

# Center For Army Lessons Learned L2I ANALYSTS ASSIST WITH INFORMATION REQUESTS

ROBERT A. CHARLES AND GREGORY VALRIE



The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has strategically located a network of Lessons Learned Integration (L2I) analysts throughout the continental United States and abroad. The concept is for this network of military analysts to expedite the flow of information/lessons learned which is critical during the global war on terrorism. The L2I initiative is foremost about people networking and collaborating together rather than individuals searching to find information. If you are not already aware, a team of L2I analysts is currently assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia. The three-man cell arrived at Fort Benning in late August 2006 and were located within the Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate (CATD) in Building 4, Room 445. The primary function of the L2I analysts is to support both the United States Army Infantry Center (USAIC) and Fort Benning. Throughout the past several months we have discovered that there is a tremendous number of Soldiers who are not familiar with CALL or the L2I program.

## KNOWLEDGE IS POWER

During several CALL briefings and CALL Web site train-the-trainer classes that were given to Soldiers at Fort Benning, the L2I analysts discovered an alarming pattern — many Soldiers were not informed about CALL, an organization that has been in existence since 1985. This may be due to the fact that the Center for Army Lessons Learned is located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In October 2006, a survey was conducted at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) by fellow L2I analysts (Scott Gould/Colin Anderson). The survey, which covered 113 students (sergeants through sergeants first class who were attending Phase II Battle Staff NCO Course) revealed:

- 50 percent of these Soldiers had no previous knowledge or use of CALL;
- 74 percent of these Soldiers had never used any of CALL's services; and
- 98 percent of these Soldiers had never submitted a request for information (RFI).

A series of Center for Army Lessons Learned briefings were created to educate Soldiers on CALL, and these briefings have been given to Soldiers in the Warrior Leaders Course (WLC), Basic NCO Course (BNCOC), Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC), CATD, as well as officer and NCO Professional Development classes. If your unit would like to receive the Center for Army Lessons Learned brief or the train-the-trainer briefing on how to

utilize the CALL Web site, contact the Infantry Center L2I analysts using the contact information listed on page 46.

## CALL PRODUCTS

Since September 11, 2001, the Center for Army Lessons Learned has produced 451 publications. CALL publishes several categories of publications including:

**Handbooks** — “How-to” manuals on specific subjects (e.g., *Soldiers' Handbook: The First 100 Days*, *Base Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*)

**Newsletters** — Publications that address a specific subject (e.g., convoy operations, etc.)

**Special Studies/Editions** — Publications related to a specific operation, exercise, or subject. These publications generally provide information on topics ranging from a country's history in relation to current events, cultural do's and don'ts, language, and environmental cautions, to tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and emerging doctrine.

**JOIB (Joint Operations Integration Branch) Bulletins** — Publications that showcase articles which encompass all aspects of war fighting at the operational to strategic level.

**CTC Quarterly Bulletins and Trends** — Periodic publications that provide current lessons, TTPs, and information from the Combat Training Centers.

**News From the Front** — News From the Front is a bimonthly online publication that contains information and lessons on exercises and real-world events.

**CTC Tips For Success** — Tips extracted from reports compiled at the Center for Army Lessons Learned from recent rotations at the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

**Training Techniques** — Online publications that provide training techniques and procedures collected or sent to the Center for Army Lessons Learned by units, commands, Combat Training Centers, Soldiers and leaders.

## DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

The L2I analysts disseminate information/lessons learned on a daily basis. This information primarily consists of observation/insight/lesson (OIL) and TTPs. The analysts “push” this information to Infantry Center units and directorates through e-mail, compact discs, and paper copies. The primary search for information for daily dissemination of information is conducted through a search on the internal L2I SharePoint Site. This Web site is available for

access by L2I analysts only. All information on the site has been screened by the Center for Army Lessons Learned Hub and validated prior to the release of information.

**REQUEST FOR INFORMATION**

The most common way for L2I analysts to support the Infantry Center is by answering requests for information. An RFI occurs whenever a Soldier has a military question that they cannot find the answer to. The Soldier should contact an L2I analyst who will research the question and also notify the L2I network of military analysts which expedites the information gathering process. Generally, the RFI is answered within 72 hours or less. It is important to note that any Soldier can initiate an RFI. The Center of Army Lessons Learned Web site (<http://call.army.mil>) is a great source of information for Soldiers of all ranks. There is a phenomenal amount of information available on a broad range of military subject areas.

Fort Benning L2I analysts contact information:

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**Robert A. Charles** is a retired Infantry first sergeant with more than 22 years of service. His assignments included serving with the 82nd Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, 3rd Ranger Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the Infantry Training Brigade with the 2nd Battalion, 58th Infantry Regiment and 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment. He is now employed as a contractor for Eagle Systems & Services, Inc., where he serves as a military analyst at the U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia.

**Gregory Valrie** is a retired Armor first sergeant with more than 24 years of service. He is a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom 1 where he served with 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment as a tank platoon sergeant (C Company), and OIF 3 where he served as a first sergeant of a tank company (C Company) with 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment. He is now employed as a contractor for Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), where he serves as a military analyst at the U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning.

# COMBATIVES!

## Do We Train As We Fight?

CAPTAIN JOSH COLLINS

*This article first appeared in the Summer 2007 issue of the Infantry Bugler.*

An Infantry Soldier enters a building and is immediately confronted by an angry, unarmed man who yells defiant obscenities in his native tongue. The Soldier closes the distance and tells the man to get on the ground. The two collide. The Soldier takes him to the ground as he has been trained to do, but something goes wrong. The man flails and resists and the Soldier's teammates descend upon the entangled pair. As they struggle, the resistant noncombatant's hand finds its way to a fragmentation grenade on the Soldier's equipment. The unthinkable happens.

**The Current Army Combatives Program**

The purpose of combatives training as identified in Chapter 1-2 of FM 3-25.150 (*Combatives*) is to prepare Soldiers "to use different levels of force in an environment

where conflict may change from low intensity to high intensity over a matter of hours. Many military operations, such as peacekeeping missions or noncombatant evacuations, may restrict the use of deadly weapons. Hand-to-hand combatives training will save lives when an unexpected confrontation occurs." The next paragraph states that, "More importantly, combatives training helps to instill courage and self-confidence."

In terms of accomplishing the greater purpose, the Army Combatives School does just that. During Phase I training, it presents a comprehensive program of Gracie Jiu-Jitsu that is easy to learn, effective for rules-based ground fighting and requires minimal resources for training. This accomplishes the greater purpose of instilling courage and self-confidence, but ironically does not address the lesser purpose, which is more combat-oriented.

Level II and III training at the Combatives School elevate drastically in intensity. Level III teaches advanced fighting techniques and styles, such as striking, kicking, knife fighting, stick fighting and



*Staff Sergeant Jay Hilliard, left, assists Iraqi Army soldiers during combatives training in Mosul.*

Specialist Christa Martin

more advanced grappling. The school successfully creates confident, tough Soldiers. However, the realistic operational skill sets — weapons retention while controlling a noncombatant or captured combatant, nonlethal techniques in crowd control, and traffic control point procedures for removing unwilling passengers from their vehicles — are not addressed. The Level III program addresses some close quarters battle (CQB)-related combatives tactics, but the premise is still the same — grappling.

As Soldiers, the combative drills we adhere to and the methodologies by which we train prepare us for today's battlefield. The premise behind our combatives training is the belief that many fights end up on the ground. The training is hampered, however, by the fact that we train without the equipment we use on the battlefield. The dangers of sticking to a "go-to-the-ground" mentality are only learned when the Soldier finds himself in a personal defense situation with more than one assailant, or worse yet on the ground with a noncombatant who is not encumbered by 60 pounds of gear. Ultimately, we are not preparing for combat if we do not simulate the combat environment during training.

### **Combatives on the Modern Battlefield**

We train in the art of hand combatives for at least three reasons: to prepare to defend ourselves in unarmed (hand-to-hand) combat as a form of personal protection, to instill an aggressive spirit and the Warrior Ethos and to execute CQB in a way that mandates Soldiers use nonlethal force as a means to control the actions of a noncombatant.

If we agree that the most beneficial aspect of a combatives program is its potential value in the CQB arena, then we must create a program that fits the tactics and techniques used for CQB. Training in both stand-up and ground-fighting methods provides a base for opponent takedowns, prisoner control, pressure point control tactics (PPCT), and weapons retention. The majority of training should focus on the stand-up approach while maintaining mobility and centering on the use of explosive aggression. Though most fights and prisoner control situations will end with someone on the ground, they all begin standing up, as does CQB.

### **A CQB-Focused Combatives Program**

Combining the combatives and CQB training during simulation exercises (using paint ball rounds) is not a new concept. Incorporating exercises that provide accurate advanced MOUT techniques (AMT) environmental simulation with human (role player) response adds a new dynamic to the training. These exercises, called Absolute Combatives Training Scenarios (ACTS), require role players to interact, each outfitted in combatives protective equipment, called High Gear. ACTS replicates the AMT environment by incorporating combatants and noncombatants who are aggressive, resistant, passive or immediately compliant. The Soldier reacts, discriminates, and responds based not only on whether the target is a threat (weapon present), but on the demeanor and behavior of noncombatants. Putting both bad guys and good guys into the same protective gear eliminates the "red man suit" artificiality, which exists anytime a Soldier comes to a room where

someone is wearing this gear and immediately shifts into a combatives mode. This type of discrimination (as it relates to a noncombatant) is uniform-based, as opposed to a more realistic behavior-based assessment.

During these exercises, Soldiers are able to practice combatives techniques in tandem with their CQB tactics. In role player education, genuine human reaction is crucial. Consequently, this type of training not only amplifies our tactical expertise, but also is cost effective (initial cost of the High Gear suits). Founded upon lessons learned during successful contingency operations around the world, ACTS create a fluid environment where the Soldier will shift gears based on threat, situational

*Staff Sergeant Gaylord Reese, bottom, attempts a submission hold on Specialist Robert Johnson during combatives training in Iraq. The Soldiers are with the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment.*

Specialist Christa Martin



awareness and target demeanor.

Army-taught jiu-jitsu provides the Army an inexpensive and efficient way to train hand-to-hand techniques; however, does jiu-jitsu alone satisfy the criteria for feasible control options during a military operation while wearing 50-60 pounds of Kevlar vest, ammunition and equipment? We must train as we fight.

### The Combatives Environment

The combatives environment, as it relates to the Soldier, is defined as the use of one's total body, armed or unarmed, to defend against, control, manipulate or eliminate the threat of a hostile opponent by physically imposing one's will onto another. Merging sound combative principles and techniques with more realistic training, (i.e. combatives training in full gear), leads to a better chance for success in a true life situation.

The fundamentals for "the stand-up approach" are the groundwork for training. The first priority of a victorious fighter is to become proficient in the initial phase of any fight — the standing phase. More importantly, a combatives situation that goes to the ground during CQB is not one in which a Soldier must fight alone; CQB is a team sport.

When the combatives environment includes armed opposition, as in CQB, it is imperative for Soldiers to stay on their feet. Even where the threat is eliminated, there still may be a need to control a frightened hostage or resistant noncombatant. Many of the same principles from unarmed hand combat transpose into armed hand combat, i.e. the instinctive use of straight, fast and effective blows to move someone out of the path or to put him on the ground. Defensive principles change slightly according to specific tactics used and with respect to the particular armor that is worn.

The most powerful aspect of CQB is team momentum. Combatives decisions made during the forward attack toward an opponent will maintain the momentum. The dynamics of team momentum entail speed, surprise, and violence of action. If capture is the intent, a combatant must close with the victim and swarm him, using the appropriate takedown or control mechanisms.

With ever-changing and more difficult missions, Soldiers must be prepared to face new challenges. Today's Soldier is the complete warrior, capable of highly sophisticated operations, precision shooting and relentless hand combat. While concentrating on becoming a skilled, stand-up fighter, he should always prepare for the possibility of a fight going to the ground. Keeping a strong defensive posture from a mobile offensive platform and reacting instinctively with fast and effective combinations will keep him on his feet. There is no other choice for a Soldier during CQB, and certainly no other choice when he is by himself in a personal protections situation.

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**Captain Josh Collins** has 17 years of active duty service, with the past 11 years spent in the special operations community. He was an amateur boxer for 12 years before turning professional. He currently teaches combatives to fellow infantrymen.

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## AMT/CQB-Focused Combative Program of Nonlethal Force

(With the secondary intention of developing personal protection skills)

### Removing noncombatants from the Soldier's path during CQB

- Weapon-muzzle strikes/rakes
- Palm strikes
- Forearm blast/SPEAR techniques (Threat Confrontation Management Systems - TCMS by Tony Blauer)
- Kicks

### Takedown/capture or subdue

- Teamwork
- With primary weapon (pain compliance)
- SPEAR techniques (TCMS)
- Asp (pain compliance and disablement)
- Stun and grab
- Leg kicks/sweeps
- Two-man high/low tackle

### Prisoner control/cuffing

- Teamwork
- Head control
- PPCT (pain compliance)
- Joint manipulation
- Ground fighting/control in kit and weapons retention

### Crowd control (MOUT)

- Maintaining reactionary gap
- Joint manipulation
- The surreptitious strike/attention getter (ball slap)
- SPEAR techniques (TCMS)
- Takedowns
- Ground fighting/control and cuffing

### Personal protection measures

- Street-fight psychology (types of attacks/attackers)
- Confrontation management
- Situational awareness (tell-tale signs of imminent danger)
- Stand-up approach (boxing/kickboxing)
- Maintaining effective distance
- SPEAR techniques (TCMS)
- Ground-fighting
- Close-quarter tactics (biting, eye-gouging, head butts, etc)
- Knife fighting (a pocket knife can be carried most anywhere)
- Asp/stick fighting (an asp can be carried most places)