of a government failing to maintain this power is in the case of the Columbian government

and the narcotics kingpin Pablo Escobar. If a government does not have the mandate and ability to utilize overwhelming force then OC can violently exert themselves to fill this vacuum. This becomes particularly dangerous when the government that is usurped by OC is going through a period of transition of limited sovereignty ("Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Security" by William L. Smith).

In emerging societies OC often maintains the ability to use force to settle disputes with the local populace, other criminals, businessmen, and law enforcement and government authorities. This ability to use force, without fear of judicial retribution, can range from direct action attacks to the threat of force against business rivals and judicial figures.

This situation is brought about by the weaknesses of governmental authorities as described above, and is exacerbated by the ubiquity of weapons. The ownership and use of weapons is in all likelihood not a new phenomenon. Likely, previous governments or regimes were unable to protect the populace who were thus forced to arm themselves for various reasons. This goes hand in hand with the pervasive public attitude that selective lawbreaking is an accepted part of life. This fact, coupled with the reality that a fallen totalitarian regime can lead to a loss of control of weapons accountability, lead to a situation where weapon possession is a part of daily life.

In many respects OC operates just as a legitimate business, and the public often sees it as such. This creates a number of additional hurdles. In terms of economic and business theory, OC moves into markets where there is both a customer and a need. OC fulfills that need; after all, nature abhors a vacuum. OC experiences a growth cycle like a normal business, and becomes integrated into the economy. As they grow they seek to set favorable conditions for their success by currying the favor of politicians and decision makers. Unlike legitimate business, OC violates the "felicitation principle" wherein the aim of laws and governance is to give the greatest happiness to the largest number of people in a society. Instead, OC is self-serving, closed to outsiders, and focuses on the baser desires of its markets. Just as legitimate businesses carry goods in inventory, so do OC groups. Typically this inventory expands beyond legitimate products and into narcotics, prostitution, protection rackets, counterfeiting, and theft of intellectual property.

One of the largest obstacles to overcome in terms of a successful information operations campaign, against both the criminals and the populace, is the notion that criminality is acceptable as a way of life, and is in fact a necessity to a life of any worthwhile quality. In the example of Kosovo, and the former Yugoslavia in general, it is the widely held belief that the government should provide the

necessities such as electricity and water. When the government fails to provide these things, the average person can more easily rationalize turning to the black or grey market or other nefarious methods; he might think, "The government isn't helping me so I have to help myself." This mindset becomes so pervasive that criminal networks have literally "incorporated" it.

Just like any entrepreneur, organized crime networks are drawn to good markets. However, a good market to a criminal entrepreneur includes both a good market (i.e. a place where a seller meets the needs of a buyer) and certain favorable market conditions such as a weak judiciary and a populace willing to conduct business. Such market conditions often exist where there is an ambiguity of law enforcement responsibilities, or during a period of transition to increased sovereignty. Once in these markets the growth of organized crime networks will go through a growth cycle much the same as a legitimate business.

Such businesses may arise from local criminal entrepreneurs who see an opportunity in their local area, from established criminal networks within the region, or worldwide (i.e. Chinese gangs in New York). This influx of criminal outsiders is not unlike the globalization of legitimate businesses. This criminal globalization takes place using the same tools and systems, namely ease of

worldwide travel and the advantages of information technology that connect the globe. Once established in an area, criminals will set up supply chain and distribution systems, carve out, and expand their markets. They will continue to expand and solidify their market share against criminal competitors, law enforcement, and military forces conducting peacemaking or peacekeeping operations.

They will do this through both legal and illegal methods. They will compete traditionally in terms of price and meeting legitimate and illegitimate needs of buyers. They will also hedge their investment using strong arm techniques from general thuggery, including menacing, coercion, assaults, outright attacks, and intimidation against all parts of a competitor's supply and distribution chain. An atmosphere of fear is established so that these tactics, along with solidifying their sway with leaders, ensures that they will retain the freedom to grow and run their business.

The lobby business in Washington is a multibillion-dollar industry. Any major corporation hoping to successfully compete will seek to influence the conditions that affect its business environment. Pfizer spends huge sums attempting to gain favorable rulings from lawmakers, and Wal-Mart has spent many a day in city board meetings trying to alter local zoning laws. In fact, third world criminal networks

are rank amateurs when it comes to gaining political or legal ruling favorable to business. However, the big difference is revealed when it comes to methods. It is safe to say that Ford Motor Company has not fired an RPG through a judge's window to gain a favorable ruling in a lawsuit. Admittedly, in developed nations there are those who engage in extreme and illegal acts to gain favorable political actions. However, they are on the extreme fringe of the normal pattern of business. In an environment characterized by ongoing peace operations, criminals maintain the threat or actual application of force as a tool to achieve their political and legal ends. Although their means may differ from the accepted standards in the U.S. or Europe, the goal of an OC group is the same as a legitimate businessman; the acquisition of wealth.

Despite looking and acting like a legitimate business, OC is, in fact, a cancer that prevents the growth of that very thing they pretend to be. Understanding this fact and the impact of OC is the first step toward building a plan to combat it.

Conditions for kinetic intelligence collection

In contrast to the operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, troops in Kosovo and other peace operations enjoy relative freedom of maneuver; currently referred to



Author's photos

A car belonging to individuals associated with criminal activity is searched by Kosovo Police Service officers under the watch of Kosovo Force (KFOR) Soldiers in Letnica, Kosovo.

as a permissive environment. There is little risk or cost associated with a mission anywhere in the region, as the likelihood of direct attack is next to nil. This freedom of action creates the conditions that are ripe for collection against OC.

The chance of any criminal launching any type of attack against peacekeeping forces is extremely unlikely for a number of reasons. OC thrives on blending into the population and being invisible to military forces, who are often concerned with other threats as well. Criminals maintain this anonymity by fully cooperating, almost to the level of patronizing, with the military forces. To launch an attack would be bring a storm of attention that would negatively impact their business in the worst possible way. Moreover, OC factions lack the manpower and firepower to overcome military forces in a protracted fight. Worse for them, to do so could likely taint their reputation within the local populace, on whom they rely to sustain their business. This is particularly true in Kosovo where KFOR is held in high regard by many of the Albanian majority. It is often in the OC group's best interest to simply wait for the peacekeeping forces to forget about the group and move on to other missions.

Forces available to the commander in modern peace operations are often limited. Peace operations, by their nature, are manpower intensive. Coupled with increasing political pressure to get troops home as soon as the combat phase of operations has ended, in peace operations commanders must fight with an economy of force. Despite a high troop-to-task ratio, conventional forces can be dedicated to intelligence collection.

The term "presence patrol" has made its way into the military vernacular. While some would argue that "reconnaissance and surveillance" patrol is a more accurate term, the fact is many patrols are merely presence. Presence patrols reassure both potential wrongdoers and the law-abiding populace that their remote location has not been forgotten. While these patrol leaders have been briefed on their collection requirements, those requirements usually take a backseat to presence.

By sending patrols to actively collect, the focus of the patrol leader and its members is on intelligence. One successful method to ensure the destruction of the "presence-patrolling" mind-set is by conducting longer patrols that give the leader more latitude. For example, a patrol is given 72 hours to collect five basic pieces of information on a specified OC-related high-value target (HVT). This technique gives the leader the freedom to move when and where he sees fit, and is loosened from the constraints of a six-hour patrol. By focusing on the intelligence target rather than time spent in a certain place, patrols will be present over a wide area, while still gaining valuable intelligence.

One concern is that the patrols will begin to try to take on the characteristics of a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT). To mitigate this risk the patrol leader is thoroughly briefed on the specific requirements that the patrol can collect on without crossing over. Soldiers must be trained on the techniques of tactical questioning, use of interpreters, and overt and covert LP/Ops. As always, the targets selected must be nested within the collection emphasis and meet the commander's intent.

The ability to orient patrols on a long term intelligence objective is a luxury enjoyed less in combat environments than in peace operations. Conventional troops patrolling in Baghdad have far less ability to focus on an intelligence target because they are not

afforded the ability to move with relative impunity. The very ubiquity of soldiers and military vehicles that move freely around a mature peacekeeping environment allows soldiers focused on an intelligence objective to hide in plain sight. This ability in conjunction with the greatly reduced risk of attack grants the freedom of movement that is necessary for an intelligence oriented patrol.

Targeting Organized Crime

The identification of an organized crime element by uniformed peacekeepers begins by earning the trust of the local populace. Upon arriving in theater the primary task of any unit should be to get their soldiers talking to the local populace. Doing this achieves many goals. It initiates, through effective dialogue, relationships between the peacekeeper and populace. This personal involvement demonstrates the peacekeepers' resolve, and by talking face to face with the peacekeeper, preconceived notions can be dispelled through respectful yet candid dialogue. Over time if these conversations are managed effectively and occur on a consistent basis, they will result in a willingness of the populace to begin to inform the peacekeepers about security threats in their area. This is especially true if they see that the peacekeepers are taking an active role in undermining the authority of OC elements.

Consistently developing useful and constructive relationships with the populace requires discipline from the Soldiers and requires leaders to explain the mission completely. Patrols remain *focused events* and do not evolve into routine events where individual Soldiers are simply going through the motions. Additionally, all information that Soldiers collect must be passed higher for fusion with previously collected information. That information can be analyzed and used to drive follow-on missions. Soldiers given actionable intelligence and a meaningful mission will perform splendidly. Conversely, it should surprise no one that when soldiers are given "cookie cutter" lists of things to look for and vague missions, these soldiers will begin to go through the motions, especially as long deployments wear on.

Over time the peacekeeper can develop a good rapport with the local populace. Both soldiers speaking to average people, or leaders engaging Spheres of Influence (SOI), need to be cognizant of the subtle signs that locals want to talk discreetly about topics. When dealing with organized crime elements retaliation can be severe against individuals who assist peacekeepers or law enforcement. As such, care needs to be taken when discussing such matters with the locals. Collecting information from the local national about the OC group in as detailed a manner as possible uses the 5W's and H principle (who, what, when, where, why, and how). Upon receiving this information it is incumbent to corroborate the information provided. Some items to consider are whether the information was provided by a disgruntled neighbor, a competitor, or if it is a genuine concern. Additionally, how should this person be handled during follow on visits? Is it safe for the local to continue to talk with uniformed peacekeepers about this topic, or does this person need to be handed off to THTs which have a lower profile than the uniformed soldier? Two key questions that will drive the decision regarding how to handle this local will be what the likely threat to this local is if the OC element discovers the transfer of information, and will it look unusual for soldiers to be speaking with this individual? Again, if it is decided

to continue collection on the local populace using conventional assets, leaders need to insure that their soldiers clearly understand the legal limitations placed on non-HUMINT collectors. The bottom line is all soldiers can talk to the populace and ask direct questions. However, non-HUMINT collectors cannot task, recruit, or coerce, according to Special Text 2-91.6, *Small Unit Support to Intelligence*.

In developing a better picture of the organized crime group, key questions need to be answered. From the perspective of operations and intelligence officers in a permissive theater one of the most important questions to answer is whether the local government/ law enforcement is willing and/or able to effectively combat/confront the OC element. A collection plan is required to answer this question.

The first question when considering a strategy to target OC must be "Can the local government confront this problem on their own?" If they have the capability, then continue to guide them in that direction. If this is not possible then leaders must determine what needs to be done so the local government can eventually confront this problem. In determining a course of action key questions about the local government, judiciary, military, and police force need to be answered to determine how to proceed. Is the local government, or elements of it, willing to confront the OC element but paralyzed by the fear of retaliation? Are parts of the government and/or police force assisting the OC element? If law enforcement is in collaboration with OC, which other parts of the government can be reasonably expected to assist? A detailed collection plan needs to be developed to learn who one can and can not work within the government to remove or reduce the threat posed by the OC element. Techniques that can be used to collect information on the local government are:

1. *Periodic meetings with local government and police to gauge their ability to confront the OC threat*
2. *Observation by patrols on how the police conduct themselves in regards to the OC threat*
3. *Conversations with the local populace to determine their opinions about the local government and police force's ability to confront the OC threat.*

The end state of this collection is a better understanding of whom one can and can not work with inside the local police force. Additionally, it will likely be determined that some individuals within the police force are colluding with the OC element and therefore need to be targeted. There are multiple ways to target these individuals and each approach depends on the specifics of the situation and the ROE.

As previously mentioned, the monopoly of the threat of force is a fundamental pillar of a legitimate law enforcement structure. When the threat of force by OC groups becomes so extreme as to be a fundamental impediment to a safe and secure environment, it then becomes a military problem to be confronted by peacekeepers. When developing an OC targeting and

collection plan part of the critical path must include a system to give to the local government a monopoly on the threat of force. The following plan is proposed.

Disrupt/Deceive/Inform/Influence

One cautionary note before beginning any disruption operation: insure that prior to targeting individuals or businesses that your information has been corroborated by at least two sources of intelligence and ideally by different types of intelligence disciplines (i.e. imagery intelligence, HUMINT, etc.).

The first step in restoring the local authorities' monopoly on the threat of force may be for a peacekeeping force to degrade the OC element. This will not often be as simple as acting on intelligence and capturing an individual. The ROE will likely forbid such straightforward solutions because in mature peacekeeping environments a large degree of sovereignty has been handed back to the local authorities. This alone restricts the peacekeepers ROE. An OC member can be captured and handed over to the local police only to be released because of corrupt and/or frightened prosecutors and/or judges. The answer to this peacekeeping challenge may be to conduct overt disruption operations on the OC element in conjunction with an aggressive information operations campaign targeting the local populace, police, and judiciary.

The purpose for the overt disruption operations directed against the OC element is multifaceted. The first is the reduction of the invincible image that the local populace and police force may have of the OC element. Each disruption is also an intelligence collecting opportunity. The third purpose is to co-opt OC to do what you want them to do. By making your disruption seem like a cause and effect scenario (i.e. if the criminal stops threatening other people, the peacekeepers will stop disruption of his business) you can effectively shape some of his actions. The final purpose is to enter his decision cycle, forcing him to take actions in reaction to the actions of the peacekeeping forces,



A 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment Soldier stands watch inside an establishment known as a haven for criminals in Klokott, Kosovo.

not the other way around. Furthermore, effectively focused operations should hurt the OC element financially, thus driving up the cost of doing business. Finally, the purpose for the Information Operations (IO) campaign is an explanation to the local populace why they had to be inconvenienced during an operation. These encounters demonstrate resolve to confront this criminal problem and encourage the local populace and police to stand up against the OC element.

Effectively targeting OC elements requires an understanding of their center of gravity (COG). The COG for OC is most often profit. Rarely are OC groups ideals-based. Even in Iraq criminal gangs are beginning to emerge. Their actions are driven by profit, not religious zeal. Money is the driver which makes all other things possible for OC; it allows them to sustain themselves, and to keep their enterprises functioning. Money also allows them to buy political favor outright, or buy the tools and weapons that allow them to coerce favorable actions. Material possessions beget power and prestige with communities that often have very little. Negatively impacting OC groups' cash flow can have a very profound effect on the organization as a whole, and should be a major action undertaken by peacekeepers within the ROE.

To effectively target this type of organization the peacekeeper needs to understand how the OC element functions. Identify how the OC operation works and look for opportunities to disrupt those operations. OC elements typically operate in a reverse cycle. This presents peacekeepers with a window of time during normal day operations to target OC groups in their rest cycle and denying them the opportunity to rest and tend to family issues; tired criminals are careless criminals. This opportunity as well as night operations aimed at impacting the places of business of OC groups present the peacekeepers and law enforcement authorities multiple options. To determine the best option, or operational mix of the two, leaders must consider the situation as a whole.

Do the OC elements have legitimate businesses that act as a

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front for their illicit operations? If business fronts are identified they can be targeted to both disrupt operations and collect intelligence on those establishments. Restaurants, bars, and factories are a few examples of legitimate business fronts that OC elements can use to conceal their illicit activities. These business fronts can act as meeting locations as well. During disruption operations these businesses can be effectively shut down for hours during a search, or days with the use of posted peacekeepers preventing access, depending on the desired effect on the OC element.

Upon entering one of these




Soldiers examine and catalog large amounts of cash discovered during disruption operations aimed against organized crime in Kosovo.

establishments as part of a disruption team, all individuals need to be tactically questioned and photographed to develop a baseline of information regarding who possibly associates with the OC element. The photography is particularly important as it serves to both document and intimidate the OC figures. Next, the establishment needs to be searched to exploit any incriminating documents or reveal concealed grey or black market goods. Additionally, messages need to be delivered to the suspected OC members and a separate message to individuals that may have just been caught up the disruption operations. The message to the OC members can be used to inform, influence, or deceive. In addition to the verbal or written messages delivered, the mere presence of peacekeepers during the disruption operation will send a nonverbal message to the OC members and the local populace alike. The message to individuals who may have just been incidentally caught up in the operations is needed to explain why the peacekeepers conducted this operation. This message is needed to mitigate some of the 2nd and 3rd order effects associated with conducting such aggressive operations.

The timing and frequency of these disruption operations can be used as a leverage to influence behavior of the OC members or group. Disruption operations will drive away customers and employees and this fact needs to be used against the OC element. The desired result of disruption operations directed against these establishments demonstrates peacekeeper resolve to the local populace and police force, and publicly degrades the OC element's standing in the community.

It is also useful to examine the transportation networks that the OC element uses to move their grey and black market goods. A holistic, production to customer, approach needs to be taken to determine how OC elements transport their grey and black market goods. Pieces of the OC logistics network to be evaluated are: production facilities, post production cache sites, intermodal transportation methods, cross border transportation methods, long range transportation methods, consolidation/deconsolidation cache sites, and customer pick up points. Each one of these logistic nodes needs to



A Soldier with the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment examines and catalogs information from cell phones during disruption operations aimed against organized crime in Kosovo.

be evaluated to identify vulnerabilities for exploitation. The goal is to drive up the cost of doing business for the OC element through intelligence driven disruption operations of their logistics network. When crime no longer pays, it will stop.

It is vital to identify the individuals that work for or help prop up the OC group. Conversations with the local populace and the police force, and observation of suspected OC frequented establishments enhances the knowledge base of which individuals are involved with the OC element. Once OC members are identified, attempt to limit their freedom of movement and collect additional information such as: vehicle description, work location, home location, times at work and at home, and a photo of the individual. This information can be used in follow on missions directed against this individual.

Reassessment

Periodic reassessment of both OC capabilities and local authorities' reaction to disruption operations is necessary. If local authorities' actions directed against the OC element have increased, the peacekeeping task force needs to decrease disruption operations accordingly. In conjunction with the reduction in disruption operations the peacekeeper should continue to periodically assess local authorities' ability to confront this threat. However, if local authorities' actions directed against OC threat do NOT increase, then develop a collection plan to determine why not. Has the OC element been sufficiently degraded that the local police can confidently confront them? Upon reassessment, increase disruption operations in conjunction with I/O messages. Is the leadership

within the police force colluding with the OC element and therefore no amount of degradation of the OC element will spur action from the police force? While working within the ROE of that specific theatre, determine a plan targeting the police officers who are colluding with the OC element. There may be an international organization (i.e. UN, EU, etc) which provides oversight for local police and other government officials. If this is the case, attempt to coordinate with oversight officers to apply additional pressure on the local police. Each theatre will be different in regards to the degree sovereignty has been handed over to the local police force and what powers the international community retains. Apply that power to bring additional pressure on the local police force to reprimand, fire, or arrest suspected corrupt police officers or leadership. Finally, messages directed at the local populace regarding the societal threat that organized crime also applies pressure on the local police force to act. Be careful not to undermine the police force. The 2nd and 3rd order effects of publicly identifying corrupt police officers will likely outweigh the benefits gained by outing this corrupt officer.

The reassessment and adjustment cycle will continue based on local authorities' abilities and OC threat. If progress slows or stops a return to implementing phase one (disrupt/deceive/inform/influence) may be required.

The long term endstate is local government regaining a monopoly on the threat of force. This is a strategic level achievement. On a battalion or brigade level, positive movement toward that endstate during the course of a deployment is a reasonable goal. Setbacks should be expected during this long and incremental process. Persistence is the keystone to success. Although the peacekeeping force is capable of dealing with the OC threat in the short term, it is imperative that the local authorities become more involved in combating the OC threat. Successful progression towards an exit strategy requires the peacekeeper to constantly seek opportunities to get the local authorities involved.

Conclusion

Organized crime's pervasiveness reaches all aspects of an emerging state. Leaders in a peacekeeping mission must understand the effect of this enemy on a free and healthy society — both political and economic. Despite the challenges of a peacekeeping mandate, certain conditions do exist to effectively target OC. By understanding OC as a business, it is possible to craft a targeting and collection cycle that not only strikes the heart of that business but also targets its enablers. As the hotspots of today's conflict slowly cool and turn toward a more permissive state, Army leaders would do well to keep abreast of the lessons from today's situation in Kosovo as a handrail for tomorrow's operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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A list of references for this article is on file with *Infantry Magazine*.
