

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF JIHAD PART II: THE LATE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES

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If we are truly to understand our adversary and posture our commanders to make effective decisions more rapidly than the enemy is able, we must acquire empathy — a deep understanding of their ideology. Such an understanding will help us on many levels. First, it will educate us on the nuances and differences between militant Islamist ideology, Islamist political theory, and the wider discourse of Islamic theology that offers spiritual sustenance to 1.3 billion people. Secondly, only by pausing and thinking like the adversary can we reduce surprise as well as begin to shape plausible theories to predict behavior and actions. Finally, the most important lesson to learn is how militant Islamist groups like al-Qaida manipulate and reinterpret Islamic theology and history to justify their acts of violence. This demands patience and continuous study. The fight against terrorism requires a long-term commitment, and we have a responsibility to educate America's current and future leaders from the tactical to the strategic levels.

Commander Aboul-Enein has for years taught, written, and helped us explore works by Arab authors, some written by terrorists, and others written by those who fight terrorism. In 2008, he came to me holding a new Arabic book by Syrian historian Dr. Maher Charif that discusses how the term "jihad" had multiple and competing meanings, interpretations, and more importantly, how the origins of jihad evolved in Islamic thought. It reveals the narrow way al-Qaida has defined the term, and highlights not only the ideologues that radicalized the term jihad, but clerical counter-weights to their argumentation. Ayman al-Zawahiri says that half of this war is media; meaning this is a war of ideas, interpretations, and competing meanings. Dr. Charif's book is a step towards understanding how militant Islamist ideology can be undermined using diverse and competing Islamic argumentation. In closing, as a former infantryman and longtime reader of Infantry, I would like to recognize the U.S. Army's Infantry Magazine, which has provided a forum for Commander Aboul-Enein's passion to highlight Arabic works of military significance. We must analyze and dissect these works with the same zeal as Russian works were avidly studied during the Cold War. I look forward to the debate this essay will generate.

— Mr. Ed Mornston

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This review essay will highlight the 2008 Arabic book by Dr. Maher al-Charif entitled *Evolution of the Concept of Jihad in Islamic Thought*. The book — an intellectual exploration of the concept of jihad — was published through Mada Publishing Company in Damascus, Syria. Although Dr. Charif's book covers the period from Prophet Muhammad to the present, this article will discuss the 19th and 20th century influences on the meaning of the term jihad, and how modern political theories like nationalism, national liberation ideology, colonial resistance movements, and the definition of what constitutes an Islamic government altered and steered some on a course towards Islamist political movements, then to radicalization, and violent militant Islamist ideology. Deconstructing al-Qaida ideology can only be done by Islamic argumentation, and Charif offers a book that traces not only the history of militant Islamist ideology but also the people who attempted to counter them along the way. This book was highlighted in the al-Jazeera Web site book review section and represents a 2008 Arabic book of significance to U.S. forces. Such Arabic works matter in the 21st century, as the adversary we face uses fragments of Islam and a narrow group of radical theoreticians to weave an ideology that justifies not only their agenda but the violence needed to accomplish this vision. Part I of the evolution of the concepts of jihad, which covers the 7th century through the late 13th century, can be found in the January-February 2009 issue of *Infantry*.

Colonial Resistance Movements and National Liberation Ideology and Jihad


In the 19th century, jihad (as warfare) merged with national liberation movements, and regrettably the term jihad as war found romanticism and resonance in the case of Abdel-Kader of Algeria resisting French occupation, Ahmed Urabi of Egypt resisting British control, and the Sanussis of Libya resisting the Italians. The terms jihad, national liberation and resistance became part of common Arabic discourse in the Middle East and impacted Islamic thinking on the term jihad.

Jamal al-Din Afghani (d. 1892) influenced the Egyptian intelligentsia such as Muhammad Abdu, the Grand Mufti of Cairo, and Saad Zaghlul, the Egyptian Nationalist hero and popular Prime Minister of Egypt. Afghani saw in constitutionalism the means of restricting powers of Muslim despots as well as colonialists. He combined national liberation ideology with Islam as a means of

ultimately reunifying Islamic lands. Afghani presents a double-edged sword for his anti-colonial stance, and for advocating Islam as a religion requiring rational and free thought to inspire genuine belief. Among his most enduring legacies was his fighting blind imitation and his revival of the Islamic practice of *ijtihad* (analytic reasoning). Afghani preached that the success of Islam was not a result of the sword and cites the peaceful spread of Islam in Yemen. He also points out that the early Islamic conquests of the Levant and Egypt numbered no more than 40,000 troops. On the issue of jihad, he said that *dawa* (evangelism) takes precedence over the sword. His disciple Muhammad Abdu (d. 1905) reformed and modernized Egypt's education curriculum, adding more modern sciences and western methods to the syllabus. Abdu is a modern militant Islamist's worst nightmare, who used Quranic argumentation to undermine the narrow views on jihad. As Grand Mufti of Cairo, he was versed in Islamic texts, but corresponded with Leo Tolstoy, visited British philosopher Robert Spencer, and attended lectures at Oxford. He argued that jihad was defensive only, and uses verse 256 of al-Baqara (the Calf) in the Quran, "let there be no compulsion in matters of religion," and verse 99 of Yunus (Jonah) in the Quran, "will you despise those who believe differently?" and finally verse 142 of al-Imran that advocates that only God knows the martyrs among us. He argued that jihad as warfare was *fard kifaya* (an optional obligation), and the *shaheed* means not only martyr but also witness upon people and their injustices. The English term "martyr," is derived from the Greek *martos*, which means "to witness." Abdu also argued that the Arabic term *jizya* was not a subjugation tax levied upon non-Muslims but one levied for the maintenance of society, and that both the Persians and Christian Byzantines had taxed all their subjects. Muslims continued the practice to sustain Muslim forces and maintain order.

Judge Ali Abdel-Razaq Counters the Notion of the Caliphate as the Only Form of Government

One of Abdu's most famous disciples was Islamic Judge Ali Abdel-Razaq, who was educated in al-Azhar, Sorbonne in Paris, and Oxford's schools of Economics and Political



<http://en.wikipedia.org>

Muhammad Abdu, a disciple of Jamal al-Din Afghani, used Quranic argumentation to undermine the narrow views on jihad.

Science. In his book *al-Islam wa Usool al-Hukm (Islam and the Essence of Governance)*, he made the central argument that the caliphate was a political tradition not ordained in the Quran or the Hadith (Muhammad's sayings). Abdel-Razaq believed that the mechanics of government, whether parliament or democracy, were completely left to Muslims. Written in 1925, a year after the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate, he went back to the sources and wrote that the caliphate was a political tradition no more and no less and that the institution was never tied to the survival of Islam as a religion. He asked the hypothetical question, "Was Prophet Muhammad a king or prophet?" Muhammad's main mission as outlined in the Quran was that of prophet, and every action was designed to advance his prophecy. Prophet Muhammad had what Abdel-Razaq called, "*hukumah nabawiyah*," or prophetic governance that was inspired by God and can never be recreated. He cautions readers about mixing Muhammad's prophecy with his oversight of Medina and eventually all of Arabia, as every act of the prophet was taken to advance the prophecy given to him by God. It is vital to amplify aspects of Afghani, Abdu, and Abdel-Razaq's writings in the 21st century to effectively counter militant Islamist ideology, which makes

reestablishing the caliphate an obligation required of every Muslim.

Rashid Rida: The Ideological Inspiration for Radical Islamist Thought

Rashid Rida (d. 1935) countered Sheikh Abdel-Razaq and began an intellectual revolution that altered views on jihad, placed it on a negative trajectory, and inspired Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan's *Jamiat Islami*. Born in 1865, in the Lebanese village of Qalmaan, near Tripoli, he was raised in a religious family and attended religious schools. While studying radical Islamists, Rida assessed the psychological and philosophical characteristics of the militant ideology. Rida began to fully embrace radicalism following the 1911 Italian invasion of Libya and the increasing secularism of the Ottoman Empire. The Libyan invasion by Italy laid bare "The Eastern Question," or how to stem the tide of European colonialism of Muslim lands by Russia, France, and Great Britain. He saw the Balkan Wars of former Ottoman dominions and the independence of Greece as a new crusader war. Rida wanted to restore the caliphate and impose shariah law (Islamic law) to stop the "crusaders." Rashid Rida led the attack against reformist Muslim clerics like Sheikh Ali Abdel-Razaq, and in 1927 established *Jamaa al-Shuban al-Muslimeen* in Egypt — the Muslim youth group charged with enforcing morality and evangelizing Rida's Islamic ideals. Rida's work left an indelible mark on Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928), the first Islamist political party, and Abu Ala al-Mawdudi in Pakistan (founder of *Jamiat al-Islami* — Islamic Group founded in 1941). Through Rida and such ideological disciples as Banna and Mawdudi, a development known as *Islam siyasi haraki* or Islamist political movement emerged from the late 1920s onward. This politicized movement changed the dynamics of jihad, further narrowing its definition in public discourse to one of confrontation and violence. Rida was instrumental in unleashing *Islam siyasi* (Islamist politics) or *Islam haraki* (Islamist movement). Rida, Banna, and Mawdudi did not make the distinction between defensive and offensive jihad and advocated a philosophy

that God accepts no other faiths except Islam. Militant Islamists would give jihad a reductionist meaning, thereby simplifying the concept of Islam itself into a formula of an unending fight until judgement day.

Sheikh Thalabi: Countering this Radicalization of the Concept of Jihad

Tunisian cleric Abdul-Aziz Thalabi (d. 1944) was influenced by Abdu and traveled throughout the Middle East and Europe in 1931. He postulated that Islam came to bring humankind together, and that is why it recognizes the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) and urges that Muslims not attempt to enter into evangelizing the faith with them except with pure intentions (Quran, Ankabut Chapter, verse 46). Thalabi reviews the Quran and finds that the words for tolerance and forgiveness appear in 36 of the Quran's 114 chapters and in 125 of its verses. He was troubled by the conversion of the Quran into a book that encourages radicalism, and encouraged clerics to object to this misuse, saying that such interpretations represent "*Afkar Daiyiqah*," or narrow mindedness. He discusses the 70 war verses in the Quran, saying that the *asbab al-nuzul* (exegesis or reasons for revelation) needed to be considered. Thalabi wrote that these sword verses represented a defensive war of survival against the Meccans and that the Quran warns that although violence is sanctioned, not to transgress (Baqara, verse 19). He takes a wider notion of jihad than militant Islamists, highlighting jihad al-nafs (personal moral struggle that is the greater jihad) versus jihad al-adu (warfare against an enemy that is the lesser jihad) and cites the Quran to bolster his argumentation (Luqman, verse 15). Although this observation can be debated, he also makes the argument that the concept of jihad as holy war was borrowed from the crusades, as Muslims before the crusades delineated between *qital* (killing in warfare) and *jihad* (struggle). Thalabi also discusses the complexities of the term *shaheed* (martyr) arguing that it has two main meanings, that of martyr and that of witness. He postulated that the emphasis on witness to God's justice and laws had been diluted in favor of the concept of martyrdom attained through sacrificing one's life. Of note, despite Thalabi's explorations of the concepts of jihad and martyrdom, he did participate in the 1936 Great Palestinian Revolt with Hajj Amin al-Husseini, viewing the British mandate on Palestine and increased Jewish immigration as a defensive sanctioned jihad (war). Why does this matter? For every clerical quotation al-Qaida produces in their audios and videos, this can be countered with clerical quotations from the same and older periods that are more pragmatic and rational. This will add to the cacophony of competing voices, sound bites and slogans, creating a more challenging media environment for militant Islamist groups.

Hassan al-Banna: The Momentum of Radically Defining Jihad

Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the *Ikhwan al-Muslimeen* (The Muslim Brotherhood), was born in the village of Mahmudiah, north of Cairo in 1906. While in middle school, he established *Jamiah Akhlaq al-Adabiyah*, the Morals and Behavior Group, to enforce Islamic morals as based on the stringent Hasafiyah Sufi Order. He participated in Egyptian nationalist protests and agitation, and in

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1923 entered Dar al-Uloom College, graduating in 1927. A year later he was assigned as a teacher along the Suez Canal city of Ismailiyah. He founded the Society of Muslim Brothers as a social group to aid the impoverished of Ismailiyah, but his vision, as he stated, was to establish, "a pious generation that understands Islam correctly, an [Islam] that is religion and state, piety and jihad (as warfare), and a *shariah* (Islamic law) the regulates the lives of all people." He began with his own mosque called *Dar al-Ikhwan*, an Islamic school, and also formed an Islamic school for girls. By 1932, he had franchised his operation in several towns and cities in Egypt before moving to Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood attempted to turn its social movement into a political movement, but they became frustrated by the government and other political competitors like the Young Egyptians with their fascist Green Shirts. Of note, the Muslim Brotherhood sent fighters to the 1936 Palestinian Revolt, the 1948 Imami Coup in Yemen, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The number of guerillas sent by the brotherhood increased with each successive campaign. By the first Arab-Israeli War, between 5,000-7,000 Muslim Brotherhood volunteers joined the Egyptian Army. The brotherhood also harassed British forces occupying Egypt's Suez Canal Zone. The Egyptian government straddled the line between encouraging harassment of British forces and participation in the Arab-Israeli War with concerns about brotherhood interference in an internal Yemeni royalist coup.

From a modernist ideological front, 1920s and 1930s Egypt experienced a proliferation of schools modeled after modern western curriculums. In addition, Egypt began adopting the legal codes and institutions of the French Civil Code. This marginalized village clerics and triggered the birth of a grass roots religious industry to handle legal questions, resolve disputes, and meeting educational requirements according to Islamic law. Modernization, materialism, and secularism became sound bites and ideas to fear and led those marginalized clergy to declare apostasy and call for violence. These fears were combined in the language of agitation as many questioned whether European civilization had brought Muslims modernism or a return to colonialism. Banna applied a narrow view of the Quran to argue that jihad (as warfare) was an obligation no different from prayer and fasting. Banna, however, could not get around Baqara verse 190, about not transgressing in jihad (as warfare) and prohibited the killing of women, children, and the elderly who were noncombatants. Of note, Banna's organization did not follow this injunction and drifted towards justifying violence against all those who rejected Prophet Muhammad's prophecy and message. Banna attempted to marginalize sayings of Prophet Muhammad that drew a distinction between the lesser jihad (warfare) and greater jihad (leading an individual moral life), saying it was a weak *hadith* (saying). He dismantled and watered down the efficacy of the

complex meanings and views of jihad, making new revisionist ideologies, such as jihad having three stages. Banna's three stages of jihad were emotional, then mental, and finally the physical sacrifice. This revisionist view of the term jihad can best be described in a single quote by Banna, "Oh Brothers! The community that perfects the manufacture of death knows how to die honorably, God will lavish them in this life and the hereafter." Banna's Muslim Brotherhood assassinated Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashi Pasha and Judge al-Khizindar, who declared the group illegal. In 1949, Banna was gunned down by Egypt's secret security.

Abu al'aa Al-Mawdudi: His Vision of an Islamic Government and Radical Islamist Philosophy

Considered one of the founders of Pakistan, Abu al'aa al-Mawdudi was born in 1903. He began his career as a journalist in 1920. In 1923, Mawdudi published his own magazine and by 1941 he established his own Islamist political party. He was jailed by British colonial authorities but eventually created a model Islamic society, the village of Dar Salam (Abode of Peace) in East Punjab. He advocated the concept of an Islamic constitution and the need for a separate nation (Pakistan) for India's Muslims. When India was partitioned, Mawdudi continued to agitate for a model Islamic society in Pakistan. In 1953 he was sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted, and he was finally released from prison in 1955. In 1964 he was re-arrested and then re-released. His political party, *Jamiat al-Islami*, was banned. Mawdudi died in 1974 but left a copious amount of material on Islamic governance that continues to inspire adversaries of the United States in Pakistan. In his book, *Nizam al Hayaa fee al-Islam (The Organization of Life in Islam)*, he postulated that an Islamic political system is based on three principles:

* **Tawheed** — Governance of God alone. The concept of mixing Tawheed (absolute monotheism) with governance by God alone is known as *hakimiyah* (literally the sovereignty of God). Mawdudi took the concept of Tawheed, and postulated that sharing governance with God, a position he felt secularism advocated, is apostasy.

* **Risala** — The mechanism by which God's revelations reach mankind through the Prophet Muhammad.

* **Khilafa** — The caliphate that applies these revelations and reduces them into the Shariah (Islamic Law).

In an Islamic government, according to Mawdudi, the emir is aided in peace and war by a Shura (Consultative) Council. In his book, *Nazariyah al-Islam wal Hidayah (The Islamic Viewpoint and Internal Peace)*, he explored his theories of *hakimiyah* (sovereignty belonging only to God and not man) further by applying verse 40, which says that sovereignty is to God alone and commands that we do not worship [any other gods] except Him. However, this is in the context of Prophet Joseph's confrontation with Pharaoh. Instead Mawdudi used this verse to justify the rule of God, appropriating the interpretation of what that means to himself and his followers. He wrote of a society that delineated between those who believe in Islamic principles and those who do not. Mawdudi also advocated the need for a Muslim vanguard. In his book *Nahu Thawra Salmiyah (Towards a Correct Revolution)*, Mawdudi wrote about the need for a pious group of those who believe in the Islamic view of philosophy, practice it daily, and operate with total commitment. Mawdudi felt that an Islamic revolution could not happen without popular support and the waging of perpetual jihad against *jahiliyah* (ignorance) of thought, behavior, psychology, and education. Although Mawdudi inspired many militant Islamist groups, readers should also note how his books defined jihad in a more complex way than al-Qaida, or even the group he founded — *Jamiat al-Islami* — does today. Militant Islamists do this by focusing only on selected Mawdudi works that defined jihad (warfare) as an individual obligation no different from prayer and fasting, and that the killing of thousands to wipe away apostasy and *ilhad* (turning away from God) is worth it. He did restrict jihad by holding the view that assaulting or killing women, children, and the elderly noncombatants is forbidden. For Mawdudi, jihad (although warfare) was how he viewed all of Islam, which is revolutionary ideology designed to re-order the entire globe, so humankind

can join the party of God. He writes that the delineation of offensive and defensive jihad applies only to wars of national liberation, giving his modernist opinion and adding it to thousands of years of other opinions on the notion of jihad.

Sayyid Qutb: Western and Islamist Radical Philosophies Collide and Weaved into Militant Islamist Thought of the 20th and 21st Centuries

Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) represents one of the most important ideologues of Islamist militant thought. It is impossible to understand Ayman al-Zawahiri, Usama Bin Laden, al-Qaida, and many other militants without reading Qutb's work. Although his book *Milestones Along the Road* is considered his political manifesto, only reading his mammoth 15-volume *In the Shade of the Quran* is necessary for a deeper understanding of Qutb and his theories. Dr. Charif does an excellent job deconstructing this complex, contradictory and radical figure. Born in 1906 from a family of farmers in the village of Qaha in Upper Egypt, Qutb's own personal intellectual journey was an extraordinary one in the context of radical Islamist theoreticians. Being the first in his family to finish university in Cairo, he achieved minor fame for poetry, short romance stories, and literary criticism. However, the pull of nationalist and anti-colonial politics drew him towards protests. The 1942 Sir Miles Lampson Incident, whereby the British dictated a Prime Minister and cabinet to Egypt's King Farouk, led Qutb to transform his writings towards criticizing Egypt's monarchy and control of Britain over the country's internal affairs. In 1942, Qutb joined the Wafd Political Party, being part of the Vanguard of Wafdists. Charif's book recounts that Qutb grew frustrated with the Wafd Party and joined the Saadists from 1943 to 1945, continuing to agitate for Egyptian nationalism. He had experienced all this before Qutb departed for his two-year fellowship in the United States in 1948. Qutb radicalized during the period from 1942 to 1950, and after returning from the United States, he veered towards the Islamist politics of the Muslim Brotherhood and became editor

of their newspaper in 1951. Qutb remained in Nasser's prisons from 1954 to 1964, being released for just under a year before returning to jail in 1965 and finally going to the gallows in 1966. He wrote a total of 32 books, and most of his writings were done under the abhorrent conditions of Nasser's prisons. He is considered the most important philosopher of militant Islamist theory.

Qutbist theory is quite complex to cover in this expose, but among his central tenants is that Islam signifies the rebirth of human existence and empowers humankind. Since Ataturk abolished the caliphate in 1924, ending the political institution in place since the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, Muslims separated religion from state and re-entered into a stage of *jahiliyah* (ignorance) — a state in which *shariah* (Islamic law) is no longer the law of the land and where God does not reign supreme. Islamic society regressed into a state of jahiliyah that attacks the sovereignty of God. This notion of jahiliyah was borrowed by Qutb from Mawdudi. Qutb's remedy was to restore *uluhiyah* (reign of God) and undermine *hakimiyah* (the rule of man). Like Mawdudi, whom Qutb corresponded with, they agreed for the need of what Qutb calls *Taliah Usbah* — a vanguard to rid society of *jahiliyah* (ignorance) by clinging to the *hakimiyah* (rule) of God. He advocated that this vanguard would create a pious society isolated from the corrupt general society. Qutb differed from the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood Hassan al-Banna, who sought to address the deficit in Egyptian society religiosity through evangelism and social work. The core of Qutb's modernist revision of Islam is his claim that the religion can address and rid humanity from the ills of industrial barbarism, culture that is bankrupt of values and the trap of communism.

Like the 14th century radical Islamist cleric Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1327), Qutb clung to the literal word of God called "*harfiyah al na'ss*." He accused reformist clerics like Muhammad Abduh of making the Quranic word fit the understanding of the human mind, and this in Qutb's opinion was a dangerous path that corrupted Islam with innovation. He believed the human mind must conform to God's will. "Shall the Quran be polluted by a human mind rife with lust, ill-intentions, ignorance, and the multiple views of the mind?" "This," Qutb espoused, "has only one ending, *fawdah* (chaos)." Qutb believed a vanguard of pure believers must be created amidst the ignorance that has plagued the globe.

On the issue of People of the Book, Qutb considered Islam the only valid religion ordained by God and uses the Quran verse 85 of al-Imran to justify his view. This is not balanced by verses that call for tolerance of those considered People of the Book. Qutb spoke out against the interfaith dialogue. Qutb writes that the concept of *tasamuh* (forgiveness) applied to personal dealings only and not society as a whole.

Qutb's Modernist Commentary on Jihad

Qutb viewed jihad as fighting for God alone and not for personal gain. He reinterpreted jihad as fighting against nationalism, racism and reduced the concept to a perpetual jihad

to spread God's word throughout the globe. He opines that jihad can be reduced to three goals: (1) ridding Muslims of divisions; (2) guaranteeing the freedom to spread the faith; and (3) establishing an Islamic system on earth, as this alone ensures freedom of man towards his fellow man. Qutb uses a modernist interpretation to marginalize the verse "let there be no compulsion in matters of religion," by saying that those who use this verse to advocate differences between a defensive and offensive jihad, confuse compulsion in *aqeedah* (Islamic practice) and the need to destroy the materialist system that worships material goods and prevents the worship of God. Qutb uses modernist national liberation rhetoric to say that Islam is not just orthodoxy, but a general declaration for the liberation of man from material or worldly slavery. The goal, according to Qutb, is to wipe away this slavery which then allows mankind the freedom of choice in religious (read Islamic) practice. He then isolates all other Muslims who disagree with his views by saying that only those who move in the name of Islam and undertake jihad (fighting) truly understand Islam, and those who do not join (the jihad) can never understand. As if to make sense of his own life and long incarceration, Qutb advocated jihad as the best form of worship, and that man gives himself and his worldly goods to God for a larger reward (in the hereafter).

Conclusion

It is important to immerse ourselves in the opinions and language of Islamist radical theorists who inspire militant Islamists. We must be cognizant that Qutb, Mawdudi, and Rida all postulated radical opinions on jihad based on modernist interpretations that were impacted by 20th century events. These opinions are by no means Islamic orthodoxy or the final word on what constitutes jihad, an Islamic state, or a good Muslim. Theorists like Qutb must be deconstructed, and their writings exposed as an amalgamation of fragments of modern western philosophy and fragments of Islam weaved into a militant ideology. Books like Charif's represent an important contribution to highlighting the diverse views and the use of Islamic argumentation to undermine militant Islamist theory, ideology, and sound bites. Such Arabic works must be dissected, discussed and taught in our war colleges, as the adversary exploits individuals with a sense of religion and not knowledge of religion to recruit fighters and elicit financial support. Al-Qaida's center of gravity is their ideology. The first step is to deconstruct this ideology and expose it as selective fragments of Islam designed to exploit the religion and justify violence that achieves a political outcome.

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