The Army in Multinational Operations

May 2010

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Headquarters, Department of the Army
Foreword

Multinational operations have become the standard for engagement worldwide. From the Army’s beginnings in the revolution through most of the 20th century and into the 21st century, we’ve seen the complexity of operations magnified by the increasing numbers of nations committing resources for the cause of stability and peace in the world. Commanders at all levels must be skilled at dealing with these multinational partners.

Standardization of multinational doctrine serves as the touchstone for our engagement strategy. Although we have made great strides in achieving some levels of standardization in doctrine in organizations like the Combined Forces Command, the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies Program (ABCA)--many of our newer partners do not belong to these organizations. This manual provides the multinational doctrine you need to be successful no matter how young or enduring the alliance.

Each coalition brings its own challenges. Those challenges entail not only new missions, conditions, and environment, but also include a new make-up of partners. Commanders must deal with cultural issues, different languages, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use respective forces, and a typically underdeveloped command and control structure. In this era of persistent conflict and uncertainty the Army must be prepared to operate with a multitude of multinational partners. This manual is designed to assist you as you face and overcome those challenges.

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The Army in Multinational Operations

Contents

PREFACE ......................................................................................................................... v

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ vi

Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS .................................................................................. 1-1
Multinational Forces ......................................................................................... 1-1
Multinational Operations ........................................................................... 1-2
Mutual Confidence ....................................................................................... 1-2

Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL ................................................................ 2-1
Command Structure ...................................................................................... 2-2
Command Jurisdiction .................................................................................. 2-9
Unity of Effort ................................................................................................. 2-9
National Interests .......................................................................................... 2-9
Command Authority ..................................................................................... 2-10
NATO Operations .......................................................................................... 2-10
CFC/USFK Operations ................................................................................. 2-10
Control ............................................................................................................ 2-12
C2 Interoperability ....................................................................................... 2-14
Cooperation and Coordination ................................................................. 2-14
Staffing .......................................................................................................... 2-15
Establishing Communications .................................................................. 2-22
Checklist ........................................................................................................ 2-23

Chapter 3 PERSONNEL ....................................................................................... 3-1
G-1 or S-1 (Personnel) .................................................................................. 3-1
Legal Considerations .................................................................................... 3-3
Environmental Considerations ................................................................. 3-8
Checklist ........................................................................................................ 3-9

Chapter 4 INTELLIGENCE .................................................................................... 4-1
Planning Operations ...................................................................................... 4-1
Communications and Processing ............................................................... 4-1
Effective Coordination ................................................................................ 4-2

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 May 2010 FM 3-16</td>
<td>Legal Parameters</td>
<td>9-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Parameters</td>
<td>9-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Factors</td>
<td>9-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration in Hostile or Occupied Territory</td>
<td>9-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Civil Affairs Operations Organizations</td>
<td>9-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles of Humanitarian Action</td>
<td>9-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships Among Civil Organizations, Governments, and the Military</td>
<td>9-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Structure</td>
<td>9-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Support to the Civilian Community</td>
<td>9-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Planning</td>
<td>9-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
<td>9-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checklist</td>
<td>9-17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 10</td>
<td>FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT</td>
<td>10-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Manager (Comptroller)</td>
<td>10-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourcing Guidance</td>
<td>10-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding and Control Processes</td>
<td>10-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reimbursement Procedures</td>
<td>10-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checklist</td>
<td>10-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 11</td>
<td>HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT</td>
<td>11-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>11-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Staff</td>
<td>11-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Surgeon</td>
<td>11-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>11-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>11-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Assessment</td>
<td>11-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies and Issues</td>
<td>11-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countermeasures</td>
<td>11-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards of Care</td>
<td>11-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required Capabilities</td>
<td>11-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checklist</td>
<td>11-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 12</td>
<td>OTHER CONSIDERATIONS</td>
<td>12-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Support</td>
<td>12-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>12-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Support</td>
<td>12-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability and Standardization</td>
<td>12-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checklist</td>
<td>12-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 13</td>
<td>MARITIME OPERATIONS</td>
<td>13-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>13-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of Maritime Forces</td>
<td>13-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Constabulary Functions</td>
<td>13-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations in Wartime</td>
<td>13-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checklist</td>
<td>13-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 14</td>
<td>AIR OPERATIONS</td>
<td>14-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Air Component Commander</td>
<td>14-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>14-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Defense</td>
<td>14-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checklist</td>
<td>14-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A  CAPABILITIES .................................................................................................. A-1
Appendix B  THREAT ASSESSMENT ................................................................................... B-1
Appendix C  CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS ESTIMATE ..................................................... C-1
Appendix D  PROTECTION MEASURES .............................................................................. D-1
GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................. Glossary-1
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ......................................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures

Introductory Figure 1. Coalition building ........................................................................ vii
Figure 2-1. Generic multinational command structure ....................................................... 2-1
Figure 2-2. UN sanctioned and authorized-lead nation led ............................................... 2-3
Figure 2-3. UN sponsored and mandated-UN led .............................................................. 2-3
Figure 2-4. Force structure concept with a lead nation ...................................................... 2-4
Figure 2-5. U.S. as a lead nation ...................................................................................... 2-5
Figure 2-6. Combination command structure: lead nation and parallel ............................ 2-6
Figure 2-7. Integrated command structure ...................................................................... 2-7
Figure 2-8. ARRC ............................................................................................................. 2-8
Figure 2-9. Combined Forces Command (Korea) .............................................................. 2-8
Figure 2-10. Comparison of command authority .............................................................. 2-11
Figure 6-1. Host-nation considerations ............................................................................ 6-4
Figure 8-1. Protection process diagram ........................................................................... 8-3
Figure C-1. Contents of CAO (CMO) annex .................................................................. C-1

Tables

Table 2-1. Preferred ranks for LNOs by unit .................................................................. 2-13
Table 2-2. Possible staff liaison requirements ............................................................... 2-13
Preface

This manual provides a guide for Army commanders and staffs operating in a multinational environment. It applies across the full spectrum of military operations. It provides general information on important topics necessary for conducting multinational operations. However, it also lists questions that multinational partners need to address to improve their mission effectiveness and efficiency. Every multinational operation differs. The purpose, character, capabilities, composition, and scope of a multinational operation are functions of changing missions. These missions are magnified by the complexities of two or more armies operating together. Each member nation brings its own view and methods of operations.

This manual blends key points of Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 into its approach to ensure consideration by Army elements of a joint force. It addresses the Army's roles and functions within a multinational operation. The focus is on responsibilities for conducting operations as part of a multinational force. It also addresses multinational leadership and provides examples of possible command relationships. Finally, it addresses planning considerations of the multinational commanders and their staffs. Information contained herein will help other national forces and other services plan and conduct multinational operations with U.S. Army forces.

Commanders must recognize those areas within multinational control and those areas under national control. This is a key issue that crosses all functions. Recognizing this issue will enable commanders and their staffs to focus on important issues. It will enable them to function more effectively and efficiently. Multinational partners conduct multinational operations to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that may pose threats to common national interests. This manual provides a handy reference of fundamental issues and interfaces that must be addressed to promote a successful multinational operation.

While North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Program (ABCA) have achieved some levels of standardization in certain areas, no comprehensive common doctrine exists between the armies. This manual does not fill this gap. It will, however, assist the multinational commander in understanding and developing solutions to create an effective fighting force. This manual incorporates selected information from NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) and ABCA standards. However, it does not reproduce these documents. This manual does not repeat staff planning procedures or the military decisionmaking process. It does include some of the differences in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures of selected nations with which the United States has operated on numerous occasions.

This manual takes into account the full continuum of operations and varying political objectives, force compositions, operating areas, and other factors. It also considers some general similarities in multinational operations. Because of varying compositions and varying political objectives, consensus is extremely difficult to obtain. Harmonization of the multinational force is critical to ensure unity of effort.

The primary audience for this manual is commanders of ARFORs, Army Service component commanders, and other senior leaders and their staffs. This manual will also assist Army branch schools teach multinational Army operations. This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

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**Introduction**

Whenever commonality of interest exists, nations will enter into political, economic, and/or military partnerships. These partnerships will occur in regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests or seek mutual security against real or perceived threats. Cultural, psychological, economic, technological, and political factors all influence the formation and conduct of multinational operations.

America's interests are global, but its focus is regional. Existing alliances and past coalitions reflect that focus. Alliance participants establish formal, standard agreements for operational objectives. Alliance nations strive to field compatible military systems, structure common procedures, and develop contingency plans to meet potential threats. As forces of these nations plan and train together, they develop mutual trust and respect. The U.S. is a member of the following alliances and agreements:

- United Nations.
- NATO.
- ABCA Armies Standardization Program.
- Defense and cooperation treaties with the Republic of Korea and Japan.
- Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

There are three basic possible responses to a multinational crisis: United Nations (UN), regional organizations (alliances or treaties), and coalitions. There are two types of responses associated with the UN. Those are UN mandated and UN authorized operations. UN authorized operations may involve either regional organizations and/or coalitions. While alliances form the basis for responding to a variety of regional threats, coalitions, such as Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom have emerged to meet national strategic requirements. Coalitions, which are created for limited purposes and for a limited length of time, do not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as alliances. Thus, planners must closely study the political goals of each participant as a precursor to detailed planning. Political considerations weigh more heavily with coalitions than with alliance operations.

Multinational military operations are not new. Most major military operations in the twentieth century have been both joint and multinational: World War I, the Allied intervention in Russia 1918-1920, World War II, the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam Conflict, and various UN-sponsored operations. Since human nature has not changed, regional conflicts over territory, religion, politics, and economics will continue to occur. The precise role of land forces in these operations will vary according to each political and military situation. U.S. Army participation is likely for three reasons:

- Only land forces can hold terrain and control populations.
- Army structure contains unique capabilities other services do not have.
- Soldiers on the ground are a clear demonstration of political resolve.
The strategic principle of collective security caused the U.S. to join several alliances and form coalitions. This requires the Army to conduct multinational military operations with forces from other nations. These operations will generally include a variety of governmental organizations, nongovernmental organization (NGO), other services, and international agencies. Another reason the U.S. conducts such operations is that rarely can one nation go it alone. Participating national contingents and NGOs bring certain unique core competencies. This blending of capabilities and political legitimacy makes certain operations possible that the U.S. could not or would not conduct unilaterally.

Much of the information in this manual is based on the ABCA Coalitions Operations Handbook. The handbook was written to support a requirement identified in the 1996 ABCA Exercise Cascade Peak in Fort Lewis, Washington. It was designed to assist the ABCA nations serving in coalitions with other countries. In 1998, the handbook was evaluated during ABCA Exercise Rainbow Serpent in Brisbane, Australia. At that time, the Australian joint deployable headquarters served as the headquarters. In 1999, they deployed to East Timor to lead the ABCA armies and other coalition nations. This was a highly successful mission. The handbook was revised based on that mission and the ABCA Exercise Focus 2000 in Sandhurst, United Kingdom.
Chapter 1
Fundamentals

Multinational operations describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. These operations are undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Army forces conduct full spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in multinational operations. The Army’s role in multinational operations may be to serve as a joint multinational command headquarters; a multinational land component command headquarters; and a troop-contributing nation as part of a multinational command.

Many Soldiers will serve with foreign military partners or with civilian partners. Having a clear understanding of this environment is necessary. This chapter discusses the environment that units will face when conducting multinational operations.

Multinational military operations are not new. American commanders throughout our history have operated with multinational forces. An example is General George Washington and his partnership with our French allies. In the twentieth century, Generals John Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight Eisenhower, Mathew Ridgway, William Westmoreland, Creighton Abrams, and Norman Schwartzkopf have all operated in difficult multinational environments.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES

1-1. Although the U.S. will act unilaterally when it is in its national interests, wherever possible it will pursue its national interests through multinational operations. Multinational operations are conducted within the structure of an alliance or a coalition.

ALLIANCES

1-2. An alliance is the relationship that results from formal agreements (for example, treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives, that further the common interests of the members. One of those broad, long-term objectives is standardization. This helps to achieve the most effective military capabilities. Standardization normally includes materiel (equipment) and nonmateriel (doctrine) matters. Alliances will normally have standing headquarters and organizations. For the U.S. Army, operations taking place within the NATO or the Combined Forces Command, Korea are alliance operations.

COALITIONS

1-3. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for a common action. A coalition action is a multinational action outside the bounds of an established alliance. It usually exists for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest.

1-4. Coalitions are created for a limited purpose and for a set time. They do not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as alliances. Thus, planners must closely study the political goals of each participant as a precursor to planning. Normally, political considerations weigh more heavily with coalitions than with alliances.
1-5. The most difficult issues for the commander of any multinational force will be sovereignty issues. Often the coalition commander is a “commander” in title only. The coalition commander will accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus or leadership rather than by traditional command relationships. Commanders must acknowledge sensitivities. Often they and their subordinates must operate as “diplomats” rather than as “warriors.” Such is the nature of coalition operations.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1-6. Multinational operations may be driven by—

- Common agreement among the participating alliance or coalition partners.
- Terms of an alliance.
- A mandate or authorization provided by the UN.

Whichever way, their multinational character merits particular attention because national interests and organizational influence may compete with doctrine and efficiency. Gaining consensus can be painstakingly difficult. Solutions are often national in character. Commanders may expect contributing nations to adhere to national policies and priorities, which at times complicates the multinational effort.

1-7. In UN-sponsored multinational operations, a force is employed under a single commander. The secretary general appoints the force commander with the consent of the UN Security Council. The force commander reports either to a special representative of the secretary general or directly to the secretary general. The force commander has wide discretionary powers over day-to-day operations. However, he or she refers all policy matters to the special representative or secretary general for resolution.

MUTUAL CONFIDENCE

1-8. Successful multinational operations are built by the commander’s focus. The commander focuses on the political objective, assigned mission, patience, sensitivity to the needs of other force members, a willingness to compromise or come to a consensus when necessary, and mutual confidence. This mutual confidence stems from a combination of tangible actions and entities and intangible human factors. Tangible considerations, such as liaison and language, are discussed throughout this manual. The intangible considerations that must guide the actions of all participants, but especially the senior commander, are—

- Rapport.
- Respect.
- Knowledge of partners.
- Team building.
- Patience.

These factors cannot guarantee success for multinational operations, but ignoring them will usually guarantee failure.

RAPPORT

1-9. Commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from other countries. This is a personal, direct relationship that only they can develop. Good rapport between multinational force members results in successful teamwork and overall unity of effort.

1-10. The first concern when establishing rapport is an understanding of the characteristics, personalities, capabilities, ambitions, sensitivities, history, and cultural habits of the various multinational partners. Additionally, commanders and staffs should understand each nation’s legal and policy constraints. Once this understanding exists, the keys to developing and maintaining rapport are respect, trust, patience, and the ability to compromise. The multinational force commander must be visible to members of the multinational force. Personal visits to all units provide the opportunity to assess capabilities, readiness, and morale as well as to build rapport.
1-11. Commanders can more easily establish rapport within the partnership when the nations combining forces share similar cultural backgrounds. Conversely, the partnership can be fractured when members come from diverse cultural backgrounds and do not respect each other’s cultural sensitivities.

**Historical Example**

During the New Guinea campaign in World War II, General Douglas MacArthur dispatched Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger to the area to improve the poor situation. Prior to Eichelberger’s arrival in Papua, an adversarial relationship had developed between U.S. and Australian commanders. Australian leaders had questioned the fighting capability of U.S. forces and similar charges were made by the American side regarding the Australians.

One of Eichelberger’s first acts upon assuming command in Papua was to send a communiqué to Lieutenant General Edmund Herring, the Australian appointed by MacArthur to be the field commander of the Papua operation. In this message, Eichelberger informed Herring that he was anxious to cooperate with the Australians. Herring, who had been terse in his previous correspondence with Eichelberger, mellowed considerably subsequent to this event.

Upon Herring’s return to Port Moresby to command all operations on New Guinea, he appointed Eichelberger field commander of a corps composed of both Australian and American units. This was the first time in the war that the Australians placed their troops under the tactical command of an American officer. The quality Eichelberger possessed that made him particularly suited to the multinational environment was his ability to demonstrate to his allies his belief that personal and national prestige cannot be allowed to interfere with harmony within the partnership. This ability, coupled with his skill in promoting a spirit of teamwork with allied forces, enabled him to command effectively in the multinational arena.

**RESPECT**

1-12. Respect must exist among multinational partners. All nations should perceive they are making a significant contribution toward accomplishing the mission, regardless of the rank of their senior member or the size of the national force. Respect for the partners’ culture, religions, customs, and values combined with understanding and consideration of their ideas, will solidify the partnership. Lack of respect may lead to friction, jeopardizing mission accomplishment. All members of the multinational force must understand their partners’ national views and work to minimize friction.

1-13. In assigning missions to multinational forces, commanders must consider that national honor and prestige may be as important as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process. Their opinions must be sought in mission assignment. Understanding, considering, and accepting ideas from multinational force partners leads to a solidified multinational force. Without genuine respect of others, rapport and mutual confidence cannot exist.

**PARTNERS**

1-14. Commanders must know their multinational partners as well as they know their adversary. Much time and effort are expended in learning about the enemy. It is even important that partners understand each other. Each partner in an operation has a unique cultural identity. Although nations with similar cultures face fewer obstacles to interoperability than nations with divergent cultural outlooks, differences will still exist. Commanders and staffs must learn the capabilities of partner nations or organizations. These capabilities differ based on national and organizational interests and objectives, political guidance, limitations on the national force, doctrine, organization, rules of engagement (ROE), law of war, equipment, religions, customs, history, and a myriad of other factors.
TEAM BUILDING

1-15. Team building is essential to multinational operations. Differing national agendas can be disruptive. On a more personal level, the natural competitiveness among Soldiers and nations can become a serious problem. Such competitiveness can be a motivating factor if properly managed. Left unchecked, it can destroy force cohesion. Multinational force commanders at all levels must reinforce the fact that all forces are on the same team. Establishing an atmosphere of cooperation and trust at the highest levels is essential. When such an atmosphere is established, subordinate commands are influenced positively.

1-16. Commanders must ensure equitable treatment and exposure of all units, regardless of national background. Failure to do so may be perceived as prejudice and result in political repercussions. All members must have fair representation on the planning staff to preclude allegations that any nation was excluded from the decisionmaking process. All participants must perceive missions as appropriate, achievable, and equitable in burden and risk sharing. Unit capabilities are an obvious factor in assigning missions. However, national honor and prestige may be as important to the partnership as battlefield capability. Partners should be included in the planning process. Their opinions must be sought concerning the type of mission assignment for their units. However, the political impact of high casualties must always be balanced against national honor and prestige. Commanders must consider national caveats based on legal and policy constraints when assigning missions and tasks to members. If these are not considered, multinational commanders may be faced with nations refusing to perform assigned tasks. The term “national red card” using a soccer simile has been coined for this type of action. Prior understanding and proper missions will avoid “national red cards”.

Historical Example

In Somalia, certain Somali factions targeted the Nigerian national contingent for repeated attack. The Nigerian sector did not have any unique features warranting attack, and the Nigerians did not provoke attacks. What planners had not considered was that Nigeria had earlier granted the former President of Somalia, Siyad Barre, political asylum in Nigeria. Some Somalis took revenge on Barre by targeting the Nigerian soldiers for attack.

PATIENCE

1-17. Developing effective partnerships takes time and attention. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational force partners requires untiring, even-handed patience.

1-18. Desert Storm proved that a successful coalition among nations having widely disparate social and cultural norms is achievable. American commanders ensured that their Soldiers received education regarding social norms prevalent in the Middle East. They imposed measures to respect these norms. Arab coalition leaders, for their part, granted American and other Western coalition forces liberties that would not normally be permitted under Islamic law. Allowing female Soldiers to drive vehicles and perform other duties forbidden by Saudi Arabian law and permitting the conduct of non-Islamic religious services would not be considered major concessions by Western standards. But in Saudi Arabia, these allowances were extremely significant.
In multinational operations, ensuring compatibility at the political, military, and cultural levels between partners to build consensus is key. A successful multinational operation must establish unity of effort, if not unity of command. The success of a multinational operation begins with the authority to direct the operations of all assigned or attached military forces.

Once nations have reached a commonality of interests and have decided to enter into a military partnership, a multinational force is created to pursue those common interests. The basic purpose of the multinational force command is to direct the military effort to reach a common objective. This chapter discusses different types of multinational command structures, command authorities, and the roles and responsibilities of the participants. It also discusses liaison, the multinational staff, and communications.

Each multinational operation is unique. Each national commander that is part of a multinational force is responsible not only to the commander of the multinational force, but to his or her national chain of command as well. Therefore troop-contributing nations maintain a direct line of communication to their national headquarters and thus to their own national governments. (See figure 2-1.)
Experience shows that responsibility for reestablishing, training, and equipping security forces for the indigenous population creates command and control (C2) challenges for a multinational command. These challenges are further complicated by the fact that the indigenous civilian governments responsible for national C2 are often in the formative stage as well. Commanders must be flexible in dealing with these units. Commanders will need to ensure that they fully understand all the elements of the command authority for these security forces.

**COMMAND STRUCTURE**

2-1. All multinational operations, regardless of their structure or authority will have two chains of command. There will be the multinational chain of command constructed by the UN, alliance, or coalition and a national chain of command extending back to national capitals. Ultimate authority is vested in the national chain of command.

2-2. The UN, which is chartered by the world to serve as a focal point for maintaining peace and upholding human rights, many times provides the mandate or authorization for the conduct of multinational operations. The UN charter serves as the basis for the conduct these operations. Under the UN charter—

- Chapter V addresses the Security Council, which directs the implementation of peace operations.
- Chapter VI addresses peaceful means.
- Chapter VII addresses enforcement actions.
- Chapter VIII addresses regional means to maintain peace and security.

2-3. There are two types of operations associated with the UN:

- The first are UN commanded operations that are under the command of the UN and report to the secretary-general. The mandate for these operations is set out by the Security Council in a resolution. The secretary-general is responsible for managing and supervising the execution of the mandate.
- The second are operations that are conducted by a coalition of willing states that are authorized by the UN. The coalition remains under the command of a lead state or regional organization and reports to its national or alliance chain of command. These operations are authorized by a decision of the Security Council that allows the coalition to take all necessary measures to achieve its specified mission.

2-4. As a result of the two types of operations, there are two types of C2 structures. The first, shown in figure 2-2, is the UN led that is UN sponsored and mandated. The second, shown in figure 2-3, is the “lead nation led” (or “regional organization led”) that is UN sanctioned and authorized.
Figure 2-2. UN sanctioned and authorized-lead nation led

Figure 2-3. UN sponsored and mandated-UN led
2-5. Alliances and coalitions create a command structure that meets the needs, diplomatic realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. Since no single command structure fits the needs of all alliances and coalitions, several different command structures have evolved. This chapter describes four types of command structures:

- Lead nation.
- Parallel.
- Combination. (Discussed with reference to coalitions.)
- Integrated. (Discussed with reference to alliances.)

2-6. While the command structures of alliances and coalitions are normally organized along these lines, there are some situations in which these structures are not applicable. Coalitions normally form as a rapid response to unforeseen crises. The nature of the coalition (for example, whether or not it is based on a UN mandate or common agreement among countries) will determine the type of command structure. The nature of the coalition is influenced by the political agendas of each of the nations that are participating in the coalition. Some nations use the term “framework nation” for lead nation. Only the name is different. Because lead nation is better known and more commonly used, all further discussion uses lead nation.

**LEAD NATION COMMAND STRUCTURE**

2-7. The lead-nation concept recognizes that one nation is assigned the lead role and its C2 dominates. Normally, the lead nation is the country providing the largest number of forces and/or resources for that operation. Figure 2-4 illustrates the concept of a force structure with a lead nation. Figure 2-5 provides an example of the U.S. as a lead nation.

![Figure 2-4. Force structure concept with a lead nation](image)
In the lead-nation concept, the lead nation determines the appropriate C2 procedures, working closely with the other national contingents. The lead nation should provide unique C2 equipment and software to national component headquarters of other nations whenever feasible. Other nations participating in the operation provide appropriate liaison personnel to the lead nation headquarters. Robust liaison is essential to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations.

Depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the operation, staff augmentation from other national contingents may be required to supplement the lead-nation staff. This will ensure that the lead nation headquarters represents the entire coalition. Such augmentation may include designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This facilitates the planning process by providing the coalition commander with a source of expertise on coalition members. Augmentation will be required if a coalition partner possesses unique organizations or capabilities not found in the forces of the lead nation.

An alternative to the lead-nation concept is the parallel command structure. Under a parallel command structure, no single coalition commander is named. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. The use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible because of the absence of a single coalition commander and lack of unity of command.
**COMBINATION COMMAND STRUCTURE**

2-11. The lead-nation concept and a parallel command structure may exist simultaneously within a coalition. This occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces. The Gulf War coalition was an example of this structure. While more desirable than the parallel command structure, an effort to achieve a total lead-nation concept for unity of command is preferred. Figure 2-6 shows the combination of a lead nation and parallel command structure.

![Figure 2-6. Combination command structure: lead nation and parallel](image)

**INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE**

2-12. In an alliance, a coalition or UN-mandated operation, instead of merely augmenting the staff with other national representatives, the entire staff is an integrated command structure. The deputy commander and each primary staff officer could be of a different nationality.

2-13. The use of an integrated command structure in an alliance provides unity of command. The NATO command structure is a good example of an integrated command structure. In Europe, NATO has Allied Command Operations, also known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). It has a commander who is designated from one of the member nations. The SHAPE staff is made up from members of the NATO nations. This integration also occurs among the subordinate commands and staffs several levels below SHAPE.

2-14. The key ingredients in an integrated alliance command structure are—

- A single designated commander.
- A staff composed of representatives from all member nations.

Subordinate commands and staffs integrated to the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission. (See figure 2-7.)
2-15. Another example of a standing integrated command structure is NATO's Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). However, it has some characteristics of a lead nation, in that the United Kingdom (UK) provides most of the framework of the headquarters structure. It is, nevertheless, an integrated command structure because the primary staff members are of different nationalities. (For example the G-3 is a U.S. brigadier general.) The entire staff is integrated. The ARRC’s two subordinate divisions, the multinational division (central) and the multinational division (south), are also integrated. Other NATO nations provide forces for specific operations as the mission dictates. One U.S. division has a standing relationship of coordinating with the ARRC in peacetime for planning and training. Figure 2-8 shows the complexity of the ARRC organization.

2-16. Another example of a standing integrated command structure is Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command, Korea (CFC), which has evolved over years of cooperation between the U.S. and Korea. The CFC staff and the staff of its subordinate ground component command are fully integrated. (See figure 2-9.)

2-17. It is possible that a coalition may also have an integrated command structure. An integrated staff demonstrates greater burden sharing and commitment, but may create more friction than the other types of command structures. Every aspect of C2, planning, and operations have to be developed while the staff is forming and learning to operate together. Because of the time involved and the work necessary to create an integrated coalition command structure, it should be avoided if possible.
Chapter 2

Figure 2-8. ARRC

Figure 2-9. Combined Forces Command (Korea)
COMMAND JURISDICTION

2-18. Command jurisdiction is the legal position of command by one national commander over the Soldiers of another nation. Each nation participating in a multinational operation is responsible to its own national authority for the conduct of operations. Each nation will view the conflict based on its own national interests. Where those interests coincide, the multinational commander will have his or her greatest latitude. Where those interests vary, he or she will have the least. Commanders will be dealing not only with the national force commander, but also with the national authority of that nation. Coalition commanders always must operate within constraints of one sort or another. Therefore, commanders must understand not only what has been agreed to, but also what national caveats have been made so they can account for them in plans. Commanders should be prepared to spend time working political and military issues rather than purely military matters.

UNITY OF EFFORT

2-19. In multinational operations, unity of effort must be achieved. The principle of unity of command also applies. However, this principle may be more difficult to attain. In stability operations (and NATO Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, government agencies may have the lead. Commanders may report to a civilian chief and employ resources of a civilian agency. Command arrangements often may be loosely defined and many times will not involve a command authority as normally understood. Commanders should consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational in nature. Because peace operations may be conducted at the small unit level, all levels must understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive friction.

2-20. For successful multinational operations, sound and effective command relationships must be developed. Multinational commanders should seek assistance from governmental agencies in assessing other countries’ capabilities. They must carefully consider national sensitivities as well as differing norms of behavior among national militaries and civilian agencies. Multinational forces should anticipate that some forces from member nations would have direct and near immediate communications from the operational area to their respective national politicalagements. This capability can ease coordination issues. But it can also be a source of frustration if external leaders external issue guidance directly to deployed national forces.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

2-21. Multinational operations are affected by the political agendas of participating countries. Many nations will not, or are reluctant to, relinquish command of their forces to other countries. On a case-by-case basis, their national governments may place national forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a multinational commander. In such cases, parallel chains of command may exist, with part being through the coalition force and part through the national authority. The challenge for the multinational force is to arrange the best command relationships with its subordinate forces to ensure mission success.

2-22. The interests of nations regarding the operation are usually described in the terms of reference (TOR) between the contributing nations and other multinational partners or, if involved, the UN. Developing a written document that outlines command relationships is vital. These documents could be an annex to an operation plan (OPLAN), an operation order (OPORD), or a campaign plan.

2-23. One essential issue in C2 concerns the transfer of authority (TOA) of multinational forces to the multinational commander’s control. Nations may not agree on when the transfer should occur. The earlier the multinational force gains control, the more flexibility it has in training for and conducting the operations. Differences in national interests, objectives and policies at the national level, as well as the availability of forces based on concurrent commitments may delay planning and agreement to subsequent decisions.
COMMAND AUTHORITY

2-24. The Army has doctrinal definitions for command relationships. Those are the same definitions used by the joint community. (See JP 1-02.) However, as a member of NATO, the U.S. has also agreed to NATO definitions for command relationships. The NATO definitions are not the same as the U.S. definitions. Additionally in CFC United States Forces Korea (USFK), definitions have been developed to describe command relationships. Therefore, to operate effectively in multinational operations, commanders must understand how each nation defines command relationships. Multinational force commanders must understand what they can and cannot do with each troop-contributing nation’s forces. For a further explanation of the U.S. view of command authority, see JP 3-16.

2-25. To provide a basic understanding of some of the issues involved in the different aspects of command authority see figure 2-10. It provides a comparison of command authorities between U.S., NATO, and CFC definitions.

NATO OPERATIONS

2-26. NATO has defined five command relationships:

- Full command.
- Operational command (OPCOM).
- OPCON.
- Tactical command (TACOM).
- Tactical control (TACON).

Definitions for these NATO command relationships can be found in the glossary.

CFC/USFK OPERATIONS

2-27. Combined operations currently employed in the Korean theater use two specific control measures:

- Combined OPCON.
- Command less OPCON.

2-28. Most national authorities providing forces to multinational operations will normally assign national forces under OPCON of the multinational force commander. Smaller nations may place their forces OPCON to a larger force. The larger force is then placed under OPCON to the multinational force commander. The assignment of these national forces under OPCON may be qualified by caveats from the respective nations in accordance with their national policies. Further assignment to service component commanders in an OPCON status by the multinational force commander is subject to approval by the respective national governments.

2-29. Command less OPCON of the national forces is retained by the parent national commander and is exercised through the designated national commander of the respective nations within the multinational force. The multinational commander and national commanders should discuss and clarify their mutual understandings of the command authorities that have been transferred to them. This clarification will ensure there is common understanding of those authorities. It will also preclude potential misunderstandings.

2-30. For Army forces, the U.S. commander retains command over all assigned U.S. forces in multinational operation. The U.S. chain of command runs from the president through a combatant commander to the U.S. national commander. The chain of command, from the president to the lowest U.S. commander in the field, remains inviolate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Most Control</th>
<th>Least Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FULL CMD</td>
<td>NATO OPCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct authority to deal with nations, diplomatic missions, and agencies</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granted to a command</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegated to a command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set chain of command to forces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign mission/designate objective</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign tasks</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct/Employ forces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish maneuver control measures</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassign forces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain OPCON</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate OPCON</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign TACOM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate TACON</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain TACON</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy forces (information/within theater)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local direction/control designated forces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign separate employment of unit components</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive authority for logistics</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct joint training</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign/Rcassign subordinate commanders/officers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct internal discipline/training</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The national authority always retains FULL COMMAND by Allied doctrine.

- has this authority

- denied authority or not specifically granted

**LEGEND**

OPCON - Operational Control
OPCOM - Operational Command
TACOM - Tactical Command
TACON - Tactical Control

Figure 2-10. Comparison of command authority
CONTROL

2-31. Two essential structural enhancements improve control of multinational forces: the establishment of a liaison network and coordination centers. These in conjunction with meetings, boards, and conferences help integrate operations across the multinational force.

LIAISON NETWORK

2-32. Regardless of the command structure, effective liaison is vital in any multinational force. Using a liaison is an invaluable confidence-building tool between the multinational force and subordinate commands. It also:

- Fosters a better understanding of mission and tactics.
- Facilitates the transfer of vital information.
- Enhances mutual trust.
- Develops an increased level of teamwork.

2-33. A liaison supplies significant information for the multinational force headquarters about subordinate force readiness, training, and other factors. Early establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications systems, doctrine, and operating procedures.

2-34. Liaison should be established as early as possible between a command and its higher headquarters, adjacent units, supporting, and attached forces, as well as other appropriate host-nation (HN) and international organizations. When supporting UN operations, the multinational commander should consider placing liaison personnel at the UN headquarters in New York and the UN office in Geneva, Switzerland. For U.S. forces, liaison with the U.S. ambassador, if there is one, is essential.

2-35. The command must identify and request liaison personnel at the earliest opportunity. The request should include any specific qualifications needed. Differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, and training among the multinational nations demand a harder liaison structure to facilitate operations than would be necessary in a purely national force. Because many functions must be covered on a 24-hour basis, liaison teams rather than individuals may be required. This requires more liaison personnel than a force normally has assigned. Liaison personnel must have equipment compatible with the multinational force.

2-36. Liaison personnel must fully understand the capabilities and limitations of their parent units and nations, to include the structure, capabilities, weapon systems, logistics, and planning methods employed and their national interests. Whether they are language qualified or have interpreter support, personnel must understand the language and culture of the headquarters to which they are attached to have successful liaison operations. However, professional knowledge and functional expertise are far more important. Officers who have participated in schools and training with other multinational nations or have experience in multinational operations can sometime provide this expertise depending upon the depth of their experience. The sending command should provide liaison teams with knowledge of the language, organization, materiel, and doctrine of multinational partners as well as an understanding of appropriate regional information. The liaison officers (LNOs) assigned to the multinational force headquarters should be of sufficient rank to influence the decisionmaking process. They should also possess the authority to answer routine multinational force queries on behalf of their commands.

2-37. Once liaison is established, liaison teams become the direct representatives of their respective commanders. They monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist the command to which attached. As such, they attend briefings and maintain close contact with the multinational operations center. However, the command to which they are sent should not formally task their sending unit through the LNO. Formal tasking should be accomplished through normal C2 channels. Table 2-1 lists preferred ranks for LNOs. Table 2-2 shows possible staff liaison requirements.
Table 2-1. Preferred ranks for LNOs by unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit size represented</th>
<th>Unit size going to</th>
<th>Preferred rank</th>
<th>Offense/defense</th>
<th>Support/stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Corps and Above</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>Corps and Above</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Brigade and Above</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Battalion and Above</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-2. Possible staff liaison requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit size represented</th>
<th>Unit going to</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Corps and above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battalion and above</td>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brigade and above</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations/Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations/Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operations/Plans</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations/Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operations/Plans</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations/Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Operations/Plans</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations/Plans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Under certain circumstances, multiple LNOs may be required due to the complexity of operations.

2-38. Integrating multinational liaison personnel into the staff of the multinational force totally depends on the commander’s desires. When integration creates a more effective organization, the multinational force should establish an orientation program for all liaison personnel. The multinational personnel reception center could perform this requirement. The multinational force must determine what staff officer or staff section will have overall responsibility for liaison personnel reporting to the headquarters.

2-39. Special operations forces have proven particularly effective in multinational operations as LNOs or liaison teams. Their language capabilities, cultural training, and experience in working and training with other country’s militaries allow them to improve coordination and minimize misunderstanding.

2-40. U.S. Army mobile liaison teams are assigned to selected Army Service component commands. These teams provide the ARFOR commander with the capability to conduct liaison with subordinate or parallel joint and multinational headquarters within the operational area. These teams are composed of 23 functional staff experts capable of providing advice and assistance to supported units and ensuring rapid and accurate coordination between headquarters. Mobile liaison teams have organic transportation and receive communications support from Army theater signal units. Although mobile liaison teams may have qualified linguists, they will need to be augmented with specific language capabilities. In Korea, the combat support coordination teams are similar in function to the mobile liaison team. These teams serve to facilitate coordination for the unique U.S. aspects of combat, information, protection, and logistical support within CFC.

COORDINATION CENTERS

2-41. Using a coordination center is a proven means of enhancing stability and interaction. It also improves control within a multinational force. Multinational forces, especially one that operates under a parallel command structure, should routinely create such a center in the early stages of any effort. The coordination center can be used for C2 and can organize and control functional areas including logistics.
and civil-military operations (CMO). Initially, a coordination center can be the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, HN support, and movement control. However, as a multinational force matures, the center’s role can be expanded to include command activities. When a coordination center is activated, member nations provide action officers who are familiar with its activities. Multinational forces should be encouraged to augment this staff with linguists and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent headquarters. Early establishment and staffing of skilled personnel add to the success of such centers.

**C2 INTEROPERABILITY**

2-42. All multinational force troops must fully understand the mission, goals, and objectives of the operation. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) should be developed whenever appropriate. These SOPs should be easy to understand and address multinational procedures, not single-nation procedures. When there is a lead nation, its SOPs will be used for most purposes.

2-43. Even with SOPs, the lead nation will still need to provide a forum for deconflicting and resolving misunderstandings. This will require more than a platform to express ideas. There may be personnel, to include commanders from multinational forces, who do not have a working understanding of English. The multinational force must use some mechanism, such as sand tables, as a tool to overcome language deficiencies when describing operational requirements. Regardless of the mechanism used, the multinational force commander and staff will need patience and possibly detailed explanations to ensure understanding. A robust liaison team will help in bridging C2 interoperability gaps.

2-44. Terminology is also a problem between multinational forces and other organizations. For example, the use of acronyms could pose a problem between organizations. Therefore, all military forces and the agencies they work with should develop and distribute a lexicon of mutually agreed terms. The glossary in this manual can help provide a common basis for understanding. See also Field Manual (FM) 1-02.

2-45. The location of the multinational force headquarters is important. The multinational force must protect itself against various threats. However, it should be in a position to easily work with both the political and military sides of the operation.

2-46. The multinational force must remember that many countries are not staffed or equipped to offer full support. They may not possess a full array of combat support or combat service support assets, maps of the projected area of operations (AO), or the capability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data of the type commonly used by other multinational forces. These military forces probably will look to other nations for equipment and supplies. With regard specifically to UN operations, it is important to know what agreements exist between the UN and these militaries before their arrival in the projected AO.

2-47. The multinational force commander will have to look at which nations can offer special capabilities such as airlift, special operations, intelligence collection, communications, security, and logistics. These capabilities can offset other countries’ shortfalls and enhance overall operational competence. The multinational force commander may have difficulty removing particular forces or individuals from the force unless they are from his or her own nation.

**COOPERATION AND COORDINATION**

2-48. Multinational force commanders must focus on cooperation and coordination rather than C2 when dealing with most nonmilitary agencies. These agencies will have their own missions and goals. Coalition commanders will have a limited ability to influence their actions. Ensuring that they can accomplish the mission and end state—while allowing these agencies to do the same—requires that commanders seek agency cooperation. It also requires that efforts be coordinated to prevent interference in one another’s missions. Additionally, these agencies may be in a position to help commanders accomplish the mission. Developing a civil-military operations center (CMOC) is one way of achieving cooperation and coordination with nonmilitary agencies. The CMOC, described in detail in Chapter 9, provides a single point of contact between these agencies and the commander.
STAFFING

2-49. The multinational staff organization will be based on what option is used to form the headquarters, either the lead-nation concept or a composite headquarters. The commander may not have a choice if the establishing authority designates an organization. If the lead-nation concept is used, the routine duties of the commander and staff will be those assigned by the doctrine of the lead nation, modified as necessary for the specific situation. If a composite headquarters is selected, the commander and staff will have to specify duties in more detail. It may be necessary to change the names of various multinational functions based on sensitivities when working with organizations such as the UN. This section covers several responsibilities unique to multinational operations.

2-50. The multinational staff should be composed of appropriate members in key positions from each country providing forces. Positions on the staff should be divided so that country representation and influence generally reflect the composition of the force. These positions should also stem from the mission and type of operations to be conducted. Multinational commanders must also look at force composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support. The importance of knowing, trusting, and quickly reaching a comfort level with staff members may make it desirable for the multinational commander to handpick some members of the staff such as the chief of staff or G-3.

2-51. When mission requirements exceed staff capabilities, the commander must request the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment from either the national chain of command or the multinational establishing authorities. They may have a “cell” of experts prepared to augment a multinational force to provide assistance in the early stages of organization and planning. Staff officers who augment the staff nucleus should be trained as part of a multinational training and exercise program. The staff should include experienced operators for the C2 systems. Personnel nominated to fill multinational augmentation billets should possess the following attributes:

- Knowledge, confidence, and forcefulness.
- Preparedness to represent their nations and units.
- Understanding that they are the de facto country “experts.”
- Ability to work as part of a multinational team without country parochialism.

2-52. The command should establish a staff orientation program to ensure that all individuals joining the staff become thoroughly familiar with their surroundings. This could be accomplished by establishing a multinational personnel reception center under the G-1 or S-1. The “buddy system” is another program that the command could establish with the reception center or by itself. This system assigns an experienced staff member to a new staff member to assist in the familiarization process.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER

2-53. The multinational force commander is responsible to the member nations for the successful accomplishment of the mission. The following responsibilities are provided as a guide. They may be adapted to the specific mission and forces assigned:

- Making recommendations to the establishing authorities on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces for mission accomplishment. This includes identifying requirements for additional forces as needed.
- Exercising control over assigned and attached forces. The commander must also determine when to transfer forces to the multinational force OPCON or TACON.
- Developing an OPORD or campaign plan within the planning guidelines as directed by the establishing authorities. The commander determines applicability of existing OPLANs, if any, to maximize the benefits of prior deliberate planning.
- Requesting supplemental ROE needed to accomplish the assigned mission.
- Establishing combat identification measures.
- Notifying the establishing authorities when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned AO.
- Ensuring that cross-nation support is provided.
Ensuring the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting multinational team.

Determining the requirement for and providing guidance on establishing the necessary boards, centers, and bureaus (such as multinational visitor’s bureau, multinational movement center, or CMOC). If a staff proposes creating an organization, the commander should require that the staff provide criteria, supporting rationale, and membership. The final decision is the commander’s. If it is not required, the commander should not establish it.

Defining the subordinate AOs for each subordinate force, to include the Special Operations Force. The commander should—

- Ensure accurate accountability of forces deployed.
- Monitor the operational situation and maintain daily contact with the establishing authorities to keep fully informed of the situation.
- Coordinate with forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, multinational nation agencies, NGOs, or international organizations as appropriate.
- Build a cohesive team, to include NGOs, international organizations, and others.

**DEPUTY MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER**

2-54. Normally, the deputy commander is from a different country than the commander. The selection may be based on the mission assigned or the number and type of forces in the multinational force. The deputy usually is of equal or senior rank to the subordinate force commanders. He or she should possess a broad understanding of the operation to be conducted. The deputy performs special duties as directed by the commander. Examples of these duties include the following:

- Chairing committees.
- Coordinating with liaison personnel.
- Coordinating for incoming and outgoing requirements.
- Coordinating interagency requirements.

**CHIEF OF STAFF**

2-55. In most cases, the chief of staff will come from the same country as the commander, probably from the same command. Because the staff may have officers from different nations, the chief of staff places special emphasis on training, coordinating, and directing the work of the staff. The chief of staff must pay particular attention to establishing routine procedures that ensure necessary coordination takes place and in reviewing staff actions for completeness and clarity.

**G-1 (S-1), PERSONNEL**

2-56. See Chapter 3, Personnel, for details. It discusses human resources, financial, legal, and religious support to the command.

**G-2 (S-2), INTELLIGENCE**

2-57. See Chapter 4, Intelligence, for details.

**G-3 (S-3), OPERATIONS**

2-58. See Chapter 5, Operations and Planning, for details.

**G-4 (S-4), LOGISTICS**

2-59. See Chapter 6, Logistics, for details. This chapter includes health service support (HSS) and contracting.

**G-5 (S-5), PLANS**

2-60. See Chapter 5, Operations and Planning, for details.
G-6 (S-6), SIGNAL
2-61. See Chapter 2, Command and Control, for details of establishing communications.

G-7 (S-7), INFORMATION ENGAGEMENT
2-62. See Chapter 7, Army Information Tasks, for details.

G-8, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
2-63. See Chapter 10, Financial Management, for details.

G-9 (S-9), CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
2-64. See Chapter 9, Civil Affairs Operations, for details.

COMMANDER’S PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFF
2-65. The commander’s personal and special staff groups may include the following:
- Political advisor.
- Inspector general.
- Command historian.
- Engineer.
- Public affairs (PA) officer.
- Legal officer.
- Surgeon.
- Provost marshal.
- Chaplain.
- Others as directed.

2-66. Each member has specific tasks and responsibilities. In addition to the G-1, Chapter 3 covers the chaplain, legal officer, and provost marshal. Chapter 11 covers the surgeon. Chapter 12 covers the engineer. See FM 6-0 for information on personal and special staff groups.

Political Advisor
2-67. Commanders will routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. The commander should establish a close, efficient, and effective relationship with the political advisor. The responsibilities of the political advisor include the following:
- Working with the commander and assisting the national government in creating policies that meet multinational objectives and are realistically executed.
- Acting as the principal contact with ambassadors and informing the appropriate diplomatic personnel of multinational force plans within the AO.
- Supplying information regarding policy goals and objectives of the diplomatic agencies relevant to the operation.

Inspector General
2-68. The inspector general (IG) is a confidential advisor and fact finder for the commanding general. He or she serves as the extension of the commander's eyes, ears, voice, and conscience. The IG has the responsibility to inform the commander of IG observations, findings, and impressions on all aspects of the command. When directed by the commanding general, the IG—
- Assesses the operational and administrative effectiveness of the command.
- Informs the commanding general on all matters affecting mission accomplishment.
- Inquires into the reports on the state of the economy, efficiency, discipline, morale, esprit de corps, and quality of command management and leadership of all assigned and attached units and organizations.
• Assists the commanding general in sustaining readiness by taking care of Soldiers, civilians and family members.
• Advises the commanding general on inspections policy and effectiveness of the organizations inspections program.

Command Historian

2-69. All too often, important events, important decisions, and lessons learned from an operation are not recorded. Thus, they are not available for use as learning tools by multinational forces in future operations. The commander should establish a staff section to collect historical information and lessons learned about the operation from the initial planning process to redeployment. A command historian should head this section. The historian is responsible for–
  • Capturing and recording events for historical purposes (to include photographs).
  • Collecting lessons learned and ensuring turnover files are properly developed.
  • Assisting in the development of SOPs.

2-70. Additionally, the historian should record all events daily. This record must be created at the time of each event. It should include available sources as well as a synopsis of rationales for actions taken. This staff section should not become entangled in the decisionmaking process.

Public Affairs and the Media

2-71. The modern battlefield has changed dramatically and so has the ability of the media to report from the battlefield. Technological advances ensure that future operations will unfold on a global stage before a worldwide audience. Tactical actions and the hardships of Soldiers and civilians alike have an increasing impact on strategic decisionmaking. Real-time visual images of operations, both positive and negative, will continue to influence public understanding and support.

2-72. Media presence on the battlefield is a factor that commanders must consider during mission planning. They must understand and account for media capabilities and requirements. Failure in this regard will not prevent the media from covering multinational operations. It will, however, ensure that the media will use alternate sources for information and multinational forces will have lost the ability to influence the outcome of the story.

Information Environments

2-73. The global information environment (GIE) contains those information processes and systems that are beyond the direct influence of the military, but which may directly impact on the success or failure of military operations. The media, international organizations, and even individuals are players in the GIE. Multinational operations can be influenced through planned or inadvertent messages communicated via the GIE. Media coverage of multinational operations can be broadcast in real-time, or near real-time, to our troops, our national publics, our allies, and our adversaries.

2-74. The military information environment (MIE) consists of information systems and organizations, both friendly and enemy—or belonging to one of the belligerent factions in stability operations—military and nonmilitary, that support, enable, or significantly influence military operations. Information superiority is a key factor in the GIE and essential in the MIE for a commander to achieve success.

2-75. Commanders must understand the pervasiveness and capability of the media, not only in its ability to report on an operation, but also on its ability to influence target audiences with respect to the legitimacy of that operation. Commanders must anticipate how an adversary may attempt to use the media to achieve their own version of information superiority. Commanders must also have the means to counter these attempts at misinformation and propaganda to mitigate the effects on the morale of the troops.
Public Affairs Objectives

2-76. PA aims to help ensure information superiority. The public affairs office (PAO) seizes the initiative with respect to media operations and puts in place programs that do the following:

- Protect Soldiers and local civilians from the effects of enemy propaganda, misinformation, and rumor.
- Support open, independent reporting and access to units and Soldiers (within the limits of operations security [OPSEC]).
- Establish the conditions leading to confidence in the multinational force.
- Provide a balanced, fair, and credible presentation of information that communicates the multinational force’s story and messages through an expedited flow of complete, accurate, and timely information.

Public Affairs Operations

2-77. PA operations assist the commander in understanding and operating in the GIE. These operations support the commander’s efforts to meet the information requirements of internal and external audiences without compromising the mission.

2-78. Understanding that the perception of an operation can be as important as the execution of the operation. PA staff supports the commander by monitoring media perceptions and reporting trends. The staff prepares and disseminates clear and objective messages about the operation to target audiences to address any instances of misinformation or imbalanced reporting.

2-79. Successful operations require an accurate PA assessment of the situation. The PA assessment is the continual analysis of the GIE and its potential impact on the operation. This assessment provides the commander with a thorough examination of critical PA factors such as–

- The number, types, and nationalities of news media representatives in theater.
- The identification of media personalities and their respective reporting trends or biases.
- Media needs and limitations.
- Media transportation and communication capabilities or requirements.
- The perception of past, current, or potential operations by internal and external audiences.

2-80. The chief challenge for the multinational PA staff is to develop a plan that not only supports the commander’s concept of operations, but also takes into account the PA requirements of the multinational partners.

2-81. The forces of each nation forming the multinational force are familiar with their respective national media organizations and their methods. However, these may be dissimilar between countries. Commanders and PA staffs must take these differences into account when developing working relationships that will allow for open and accurate reporting with a minimum of ground rules to ensure OPSEC. Policies on media accreditation and release or nonrelease of information must be developed at the multinational force headquarters level and adhered to by all units in the command regardless of nationality.

2-82. PA operations consist of four key elements: planning, media operations, internal communications, and training.

Planning

2-83. PA planning is an integral part of operational planning. It must be included at the very outset of the planning process. PA officers seek to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in the multinational force. They expedite the flow of complete, accurate, and timely information that communicates the multinational force’s perspective. This helps to ensure media understanding of the events covered and thus contributes to fair and balanced reporting. Included in this planning element is the requirement to provide issues management and crisis communications advice to the commander and senior staff on a wide range of issues, both operational and nonoperational.
Media Operations

2-84. Commanders and their staffs must accurately assess the level and intensity of media interest in their operation. Media operations involve advising the commander on the likely implications of media reporting on the chosen course of action. Media operations involve the following:

- Facilitating media coverage of operations by anticipating and responding to the needs of the media. This includes providing access to official spokespersons and subject matter experts. In-theater media may have additional requirements such as transportation, accommodation, and emergency medical treatment. Most media organizations will come prepared with either the necessary logistic support or the money to buy it. However, whatever level of support is provided to the media, it is important that it be consistently applied.
- Verifying media accreditation and assisting with accreditation, as required.
- Discussing the “ground rules” with respect to media coverage of ongoing operations with written acknowledgement and ensuring enforcement, as required.
- Establishing and operating an information bureau.

Internal Communications

2-85. PA has an essential and constant requirement to inform multinational troops on operational issues as well as national and international events. This is an important function as it contributes directly to the maintenance of morale. It also helps to counter rumors and misinformation.

Training

2-86. Given the level of media interest in military operations, all Soldiers must learn how to deal effectively with the media, both on and off the battlefield. Soldiers of all ranks must receive media awareness training prior to deployment. Attention must be paid to individuals selected as “official” spokespersons. However, the potential exists for any Soldier to be asked to respond to media queries regarding their jobs and personal experiences.

Information Bureau

2-87. The multinational force should establish a multinational information bureau staffed by PA officers with necessary logistic support. It verifies media credentials and assists with accreditation. This bureau facilitates media coverage within the AO by sustaining the efforts of those media representatives accompanying units. It also facilitates media coverage by communicating with media agencies outside the AO. In taking advantage of the principles of modularity and flexibility, the bureau must expand its capability in concert with that of the deploying force. It must be prepared to deal with the potential for a large number of media deployed throughout the AO. It must also be prepared to establish subbureaus, if required.

2-88. Information is important to multinational force personnel and their families at home. The bureau should ensure that the international media, including the national media of the multinational partners, receive information on the multinational force’s activities. The morale of the multinational force members often is influenced by what their family members report they have seen or heard on television and radio. Release authority for information should be pre-established. It should not compromise OPSEC parameters and next of kin process or investigative procedures. The bureau must be prepared to deal with the language requirements of the various target audiences.

Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations

2-89. The common ground between PA, civil affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOP) is information. Civil affairs operations use information to inform the in-theater public on assistance programs and reconstruction projects in their area. PA uses information to manage issues and inform the troops and the international media community. PSYOP use information to attempt to change the perceptions, opinions, attitudes, behavior, and beliefs of a population to gain support for civil tasks and military activities.
2-90. PSYOP should use government or military means for producing and disseminating messages. PSYOP may also use information from the media to reinforce its messages. However, PA must not be used to disseminate PSYOP messages. Coordination is essential between CA, PA, and PSYOP to ensure that no contradictions or divergences occur. The information operations coordination cell (chaired by the multinational J-7 or G-7) normally coordinates these activities.

Public Affairs Guidance

2-91. The media will want to talk to commanders and troops. This is a good idea, but commanders must avoid staged shows. Experienced media will immediately spot them. It is better to let the media talk to the troops after PA guidance has been issued to the troops and “ground rules” for reporting have been explained to accredited media. PA guidance is covered in the PA annex to the operation order. PA guidance to Soldiers should include the following:

- The Soldier’s right to talk to the media.
- Everything said is “on the record.” What is said will be quoted by name.
- Do not discuss classified or sensitive information and do not comment on policy.
- Be honest.
- If you do not know the answer, say so.
- Do not speculate. Stay within your area of expertise.
- Listen to the question carefully. If you are unsure of a question, ask the reporter to clarify it.
- Treat the media as professionals and respect their deadlines.
- Respect HN sensitivities and speak slowly when necessary.
- Keep your answers brief and to the point.
- Always maintain eye contact with the interviewer.
- Avoid military or technical jargon.
- Relax, be yourself, and be friendly.

Linguists and Interpreters

2-92. Linguists and interpreters can be critical to mission success. Communications with the local populace and multinational forces can be greatly hindered without them. Language barriers may cause difficulties in interoperability with other armies and in dealing with the host nation. Language problems can make it difficult to sustain a rapid decision cycle. Even common tasks, such as sharing intelligence, must await translation before data can be passed through the command, slowing the development of plans and execution. Language capability speeds command, reduces confusion, and contributes to mutual respect. Forces must be able to effectively exchange commands and other information to work successfully together. Few linguists have both the technical expertise and depth of understanding to be fully understood while crossing both language and doctrinal boundaries.

2-93. Planners must consider LNOs, foreign area officers, and language-capable personnel to fill these positions. Planners must determine requirements for language-trained personnel early in the planning cycle because of the scarcity of these assets and the long-lead time required for deploying them. These language-qualified personnel will probably require a training period to familiarize themselves with technical terms and procedures of the organization. Language is more than the direct translation of words. Word choice, mannerisms, and so forth also convey much information.

2-94. Linguistic requirements are not confined to liaison teams or headquarters elements. Linguists are needed throughout CMO and logistics functions to coordinate with local authorities, civilian transportation coordinators, refugee and relief centers, medical staffs, legal offices, and local police forces.
2-95. Historically, the timely acquisition of enough linguists and interpreters has been a problem that significantly impacted both personnel tempo and multinational operations. These assets often are in the reserves and must be requested early to ensure availability and timeliness for deployment. Contracted interpreters may also be used. While this is acceptable for many requirements, some sensitive positions will require military linguists with appropriate security clearances. In cases of less common languages, multinational components may require parent country or other country augmentation.

ESTABLISHING COMMUNICATIONS

2-96. Communication assets and the capability to communicate are fundamental to successful multinational operations. The key to successful communications is preparation during planning. The mission analysis and assessment process provide the opportunity for the communications officer to identify communication requirements and evaluate in-country capability.

INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

2-97. Many communication issues can be resolved through equipment exchange and liaison teams. Continual liaison between communication planners helps alleviate interoperability issues. Communication requirements vary with the mission, composition, and geography of the AO. Interoperability is often constrained by the least technologically advanced nation. The multinational force should address the need for integrated communications among all forces early in the planning phase of the operation.

2-98. In a multinational force, a primary communication link is between the lead nation and the national contingent headquarters. The ability to communicate with civilian agencies across the full continuum of operations is equally important. The transition to follow-on units, commercial communications, or to agencies like the UN must be considered early in the operation.

2-99. The multinational force should plan for adequate communications, to include the ability to communicate using voice (secure and nonsecure), data, and video teleconferencing. The force needs a deployable communication capability and enough trained operators for sustained operations, with multiple means of communications to avoid the possibility of a single point failure.

ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT

2-100. In addition to problems of compatibility and security, many units do not have enough communication equipment to meet mission requirements. During initial planning stages, planners must identify required communications, issues of spectrum management, and controls on access to information. Liaison teams, with adequate communication gear, can reduce the severity of some of these problems. Satellite communications may be needed to provide communications between the higher-level multinational force headquarters. Other space-based services, such as weather reporting and use of global positioning systems, may also be needed.

2-101. Communications planners must anticipate these requirements during initial planning, evaluate HN communication resources, and integrate them into the communication plan. However, these means must satisfy operational requirements. Common user communications may be used for operations provided there is sufficient capacity to ensure acceptable reaction times. Although many combined communication doctrine and procedures exist, there are some differences in operating standards.
CHECKLIST

Commanders participating in a multinational operation should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the force’s participation in the operation.

COMMAND

2-102. What is the command structure? Is it a lead nation, parallel command, combined, or integrated command structure?

2-103. What political motivations are responsible for each nation’s participation in the operation? What potential conflicts may arise?

2-104. Have the implications of national and regional culture on contemplated multinational operations been assessed?

2-105. Have appropriate orientation briefings from civilian agencies been requested?

2-106. Have status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations? Is there an alternative (for example, technical agreements) that will provide adequate protection?

2-107. What interoperability factors (for example, command, control, communications, or logistics) will affect the mission?

2-108. Are there cultural barriers that may prevent a harmonious relationship? What force structure will minimize friction between partners?

2-109. Have supported and supporting relationships been established or referred to higher authority to resolve inadequacies?

2-110. What unique capabilities does a national contingent bring to the multinational force?

2-111. What constraints are imposed on multinational forces by their national authorities?

2-112. Have standards regarding operational or logistics capabilities been established for certifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated a method of resolution?

2-113. Have deficiencies with multinational commanders been negotiated for resolution?

2-114. Have C2 arrangements been made to include the multinational ambassadors, military attaches, and nonmilitary government officials in coordinating functions?

2-115. Are forces; logistic support; and command, control, and communications capabilities robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?

2-116. Have all multinational legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?

2-117. Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the required functional skills, training level, language skill, and avoidance of historic animosities?

2-118. Have minimum communications capabilities been established for each multinational member to enable successful 24-hour operations?

2-119. Has the command structure been designed to minimize the number of layers?
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

2-120. Have command relationships for the control of forces been defined?
2-121. Is there an initiating directive that clearly articulates the command arrangements?
2-122. Have the command relationships been defined and analyzed for the following:
   ● Feasibility of achieving unity of command or unity of effort?
   ● The feasibility of achieving mission under the command relationships?
   ● Assistance required from the national government in negotiating unity of command or effort at
     the strategic level?
   ● Clarity of relationships and understanding on the part of all multinational elements?

LIAISON

2-123. What LNOs must be sent to multinational force headquarters and adjacent, supporting, and
       supported units?
2-124. Do liaison elements on the staff possess requisite authorities? Do they have a full understanding of
       both national interest and multinational objectives?
2-125. Do liaison elements have appropriate communications, linguistic, logistics, and office support
       capabilities in place?
2-126. Have LNOs been identified? Have key LNOs been interviewed for suitability?
2-127. What are the requirements for interagency and multinational coordination? Does the force have
       adequate LNOs or LNO teams to meet required coordination?
2-128. Have ARFOR mobile liaison teams been requested?

LANGUAGE

2-129. What language will be used for force wide communications?
2-130. At what command level will each force resort to its national language? Are there sufficient
       interpreters for planning and execution?

COMMUNICATIONS

2-131. What areas come under multinational control and what areas remain national issues?
2-132. What is the requirement for portable communication devices such as cell phones?
2-133. Will commercial companies establish telephone service for use by multinational forces?
2-134. If the multinational force establishes a multinational visitor’s bureau, what communication
       capability is required?
2-135. Do national laws require agreements defining payments for using the information systems
       networks or military satellite communication assets?
2-136. Who is responsible for funding additional communication capability?
2-137. Will nations be expected to provide communication capability to other nations’ military forces or
       civilian agencies?
2-138. What are the plans for expanding the communication system, if needed?
2-139. What is the policy on morale calls? Who supports them?
2-140. What steps have been taken to ensure procedural compatibility?
2-141. What is the common identification friend or foe procedure?
2-142. What are the data-link protocols?
2-143. What is the communication equipment capability between forces?
2-144. Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?
2-145. What C2 systems are required to support diminishing multinational force presence?
2-146. Will command channels be used only for execution and national channels for reporting status and requesting support?
2-147. Are there a means and a plan to provide all forces with a common operational picture?
2-148. Do multinational partners with a lesser C2 capability have appropriate LNOs, interpreters, operators, and maintainers to enable adequate C2 within the multinational force?
2-149. Is there a policy or plan for the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information and cryptographic materials, especially to civilian agencies that may require some access to classified material to accomplish their missions?
2-150. Has the language exchange point been determined?
2-151. Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?
2-152. Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for the C2 network?
2-153. Has the rapid dissemination of targeting materials been provided for?
2-154. Have arrangements been made for staff communications?
2-155. Have common databases been provided for?
2-156. Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable C2 network been selected to serve as network manager for the multinational C2 infrastructure?
2-157. Have arrangements been made to allow contract HN employees to work on C2 staffs without exposing them to automated data processing and classified information used in daily operations?
2-158. Has the multinational established a standard datum? Will all products be on that datum?
2-159. Is there a multinational force geospatial information and services plan that designates all mapping, charting, and geodesy products for use?
2-160. Have the command relationships, locations of headquarters and the type of services required such as tactical satellite, telephone, facsimile, amplitude modulation, and frequency modulation/modulated been determined?
2-161. What are the frequency requirements and planning ranges for equipment?
2-162. Have frequencies been requested from the multinational force communications coordinator?
Chapter 2

2-163. How will the multinational force conduct spectrum management? This must account for frequencies already in use by civilian agencies.

2-164. How will the multinational force achieve automated data processing software compatibility to facilitate file transfers?

2-165. How will the multinational force achieve communication interoperability? Will the system satisfy communication requirements from the national authorities to the lowest information exchange requirement?

2-166. If civilian agencies have separate communication networks and the multinational force provides security for these agencies, how will they request assistance during emergencies?

2-167. How will the multinational ensure adequate redundancy? Multiple assets must be available and used during operations to ensure information flow.

2-168. How will the multinational handle noncompatible communications equipment among organizations and multinational forces?

2-169. What communications support will be provided to civilian agencies? Will it be provided through the CMOC?

2-170. How and when will the multinational force establish its communications architecture?

2-171. How will the multinational force account for and utilize communication networks established by civilian agencies? This includes commercially leased circuits, commercial satellite services, high frequency, and very high frequency radios.

2-172. How will the multinational force address the need for secure communications?

2-173. How will the command handle incidents when a person accidentally transmits classified data over the unclassified computer network?

2-174. What is the policy on implementing communications black-out periods in support of multinational OPSEC?

2-175. Is there a multinational force standardized email naming convention?

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

2-176. What areas come under multinational control and what areas remain national issues?

2-177. Has coordination been affected with other national PA officers or equivalents?

2-178. What is the plan for handling publicity, news correspondents, and journalists?

2-179. What are the biographical backgrounds of multinational force senior leaders? What unique equipment do they have or require?

2-180. Has the senior PA officer met the multinational force senior leaders?

2-181. Who is the senior spokesperson for the multinational force?

2-182. Has the multinational force information bureau been established?

2-183. Has a coordinated media policy, to include a system to provide credentials for the media, been established? This allows some control over who attends multinational force briefings.
2-184. Do the media understand the end state and how the force is progressing toward it?

2-185. Has the command aggressively countered inaccurate information with subject matter experts?

2-186. Has media awareness training been conducted prior to deployment? Has sustainment training been conducted in the AO?

2-187. Has the senior PA officer identified points of contact with agencies that will operate in the AO to arrange referrals of media queries regarding their operations?

2-188. Has release of information authority for accidents/incidents and notification of next-of-kin process and investigative procedures been established?

2-189. Will media be embedded in units? What are the procedures for dealing with this situation?

2-190. Has translation/interpretation support for media ground rules, as well as other documents, been established?

2-191. Does the command have a PA plan that includes crisis management? Is the senior PA officer a member of the crisis management team?

2-192. Does the PA plan reflect the cultural differences of all troop-contributing nations and the host nation?

2-193. Does the PA plan consider the impact of print, radio, televised, and internet media?

2-194. Does the command have a PA plan that includes the following:

- Provides a contingency statement to use in response to media queries before initial public release of information concerning the multinational force and its mission?
- States who (which nation and when, or all nations simultaneously) makes the initial public release concerning the multinational force and its mission?
- States agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of information concerning the multinational force and its national components?
- States specific requirements for combat camera support, including communicating to subordinate units the need for operational documentation?
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Chapter 3
Personnel

Although human resources support for national contingents is a national responsibility, human resources support assets of the multinational force should be collocated for ease of coordination between the national elements of the multinational force. Human resources support is the system and functions of staffing, personnel support, and personnel services. Staffing includes personnel readiness management, personnel strength accounting, personnel information management, and replacement management. Personnel support includes casualty operations management, personnel processing, and essential personnel services (promotions, awards, evaluations, and so forth). Personnel services support includes postal operations management; morale, welfare and recreation; equal opportunity; and drug and alcohol. In addition to human resources support, the G-1 or S-1 normally assumes staff coordinating responsibility of financial management, finance services, chaplain activities, command information, and legal service support.

G-1 OR S-1 (PERSONNEL)

3-1. The G-1 or S-1 is the principal staff assistant to the commander on human resources support. He or she is responsible for providing guidance, oversight, and coordination of overall manpower and personnel issues. He or she is the coordinating staff officer for finance, religious ministry, and legal support.

3-2. The multinational G-1, in coordination with the national contingents, should recommend a policy on tour lengths to the multinational force commander. A rotation policy should be based on the multinational force’s mission, length of operation, operational environment, and requirement for skilled personnel. A standard tour length for all personnel is equitable and impacts favorably on morale. However, this may not be supportable from an operational aspect. However, the rotation policies of participating nations and services will probably preclude a standardized tour length. The multinational commander must be aware of national contingent rotations and their status so that he or she can accurately account for all the forces in the AO.

RECEPTION CENTER

3-3. In multinational operations, a multinational personnel reception center may be established by the G-1. The center familiarizes personnel with the multinational force, its mission, and the situation for which the multinational force was formed. It also assists personnel in acclimating themselves to the host nation, its culture, and its history. Each troop-contributing nation should be represented in the center. The multinational personnel reception center may also serve as the location of national personnel service support operations.

VISITOR’S BUREAU

3-4. The number of visitors to an AO may warrant establishing a multinational visitor’s bureau. This bureau can assist in handling all visitors, especially distinguished visitors. This is usually a full-time responsibility. A senior officer should be the director of the bureau. A reservist with a protocol background can be a good choice as a director. The multinational visitor’s bureau should be a separate entity and not part of the multinational information bureau or PAO. It should be composed of representatives from all multinational force nations. It must possess sufficient communications and transportation capabilities. Its personnel may require training in executive protection and properly escorting distinguished visitors.
RELIGIOUS MINISTRY

3-5. The entire force must understand the religious groups and movements within the AO and the potential impact they may have on the mission. Religious differences among personnel in both participating nations and populations in the AO must be identified and addressed during the planning stages. Religion plays a pivotal role in the self-understanding of many people. It has a significant effect on the goals, objectives, and structure of society. This may seriously impact multinational policy, strategy, and tactics.

3-6. The primary responsibility for religious ministry support in multinational operations remains with the national component commanders. The multinational force may assign the senior national component chaplain to the multinational force staff. This helps ensure comprehensive ministry cooperation and respect for any religious sensitivity of the host nation and among the national components. This also helps ensure a balanced coverage among personnel and faith group requirements exists among the multinational force. The chaplain has the following responsibilities:

- Recommends deployment of religious ministry teams.
- Advises the commander on religion, morals, ethics, and morale.
- Performs ministry according to his or her faith and country practices and standards.
- Ensures that all nations’ religious support personnel receive professional assistance, program funding, logistics, and personnel through appropriate staff channels.
- Establishes and coordinates a multinational force religious ministry support plan to provide adequate religious ministry support to all elements of the multinational force.
- Advises on personnel replacement or rotational policies.
- Assists the command with humanitarian and disaster-relief programs.
- Ensures that detainees receive ministry and care appropriate to their needs.
- Prepares religious ministry support portions of the OPLAN and OPORD.
- Provides confidential and privileged communications in counseling for multinational personnel in support of stress management, morale, and early identification of critical personnel problems.

LEGAL ADVISOR

3-7. Legal support is essential to multinational operations. Operations, especially peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, involve a myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations, both foreign and domestic. Therefore, a commander may call on the legal advisor as often as the operations officer. The legal advisor can help a commander understand the problems of multinational operations. The legal advisor should be a vital part of the planning team before deployment. However, adherence to the law is the responsibility of command at all levels. Legal advisors will not be those called to account if the multinational force carries out an illegal act. This is especially relevant in areas of national fiscal restrictions on the expenditures of funds, equipment, and manpower.

3-8. Additionally, multinational operations and missions may require subordinate commanders to become involved with local governments and conduct negotiations among competing factions. Commanders may also be required to negotiate with governmental organizations, NGOs, and other international organizations to accomplish the mission. Accordingly, the command will need a legal advisor of sufficient rank to influence the decisionmaking process.

3-9. The legal advisor should be responsible for the following:

- Advising the commander on operational law including the law of war, ROE, law of the sea, air law, SOFAs, and applicable international laws, military justice, claims, legal assistance, and administrative law encompassing environmental issues, contracts, and fiscal law.
- Reviewing operational plans for legal sufficiency and potential issues.
- Drafting basic policy for the force regarding prohibited and permitted actions while deployed.
- Serving as a member of the ROE planning cell providing advice and counsel on the development and promulgation of ROE.
In the absence of existing agreements, negotiating with local governments concerning procurement, seizure of property for military purposes, and scope of foreign criminal jurisdiction.

Ensuring that all adverse actions are properly administered.

Advising the commander on international directives and agreements that form the basis for the multinational operations. This includes such issues as HN support, diplomatic status, foreign criminal jurisdiction, ROE, environmental matters, and medical treatment of civilians.

Providing legal advice on prisoners of war (POWs), refugees, displaced and detained civilians; PSYOP and CMO/civil-military cooperation (CIMIC); local culture and customs; government, military, and political liaison; investigations; the legality of landing fees; and interpretation of transit agreements.

Establishing liaison as early as possible with multinational, international, and HN legal officials, local police, authorities, and court officials who administer the judicial system.

Implementing, interpreting, or executing a system for payment of claims arising from personal injury or property damage resulting from the operation.

Advising the force on legal and fiscal restraints involving logistics assistance to nonmilitary organizations and multinational forces.

Advising the command on issues affecting the detention of persons who may attack or otherwise disrupt the force in accordance with customary international law, applicable UN Security Council resolutions, alliance or coalition directives, and national policies. The force must be sensitive to apprehension and turnover procedures, especially where there are distinct cultural differences in the AO.

**LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS**

3-10. It is vital that commanders and planners of multinational forces understand the legal basis for all operations. All applicable laws must be obeyed. Even multinational forces conducting operations under UN mandates have no overall immunity under the law.

**JURISDICTION**

3-11. Jurisdiction is based on the national laws of the country sending the troops, as far as they have extraterritorial application outside the country concerned. SOFAs for stability operations should grant total exclusion of host-state jurisdiction; thereby providing a legal framework for the strictly international and neutral status of the multinational forces. The multinational force cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of any of the parties engaged in the conflict. To do so would lead to an undermining of impartiality. Additionally, the ability to arrest, detain, and try members of the multinational force or community could directly influence the activities of the operation.

3-12. The consensual basis for the multinational force’s presence in the host country, its mandate, and the privileges and immunities of any civilians should be established. This should be provided in a document of treaty status. In most cases, an international organization, such as the UN, will perform this task. However, when the operation is an exercise in regional peacekeeping, it is incumbent on the participating nations to establish a legally sound basis for such an operation that is sustainable under international law.

3-13. Most stability operations SOFAs allow members of the multinational force to be exempt from local jurisdiction in civil proceedings for acts “related to the official duties of the member.” A claims regime compensating for damages arising from such acts will almost always be a feature of any SOFA or other agreement with the receiving state. In matters not related to official duties, multinational members are subject to local jurisdiction, with only a few minor concessions in favor of the force. If service members are involved in any incident while on leave, they may be sued for any damage they do or injury they cause.

3-14. International law applies to all operations. Multinational partners will be bound to comply with obligations that arise from the treaties to which they are party. As not all multinational members will be party to the same treaties, this may create a marked disparity between partners as to what they can or
cannot do. Some obligations under international law arise from customary international law and are binding on states whether or not they have entered into a treaty on the subject. Most of the major rules relating to humane treatment of persons within the power of the force fit within this category.

3-15. The question of what element of international law is applicable may be a complex issue that depends on several factual considerations. It is an issue on which expert legal advice should be sought. However, such operations will never be conducted in a legal vacuum. The international law requirement for humane treatment and respect for the life, rights, and property of noncombatants remains constant even if the treaty or customary basis for those protections differ.

LEGAL BASIS FOR USE OF FORCE

3-16. There are a variety of internationally recognized legal bases for the use of force in multinational operations. For the majority of multinational operations, the UN charter provides the primary authority for the use of force under Security Council sanctions. (For example, Chapter VII enforcement actions.) Under Chapter VII of the UN charter, the Security Council is empowered to determine what measures are appropriate to use against acts of aggression or other threats to international peace and security. However, prior to use of military force, the Security Council must first determine the basis of the threat and then employ measures less than use of force to attempt to compel compliance. Using the authority granted to it under Chapter VII, the Security Council has authorized multinational operations to compel compliance with the Security Council’s resolutions in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. For further information on this and other legal issues, see the Operational Law Handbook published by the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School (email: CLAMO@hqda.army.mil).

3-17. Because of the complexity of multinational operations, it is vital that commanders and planners of multinational forces understand the legal basis for their involvement in the operation. Legal issues affecting use of force, detention, searches and seizures, foreign criminal jurisdiction, and adherence to international law all impact upon mission accomplishment. Close coordination with the multinational force legal advisor is therefore essential.

FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

3-18. One of the most important issues affecting commanders and their Soldiers is criminal jurisdiction. This is especially true in multinational operations. Because of the variety of stability operations often performed by multinational forces, the issue of criminal jurisdiction is central to the ability of the multinational force to accomplish its mission. Mission realities dictate the multinational force not be subject to the jurisdiction of any of the parties engaged in the conflict. To do so would lead to an undermining of impartiality essential to mission success. Additionally, the ability to arrest, detain, and try members of the multinational force could directly influence the activities of the operation. As a result, the consensual basis (mandate) for the multinational force’s presence in the host country and the privileges and immunities of any civilians should be clearly established.

3-19. In a best-case scenario, these protections should be provided in a document with treaty status and, because of the nature of multinational operations, negotiated by an international organization such as the UN. However, when the operation is an exercise in regional peacekeeping, it is incumbent on the participating nations to establish a legally sound basis that is sustainable under international law.
STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENTS

3-20. Generally, international law recognizes that each sovereign nation has jurisdiction over all persons within its recognized borders. A receiving state must therefore consent to any limitations on this sovereign right before any foreign nation sending forces (sending state) into that host nation can assert jurisdiction over sending state personnel sent for military operations. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, military personnel taking part in a multinational operation are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. Because of the potential ramifications that may result from a receiving state exercising jurisdiction over multinational deployed personnel, a SOFA is often deemed essential prior to a deployment. While a SOFA may come in many procedural formats, it generally addresses three substantive areas of foreign criminal jurisdiction:

- The first involves those cases where the sending state has exclusive jurisdiction. Under exclusive jurisdiction, the sending state retains sole jurisdiction over cases where its personnel have committed an offense punishable under its laws, but not the laws of the receiving state. These offenses are primarily those characterized as purely “military” offenses (such as absent without leave or dereliction of duty) under the sending state’s military criminal code.

- The second area involves those cases where the receiving state exercises exclusive jurisdiction. These offenses are commonly receiving state traffic offenses—offenses that are punishable under the laws of the receiving state but not the sending state.

- The last area commonly addressed in SOFAs involves those cases where jurisdiction is shared by both the sending and receiving states. This is commonly referred to as concurrent jurisdiction. Under concurrent jurisdiction, either the sending or receiving state may exercise a primary right of jurisdiction depending upon the negotiated offense. As is often the case, in those cases where the receiving state has a primary right of jurisdiction, the receiving state may either waive its right, or, give “sympathetic consideration” to requests by the sending state for jurisdiction.

3-21. In the absence of a SOFA, it is still possible for a sending state to retain some criminal jurisdiction over its deployed forces. In those cases where military personnel are participating in a UN mission, those military personnel will typically have special protection. Further (under Article VI of the convention on the privileges and immunities of the UN charter) the state may grant deploying forces “expert on mission” status in order to provide a strong legal framework for the international and neutral status of the multinational force. In this case, complete immunity for crimes committed by members of the multinational force is granted. Alternatively, the UN may negotiate a SOFA with the host nation that is commonly referred to as a status of mission agreement retains exclusive criminal jurisdiction in the sending states participating in the multinational mission.

3-22. In addition to criminal jurisdiction, civil liability for acts of omission by multinational personnel is also an important concern to commanders and planners. (This includes, for example, claims by receiving state civilians for damage during a deployment.) Most SOFAs allow members of the multinational force to be exempt from local jurisdiction in civil proceedings for acts “related to the official duties of the member.” For example, a claims procedure compensating for damages arising from such acts will almost always be a feature of any SOFA or other agreement with the receiving state. In matters not related to official duties, multinational members are subject to local jurisdiction, with only a few minor concessions in favor of the force. Therefore, if service members are involved in any incident that is not in performance of their official duties, they could be liable in the courts of the receiving state for any damages or injuries they cause.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

3-23. International law applies to all operations. Multinational partners will be bound to comply with obligations that arise from the treaties to which they are party. Not all multinational members will be party to the same treaties. This may create a marked disparity between partners as to what they can or cannot do. Some obligations under international law arise from “customary” international law and are binding on states whether or not they have entered into a treaty on the subject. For example, most of the internationally recognized rules relating to humane treatment of persons who are within the power of a military force fit within this category.
3-24. The law of war is binding on the multinational partners in any operation where a state of armed conflict exists to which the multinational members are a party. Some aspects of the law of war, such as prohibitions on the use of certain weapons, may bind multinational partners even though no “state of war” exists. Even when not strictly applicable, the law of war may provide guidance and may be applied as a matter of a multinational member’s national policy. Within the scope of multinational operations, international human rights law is an issue at the forefront. In particular, both treaty and customary international law prohibitions are binding on the multinational force and its members. These prohibitions include—

- Genocide.
- Slavery.
- Torture.
- Inhumane treatment.
- Arbitrary detention.
- Deprivation of civil rights.

**PRISONERS OF WAR AND DETAINED PERSONS**

3-25. Troops involved in peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate are in a special position. While such troops are expected to respect the laws relating to the use of force, they are not parties to the conflict where they maintain peace. Thus, if they are taken prisoner, they are not POWs, but are considered to be illegally held and must be immediately released.

3-26. Although not a party to the conflict, members of the multinational force must comply with the spirit of all provisions of the law of war. In many operations, persons who are not entitled to POW status may be detained by the force. Either the situation has not reached the threshold of international armed conflict or the individual is not a combatant or otherwise entitled to enjoy POW status under Geneva Convention III. The force may also need to detain common criminals who pose a threat to the force or to law and order.

3-27. The status of a person who has been captured may not be known immediately. This is particularly so where opposing forces comprise or include irregular militia, where there are civilians accompanying the force or acting as unlawful combatants, or where a spontaneous uprising has occurred.

3-28. Similarly, there may be a question as to whether the situation has reached the point of being an armed conflict for the purposes of the law of war or of being an international armed conflict. Detainees are often taken in circumstances, such as UN or other peace support operations, where the law of war may not strictly apply. However, international law has developed to the point that no person who is in the power of a force is without legal protection.

3-29. International rules of humane treatment must be applied to any persons captured, arrested, interned, retained, or otherwise detained by multinational personnel. It does not matter whether the persons are enemy POWs, retained personnel, internees, or detainees. It does not matter whether captivity arises out of international armed conflict, armed conflict not of an international character, or during peace support operations. It is important to understand that different countries have different rules regarding the holding and transfer of enemy POWs. These rules may preclude the transfer of enemy POWs between national contingents.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

3-30. All nations in the multinational force will be provided with ROE by their respective chains of command. Multinational force ROE will be developed during the planning process by the force headquarters. Subsequently, subordinate formations, from nations other than that of the force headquarters, must develop supporting ROE. It is probable that some subordinate ROE will be at variance with the lead nation’s ROE in compliance with national legal requirements and the parameters of national ROE provided by national chains of command. Subordinate ROE for any given national contingent must also provide clear national guidance on other nations’ weapons usage that would be prohibited by law or restricted in usage for that contingent. Commands should also be aware that using another nation’s capability that is prohibited by the command’s national ROE may place the command at risk of national prosecution.

3-31. U.S. forces assigned OPCON or TACON to a multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force for mission accomplishment if authorized by the president of the U.S. or secretary of defense. U.S. forces always retain the right to use necessary and proportional force for unit and individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When U.S. forces, under U.S. OPCON or TACON, operate in conjunction with a multinational force, reasonable efforts will be made to effect common ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, U.S. forces will operate under standing ROE. To avoid misunderstanding, the multinational forces will be informed prior to U.S. participation in the operation that U.S. forces intend to operate under these standing ROE and to exercise unit and individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying national obligations derived from international agreements. For example, other multinational force members may not be parties to treaties that bind the U.S. Or they may be bound by treaties to which the U.S. is not a party. U.S. forces remain bound by U.S. international agreements even if the other members are not parties to these agreements and need not adhere to the terms.

3-32. ROE are the primary tools used by multinational forces to regulate the use of force. ROE provide operational constraints based on the mission the multinational force is conducting. Although numerous legal factors serve as a foundation for multinational ROE, the fact remains that multinational ROE reflect both international law and the national laws of the various participating nations. Nonlegal issues, such as the political objectives of the multinational force and the individual troop-contributing nations combined with military mission limitations, also play an essential role in the creation and application of ROE. Determining and implementing acceptable ROE between all nations involved in the multinational operation is the challenge faced by both commanders and their legal advisors. The multinational force legal advisor has an important role in assisting commanders and staffs with the preparation, dissemination, and training of ROE. However, ROE are ultimately the commander’s “rules” to be implemented by the force.

3-33. All troop-contributing nations in the multinational force will be provided with the operational ROE by their respective national chains of command. However, multinational force ROE will be developed during the planning process by the multinational force headquarters. Subsequently, subordinate national force commands from nations other than that of the force headquarters, will develop supporting ROE that follows, to the extent possible given possible national limitations, the ROE promulgated by the multinational force headquarters. As a result, it is probable that some subordinate nation’s ROE will differ from the lead nation’s ROE because of national legal requirements and the parameters of national ROE provided by their respective national chains of command. To prevent confusion that may impact upon the ability of the multinational force to accomplish its mission, a subordinate command’s ROE should provide clear national guidance on other participating nation’s ROE differences. For example, weapons use (such as use of riot control agents and measures) that would be prohibited by law or restricted in use for one nation should be clearly explained for all other multinational participants. Participating nations must remain aware not to adhere to ROE measures (whether multinational force or another troop-contributing nation) that would violate their own national laws when doing so could place the command at risk of national prosecution. An example would be using landmines when their nation has signed international treaties banning landmine use.
3-34. Because ROE are intended to be a control mechanism for use of force during military operations, individual Soldier and collective unit training is essential. This is made even more important by the potential for varied differences between the national ROE that a contributing force regularly uses in training or operations and the ROE promulgated by the multinational force headquarters. To assist the command in ensuring that ROE can be properly understood and applied under mission conditions, realistic and rigorous scenario- or vignette-driven training exercises are often the best means of training ROE.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-35. During multinational operations, particularly stability operations, force members must be aware of the environmental considerations of HN and participating nations’ environmental legislation. Military materiel restrictions, by one or more armies or the host nation—such as the use of depleted uranium rounds—may also limit the method by which forces conduct operations. Additionally, HN cultural and historical sensitivities should be considered as a factor in the planning process. The force headquarters should produce an environmental constraints and factors checklist for the force. This will also assist subordinate commands in understanding the impact of operations on the environment. Force planners should also consider these as factors in operational planning.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the personnel support portion of the operation.

PERSONNEL

3-36. What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?

3-37. What are the special skill requirements (unit or individual) of the command?

3-38. What are the requirements for reserve component units, individuals, or a combination of both?

3-39. What is the personnel replacement and rotation scheme?

3-40. What language-qualified personnel are needed for augmentation? What training is available?

3-41. Has the G-3 or S-3 been consulted on required augmentation?

3-42. What is the primary means of maintaining personnel accountability and strength management?

3-43. What is the primary means of processing awards and evaluations?

3-44. How is the G-1 tracking medical evacuations?

3-45. What national agreements relating to personnel policy or service exist? If there are any constraints, what are they?

3-46. What communications capabilities exist to support the submission of personnel reports? (For example, automation nonsecure internet protocol, secure internet protocol, and combined enterprise regional information exchange voice networks.) At what echelon are the capabilities available? What are the theater and national reporting requirements?

3-47. What are the personnel service support capabilities of multinational force units to provide essential services? Where do units require capabilities augmentation to ensure minimum essential services? What LNO requirements exist? What translator requirements exist for the multinational force units?

3-48. What is the leave policy for force members? Which units are eligible to participate in the rest and recuperation leave and or pass programs? Which are not eligible? Can a multinational or joint task force limit multinational force units leave programs to ensure personnel readiness?

3-49. What are the equivalent modified tables of organization and equipment for multinational force units? How can a multinational or joint task force headquarters conduct personnel replacement and rotation to ensure unit personnel readiness levels?

3-50. Does the deployed theater accountability system or the joint personnel status report all personnel?

3-51. What processes do multinational force units use to track, process, and report casualties within the theater and to national headquarters? What are their next-of-kin notification procedures? What is the theater feedback mechanism to the controlling headquarters?
3-52. What support agreements exist to facilitate postal operations for multinational force units? Do units have access to Army Post Office mail? Free mail?

3-53. How are multinational force replacements requisitioned, processed, and delivered to their respective units?

3-54. What are the morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) capabilities of the multinational force units? What agreements exist to share MWR assets? Are there any special MWR considerations?

3-55. What national service and/or achievement awards are available to force personnel? What are the theater processing requirements? How does the theater awards policy ensure equity?

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-56. What areas come under multinational control and what areas remain national issues?

3-57. Do legal advisors understand national policies?

3-58. Has a SOFA or status of mission agreement been established with the receiving nations?

3-59. What are the key differences in SOFAs, if any, across the multinational force area of responsibility?

3-60. What are the environmental constraints and factors that may affect the conduct of operations?

3-61. Is there a system to pay for claims arising from personal injury or property damage resulting from the operation?

3-62. What are the legal and fiscal restraints involving logistic assistance to nonmilitary organizations and other nations’ forces?

3-63. What are the multinational force’s obligations to war crimes’ investigations and indictment? Are these obligations consistent with the multinational force’s mandate?

3-64. What are the multinational force’s obligations to the HN police forces, international police force, or both forces deployed within the multinational AO?

3-65. What are the HN laws with respect to civil rights of its citizens?

3-66. Are HN judicial infrastructures intact? If so, has liaison been affected? If not, what resources and procedures are required to establish them?

3-67. What is the legal status of enemy POWs?

3-68. What is the legal status of displaced civilians?

3-69. What are the differing troop-contributing nation’s national policies for the use of antipersonnel mines? How does this affect the multinational force?

3-70. Who is responsible for interrogation of enemy POW or detainees?
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

3-71. Are there multinational ROE that all nations have agreed to?

3-72. What is the impact of the ROE to the troop-contributing nations?

3-73. How does each troop-contributing nation disseminate and train ROE to its Soldiers?

3-74. Have the ROE been distributed to the Soldiers? Has training been conducted prior to deployment? Has the ROE training been effective?

3-75. What are the key differences in ROE across the multinational force? How does this impact upon the multinational force headquarters’ ability to accomplish its mission?

3-76. Are there national restrictions or points of contention concerning ROE that the commander must know?

3-77. Are there ROE on the use of indirect fire? Are there force guidelines on the use of indirect fire as a demonstration of intent? Is there a difference between the multinational force ROE on the use of indirect fire and national protection requirements?

3-78. Does each troop-contributing nation have a common or clear understanding of the terms used in the ROE?

3-79. Has the use of certain systems or equipment—such as defoliants, riot control agents, or land mines—been evaluated for its impact in relation to the ROE and upon the multinational force’s ability to accomplish its mission?

3-80. Is there a joint targeting process? Are there ROE for joint fires? Are there systems available to assess collateral damage from joint fires?
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Chapter 4

Intelligence

Every multinational operation is different. So are the ways in which intelligence will be collected and disseminated within the force. Classification may present a problem in releasing information, but keeping as much unclassified as feasible will improve interoperability and trust within the multinational force. Commanders must know their own and other nation’s positions on intelligence sharing. Early sharing of information during planning ensures that multinational force requirements are clearly stated; guidance supports the commander’s intent; and the multinational force uses procedures supportable by other nations.

The G-2 or S-2 must clearly articulate the releasability instructions to analysts and planners who must “write for releasability” to the members of a particular coalition. The intelligence foreign disclosure officer must be consulted early in an operation to facilitate smooth lines of communications between U.S. Army elements and allied nations.

The national policies on intelligence affect the intelligence cycle. Each multinational force must develop intelligence procedures tailored to the mission. These procedures must be responsive to the commander and deliver timely intelligence products.

PLANNING OPERATIONS

4-1. Centralized control is desired but frequently unattainable in intelligence operations. As with command relationships, an organization may evolve that has some national assets and intelligence at the multinational force’s disposal, while others are under national control. Due to the nature of many intelligence sources, it is unlikely that nations will make all of their sources available for tasking by a multinational force. This must be taken into account when planning multinational intelligence operations. Many nations will have a national intelligence cell at the multinational force headquarters. Taskings by, and support to, the multinational force will flow through this cell. Integrating intelligence representatives and liaison personnel at each organizational level will improve access to intelligence capabilities. Matching intelligence requirements with available assets in an AO is the basis of a collection plan.

4-2. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort must be unified. The commander must provide the G-2 or S-2 with a clear mission statement, commander’s intent, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). A multinational force’s ability to gather and process intelligence varies widely. The command’s collection manager must account for this and task accordingly. The collection manager must match various sources, with requirements to answer CCIR. Sharing and mutual support are key to integrating all resources into a unified system to best meet the command’s intelligence requirements. The G-2 or S-2 prioritizes intelligence requirements to meet the commander’s needs.

COMMUNICATIONS AND PROCESSING

4-3. The ability to collect, process, and disseminate information to many users requires effective lateral and vertical communications. The multinational force must have a system and operating procedures that can transmit critical intelligence rapidly to units. This system may rely on the distribution of standardized equipment by the lead nation to ensure commonality. It should include LNOs at major intelligence centers.
to provide redundant communications to their parent nation and to determine and obtain intelligence uniquely suited for that nation’s mission in time to exploit it.

4-4. Multinational intelligence operations cannot be effectively conducted using U.S. systems exclusively. Multinational force members must be able to readily exchange intelligence information among each of the partners. As a result, intelligence staffs must assist in the development of an intelligence architecture that enables participating members to communicate effectively within the multinational force without compromising U.S. security interests. The establishment of a local area network using systems such as linked operations-intelligence centers Europe or Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) will greatly enhance information sharing within the coalition. The basic CENTRIXS operational architecture framework is the same for all combatant commands and leverages existing networks, technology and network centers. CENTRIXS services include email, web, chat, and common operational picture capabilities and uses controlled interfaces for two-way information flows among U.S. military commands and multinational partners.

**EFFECTIVE COORDINATION**

4-5. A multinational force must compensate for the lack of standardization through coordination. The communications architecture is an essential element in this area. Areas requiring extensive coordination include the following:

- Friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
- Use of space assets, location of intelligence assets, and location of intelligence collection targets.
- Intelligence centers, which should be multinational, serving both the multinational and national needs. Such centers require the personal involvement of the multinational commander to make this a reality.

4-6. The CCIR and priority information requirements should serve as the focus of the intelligence effort, the answers to which can only be gained through effective coordination at all levels.

**SUPPORT TO STABILITY OPERATIONS**

4-7. There are no standard templates for intelligence support to stability operations. Commanders must use the same approach for stability operations as for war. In stability operations, the nature and intensity of a potential threat can change even more suddenly and dramatically than in other operations.

4-8. Stability operations demand greater attention to the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in an AO than conventional war demands. Stability operations expand intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) beyond geographical and force capability considerations. The centers of gravity frequently are not military forces or terrain. Cultural information is critical to gauging the potential reactions of the population to the operation, to avoiding misunderstandings, and to improving the effectiveness of operations. Changes in the behavior of the populace may suggest a needed change in multinational strategy. Biographic information and leadership analyses are key factors to understanding adversaries or potential adversaries, their methods of operation, and how they interact with the environment. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the historical background of the hostilities underlying the deployment are vital to mission success. Such information helps to prevent unintentional mission creep and ultimately achieve the objectives of the operation. *Mission creep consists of tangential efforts to assist in areas of concern unrelated to assigned duties that cripple efficient mission accomplishment.*

4-9. The commander’s understanding of the local infrastructure improves his or her situational understanding. While traditional reconnaissance elements still provide much information, local media, diplomatic mission personnel, and civilian agencies can provide information not available elsewhere. Special consideration must be given to the intelligence role that all Soldiers have in stability operations. Medical, transportation, CA, PSYOP, military police, and engineer personnel and peace observers are superb sources of information. These personnel routinely operate in the HN environment and can discern change within it.
4-10. The primary source of intelligence in stability operations is normally derived from human intelligence (HUMINT). Interpreters, elicitations, debriefs of indigenous personnel, screening operations, and patrolling are primary sources for assessing the economic and health needs, military capability, and political intent of those receiving assistance. Emphasize to all personnel the importance of always being intelligence conscious and provide basic guidelines to improve their intelligence-gathering capability. Multinational commanders should be aware that each nation has a set of established legal norms that govern HUMINT and counterintelligence. Therefore, to achieve a multinational HUMINT effort requires coordination at the national level.

4-11. In multinational operations, the intelligence community may work with a variety of government agencies. Synthesizing and leveraging intelligence information from the various agencies presents many challenges. To overcome this, agencies may assign personnel to a multinational headquarters to improve interagency coordination. For example, during past operations–

- Central Intelligence Agency analysts have worked with military intelligence analysts.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation agents have worked with military members conducting forensic analysis of explosions.
- Department of the Treasury agents have worked with military analysts on foreign funding of insurgency operations.
- Drug Enforcement Administration agents have worked with military analysts to determine linkage of drug trafficking and insurgent actions.

Agents have served as liaisons to a multinational corps or a multinational force to facilitate intelligence support and synchronize agency operations with military operations. Interagency players have access to many forms of specialized information that will help to complete intelligence picture.

4-12. Counterintelligence operations are a good source of security intelligence. (UN operations may inhibit collection of information.) This intelligence will aid in determining any threats to the multinational force or its mission by adversarial intelligence personnel. It will aid in determining the host nation’s willingness and ability to protect multinational resources and personnel. Counterintelligence also provides input into protection and OPSEC estimates.

4-13. Approaches to civilian organizations, including the media, for information should be characterized by openness and transparency, including a clear statement of the use of the information, to avoid undermining cooperative efforts with such agencies. If you keep the media informed, they may become willing to exchange information with your staff.

INFORMATION VERSUS INTELLIGENCE

4-14. In multinational operations, national sensitivities may exist concerning the dissemination of intelligence. These sensitivities may even extend to the term intelligence. Consider the ramifications of labeling information as intelligence, especially when dealing with civilian organizations. In many cultures, intelligence connotes information gathered on the nation’s citizens for use against them. Further, attempts to exchange information with civilian agencies may be stifled as they try to maintain neutrality by not being part of any perceived intelligence programs. To enhance exchanging information, the command should consider labeling unclassified data as “information” rather than “intelligence” and using “information collection” rather than “all-source intelligence collection.”
**GEOSPATIAL DATA**

4-15. Multinational operations require interoperable geospatial information and services data and data exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants should agree to and ensure all work is on a standard datum. A geospatial information and services plan must coordinate all multinational products, to include access approval procedures and blending multinational assets into a cohesive production program. The following concepts should guide multinational intelligence operations:

- Adjust for national differences in intelligence concepts.
- Create an integrated multinational staff and intelligence center with representatives from all participating nations within the national limits on intelligence sharing.
- View the mission from a multinational as well as a national perspective. Treat an adversary’s threat to one member as a threat to all members.
- Agree to and plan for multinational intelligence requirements in advance of the operation.
- Plan complementary intelligence operations using all multinational intelligence resources, focusing on national strengths to enhance and overcome weaknesses in others.
- Exchange LNOs to help reduce problems of culture, language, doctrine, and intelligence requirements.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the intelligence portion of the operation.

WARNING/PLANNING PHASE

4-16. What are the CCIRs? Have the CCIRs been clearly stated to focus the collection effort?

4-17. Does the multinational force have an initial all-source cell and collection management cell? What are their positions in the deployment timetable?

4-18. Has the command conducted initial IPB, to include counterintelligence estimates?

4-19. Does the collection plan identify gaps in intelligence? Does the collection plan incorporate all collection assets available for tasking?

4-20. Are there any unique cultural, historical, or religious relationships between the multinational force partners and the adversary?

4-21. Have the cultural, social, political, and economic factors in the AO been included in the intelligence estimate?

4-22. Has the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed? Have requests for denying militarily useful space information to the adversary been considered?

4-23. What is the intelligence architecture?

4-24. Does the intelligence architecture meet mission requirements? Are there any gaps in coverage?

4-25. Has the C2 system been established with the capability to rapidly disseminate to all participants the time-sensitive information for targeting or rapid reaction?

4-26. Do multinational forces have the capability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data of the type commonly used by other multinational forces?

4-27. Have sufficient intelligence collection resources been placed under the control of the multinational force? Are the national resources immediately responsive to the multinational force?

4-28. Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into multinational centralized processing and exploitation centers?

4-29. What are the commander’s requirements for intelligence briefings and products?

4-30. What is the counterintelligence plan?

4-31. Is there a single focus for asset management?

4-32. Are intelligence-gathering tasks assigned in accordance with the CCIR and the capability of the multinational equipment under multinational force control?

4-33. Has theater reconnaissance been undertaken to utilize available assets?

4-34. What are the multinational force intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities and plans?

4-35. What are the procedures for sharing intelligence and information or releasing information policies? Are all multinational partners treated equally, considering compartmented and national sensitivities?

4-36. How is strategic intelligence shared among other forces?

4-37. What are the levels of interoperability between different intelligence information systems, to include database compatibility?
4-38. What are the staffing requirements for the G-2 or S-2 staff including specialists, linguists, and LNOs to include a subordinate J-2X staff? What support is available from the G-1 or S-1?

4-39. What are the requirements for national intelligence centers?

4-40. What are the differences in availability and capability of national collection sources?

4-41. What are the requirements for ROE governing intelligence aspects of the operation such as HUMINT activities or reporting?

4-42. What are the contingency plans when normal communication channels fail?

4-43. What are the multinational or force security procedures?

4-44. What links should be established with civilian agencies, to include the media? Have efforts been made to pool information with applicable civilian agencies?

4-45. Have HUMINT and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted through the J-2X?

4-46. Has the use of a counterintelligence coordinating authority and HUMINT operations chief been staffed and resources within the J-2X to deconflict and synchronize collection, debriefing, and interrogation activities within the AO?

4-47. Do the subordinate forces have collection assets available? What type? What are their capabilities and limitations?

4-48. Is the analysis effort prioritized and have analytical production responsibilities been clearly laid out for coalition members?

4-49. Are intelligence LNOs planned for in the operation?

4-50. Is the intelligence support package planned for with capabilities and limitations explained to supporting units?

4-51. Have intelligence staff attachments and detachments been planned?

4-52. Are training programs in place with a focus creating a common view of the enemy, enemy dispositions, order of battle, doctrine, capabilities, and intelligence systems?

4-53. Has intelligence daily cycle been established? Does it include reporting timelines and routine briefings and conferences? Have collection management timelines been defined?

4-54. Have intelligence-reporting formats been defined and rehearsed?

4-55. Does the deployment plan provide for early deployment of intelligence assets in theater?

4-56. Have routine and emergency “classified” destruction procedures been promulgated along with classified handling procedures?

4-57. What is the criminal threat? How is criminal intelligence incorporated into the CCIR?

**Threats**

4-58. What enemy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, delivery means, and employment doctrine exists?

4-59. What infrastructure (such as nuclear power plants, chemical industries, hospital radiotherapy sources) exists that could result in low-level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards?

4-60. What intelligence-gathering assets are available to monitor CBRN threat changes?

**Predeployment Phase**

4-61. Have the commander and staff been briefed on the initial IPB?

4-62. Who are the HN, civilian agency, and media contacts?

4-63. Have all intelligence systems, to include communications and information systems, been rehearsed?
4-64. Do subordinate forces have sufficient personnel to handle the amount of intelligence available?
4-65. Has all familiarization training on deploying intelligence systems been completed?
4-66. How will national intelligence cells exchange intelligence between multinational nations?

**DEPLOYMENT PHASE**

4-67. Has the intelligence architecture, including communications and information systems and supporting LNOs, been established and tested?
4-68. Are links with the HN, civilian agencies, and the media functioning?
4-69. Has the collection management plan been refined?
4-70. Have the commander’s briefing and intelligence product requirements been refined?
4-71. What additional specialist personnel or equipment is required?
4-72. What is the effectiveness of SOPs for—
   - Handover by the in-country force?
   - Operations of all-source cell, collection, coordination and intelligence requirements management cell, and national intelligence cell?
   - Compatibility of intelligence communications and information systems?
   - Protocols for the handling of HUMINT sources?
4-73. Was the actual process for the national intelligence cells to exchange intelligence between nations effective?
4-74. Have HUMINT and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted?
4-75. Have national intelligence summaries, imagery, and threat assessments approved for dissemination been shared?

**EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS THREAT**

4-76. What are the explosive hazards (such as mine, unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO), booby trap, or improvised explosive device (IED) in the AO?
4-77. What data is available on mines already in place or the types of booby traps/IEDs that have been employed in the AO?
4-78. What types of friendly munitions have been employed in the AO and at what location? What is the likelihood of components of those becoming IEDs?
4-79. Are there indications that booby traps have been or will be emplaced by withdrawing forces or threat elements that stay behind?

**REDEPLOYMENT PHASE**

4-80. What are the handover procedures for intelligence and physical architecture to the UN or other agencies? Do the procedures include protocols for information exchange and handling, resettlement, or handover of HUMINT sources?
4-81. Are security procedures for the redeployment of personnel, equipment, and documentation adequate and properly supervised?
4-82. What are the requirements for briefings, and have necessary debriefings been conducted?
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Chapter 5

Operations and Planning

Operations conducted by a multinational force require continuous coordination among throughout the process. Coordination must occur in all phases of the operation from planning and deployment to redeployment. Multinational force commanders and their staffs should involve their partners in each phase to the greatest extent possible. Exchanging information among multinational formations must occur as soon as possible.

PLAN EARLY

5-1. Multinational planning should start well before the actual operation and may use generic plans to build the specific plan around. Depending on the type and nature of operations to be conducted, planning may include governmental agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. Predeployment, deployment, sustainment, and transition operations must be addressed in the plans.

STRATEGIC SCHEME

5-2. Military advice to the president and the secretary of defense or another nation’s national authority is critical in the early stages of multinational planning to determine the strategic end state, objectives, and composition of the multinational force. Commanders should take every opportunity to ensure that political leaders fully understand the force’s abilities and limitations and the time required to successfully plan and prepare for an operation. See Appendix A for further details on multinational capabilities.

5-3. Strategic planning is also supported by the mandate of a legitimizing authority, such as the UN or other multinational political organization. The mandate is usually expanded by TOR that establish for the military the limits of the mission, operational parameters, and specified authorities to conduct operations. (For example, the right to search civilians and seize property.) Nations often supplement the TOR with national guidance for their own military force.

5-4. Whether in TOR or another form, this guidance must be secured because it is the starting point for the military appreciation, analysis, and estimate process. This process, which precedes or is the first step in campaign planning, establishes a common understanding of the mandate among multinational partners. Without a common understanding, agreement on such factors as the role of the military, required forces, acceptable risk, and ROE cannot be formed.

CAMPAIGN PREPARATION

5-5. Thorough campaign planning is a vital factor in achieving unity of effort among multinational partners and civilian agencies. Processes must be simple enough for subordinate commands to agree to and understand. Habitual relationships in peacetime or sufficient training time before operations allows enough time for multinational planners to teach others the key points of the process and build consensus on the approach to the particular operation.

5-6. The mandate expresses political will. The TOR establish conditions for execution. The campaign plan translates these into military and political tasks, ways, and means. Transition planning should be an integral part of campaign planning and should be done simultaneously with the other elements. This not only assists in the timely creation of the follow-on force, but also promotes a smooth transition.
FORCE PROJECTION

5-7. Force projection, especially for a multinational force, is critical to overall mission success. Participants must know from the beginning the multinational considerations to smoothly deploy forces and to effectively use lift assets. Multinational operations often have duplicated effort and unit capabilities. For example, before the UN protection force deployed to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, each participating nation performed its own engineer reconnaissance of the infrastructure. This resulted in duplications and omissions. The multinational force must coordinate and anticipate requirements during this phase to maximize capabilities and minimize resources. Planners must review national military contingents and HN assets. They should also agree on a division of labor.

5-8. Limited lift calls for maximizing its efficiency during deployment. This requires coordination with the host nation so units do not deploy capabilities already available, such as port operations forces. In some cases, one multinational force may transport another nation’s forces to the AO. LNOs from national contingents either must coordinate directly with the nation moving its forces or with the multinational force headquarters responsible for coordinating the movements with the nation providing lift. Chapter 6 provides additional information on logistics.

MISSION FOCUS

5-9. Political considerations and the military capabilities of the multinational force are the most important factors in multinational operations. The commander must remain focused on the assigned mission. He or she must understand the reason each national contingent is participating. This determines the structure and resultant taskings of the multinational force. Failure to understand may cause the force to split into components operating under differing political directions. While agreeing to the overall goal, national contingents may have different ideas about how to execute the mission. The commander must recognize that political considerations may force the choice of an acceptable course of action, rather than the optimum military solution. The commander must remain flexible to adjust to unforeseen political influences, keep the multinational forces focused on the military objective, and avoid mission creep.

5-10. To overcome differences in doctrine, training, or equipment, leaders may assign selected functions to a smaller group of partners. For example, the multinational force could assign the mission of support area security to home defense or police forces. Commanders may also entrust one member of the multinational force with air defense (AD), coastal defense, or some special operation based on the threat’s special capabilities. They must recognize the strengths and differences of the cultures from which these forces come. Their decisions on employment, made with the military leadership, must consider the capabilities of the forces. Subordinate commanders may request control of forces that provide capabilities not organic to that nation’s forces. The guiding principle is to allocate assets, as they are needed, while maintaining concentrated critical capabilities.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

5-11. The glue that binds a multinational operation together is the commander’s ability to understand and integrate each nation’s capabilities into a cohesive force. This requires the commander to clearly articulate his or her intent. This enables each nation to form the same picture of the end state and the rules governing engagements. Given the language difficulties found in many multinational forces, the commander’s intent must be clearly and simply stated.

TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY

5-12. At some point, national units come under the control of the designated multinational commander. This process, known as TOA, should be accomplished as early as possible. The timing of the transfer must be part of the initial negotiations that govern how the multinational force forms. Planners must determine where the TOA—and the follow-on integration of units and headquarters—occurs. Early TOA enables the multinational commander to plan and conduct effective integration training.
5-13. The first option is to arrange TOA to the multinational force before deploying a unit’s home station. Commanders can then control the unit arrival sequence to best suit operational requirements and facilitate reception area base operations. This option also assumes clear political consensus, timely decisions on national participation, and a significant lead time for planning and setting up the multinational force headquarters.

5-14. A second option is to have TOA at an intermediate staging base (ISB) en route to the operational area. Forces resolve problems in a secure area. They deploy only when fully ready and in the sequence required by the multinational force.

5-15. The third option is to have TOA occur once forces arrive in the AO. This option leaves each nation responsible to deploy its contingent and prepare it for operations. It does not allow the multinational force positive control of deployment into the AO. This option is less than optimum if immediate combat is likely.

5-16. Whichever option is chosen, central coordination of deploying forces is preferred. Then reception operations are not done by repetitive crisis management. Centralized control of force flow provides the best support to the multinational force’s requirements and the best support to the forces.

5-17. Each multinational nation has a slightly different process for planning operations. If a lead nation commands the multinational force, then the planning process that will be used is that of the lead nations. At national contingent headquarters, nations will use their own planning process.

PLANNING GROUP

5-18. Forming a multinational planning group will facilitate the multinational planning process. When the multinational force is formed, the commander decides on the organization and functions of the planning group as well as how the group and the staff sections will interact during planning and execution. This planning group should–

- Conduct crisis action planning.
- Be the focal point for OPLAN or OPORD development.
- Perform future planning.
- Perform other tasks as directed.

The planning group comprises representatives from appropriate multinational staff sections, national formations, and others as deemed necessary.

TRANSITION PLANNING

5-19. Most multinational operations end in a transition from multinational control to UN, HN military, or HN civilian control. Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning. It must extend throughout the planning process and into operations and redeployment. It must be as detailed as any other planning. It should be done in cooperation with the organization taking control. The multinational force will be most vulnerable during transition and redeployment. Therefore, protecting the force is likely to be the most important consideration.

5-20. Staff sections should highlight in the transition plan how they are organized and how they function. Checklists should be developed to facilitate the transition. Staff sections should recommend how to organize the incoming staff. Staff sections should develop turnover files. These often are forgotten in the haste to redeploy.

5-21. Planning should link the departure of the force with the anticipated arrival of the organization taking charge. Knowledge of the incoming force or organization is paramount. Funding can be a major obstacle, especially when working with the UN. Another concern in working with the UN is to ensure that enough UN staff and officers are deployed for the transition process. The incoming headquarters should co-locate with the multinational force headquarters. This will enhance the assimilation of the incoming staff with the outgoing staff.
TYPES OF TRANSITIONS

5-22. The following describe the types of transitions. Also included are some of the key planning aspects of transition operations:

- Multinational force military relief-in-place. This transition has normal military operation emphasis on mission and protecting the force. The relief-in-place would use doctrine from the lead nation.

- Multinational force military to civilian or UN authorities. This transition occurs with a normal UN civilian support type mission with emphasis on military support to the civilian and UN missions. Both the military and civilian authorities would need to:
  - Identify the conditions suitable for handover.
  - Identify and agree on responsibilities for C2 of operation.
  - Identify the necessary phases of the operation.

- Escalation or de-escalation by UN chapter or the roe situation. The command places emphasis on ROE and protection. The command must:
  - Confirm multinational members.
  - Identify national differences of ROE.
  - Identify protection issues.

- Multinational force military handover to a national government. This transition is a withdrawal conducted in peaceful conditions having achieved the desired end state. The military places emphasis on fully handing over responsibilities and allowing the government to assume power and authority. The command must identify those capabilities that will need to remain behind to ensure that a seamless handover of authority and support to the government occurs.

TRAINING

5-23. The success of the operation may well depend on the training the command does before and during the operation. Most components of the force likely will not have trained together. If they have, it will be of limited frequency. The importance of training together should therefore be stressed to participating nations. Training is the best way to develop an effective multinational force formed from national units. It should be a continuing process for both personnel and units.

5-24. The predeployment and in-theater training programs should be based on assessments of the mission and AO. The command may be presented with national contingents from different cultural backgrounds that are at different states of training. The more that multinational forces and civilian agencies participate in the training, the more the command will learn about how these organizations think and operate. This participation will also enhance team building and staff member’s perceptions of one another. Multinational force commanders must also be prepared to receive, train, and integrate multinational contingents during the course of operations. This will require commanders to be flexible and adaptable.

IDENTIFY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

5-25. Training teaches the participants about the strengths and weaknesses of multinational partners and about how to integrate them into an effective force. Training should be conducted at all levels of command and include all staffs. Before deployment, command post exercise simulations can be used for staff training and solving problems in the multinational force command structure.

5-26. Training continues once the command arrives in the AO. It is based on specific requirements and functions. Training should include exercises to rehearse operational tasks, the OPORD, or new missions. They may also be used to advertise the command’s capabilities and serve as a deterrent.

5-27. Command post and field training exercises can be used with simulations. Distributed simulation can enhance training between remotely separated forces. A comprehensive training program helps commanders identify weaknesses and helps build troop cohesion. Whenever possible, commanders should arrange seminars to develop or stress SOPs and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Protection requirements may impact on areas available for training. Some training, such as live-fire exercises, will require HN approval.
IDENTIFY CAPABILITIES

5-28. Some nations possess doctrine that fully addresses strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other nations focus primarily on the tactical level. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized operations. Others focus on counterinsurgency or light infantry operations. A few nations stress rapid, agile operations—emphasizing ingenuity, creativity, and improvisation within the commander’s intent. Some nations regard this approach as too risky. Because of these variations, commanders must carefully consider which units are best suited for particular missions.

5-29. When the situation permits, commanders should seek to improve the contributions of national forces by providing training assistance and sharing resources such as radios, vehicles, or weapons. The importance of training assistance and dedicated liaison teams cannot be overstated, particularly when working between a force with digital warfighting capability and a force that works with analog means. Multinational exercises are essential to training and doctrine refinement. Multinational exercises should exercise logistic support mechanisms and identify possible problems in providing logistic support with forces from other nations.

PROPER CONDUCT

5-30. All it takes is one Soldier or small unit acting improperly to undo weeks of effort building goodwill in an AO. Inappropriate individual statements and actions may offend forces from other nations or civilians in the AO, creating negative perceptions. Individuals should not assume that others would not understand derogatory statements made in their own language, slang, or gestures. Training on proper personal conduct and its continued emphasis may prevent this.

5-31. All personnel should receive instruction on understanding the methods of operating in a multinational environment. Commanders must do the following:

- Ensure that all augmentees participate in their host formation training events.
- Provide training to all units or individuals that receive equipment from other nations.
- Evaluate training opportunities offered by each nation. This includes training offered by the Seventh U.S. Army Training Command in Germany, the UN Operational Training and Advisory Group in the UK, and the Swedish Armed Forces International Center. These all have extensive experience in training units and individuals for operations.
PREDEPLOYMENT FOCUS

5-32. Predeployment training should focus on the following areas:
- Individual military skills.
- Individual and collective preventive medicine procedures and practice.
- First aid, both individual and “buddy.”
- Terrorism awareness and prevention.
- Education lessons in the multinational structure, mandate, chain of command, and division of responsibilities to include NGO and international agency structures.
- Unit training (rehearsals should be mandatory) based on projected operations.
- Team building and staff training to include training with multinational forces and nonmilitary organizations.
- LNO training to ensure that personnel are knowledgeable representatives.
- Information on the customs, culture, religious practices, political situation, geography, and the economic and historical background of the situation and the population of the AO.
- Capabilities of the adversary.
- How to effectively communicate to the public through the news media.
- Negotiation and mediation.
- Language training, especially key phrases. Although ABCA armies all speak English, not all operational terms have the same meaning to each army.
- Situational awareness to include mine, booby trap awareness, and weapons recognition.
- ROE.
- Law of war.
- Crowd control and the use and employment of nonlethal riot control agents.
- Employment and use of nonlethal weapons capabilities.
- Training drivers and vehicle commanders on in-theater driving conditions and skills.
- Training service members to accommodate environmental constraints.
- Detainee handling operations.

IN-COUNTRY TRAINING

5-33. The multinational commander may need to evaluate the level of training of each troop-contributing nation to determine if it is ready to commit to the AO or if additional training may be necessary prior to commitment. This training may be related to cultural or other issues related to the host nation.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the operations and planning portion of the operation.

OPERATIONS

5-34. What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?
5-35. Does the command have a capabilities brief and description or organizational chart of its own force and the multinational forces?
5-36. What is the effect of national ROE and objectives on force composition and mission assignment? (See Chapters 1, 3, and 13 for additional information on ROE.)
5-37. Do the ROE support protection?
5-38. Does the force have a mechanism to identify potential threats to the force?
5-39. What nonlethal technology is available? How is the force trained to use it? Do the ROE authorize its employment?
5-40. What is the current situation in the AO?
5-41. Has the mission, to include commander’s intent, been disseminated? Do elements two echelons down understand it?
5-42. Has planning begun for the transition to UN or other organizations that will take over from the multinational force? (See transition below.)
5-43. What is the logistic situation?
5-44. What are the language and interpreter requirements?
5-45. What are the security screening procedures and limitations relating to contracted interpreters?
5-46. How does ROE apply to contracted civilians?
5-47. What are the special customs and courtesies of the population in the AO or among multinational forces?
5-48. Does the command have a SOP that includes reporting requirements and procedures?
5-49. What units are available to the command and when are they available?
5-50. How will the command coordinate ground and air reconnaissance?
5-51. Has a common map database been established?
5-52. Have staff visits been coordinated?
5-53. Have visits by the unit commander to higher headquarters been coordinated?
5-54. What forces remain to support the multinational and how long are they required when redeploying or moving?
5-55. What national forces will interface with the joint movement control center?
5-56. What training is required before deployment?
5-57. What training is required once deployed?
5-58. Has a PSYOP program been developed to support the operation?
5-59. Have PSYOP assets been requested?
5-60. Has a CA/CMO plan been developed to support the operation?
5-61. Have CA/CIMIC assets been requested?
5-62. Has an information operations (IO) plan been developed to support operations?
5-63. Have IO assets been requested?
5-64. Has a search been conducted to determine if extant documents are available to support operations or on a given capability? Both for military and nonmilitary agencies?
5-65. Is there a mine or UXO threat in the AO?
5-66. Is there an existing mine or UXO action center?
5-67. What is the status of law enforcement capabilities in the current environment?
5-68. Is there additional training required for law enforcement personnel in the current environment in order to maintain security and stability?
5-69. Are there measures of merit for tasks and subtasks?

PLANNING

5-70. Has the deployment sequence been completed and validated?
5-71. Have members of the coalition been included on the operational planning team?
5-72. Has the political advisor, a representative from the Department of State, and a representative from the host nation been included on the operational planning team?
5-73. Have the forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and redeployment from other multinational members been included in the supporting nation’s deployment sequence?
5-74. Has the deployment plan deconflicted civilian agency and contractor transportation requirements to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?
5-75. Has a risk assessment been accomplished as appropriate?
5-76. To what standard have multinational forces been trained?
5-77. Does the multinational force have a standard of training? Is a standard provided by an outside agency?
5-78. Have all multinational forces received the proper predeployment training?
5-79. What type of predeployment training have multinational forces received?

AVIATION PLANNING GUIDE

Force Structure

5-80. What is the multinational aviation force structure?
5-81. What is the desired aviation organization for battle for early entry forces?
5-82. What is the desired order of arrival of aviation assets?
5-83. What types of readiness are multinational aviation forces and supporting elements, including strategic air and shipping for deployment, ordered to maintain? How long can they sustain this readiness?
5-84. What are the phases and flow of aviation units, capabilities, and materiel to the AO? Is this flow reflected in the multinational time-phased force and deployment list?
Command and Control

5-85. What is the commander’s intent?

5-86. What is the multinational C2 structure for aviation?

5-87. Has a multinational aviation commander been appointed? What is his or her command, control, and coordination authority?

5-88. What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aircraft system use?

5-89. Has other nations’ navigational equipment performance (input requirements, accuracy and susceptibility to attack) been ascertained? Will relative performance affect control and use of operational environment? Will it affect control, direction, and coordination of fires and ROE?

5-90. Are nations’ target designators interoperable? If not, what effect will this have and what can be done to avoid or mitigate these designators?

5-91. Where are the aviation coordination interfaces?

5-92. When will any changes of status of command and coordination measures take effect?

5-93. Is there a requirement for a multinational operational environment management cell?

5-94. What will be the multinational command relationships—for example, OPCON versus TACON—for aviation assets?

5-95. What are the command arrangements for the conduct of multinational longer range operations?

5-96. What national aviation command arrangements are required to support the multinational command structure?

5-97. What are the national requirements for aviation LNOs?

5-98. How will national communications and information systems be integrated?

5-99. What multinational bearer communications system will be used?

Mission and Tasks

5-100. What is the multinational aviation mission?

5-101. What are the multinational aviation specified tasks?

5-102. Are there any multinational aviation implied tasks?

5-103. What is the multinational C2 warfare plan? Can aviation enhance its effectiveness?

5-104. Are multinational aviation assets for communications and information systems protected against possible attacks?

5-105. What is the multinational CBRN threat assessment? What can aviation forces do to identify and monitor hazards, including contamination?

5-106. What is the multinational plan for recovery of critical aviation equipment, facilities, and resources?

Constraints and Freedom of Action

5-107. Has the multinational headquarters established constraints on aviation output and technical media activity or effect? Do these constraints include legal factors, acceptance of risk, financial factors, and human factors such as physical, moral and cultural?

5-108. Is the nations’ capability confirmed for night movement and finding, fixing, and striking the enemy?
5-109. Do international organizations, NGOs, and CMO activities affect the aviation plan?

5-110. Has the multinational headquarters established environmental and AO characteristics (such as terrain, altitude, and climate) likely to impact on aviation equipment and multinational interoperability? Subsequently, has the multinational headquarters reviewed participating nations’ capabilities and aircraft performance (weapons, payload and radius of action) in light of environmental conditions?

5-111. Has the multinational headquarters established the mapping, global positioning system, and geodetic datums to be used? Has it ascertained consequent implications for multinational interoperability and coordination of fires?

Control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum

5-112. Has a multinational aviation electronic preparation of the battlefield been prepared? Is the electronic preparation of the battlefield continuously being reviewed, developed, and disseminated throughout the multinational aviation chain of command?

5-113. Is there a multinational aviation electronic warfare (EW) targeting process or surveillance and target acquisition plan and battle damage assessment process? What countersurveillance control measures are in force?

5-114. What factors will frustrate multinational control of the electromagnetic spectrum? Are all nations’ cryptographic driven systems interoperable?

5-115. What multinational EW assets are available to support aviation maneuver?

Information and Intelligence

5-116. Has a multinational aviation IPB been prepared? Is the IPB being reviewed or developed and disseminated continuously, throughout the multinational aviation chain of command?

5-117. What is the multinational’s information and intelligence collection and dissemination plan? How is this information collected from and disseminated to aviation?

Protection

5-118. What are the multinational aviation protection requirements?

5-119. Is there a multinational aviation EW targeting process or surveillance and target acquisition plan? What countersurveillance control measures are in force? Have limitations been placed on using white illumination to facilitate aviation night-vision goggle operations?

5-120. Have the national and individual aircraft EW and defensive aid capabilities been compared against threat and aircrew individual protective equipment? Have they been compared against laser and CBRN hazards? Is the multinational C2 structure capable of delivering threat information and essential codes and preflight messages? Are means and media to move and load codes and fills interoperable? Are fills and threat library information for the following available–

- Identification, friend or foe systems?
- Missile approach warning equipment?
- Infrared or radar jammers?

5-121. Are combat identification systems available to all allies? If not, can they be made available and embodied to enhance allied freedom of action? Are nations’ combat identification systems interoperable? If not, what multinational joint antifraticide measures are in place?

5-122. Are multinational plans, procedures, and training (scale, radius of action, quality, quantity, and timeliness) suitable for likely combat search and rescue as well as recovery of encircled forces?
5-123. What CBRN protection measures (individual and collective) are afforded to other nations’ air crew, ground crew, and technical personnel? What effect will adopting protective measures or using protective equipment have on multinational aviation operations (quality, quantity, and sustainability)? Are nations able to decontaminate aircraft, to what standards and what effect will residual CBRN contamination or hazards have on operational output?

5-124. Has the multinational headquarters established differing national approaches to risk management? How have these approaches affected multinational operational output? What is the impact on the planning cycle and battle procedure?

Weapons Effects and Rules of Engagement

5-125. Has the multinational headquarters established contributing nations’ aircraft weapons’ capabilities and performance? What are their effects on ROE?

5-126. What systems will be used for collateral damage assessment?

Doctrine

5-127. What level of aviation doctrine standardization has been achieved within the multinational force? What does the lack of standardization for multinational aviation operational output imply?

5-128. Is there a multinational aviation mechanism for capturing lessons learned and informing nations to ease continuous review of equipment performance; doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and other vital information?

5-129. What multinational agreements or standards are available to enhance operational output? What scope is there to exploit existing agreements or standards or to develop new ones?

G-1 or G-4

5-130. What aircraft are multinational partners bringing to theater?

5-131. Has the nations’ aircraft performance, given ambient conditions in the AO (payload and radius of action) been confirmed?

5-132. Has a multinational, HN, or theater facilities survey been conducted and coordinated at the multinational headquarters aviation level?

5-133. What is the logistics structure?

5-134. What arrangements will be in place for multinational resupply of common user items? If fuel and munitions are included, is the system appropriate for the planned operational activity level?

5-135. Does the lead nation’s criterion for fuel quality and fuel system icing inhibitor meet national equipment requirements?

5-136. What will be the in-theater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common equipment?

5-137. Has the multinational headquarters established the support capabilities and levels of service—to include national environmental restrictions—that nations’ aviation forces can offer each other?

5-138. Has the multinational headquarters established national aircrew duty time specifications? What impact will this have on planned multinational aviation surge and continuous operational output?

5-139. Are there national fleet management issues that will reduce expected multinational operational output?

5-140. Are there multinational support issues that will affect the nations’ efficient aircraft fleet management resulting in reduced operational output?

Finance and Budget

5-141. What are the multinational funding arrangements for aviation mission or tasks?
Chapter 5

5-142. Are procedures in place to capture costing and expenditure information?

5-143. Are multinational and national funding authorities clearly understood throughout the multinational force?

Training and Collective Performance

5-144. What scope is there for multinational aviation mission rehearsal and war gaming? Is appropriate simulation equipment available? Can it be made available? Can an appropriate environmental database be developed?

5-145. Are there any multinational mission-specific training requirements and training responsibilities?

5-146. What scope exists for multinational forces using multinational, national, or HN facilities, particularly simulation and live-firing training space?

Host-Nation Issues

5-147. Has the multinational headquarters coordinated the HN provision of aviation services?

5-148. Has the multinational headquarters anticipated and considered HN cultural issues that will likely impact multinational aviation operations?

CBRN Defense

5-149. What is the CBRN warning and reporting structure in-theater? What communication nets will be used to pass CBRN information?

5-150. How are the high-value assets such as biological detectors allocated and deployed in-theater? Are there enough assets to be allocated among multinational partners?

5-151. What national caveats exist for deploying biological detection assets?

5-152. Have armies adopted a standardized individual CBRN protective dress state?

5-153. Has an operation exposure guide been established to manage radiation exposures?

5-154. Have armies adopted standard guidance for interpreting hazards identified by chemical detectors?

5-155. Are sampling standard and identification protocols in place to verify first use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)?

5-156. Which national laboratories will be used to analyze collected samples for first use and treaty violations?

5-157. What medical pretreatment or prophylaxis do multinational partners have for CBRN protection such as vaccinations, auto-injectors, and anti-emetics? What are national policies for their use?

5-158. How will the psychological impact of potential enemy WMD use be countered?

Transition

5-159. What are the issues and key multinational force events (past and present) that lead to the current situation?

5-160. What work is required to accomplish the transition?

5-161. What force or agency is taking control of the operation?

5-162. Has contact been made with counterpart planning staffs?

5-163. Who will determine when the transition begins or is completed?

5-164. Who will fund the transition?
5-165. What is the multinational force policy for transition and redeployment?

5-166. What issues exist before the transition? What potential issues will exist for the transition force once the transition is completed? Have these been provided to the incoming transition force?

5-167. Has the multinational force’s end state been accomplished? If not, will this have a bearing on the incoming force?

5-168. If there is a new mission, can the multinational force assist the incoming force in preparing for it?

5-169. What multinational forces, equipment, or supplies will remain behind?

5-170. What is the disposal plan to facilitate disposal of commodities?

5-171. What will be the command relationship for the multinational force during the transition and for those multinational forces remaining behind?

5-172. Who will support the multinational force remaining behind?

5-173. What will be the communications requirement for the multinational force remaining behind?

5-174. Will the multinational force provide communications capability to the incoming force?

5-175. Can information be shared with the incoming transition force or organization?

5-176. Will new ROE be established for the transition?

5-177. Will ongoing operations be discontinued or interrupted?

5-178. Will the incoming force use the same headquarters facility as the multinational force?

5-179. What agreements have been developed with civilian agencies that may impact the incoming force?

5-180. Have points of contact been developed for the incoming force?

5-181. What will be the requirement for liaison personnel?

5-182. Will sufficient security be available to provide protection? Who will provide it?

5-183. How will the turnover be accomplished?

5-184. Who will handle PA for the transition?

5-185. What C2 arrangements are for departure?

5-186. What are the customs, immigration, and quarantine implications for the incoming and outgoing forces?

5-187. What are the identities of all stakeholders and their level of involvement in the transition operation?

5-188. What are the outgoing multinational forces’ obligations with respect to employed local labors and contractors?

5-189. What are the incoming multinational forces’ obligations with respect to employed local labors and contractors?

5-190. What are the functions and appointments that the outgoing force should maintain during the handover period?

5-191. Is it the intention to proceed with the transition upon achieving military end state or not?

5-192. What ongoing obligations has the outgoing force left to the incoming force?

5-193. What effects does transition have on the local economy and security situation?

5-194. Is this an in-contact (hot) transition operation or an administrative (cold) peaceful transition operation?
TRAINING

5-195. What predeployment training has been conducted by the troop-contributing nations?

5-196. Have designated troops from the various participating nations previously trained with each other?

5-197. What predeployment or in-country training will be necessary before the commitment or deployment of troops into the AO?

5-198. What level of training is posed by each of the troop-contributing nations?

5-199. Does each of the nations have some form of training for LNOs or will the coalition headquarters need to establish a program?
Chapter 6
Logistics

A coordinated logistics effort within a multinational force is essential to the success of accomplishing its mission. The multinational commander must consider how best to ensure that the logistics effort is coordinated. If nations are competing for HN resources to provide logistical support to troop-contributing units, it will only hamper the multinational force’s efforts in achieving its mission. The multinational commander will strive to achieve unity of effort in the logistics effort.

UNITY OF EFFORT

6-1. Unity of effort is essential to multinational logistics operations. This requires coordination not only between contributing nations, but also with civilian agencies in the AO. Executing multinational logistics must be a collective responsibility of the multinational force. When possible, mutual logistic support should be developed for economy of effort. Multinational logistics should be flexible, responsive, and predictive and provide timely sustainment throughout the entire multinational force. The multinational logistics plan should incorporate the logistics requirements capacities and capabilities of all contributing forces. This will ensure sustained and synchronized execution of the plan.

6-2. Consensus on multinational logistics issues and requirements should be formed early. Commanders must thoroughly comprehend multinational forces’ doctrine. They must also have good relations with subordinate commanders and civilian leaders. There should be cooperation and continuous coordination between all elements providing logistic support and the operational elements. This must begin during the initial planning phase and continue through the operation’s termination and redeployment of forces back to their countries of origin.

6-3. Commanders must handle logistics on a multinational basis, with as much centralized control over logistics as interoperability permits. Under certain conditions, creating a single multinational logistics command may provide economy of assets and system efficiency. Even if multinational participants (for national command reasons) insist on maintaining a national logistics structure, assigning a lead for logistics responsibility precludes duplication of effort. The G-4 or S-4 should establish a planning group with members from all participating nations to define the extent of interoperability that may exist between multinational forces. Commanders should identify the funding authority, as early as possible, to support multinational forces and develop procedures to prevent an adverse impact on operations.

6-4. Multinational operations can complicate logistic support and reduce the degree of flexibility inherent in a national logistics system. Although responsible for logistic support of its national forces, not all nations have deployable logistics capabilities. Such nations then become dependent on other nations for all or part of their support. In these cases, the multinational force must be prepared to provide the required support to both military and civilian organizations. Support may include both deployment and sustainment. For deployment, close liaison with theater airlift C2 can assist in coordinating approval and facilitating airlift once approved. When support is required, close liaison will ensure funding lines are clearly identified.

RESPONSIBILITY

6-5. In multinational operations, logistics is primarily a national responsibility. Therefore, some nations may not want to relinquish authority over their logistics assets. However, relations between NATO and the U.S. have evolved to where logistics is seen as a collective responsibility. The multinational commander needs the authority and control mechanisms for logistics to achieve the mission. Having each nation to
perform logistics functions separately would be inefficient and expensive for each nation. Varying degrees of mutual logistic support among multinational partners must be planned to complement partners’ capabilities and minimize weaknesses. The multinational force staff should evaluate the degree of interoperability among the participating nations. After which, the participating nations can discuss which nations will provide support functions for the multinational force and the procedures and methods of how that support will be provided. For additional information on multinational logistics, see JP 4-08, AJP-4, and FM 4-0.

6-6. In some cases, the multinational force may exercise control over the national logistics units, in other cases it will act only as the coordinating authority. The degree of authority will depend on existing agreements and arrangements negotiated with contributing nations. The multinational force commander may delegate to subordinate commanders the level of authority granted by the individual nations. The multinational force commander may establish a logistics coordination or control center headed by a senior logistics coordinator or commander to coordinate common logistic support within the AO.

6-7. The G-4, in coordination with the multinational force J-4, must determine what, if any, logistics authority for a common support capability that national authorities have delegated to the multinational force. The G-4 or S-4 must also determine whether that authority meets the multinational’s requirements. The multinational force commander’s delegated or directed authority does not negate national responsibilities for logistic support or discourage coordination. Nor is it meant to disrupt effective procedures and the efficient use of facilities or organizations.

6-8. Three methods of executing cooperative logistics exist in a multinational force. Each can be used singularly or combined. Regardless of the method used, national decisions and commitments must lead or participate in such arrangements provided early during the planning cycle. The three methods are—

- The lead-nation concept. For this method, one nation accepts the responsibility for providing the framework for one or more logistics functions in support of the multinational force.
- A role-specialization agreement. Under this method, one nation accepts responsibility for providing a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the multinational force.
- Pooled assets and resources. For this method, two or more nations form an integrated logistic support structure to provide supply or support functions to the multinational force.

PLANNING

6-9. The logistics staff must become involved early in the planning process. This ensures that sustainment requirements balance with capabilities. To facilitate planning, the staff should identify personnel and make them available as early as possible. Concurrent logistics and operations planning is critical. Staffs should develop plans with all participating nations to achieve logistics efficiencies. The multinational headquarters should determine the logistic support needed to uphold the commander’s plan and provide estimates of these requirements to national units. Planners should share partial planning data with prospective partners to facilitate parallel planning. Staffs should—

- Evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability among participating nations.
- Determine differences in logistics doctrine, capabilities, methods for computing requirements, stockage levels, organizations, and communications and information systems.
- Account for these differences in the plan.
- Account for differences in language, values, religious beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks that may impact logistic support to multinational forces.

6-10. The logistics planners should assign responsibilities and procedures for providing logistic support within the multinational force and the task organization of multinational logistics units. NGOs normally support the local population. However, in some circumstances, military support may be required. In those circumstances, the plan must also address the requirements of the local population if they are being supported. When planners quickly determine what support the civilian populace requires, they help develop that supporting plan.
6-11. A key tool to help logistics personnel in building a flexible operational support plan is the logistics preparation of the theater. Logistics preparation consists of actions taken by logistics personnel at all echelons to optimize the means (force structure, multinational and HN resources, and strategic lift) for supporting the multinational force commander’s plan. These actions include—

- Identifying and preparing ISB and forward operating bases.
- Selecting and improving line of communications (LOC).
- Projecting and preparing forward logistics bases.
- Coordinating multinational logistic support.
- Forecasting and building operational stock assets forward and afloat.

6-12. Those actions focus on identifying resources that are currently available in the theater for use by multinational forces and ensure access to those resources. (FM 4-0 provides the details of logistics preparation of the theater.)

6-13. The plan must ensure all appropriate environmental reviews are completed in accordance with environmental laws, policies, and regulations. The plan must be in accordance with national, international, and HN agreements. The G-4 or S-4 must coordinate with legal and other appropriate staff officers to ensure that current environmental conditions—such as water and soil contamination—epidemiological surveys, and disease risk assessments comply with legal requirements. The G-4 or S-4 must also ensure that the data has been recorded for future remediation.

6-14. When planning to acquire real property and lease facilities, planners must determine what facilities and land are needed and whether they exist in the AO. Planners should establish priorities for property acquisition taking into account when the property is needed.

6-15. Logistics planners must determine the multinational force resupply requirements and make recommendations to the commander on the best method and type of servicing recommended.

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

6-16. The command must analyze the physical infrastructure in the host nation to determine what facilities and services are available to support the command and how they can reduce the logistics footprint. The command should have a good understanding of the culture, business practices and laws, religious implications, and political and social structure of the host nation. Evaluation should include location and what the command will be allowed to use. AOs without a functioning government may only be able to provide limited support. HN support may be integrated into the logistics structure of the command to ensure their effective use. Commanders should be prepared to assume all logistics responsibilities in the event this support is curtailed. Allocating this support is based on command priorities. Nations must agree on whether a multinational force will have the authority to conclude HN support arrangements on behalf of participating nations, or whether prior national approval is required.

6-17. HN support expertise (legal, financial, acquisition, medical, and administrative) should be centralized within the logistics staff for both identifying and procuring HN support. This ensures that the command’s requirements are known and prevents competition between partners.

6-18. Local procurement efforts may be beneficial to the host nation, but they may also undermine important goals. Local suppliers may have important political connections. An otherwise innocent procurement decision may have significant political meaning in the host nation. Procurement may bid up local prices with negative impacts on local groups or civilian agencies. These effects may influence the attainment of the end state and the timing of withdrawal. CMO and CA personnel are trained to identify and coordinate HN support and can provide valuable assistance to the logistics staff in this area.

6-19. The command must obtain authorization from national authorities to negotiate for HN support. Agreements with the host nation should include the authority for the command to deal directly with the host nation for support. The command should develop a list of current HN agreements. The command legal advisor helps to negotiate HN support agreements. Agreements should be negotiated for local contracting, currency exchange rates, local hire wage scales, and customs regulations.
6-20. The logistics staff should evaluate current HN contracts between the HN and civilian agencies in the AO and evaluate their effectiveness. Then, the staff must determine the best lead agency (military or civilian) to negotiate and contract for HN support. Figure 6-1 provides HN considerations for support.

6-21. Multinational forces need to have intelligence on HN support personnel and contractors. Based on experiences from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, HN support personnel and contractors may have family, social, organizational or financial ties or routine contact with insurgents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item and considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accommodations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stores and warehouses</td>
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<td>Workshops, vehicle parks, gun parks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hardstands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
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<td>Weapons and ammunition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation, including aircraft</td>
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<td>Firing ranges</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training areas and facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation areas and facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laundry and dry cleaning facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Communications</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finance. Payment for—</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Accommodations, supplies,</td>
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<tr>
<td>communications, equipment, local labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>maintenance, medical, and movement facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fuel</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Method of Delivery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Storage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interoperability of refueling equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common use of refueling installations</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Local Labor</strong></td>
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<td>Method of hiring</td>
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<td>Method of payment</td>
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<td>Administration</td>
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<td><strong>Rations</strong></td>
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<td>Pack</td>
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<td>Potable water</td>
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<td><strong>Medical</strong></td>
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<td>Normal facilities</td>
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<td>Emergency facilities</td>
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<td>Reciprocal national health agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evacuation of causalities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical and blood supply system</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Translation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpreters/language specialists</td>
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<tr>
<td>Translation of documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6-1. Host-nation considerations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintenance</th>
<th>Supplies and Equipment (other than ammunition, fuel, or rations)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodations</td>
<td>Common use items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
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<td>Ships</td>
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<td>Equipment</td>
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<td>Roads (including snow clearance)</td>
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<td>Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft</td>
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<td>Provision of assembly areas</td>
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<td>Damage control</td>
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<td>Emergency facilities for visitors’ vehicles and equipment</td>
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<td>Recovery and transportation of disabled vehicles and equipment</td>
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<td>Waste and disposal</td>
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<td>Movement</td>
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<td>Airheads</td>
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<td>Alternates</td>
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<td>Facilities</td>
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<td>Refueling</td>
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<td>Alternates</td>
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<td>Draft</td>
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<td>Bunkering/fueling</td>
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<td>Repair</td>
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<td>Road and rail movement</td>
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<td>Security</td>
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<td>Traffic control</td>
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<td>Pipeline</td>
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<td>HN water quality standards</td>
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<td>Movement</td>
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**Figure 6-1. Host-nation considerations (continued)**

**ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS**

6-22. Agreements for transferring defense goods and services between nations must be done at the national government level. This may prove cumbersome and time consuming. Support provided and received in multinational operations must be in accordance with existing legal authorities. Under an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA), national authorities enter into agreements for acquiring or cross-servicing logistic support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange for equal value basis. The ACSA is a broad overall agreement, generally supplemented by an implementing arrangement. The agreement is conducted by the J-4 and the Department of State with the country involved in the ACSA. Approval is provided by and the agreement is signed by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the country involved in the ACSA. Major commands in country then negotiate the details with their...
counterparts and reference the ACSA for exchange of support and services. The implementing arrangement contains specific details under which orders for logistic support are placed. ACSA can cover–

- Food.
- Billeting.
- Transportation.
- Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).
- Clothing.
- Communications.
- Health service support.
- Ammunition.
- Base operations support to include construction.
- Storage.
- Use of facilities.
- Training.
- Spare parts.
- Repair and maintenance.
- Calibration.
- Port services.

6-23. Items not included are–

- Weapons systems.
- Major end items.
- Guided missiles.
- Nuclear and chemical munitions other than riot control agents.
- Cartridge and aircrew escape propulsion system components.
- Chaff and chaff dispensers.
- Guidance kits for bombs and other ammunition.

**CONTRACTING**

6-24. Contracting, such as theater-support contracting, is a means to acquire locally available logistic support for immediate use by deployed units at staging locations, interim support bases, or forward operating locations. Contracting may be conducted with foreign governments, commercial entities, or civilian agencies. Contracting does not replace HN support or existing supply systems where these systems are available or operational. When properly used, contracting is an essential tool for supporting the mission. Deployments in remote AOs are most likely to require contingency contracting support. FM 3-100.21 and FM 4-92 provide more information on contractor support to the Army. The commander or G-4 or S-4 must prioritize available contractor resources in the AO. Contracting can accomplish the following:

- Bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic or HN support is available.
- Reduce dependence on a nationally based logistics system.
- Improve response time and reduce footprints.
- Augment the existing logistic support capability for critical supplies and services.
- Transition from military to civilian-controlled operations.
- Manage limited resources by using contractors instead of calling up reservists.
- Reduce demands for military resources and improve relationships with the populace.

6-25. Contracting is valuable where no HN support agreements exist, or where HN support agreements do not provide for required supplies or services. Contracting can be expensive. Funding guidance is required. Close coordination with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support is essential. Upon mission termination or redeployment, the command must close out all records or files and submit them to the appropriate authorities for disposition. The same economic considerations apply for contracting as for HN
support (see previous). Contractors external to the AO may be used, but the logistics staff must consider such issues as taxes, cross border fees, and landing fees. The command must have a comprehensive contracting support plan to ensure the force uses proper legal methods when getting supplies and services. The plan should meet the following requirements:

- Include procedures and policies for contracting support in the AO. These procedures and policies should assure full use of HN support and contracting resources.
- Ensure contracting receives consideration during logistics planning and becomes part of the OPORD or OPLAN.
- Identify subordinate command’s requirements for HN support or contracting support.
- Include an area database containing all available data concerning local resources from area studies, Foreign Service personnel, civilian agencies, and locally developed logistic support data. It should also contain a list of contracting and HN support agreements in the AO. A source of information on current global complex emergencies is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ relief internet site (http://www.reliefweb.int) that contains maps and current field reports from civilian agencies.
- Address security performance measures and quality control aspects of contracting to include inspection of goods received to ensure against sabotage, poisoning, or other terrorist-style actions.

6-26. The command should establish a multinational contracting office. This office, working with the multinational logistics procurement support board, coordinates contracting requirements for and assists in acquiring local logistic support. Highly trained contracting personnel, linguists and interpreters, and representatives from all the multinational forces staff the contracting office. If more than one contracting office is required, contracting officers will be assigned to provide support on an area basis. The contracting office should perform the following:

- Provide coordination and cooperation among nations that maintain contractors performing parallel functions in the AO. This avoids competition for local services and obtains the best prices through consolidated requirements.
- Coordinate with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support.
- Provide contracting representatives to subordinate logistics organizations.

ROLE SPECIALIZATION

6-27. Role specialization is where a nation or organization assumes the sole responsibility for procuring and providing a particular class of supply or service for all or part of a multinational force. Normally performed at echelons above corps, role specialization may be executed at a lower level depending upon the size of the multinational force. Role specialization is normally used for a finite mission and time because of the great burden it places upon the nation or organization. First, unless reimbursement across national lines is agreed to before deployment of the force, the providing nation bears an unfair portion of the financial cost of the operation. Secondly, the nation or organization may use an inordinate amount of its own resources supporting others. This leads to internal supply shortfalls or delays in resupply and increases wear and tear on vehicles and personnel. Other multinational force members may then have to provide other support to the partner doing the role specialization.

6-28. If properly planned and negotiated, this approach promotes greater efficiency in cases where one multinational force member is already well established in the area and has contractual arrangements in place, has a unique relationship with the populace, or has a much greater capability than other nations. One example is Saudi Arabia’s role of supplying fuel to multinational members during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Another is the French role in supplying theater-level transportation and certain logistics commodities to members of the UN protection force in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.

ORGANIZATION

6-29. The logistics organization should include specialists from all logistics functional areas. Some or all logistics responsibilities will follow single-nation channels so the logistics staff should have representatives from each multinational nation. Representatives should have sufficient expertise in logistics to interface with their national channels.
6-30. The G-4 or S-4 should assign an officer or team to prepare the daily logistics status report for the command. One point of contact becomes the command expert for logistics status and issues. The capabilities of any civilian agency logistics organization should be incorporated into the logistics status report. The logistics status report should clearly identify what critical shortfalls exist and are anticipated, what actions are being taken to resolve the shortfalls, and if any assistance is required. A secure means of communications, such as a secure coalition email system, should be used as a means to receive and forward the logistics status report.

6-31. The multinational headquarters must establish effective logistics coordination and communications links with multinational forces and civilian agencies. Links to civilian agencies should be established in cooperation with the CMOC. Much of this coordination can be accomplished by establishing a logistics readiness center that can perform the following:

- Monitor current and evolving multinational force logistics capabilities.
- Coordinate logistic support and maintain total assets visibility.
- Recommend the priority of logistics resources.
- Determine logistics sustainment requirements for planning and execution.
- Provide a central point for logistics-related boards, offices, and centers.

6-32. Additionally, the following positions in the logistics readiness center require personnel with multinational experience:

- Supply and contracting officers with appropriate warrants.
- Explosive ordnance disposal personnel for mines and other UXO.
- Transportation officers.
- Materiel support officers.
- Customs officials.
- Engineers or facility managers.
- Bulk liquid specialists—water and POL.

BOARDS, OFFICES, AND CENTERS

6-33. While not all of the following organizations may be required, the logistics staff should evaluate the need for each to assist in coordinating logistics efforts:

- Multinational petroleum office. This office coordinates POL planning and execution, as well as the supply of common bulk petroleum products.
- Multinational civil-military engineering board. This board establishes policies, procedures, and priorities for civil-military construction and engineering requirements.
- Multinational facilities utilization board. This board evaluates and reconciles requests for real estate, facilities, inter-Service support, and construction in compliance with the multinational civil-military engineering board.
- Multinational logistics procurement support board. This board coordinates contracting operations with national authorities and host nation for acquiring supplies and services.
- Multinational materiel priorities and allocation board. This board modifies and recommends priorities for allocating materiel assets for multinational forces.
- Multinational movement center. This center establishes the taskings and priorities for movement. It also coordinates the employment of all transportation assets in the AO, to include movement into and out of the airports and seaports of debarkation. This center is responsible for establishing priorities for troop contributing nations for the movement of their forces into the AO.
- Multinational mortuary affairs office. This office plans and executes all mortuary affairs programs. It provides guidance to facilitate mortuary programs and maintain data.
- Multinational deployment agency. This agency deconflicts the movement of forces into the AO and creates the deployment plan.
- Multinational contracting office. The responsibilities of this office are explained in detail in the contracting section.
TRANSPORTATION

6-34. The G-4 or S-4 must understand the roles and functions and capabilities of all mobility assets used in deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the multinational force. Accurate, up-to-date transportation information is vital to effective operations. The multinational force must be able to track multinational assets into and within the AO. Logistics flow priorities should be established in the initial assessment and continually updated during operations.

6-35. Commanders must integrate the strategic and theater movement requirements to prevent congestion at seaports and airports. Establishing in-theater hubs maximizes cargo throughput and improves theater distribution. Nations must provide movement data to the multinational force theater movement control system. This data provides information for the direct delivery or transloading of passengers and cargo. It can be used to deconflict strategic movements with other theater movements.

6-36. Civilian agencies, in an effort to help by shipping relief supplies, will likely cause transportation “choke points” en route to and within the theater. A G-4 or S-4 link with the CMOC may help provide a solution to this type of circumstance.

6-37. The multinational force should designate a director of mobility forces. The director is normally a senior officer familiar with the AO with an extensive background in airlift operations. The director serves as the designated agent for all airlift issues in the AO and for other duties as directed.

WASTE AND DISPOSAL PLANS

6-38. Inadequate waste disposal plans cause conflicts with public and international law and increase costs. Waste and disposal must be addressed in the OPLAN or OPORD from initial planning to redeployment. When cost becomes paramount during redeployment, waste and disposal are particularly important. These commodities may require disposal:

- Usable property and scrap.
- Munitions list and strategic list items.
- Captured and confiscated weapons.
- Hazardous materiel and hazardous waste.
- Rations and food.
- Ammunition, explosives, and dangerous articles.
- Radioactive materiel.
- Medical waste.
- Classified items.
- Drugs, biological substances, and controlled substances.

UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

6-39. The UN logistics system requires member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level, normally for 60 to 120 days. This allows the UN to organize a logistics structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and local memorandums of understanding and letters of assist to provide support for the multinational. Once established, the UN logistics structure provides continuing support through a system of lead nations, civilian contracts, a UN force logistic support group, or a combination of the above.

6-40. A UN survey and assessment team will evaluate operational requirements and develop planning data for sustainment. When participating in UN missions, the command should send a logistics representative with the UN survey team if possible. The multinational force should coordinate with UN forces to improve the unity of effort and reduce potential conflicts.
LEAD-NATION CONCEPT

6-41. A lead nation is a nation assigned to provide the UN support to other nations under a reimbursable agreement. The lead nation would assume responsibility for providing an agreed upon list of logistic support for itself and other troop-contributing nations. Supported nations then rely on the lead nation for the agreed level of support. National contingents must have representatives within the lead nation’s logistics organization.

FORCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT CONCEPT

6-42. In most cases, the UN will ask a member state, or states, to form a force logistic support group. The group incorporates logistics units from participating nations. A state accepting the group role will be responsible, along with the chief logistics officer at the force headquarters, for establishing local contracts to support the force. Even with a force logistic support group, member states remain responsible for unique national elements of resupply—such as repair parts, clothing, food, and major end item replacements—unless an agreement is established between nations to provide this support. This would be on a reimbursable basis under either a wet or dry lease arrangement agreed before deployment between the UN and the contributing nation’s government.

CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR CONCEPT

6-43. The UN will attempt to economize the logistic support by using civilian contractors. The goal is to achieve the most economical logistics organization that both meets the demands of the force and releases military manpower for redeployment. Force headquarters will coordinate the process. UN contracting does not fall under the logistics division but rather the purchasing and transport services division. The UN procurement process can be bureaucratic and slow. It is decentralized, with each agency using its own procedures. The interagency procurement services office of the UN development program is slated to create a standard procurement system.

6-44. The UN chief administrative officer does not work for the force commander, but reports to the special representative of the secretary general. The civilian logistics infrastructure, to include the budget officer, reports to the chief administrative officer. Logistics problems will not be resolved unless the chief administrative officer is involved in the process. Maximum liaison between military and civilian counterparts is required to allow synchronization of effort.

6-45. The UN normally coordinates such logistics areas as bulk supplies and services. National standards such as consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels may exceed UN standards. Sophisticated multinational military equipment may require different standards of support than what the UN has agreed to provide or fund. UN standards must be clearly understood concerning level and quality of support provided and funded. Logistic support that significantly extends beyond what is outlined in the UN agreement may not be reimbursable. The multinational force must be prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support is deficient.

MOVEMENT

6-46. Movement is critical to multinational force operations. A multinational force headquarters, or its supporting combatant command, normally plans and executes all intertheater movement. However, it remains a national responsibility to move forces into the operating area. The multinational force headquarters is responsible for coordinating these deployments to support the commander’s plan and then for planning and controlling intratheater movement through the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process.
INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE

6-47. The decision on use of an ISB outside the operating area requires a conscious decision to balance numerous requirements, including greater lift requirements against better efficiency. Multinational forces should assemble and stage in an ISB, especially if combat is imminent. The ISB provides a secure area to assemble, train, equip, and bond the coalition or alliance force into a cohesive one. It is better to solve problems and correct deficiencies in a nonhostile environment. The multinational force headquarters staff should assemble first and work together, followed by the rest of the multinational force. The ISB should have sufficient billeting and training capacity to support the entire multinational force at once. Access to airports and seaports for smooth reception of the force and its subsequent deployment is critical. If the multinational operation is a lesser regional contingency or a second major regional contingency, an ISB may not be possible.

6-48. Planners should anticipate disruptions from many factors, ranging from weather to political decisions. This will alter the planned flow of personnel, forces, and equipment. The Army Service component commander, or a supporting combatant command, operates the ISB and deploys fully ready forces into the operating area. When the lodgment is well established, the ISB may shift into the operating area if it will not drain additional resources. Larger areas, such as Europe or Korea, allow for a reception center or ISB in theater from the beginning. In the Korean War, UN forces operated the UN reception center where incoming contingents were equipped, trained, and linked up with U.S. liaison elements.

THEATER RECEPTION

6-49. At ports of debarkation, units work with HN contracted, HN support, and multiservice personnel to secure the port, discharge equipment, process equipment and personnel, and move units to marshaling areas. HN forces can perform and assist in many of these functions. The multinational force headquarters may assign a troop-contributing nation to oversee and assist the host nation in performing these functions. If no HN support forces are available, national units must perform those functions. All units must be planned for in the strategic flow and some, because of their limited capability, may be assigned a certain function.

THEATER STAGING

6-50. Staging is that part of the RSOI operation in which several key activities take place in controlled areas in the ongoing incremental buildup of combat power. During this phase the following is accomplished:

- Units are reassembled and united with their equipment and scheduled for movement toward the tactical assembly area.
- Materiel is segregated, prioritized, and prepared for transport.
- Class V supplies are uploaded.
- Life support is provided to personnel.
THEATER ONWARD MOVEMENT

6-51. This phase begins when units are configured to move to their final destination. Such movement is accomplished through a carefully devised movement program that employs convoy, rail, and HN contract assets (such as heavy equipment transporters and other trucks) to ensure the forward and concurrent movement of troops and supplies. Centralized control of transportation assets is required. Real estate management may be a problem unless a multinational counterpart to the U.S. joint force utilization board (usually controlled by engineers) is given authority to allocate terrain to all forces and agencies.

6-52. Movement planning must account for differences in how nations conduct road marches or similar administrative movements. These differences can lead to confusion and disorganization. For example, one multinational force contingent may consider any movement made by a tactical unit to be a tactical movement. Terminology must be coordinated through the movement control center to avoid confusion.

6-53. When planning the movement of a multinational force, planners must know the details of the organization, equipment, capabilities, and limitations of the forces. Planners must know how to efficiently request intratheater movement of multinational operational forces consistent with the operational commander’s OPLAN. The movement should complement sequencing of operations and time-phased force deployment. Movement planners should consider all assets (joint, allied, host nation, and third country) and modes (air, land, or sea) of transport. During execution of these movements, movement control personnel must locate where they can validate actual movements.

THEATER INTEGRATION

6-54. This phase covers both the effective management of RSOI movement of units, as well as, the TOA of units to the tactical commander.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the logistics portion of the operation.

SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES

6-55. What areas will come under multinational control? What areas will remain national issues?

6-56. What logistic support is available?

6-57. Does the unit have sufficient assets (such as maintenance, communications, transportation) to conduct its movement and/or mission? Will it require support?

6-58. What are the unique logistics capabilities of each nation of the multinational force? Understanding these capabilities is essential to effective and efficient logistics planning and support.

6-59. What mortuary affairs capabilities does the command have?

6-60. What legal restrictions do national laws impose on logistic support?

6-61. Do national legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support among multinational nations?

6-62. Are mutual logistic support agreements in accordance with existing legal authorities?

6-63. What is the system for property accountability?

6-64. What are the special clothing and equipment requirements that may require a long lead-time to obtain? (For example, nonmilitary supplies or riot control gear.)

6-65. What are the procedures for providing support such as transportation, housing, and meals to diplomats and distinguished visitors? What coordination is there with the joint visitor’s bureau on this?

6-66. What is the system for preventing fraud, waste, and abuse?

6-67. How does the command assess logistics requests, requirements, and actions to ensure that they are valid with respect to the operation and authority given to the command?

6-68. How does the command adequately secure logistics assets?

6-69. Will the command establish a common retail store? A well-stocked retail store will not only provide personnel support items, but will also serve as a morale booster.

6-70. How will the intelligence staff gather information from logistics sources such as truck drivers and engineers?

6-71. What are the ACSA procedures to account for and reimburse nations for services and supplies exchanged between nations?

6-72. What are the common supplies and services that one nation or a multinational organization might provide?

6-73. Is there an agreement that authorizes forces to exchange mutual logistic support of goods and services and that accounts for the amounts received?

6-74. Will there be, and if so when and how, a TOA of national logistics assets to the multinational force?

6-75. What is the multinational force’s authority to redistribute or cross-level logistics assets and services under routine and emergency conditions?

6-76. How will the command maintain national asset accountability from the national sustaining base to the front-line units?
6-77. How will the command ensure compatibility and interoperability of communications and information systems, to include automated data processing interfaces between the multinational and national support systems?

6-78. How will the command prioritize, allocate, and use common infrastructure capabilities (ports, airfields, roads) to support military and civil operations?

6-79. What are the existing standardization agreements that will facilitate multinational logistic support?

6-80. What is the logistic support structure? How will it identify capabilities and responsibilities of contributing nations?

6-81. Does the multinational have ACSA among multinational nations?

6-82. Does the logistics structure have one officer in charge or a main point of contact for C2 of contract personnel?

6-83. Have contractor procedures been established to allow total multinational participation in contracts let by national personnel and used by multinational personnel?

6-84. Is there a need to establish a multinational logistics command or element? If so, has its staffing been determined?

6-85. Has the relationship between the multinational and national logistics elements been clearly defined?

6-86. Have lead nations been designated where appropriate?

6-87. Have logistics reporting procedures been established throughout the force?

6-88. Do all forces know and comply with the infrastructure repair plan?

6-89. Is there duplication of effort in the support plan for the operation?

6-90. If there is a need, what is the composition of the multinational logistics command or element? Have coordinating centers been established for movements, medical support, contracting, infrastructure engineering, and logistics operations?

6-91. What is the transitional plan for operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?

6-92. Are multinational legal representatives available to provide counsel on international law and legal agreements?

6-93. Has a certification process been established?

6-94. Have standards been identified for logistic support? Is there a plan to conduct, inspect, and ascertain compliance with these standards prior to deployment?

6-95. What is the division of responsibilities between multinational, national, and HN logistic support?

6-96. How will each class of supply be handled?

6-97. What are the multinational force’s capabilities to receive, store, and issue dry cargo, fuel, and water to include water production and purification capability?

6-98. Does the multinational force have the means to communicate requirements to the multinational logistics management center?

6-99. What materiel handling equipment is available within the multinational force?

6-100. Does the multinational force have a basic load of ammunition? What are the ammunition procedures?

6-101. What are the multinational force’s special requirements to include tents, cots, reverse osmosis water purification units, laundry, latrines, and batteries?

6-102. What are the military assistance program requirements for multinational forces?
6-103. What is the best method for providing potable water? Have the engineers, medical personnel, and other staff officers been consulted about this issue? Using bottled water may have an added advantage of enhancing troop morale.

6-104. What is available in lessons learned databases for unique requirements, planning factors, and potential problem areas?

6-105. Has liaison been established with other multinational nations and civilian agencies to obtain the most up-to-date logistics information on the AO?

6-106. What are the personnel augmentation requirements and equipment needed for mission support?

6-107. Have basing rights and diplomatic clearances critical to mobility been secured?

6-108. What are in-theater capabilities and resources of civilian agencies in the AO?

6-109. What current agreements exist with other participating nations that provide for logistic support? Does this include agreements governing logistic support with representatives of other nations?

6-110. What quality controls have been established for all services and supplies such as POL, water, and food? How will they be monitored?

6-111. What are the procedures to ensure in-transit visibility at all transportation nodes? Lack of in-transit visibility will cause loss of confidence in the supply system and lead to unnecessary reordering, further clogging the supply lines.

6-112. For UN operations, what standards are to be followed concerning support?

6-113. What is the support plan for redeployment of forces, materiel, and equipment?

6-114. What logistics infrastructure, materiel, capabilities, and equipment will remain in-country for use by follow-on forces or organizations?

**FUNDING**

6-115. Has it been determined if, or to what extent, operational-related expenses will be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?

6-116. Has funding been identified to support operations or to reimbursement expenditures? What are the limits on funding authority?

6-117. What is the availability of common funding for contracting, establishing a multinational headquarters, and general or common support? What are the procedures for common funding for contracting, establishing a multinational headquarters, and general or common support?

6-118. What are the accounting and reimbursement procedures for services and supplies exchanged between nations? Are replacement-in-kind procedures included?

6-119. Has the probable cost of the multinational operations been determined? Is the probable cost acceptable?

6-120. What are the funding requirements for renting facilities to support operations?

6-121. Does the command have funding codes from all multinational nations? What methods and documentation are required to record all expenditures?

6-122. How will the command capture costs associated with supporting the multinational forces?
HOST-NATION SUPPORT

6-123. Has HN support been evaluated to determine the logistic support available? Are law enforcement, sanitation, medical services, facilities, storage, and materiel included?

6-124. What are the capabilities of existing infrastructure? Do they include water treatment plants, power stations, reservoirs, and bulk and retail fuel storage? Engineers or facility managers can provide critical information on the availability of existing facilities.

6-125. Have negotiations to secure support either been established or completed?

6-126. What is the impact of obtaining HN support on the host nation’s economy?

6-127. What are the possible environmental impacts on the host nation providing this support?

6-128. What specific technical agreements—such as environmental clean-up, customs duties and taxes, and hazardous material and waste storage, transit, and disposal—must be developed to augment HN support agreements?

MAINTENANCE

6-129. Do the multinational forces have maintenance support?

6-130. Do the multinational forces have the means to order and receive repair parts?

6-131. Do the multinational forces have wreckers, stake and platform trailers, or heavy equipment transporters?

6-132. Do the multinational forces have communications repair facilities?

CBRN DEFENSE

6-133. What infrastructure exists for assisting multinational forces to deal with low level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards like medical treatment facilities or detection equipment supply houses? (Are U.S. policy and guidelines acceptable to other nations if none exist?)

6-134. Is the necessary CBRN protection, detection, and reconnaissance equipment available to troops to counter the threat?

6-135. Are adequate theater stocks of chemical overgarments available?

6-136. What plans exist to protect and train locally hired civilians against WMD threats?
TRANSPORTATION

6-137. What is the multinational transportation command structure?

6-138. What are the available multinational air and sea lines of communications?

6-139. What are assigned airlift and sealift capabilities and allocations? Are the requirements to support both military and civilian agencies included?

6-140. What are the requirements for and capabilities, limitations, and availability of airfields, seaports, and inland transportation systems in the departure, intermediate staging, and objective areas? What resources are required for new construction or necessary improvements to existing facilities?

6-141. What is the multinational RSOI process?

6-142. What is the ability of the host nation to receive personnel and equipment at ports and airfields?

6-143. What are the access rights in the AO? The command must coordinate diplomatic efforts to arrange for–
   ● Support, country, and diplomatic clearances.
   ● Over-flight rights.
   ● Basing for forces in transit from one locality to another.

6-144. What is the capability of transportation systems to move forces once they arrive in theater?

6-145. Do multinational forces have tactical rotary- and fixed-wing assets for intratheater supply?

6-146. Who supplies transportation supply throughput from the multinational logistics center for multinational forces?

6-147. Do multinational forces have transportation assets for moving troops?

6-148. How will the command control movement into and out of airfields and seaports?

6-149. How will transportation facilities be shared with civilian agencies and contractors?
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The impact of the information environment on operations continues to increase. What Army forces do to achieve advantages across it—information superiority—significantly affects the outcome of operations. Consequently, FM 3-0 revised how the Army views IO and staff responsibility for associated Army information tasks. Army information tasks are used to shape the operational environment. The Army conducts five information tasks to shape the operational environment. These are information engagement, C2 warfare, information protection, OPSEC, and military deception. FM 3-0 contains additional information about Army information tasks. This chapter discusses and uses the terms Army information tasks and information superiority.

The joint and multinational communities continue to use the term information operations. Each of the nations in the multinational force may embrace a concept of information superiority. The multinational force commander must resolve potential conflicts between each nation’s individual Army information tasks and those of the multinational force as a whole. If some multinational members do not have Army information task capabilities, it may be necessary for the multinational force headquarters to assist the subordinate commanders and staffs in conducting Army information tasks to achieve the multinational force information superiority plan goals.

**MULTINATIONAL FORCE ARMY INFORMATION TASKS**

7-1. Developing Army information tasks and supporting activities requires close coordination between multinational members. The key to effective information superiority within the multinational force is coordinating the information-related activities of all multinational force formations to achieve the multinational forces’ aim.

7-2. Planning, preparing, and executing multinational Army information tasks is difficult due to differences in doctrine and training, complex security issues, and interoperability of equipment. The need to produce Army information task products in unfamiliar languages compounds these difficulties. The multinational force size, composition, and mission—as well as diplomatic considerations— influences how multinational Army information tasks are planned, prepared, and executed. Centralized planning, preparation, and execution by the multinational force headquarters IO (Army information tasks) cell are essential for conducting successful Army information tasks, especially because multinational formations below force headquarters level may not deploy their own IO (Army information tasks) cells. It would therefore be beneficial for the multinational force headquarters IO (Army information tasks) cell to represent all force formations. Direct representation ensures that multinational IO elements are efficiently used and that the information engagement plan is coordinated with all other aspects of the operation.
7-3. Army information tasks must consider the impact public opinion has on policy makers to modify their participation in the multinational mission. Thus, the impact of media coverage of force activities is a vital consideration.

7-4. To assist the multinational force in coordinating Army information tasks, the commander should establish a multinational IO (Army information tasks) working group. (See JP 3-13 for details.) All countries should be invited to send LNOs to the IO (Army information tasks) working group. This will help to rapidly identify differences in IO (Army information tasks) doctrine (if any), country capabilities, and national caveats that could influence the development or execution of the multinational information engagement plan. Additionally, the working group should work with the multinational fires-effects coordination cell. This will help to ensure that lethal and nonlethal capabilities are synchronized and mutually supporting. It will help to ensure that the desired effects are achieved in the AO.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to Army information tasks.

ARMY INFORMATION TASKS

7-5. What is the process for releasing information among the multinational partners?

7-6. How does each multinational nation view population, neutrals, adversaries, and civilians?

7-7. What is the multinational members’ understanding of the GIE?

7-8. What is the multinational members’ understanding of national information environment? Is it accessible to the other multinational members?

7-9. What do multinational members understand about the MIE?

7-10. How interoperable are Army information tasks between multinational members?

7-11. What is the multinational member’s definition of IO?

7-12. What is the respective army’s doctrine for exploiting the elements of Army information tasks?

7-13. How does each of the multinational members manage information? Is the process open to other multinational members?

7-14. What threats to Army information tasks are common to all the multinational members? What threats to Army information tasks are specific to any one army?

7-15. What common solutions can be applied across armies to negate the threats to Army information tasks?

7-16. What mission essential task lists must be modified to accommodate multinational Army information tasks?

7-17. What is the guidance (for example, types of information, level of detail, and approved audience) on releasing information to multinational partners?

7-18. What is the process for obtaining authorization to release information to multinational partners?

COMMANDER

7-19. How do commanders examine the vulnerability of their Soldiers and systems to exploitation or attack by an adversary capable of employing EW, physical destruction, military deception, and propaganda?

7-20. Does the commander’s intent and concept of the operations provide sufficient guidance for information engagement planning?

7-21. Are there anomalies between multinational members in how commanders synchronize Army information tasks with other military operations?

STAFF ORGANIZATION

7-22. Do multinational members use an Army information tasks cell for coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction?

7-23. Does the Army information tasks cell or some other staff element contribute to planning, preparing, and executing the information engagement portion of the plan?

7-24. How does the commander provide guidance concerning Army information tasks during the planning process?
7-25. Are the elements of Army information tasks deconflicted?

7-26. Is the information engagement annex reviewed for compliance with ROE and other legal restrictions?

7-27. How are Army information tasks CCIRs integrated into the collection plan?

7-28. What are the roles and responsibilities of the Army information tasks element staff members in planning and conducting Army information tasks?

7-29. Do Army information tasks cell personnel understand the planning process? Do they employ effective and efficient models and tools?

7-30. Do multinational members use an Army information tasks coordinator?

7-31. Does the table of organization and equipment of multinational members require augmentation to perform its Army information tasks mission?

7-32. Does the information engagement cell accomplish the following tasks:
   - Focus the commander’s intent to gain information superiority?
   - Establish Army information tasks priorities to accomplish planned objectives?
   - Determine the availability of Army information task resources to carry out Army information task actions?
   - Synchronize, coordinate, and deconflict Army information tasks?
   - Integrate Army information tasks into the OPLAN?
   - Recommend tasking to the G-3 for the assets needed to execute Army information tasks?
   - Nominate targets for physical destruction to the targeting meeting?
   - Publish the information engagement appendix to an OPLAN or OPORD?
   - Coordinate Army information tasks input into an OPLAN or OPORD?
   - Coordinate intelligence support from the all source intelligence cell?
   - Ensure that a solution is provided to the command to reverse Army information task vulnerabilities?

**ARMY INFORMATION TASKS ASSESSMENT**

7-33. Is IPB reviewed and incorporated into the information engagement estimate?

7-34. Are potential courses of action analyzed for Army information tasks supportability?

7-35. Are all Army information tasks elements considered throughout the mission analysis process?

7-36. How do Army information tasks support all potential courses of action?

7-37. How does the staff integrate and synchronize the actions included in the related annexes with each other and the OPLAN?

7-38. Are CCIRs, information requirements, and battle damage assessment requirements developed to support the plan and annexes?

7-39. Do the intelligence capabilities and resources request cycle support Army information tasks requirements?

7-40. Are the CMO, and PA annexes fully deconflicted and synchronized with the appendices of Army information tasks elements?

7-41. How does the staff integrate and synchronize the actions of the Army information tasks elements?

7-42. Is a synchronization matrix employed?

7-43. Does the higher headquarters intend to synchronize and coordinate the implementation of Army information tasks support within the force?
**INFORMATION, PLANNING, PREPARING, AND EXECUTION**

7-44. Are information engagement plans supportable by organic and nonorganic assets?

7-45. Is the target development process appropriate to produce Army information tasks targets?

7-46. Does the target development process adhere to doctrine and follow established procedures in support of Army information tasks?

7-47. Is information superiority over the adversary the chief criterion for target selection?

7-48. Do the targets selected support Army information tasks?

7-49. Are potential targets evaluated for vulnerability and accessibility as well as fratricide avoidance?

7-50. Are selected targets and engagement methods reviewed for ROE compliance?

7-51. Is the C2 structure analyzed to identify critical friendly nodes and systems?

7-52. Is a threat assessment done to determine adversary Army information tasks capabilities?

7-53. Is a vulnerability assessment of critical friendly nodes and systems conducted and are protection measures recommended and executed?

7-54. Are Army information tasks resources and capabilities sufficient to execute the OPLAN?

7-55. What security policy, guidance, and implementation procedures need to be modified to effectively conduct Army information tasks?

7-56. Are security policy, guidance, and implementation procedures effective in protecting C2 and ISR systems from information compromise, data corruption, and denial of service?

**VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT**

7-57. Can the unit protect its equipment and personnel from threat Army information tasks?

7-58. Is the Army information tasks threat to the unit’s equipment and personnel identified and validated?

7-59. Are the unit’s critical C2 systems, nodes, and networks identified and validated?

7-60. Has a vulnerability assessment been done on Army information tasks elements from—
   - Malicious software?
   - Insider threats?
   - Intrusion?
   - Unauthorized users?
   - Signals intelligence?
   - EW?
   - Physical destruction?
   - Electromagnetic pulse directed energy weapons?
   - Obscurants?
   - Biological and chemical weapons?

7-61. How interoperable are the elements of information systems between multinational partners?

7-62. Can the unit’s Army information tasks posture be improved by identifying and correcting component-level vulnerabilities in its information systems?

7-63. Have the components of the information systems been identified?

7-64. Have the critical components been isolated?

7-65. Are countermeasures being incorporated to correctly identify the components of the information systems?
7-66. Are security policies, guidance, and implementation procedures effective in protecting division C2 and ISR from information compromise, data corruption, and denial of service?

7-67. Has the vulnerability of C2 and ISR been assessed versus friendly and adversary Army information tasks capabilities?

7-68. Have the critical nodes or networks been identified?

7-69. Has a vulnerability assessment been conducted?

7-70. Has the accessibility of vulnerable nodes or networks been assessed?

7-71. Are security policy, guidance, and implementation procedures in place to protect critical information systems?

7-72. Are instances of adversary Army information tasks accurately identified and reported?

7-73. Are instances of Army information tasks fratricide accurately identified and reported?
Chapter 8

Protection

In a multinational environment, philosophies of protection may vary. The nations must coordinate at the earliest opportunity to ensure cohesion. The multinational commander should develop and coordinate protection guidelines for the force as a whole. Effective protection makes the command more credible as a multinational force. Within each national unit, national commanders will conduct protection for some nations in accordance with their own national concepts and multinational guidelines.

ASSYMETRIC THREATS

8-1. Protection minimizes, as far as is practical, the threat from IO components overhead attack systems, WMD, and environmental hazards to sustaining operations in general. In addition to attacks by conventional forces, irregular forces frequently threaten to attack. This may be indigenous or from a third party. It could manifest itself in a number of ways—from guerrilla and terrorist action to civil disturbance. In stability operations, such activity may be the main threat. One of protection’s primary aims is to protect the force from these attacks. Protection also aims to reduce the civil population’s interference with operations. This will minimize casualties and reduce the loss of materiel. It also allows the commander to concentrate on the mission. Using IO will provide valuable security intelligence and aid protection activities.

POTENTIAL FOR FRATRICIDE

8-2. A significant problem facing multinational force commanders is the potential for fratricide. Different operational procedures and languages compound this risk. Commanders must make every effort to reduce fratricide. They must know what situations can increase the risk of fratricide and, with other multinational forces, institute appropriate preventative measures. The measures include—

- Command emphasis.
- Disciplined operations.
- Close coordination across national commands.
- Rehearsals.
- Enhanced situational understanding.
- The use of LNOs to assess the fratricide risk and recommend potential solutions.

8-3. Antifratricide measures should be included in the command’s SOPs and other directives. The command must coordinate these measures with other multinational forces to ensure that all forces understand and follow them.

PRINCIPLES

8-4. Five protection principles are common for national, multinational, and subordinate commanders:

- Threat assessment.
- Risk management.
- Joint and multinational focus.
- Prioritization.
- Flexibility.
Chapter 8

THREAT ASSESSMENT

8-5. A threat assessment based on accurate and timely all-source intelligence must be conducted as the basis for selecting protection measures.

COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT

8-6. Protection is based on composite risk management, not risk elimination. Casualties are a reality of military operations. Thus, commanders must balance the risks and balance them in the context of the campaign end state. The commander should ensure that composite risk management is fully integrated into planning and execution with special emphasis on the hazards related to multinational operations. Safety in training, planning, and operations must be stressed. Composite risk management applies to all levels of military operations. The multinational commander must ensure that all nations are involved in this process.

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL FOCUS

8-7. Protection must embrace all force components, joint and multinational, within the AO. It should address all aspects of the threat.

PRIORITIZATION

8-8. Although, protection must embrace the whole force, the capability to protect all elements to the same degree probably will not exist. Priority should be given to centers of gravity. These centers of gravity may be tangible such as intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets or combat service support (CSS). They may also be intangible such as multinational cohesion or political will as influenced by public opinion.

FLEXIBILITY

8-9. The protection policy and measures must be flexible and capable of responding to a rapidly changing threat.

CONCEPT

8-10. Protection is not an issue that can be addressed separately or in isolation. It is an integral part of operations and must be incorporated into the multinational force commander’s plan from the outset. The commander should stress the importance of protection in his or her estimate and directive to subordinates. The lead nation headquarters may have to negotiate with national command elements to arrive at protection measures that satisfy national political imperatives, the multinational commander’s intent, and the ability of the force to act cohesively. Mission analysis done by subordinates must include protection and incorporate the guidance given in the multinational force commander’s directive.

8-11. Protection is, primarily, a composite risk management process as shown in figure 8-1. By producing an accurate and comprehensive threat assessment and covering all the principles covered in the section above, the staff can produce an initial set of measures that address the actual threat. Protection measures can be offensive or defensive. Examples are given in Appendix D. The proposed measures are balanced against the commander’s mission and operational requirements. The measures are then tempered in application by risk management. For example, measures that could be perceived as aggressive, such as patrolling in armored vehicles or hard targeting, could impair a force’s mission in many peace operations environments.
8-12. The lead nation headquarters distributes the final selection of protection measures in an annex to the OPORD. Implementing some measures may not be force wide. The threat, particularly in stability operations, may not be uniform and may be subject to frequent review and change. Subordinate commanders, in consultation with the multinational force commander, may implement additional local measures.

8-13. The threat assessment is a continual process. As the situation changes or new intelligence is received, the staff will review protection measures and adapt them to the new situation. As part of mission command, subordinate commanders will be directed to conduct local reviews, although the overall coordination of protection will remain under the control of the lead nation headquarters.

**NONMILITARY AGENCIES**

8-14. Nonmilitary agencies may request some form of protection. As these threats may not always be transparent, these agencies may provide help in identifying them. The protection afforded to these agencies may enhance military credibility and thereby provide the multinational force with an opportunity to advance a cooperative environment. However, the protection provided must be in proportion to mission requirements.
CONSTITUENTS

8-15. There are two constituents of protection. They are a balanced threat assessment and derived protection measures. Together they provide collective security of the multinational force.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

8-16. Protection is based on the threat assessment, the results of which determine those measures addressing collective protection, security, and health and safety. Overprotection, to counter an improbable threat, can divert scarce resources from achieving the mission. As part of the planning process, the national authorities should conduct a threat assessment. The national authorities may provide political guidance on which priority to take to avoid casualties. Where multiple adversaries exist, their varying intents, threats, and capabilities must be included in the threat assessment. An overall assessment of protection requirements based on this threat assessment should be incorporated into the national military directive. Appendix B gives examples of the content for a threat assessment. It includes the following:

- The lead nation’s national assessment. This will provide the basis for the multinational force commander’s estimate and directive. It also provides a start point for negotiations with the other troop-contributing nations.
- National or local assessments. These may reveal a threat to the civilian population of troop-contributing nations or their forces in other theaters. They may include nonviolent activities such as PSYOP and other associated tactics aimed at influencing international perceptions. Countering such threats will be a national responsibility.

PROTECTION MEASURES

8-17. Following the threat assessment, commanders can decide on appropriate protective measures. The threat assessment also informs the targeting process. The best or, indeed, only form of defense against certain threats may be attack. Protection includes those elements, normally the responsibility of the lead nation headquarters, which protect the whole force. Responsibility for these may be devolved to subordinate commanders. Protection measures fall under several broad categories:

- Theater missile defense.
- CBRN defense.
- AD.
- IO.
- Countersurveillance.
- CSS protection.
- Physical protection (equipment and standards).
- Traffic regulation.
- Counterfratricide.
- Security.
- Space control.

8-18. Within an American-led multinational force, the U.S. would probably provide theater missile defense. Multinationals without U.S. coverage would have to rely not only on destroying surface-to-surface missiles and ground launchers, but also on preventing the adversary from neutralizing or destroying their associated C2 structures.

8-19. The threat assessment will determine the need to deploy specialist CBRN assets and additional medical resources.

8-20. The multinational force airspace control commander will normally coordinate AD, to include offensive and defensive operations, for the multinational force. The functions and responsibilities of this commander, the airspace control authority, and the air defense commander must be integrated to unite joint air operations, airspace control, missile detection and warning, and AD operations in support of the multinational plan.
8-21. IO must be related to protecting the integrity and capability of the force. These operations must also physically protect the headquarters and communications assets, particularly isolated communications outstations. Specific measures may be exercised nationally or within the multinational force as a whole. These measures include—

- Physical destruction.
- EW.
- PSYOP, OPSEC, and deception that falls within an IO or C2 warfare plan.
- Computer network operations.

8-22. Effective countersurveillance protects all force elements by making the locating and targeting of friendly forces harder. Countersurveillance measures should be part of each formation’s SOPS, but direction should come from the lead nation headquarters via the subordinate commanders. It should be based on the adversary’s ISTAR capability from the threat assessment.

8-23. CSS units require specific protection in warfighting as they lack a self-defense capability against anything other than small-scale infantry attacks. The threat assessment should determine the likely level, scale, and warning time for attacks on CSS units. This will determine the allocation of additional forces to the sustainment area commander, multinational force logistics commander, or both. CSS units may have to decrement mission assets (such as converting cargo-carrying trucks to gun trucks) to augment protection forces.

8-24. The physical protection of the force has three aspects. They are structures, vehicles, and individuals. Structural specifications for field defenses are an engineer responsibility. Decisions on additional armor protection and other vehicle modifications will be made by national authorities. The decisions should be implemented before deployment or arrival in theater. The subordinate commanders will control some personal equipment, such as general-purpose laser goggles and fragmentation vests, within lead nation headquarters guidelines. Decisions on protective dress policy should normally be delegated to subordinate commanders.

8-25. Military police provide a wide array of functions and capabilities during multinational operations. Military police are uniquely trained to—

- Interact with local police authorities where appropriate.
- Advise on, implement, and enforce main supply route regulations.
- Provide a visible protection presence in built-up areas.
- Provide vital information on criminal and threat forces.
- Conduct dislocated civilian and refugee operations.

8-26. A counterfratricide policy should cover areas such as overall operational awareness at all levels, weapons-tight zones, use of liaison, coordination between adjacent units, and combat identification. The lead nation headquarters should formulate and coordinate this policy.

8-27. Security covers the physical and procedural measures, directed at lead nation headquarters level and integrated into the overall plan, but mainly applied at the local level. Security aims to minimize direct and indirect attacks on personnel, equipment, installations, and LOC by other than the adversary’s main forces. In stability operations, NATO Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, and peace support operations (PSO), where the adversary may not possess an air, surface-to-surface missile, and CBRN capability, security is probably the main constituent of protection. Some security measures will affect the civilian population. Such measures must be subject to appropriate legal advice that may need to incorporate the requirements of international law, HN law, and any extant SOFAs or memorandum of understandings. Security incorporates the following:

- Personnel security—to include standing physical and procedural measures to protect personnel.
- Positional or installation security—to include physical and procedural measures to protect positions or installations from attack, sabotage, and theft.
- LOC defense—to include patrols, mine clearance, overwatch, and bridge guards that ensure safe and secure lines of communications.
Security of information—to include physical and procedural barriers to protect friendly information.

Liaison with HN security forces. Where the HN security forces retain some operational capability, liaison is vital to coordinate actions. In some cases, HN security forces may have primacy. In nearly all cases, they can provide intelligence and other related information about conditions in-theater.

Population controls—to include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of villagers.

POWs and detainees—to include providing secure accommodations and guard forces to contain POWs and detainees.

Health defense that aims to minimize casualties from disease and environmental hazards. For example, pollution, poor sanitation, and climatic extremes. It incorporates the following:
- Proactive measures—to include vaccination against endemic and biological warfare pathogens, acclimatization, medical surveillance, and clinical presentations.
- Health education—to include advising personnel on prevalence of, and measures to prevent, endemic and sexually transmitted diseases; measures to prevent casualties from climatic extremes; and measures to prevent transmission of biological warfare agents and persistent or residual chemical and radioactive agents.
- Local environment advice—to include dangerous wildlife, hazardous terrain, and industrial and other pollution hazards.

Mine defense—to include mine, UXO, IED, and bobby traps marking; clearing and awareness; and out of bounds areas. This may require the establishment of a mine and UXO action center. These centers are established to track mine, UXO, and booby trap hazards resulting from previous combat.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

8-28. Protection is a cyclical process, which assesses the threat and prescribes appropriate measures to reduce the vulnerabilities at risk from elements of that threat. It is not a separate staff function, but an implicit part of the OPLAN. Multinational force construction should address the required elements or components of protection and their C2 functions to implement the plan. All these elements must be brought together in a single coordination process at senior J-3 staff level with joint coherence. As with all other aspects of military operations, responsibility for protection rests with the multinational force commander. Nevertheless, the chief of staff through the J-3 should exercise day-to-day responsibility for protection. The multinational commander may establish a coalition operational protection coordination center under the staff supervision of G-3 to coordinate protection issues for the multinational force and with the host government.

8-29. If the threat to sustaining operations is anything other than low, and particularly if adversary main forces threaten sustaining operations, then the multinational force commander may need to appoint a sustaining operations coordinator separate from the force logistics headquarters.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following question with respect to the protection portion of the operation.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

8-30. Has a threat assessment been carried out?
8-31. Has the lead nation headquarters coordinated protection measures for the multinational force?
8-32. Has the mission, to include the commander’s intent, been disseminated? Do elements two echelons down understand it?
8-33. Who is the designated staff officer for protection at the lead nation headquarters and subordinate headquarters?
8-34. What does protection mean to each nation in the multinational?
8-35. Do the ROE support protection?
8-36. What are the force’s antifraticide measures?
8-37. Do commanders at all levels understand how to apply risk management?
8-38. Will any formation be required to carry out a local threat assessment?
8-39. Are countersurveillance measures included in formation SOPs?
8-40. What nonlethal technology is available? How is the force trained to use it? Do the ROE authorize its employment?
8-41. What controls exist on using personal equipment?
8-42. What units are available to the command and when are they available?
8-43. What are the multinational airspace control measures?
8-44. What training is required once deployed?
8-45. Has a PSYOP program been developed to support the operation?
8-46. Have PSYOP assets been requested?
8-47. What multinational space control assets are available?
8-48. Has a computer network operations plan been developed to support the operation?
8-49. Have computer network operations assets been requested?
8-50. Has a vulnerability assessment been made of friendly high value facilities?
8-51. Has a multinational operation protection coordination center been established?
8-52. Are there sufficient military police or similar forces available for area and route security in the AO?
GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE FORCE PLANNING

The Army air defense artillery is to protect the force from enemy interference from the air. This checklist assumes that the multinational air force has not neutralized a credible air threat.

8-53. Stability operations and PSO may not have a credible air threat. If that is the case, is there a real need for ground-based air defense?

8-54. Which ground-based air defense package does the warfighting, low to high intensity conflict, require?

8-55. What is the multinational force structure?

8-56. What maritime and air assets will support the multinational force?

8-57. What is the desired ground-based air defense orbit for early entry forces?

8-58. What is the desired order of arrival of ground-based air defense assets?

8-59. What is the commander’s intent?

8-60. What is the multinational command structure for ground-based air defense?

8-61. What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aircraft system use?

8-62. Is there a requirement for a multinational airspace management cell at division or force level?

8-63. What will be the command relationships for ground-based air defense assets in OPCON versus TACON situations?

8-64. What national sensitivities exist concerning the use of national ground-based air defense assets?

8-65. What international procedures will apply during the operations—for example, NATO or ABCA?

8-66. What national ground-based air defense command arrangements are required to support the multinational command structure?

8-67. What are the national requirements for LNOs?

8-68. Will there be a multinational ground-based air defense C2 system? If not, how will national systems such as forward area AD; command, control, communications, and intelligence; and AD communications and information systems be integrated?

8-69. What multinational bearer communication system will be used? (Examples include mobile subscriber equipment.)

8-70. Will the low-level air picture interface be used?

8-71. What are the multinational real estate procedures for ground-based air defense assets?

8-72. What battlefield coordination detachment requirements are available to coordinate land component commander requirements in the air operations center?

Intelligence

8-73. Has a multinational IPB, including air IPB, and estimate process been conducted? What factors were deduced by the multinational force headquarters?

8-74. Is there a multinational G-3 geospatial database to assist in defining likely air avenues of approach and, consequently, the ground-based air defense deployment plan?

8-75. What multinational force assets will need protection—seaport of disembarkation, aerial port of disembarkation, LOCs, force logistics areas, force concentration area, forward battle area, or a combination of these?
AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM

8-76. Will the joint force air component commander concept be employed by the multinational force? If so, who is the multinational air component commander and where is he or she located?

8-77. Will the multinational air component commander produce the airspace control plan, the airspace coordination order, and the air tasking order and act as the airspace control authority for the operation? If not, who will?

8-78. What interface will there be with the HN civil aviation authority prior to the commencement of hostilities?

8-79. Where will the combined air operations center for the force be located?

8-80. Will the airspace control system aim for positive control or will national ground-based air defense C2 limitations force it back to procedural control?

SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

8-81. What type of recognized air picture and local air picture system is available?

8-82. Will there be a recognized air picture?

8-83. How will maritime, land, air, and space units contribute to it?

8-84. What tactical data link system will be used?

8-85. Who will be the identification authority for the recognized air picture (multinational air operations center or sector operations center)?

8-86. Who will be the identification authority for situational understanding?

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

8-87. What will be the multinational ROE before hostilities and after committing the first hostile act?

8-88. Will the policy on pre-emptive air strikes be contained within the multinational ROE?

8-89. Who will define weapon control statuses such as weapons free, weapons tight, and weapons hold?

8-90. What mechanism will exist to update ROE during the operation?

IDENTIFICATION, FRIEND OR FOE

8-91. What identification, friend or foe systems will be used?

8-92. What identification, friend or foe types are fitted to ground-based air defense systems?

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

8-93. What electronic countermeasure policy will be put in place by the force J6?

8-94. Does the electronic countermeasure policy minimize potential suppression of enemy air defenses against the force ground-based air defense assets?
Chapter 8

LOGISTICS

8-95. What major equipment will multinational partners bring to theater?
8-96. What is the logistics structure?
8-97. What arrangements will be in place for multinational resupply of common ammunition?
8-98. What is the multinational policy on the scale of war reserve ground-based air defense systems, by equipment type?
8-99. What will be the in-theater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common equipment?

TRAINING

8-100. Where will training take place—at home, en route to operation, or in concentration area? When will training take place?
8-101. Will in-theater ranges be available?
8-102. What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems in-theater?
8-103. What part will simulators play in the transition to war training strategy?
8-104. What collective training will take place?

EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS

8-105. What types of explosive hazards have been used in the AO?
8-106. Are there existing mine field maps and/or assessments of the types of mines and patterns used?
8-107. What types of cluster munitions were used and what are their locations?
8-108. What types of booby traps/IEDs have been, or are anticipated to be, used in the AO?
8-109. Is there an ongoing humanitarian demining program in the AO?
8-110. What explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and engineer assets are available in the AO to respond to these threats?
Chapter 9

Civil Affairs Operations

As with many areas discussed in this manual, civil affairs operations (CAO), civil-military operations, or CIMIC does not have a single doctrinal focus that all the nations share. (CIMIC is the more commonly used term in the multinational community.) For example, some nations see CAO as supporting the commander’s mission. Others believe that CIMIC has a wider scope in that it supports the commander’s mission as it helps the military troops play their part in a wider response to a crisis. For those latter nations, CAO funding may come from other government departments rather than from their defense establishment. Therefore, CAO for those nations does not support the military mission alone.

The concept of CAO was developed to allow the commander to interface effectively with all parts of the civilian environment within the joint operations area (JOA). CAO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

It is a function of operations conducted by staffs that are fully integrated into headquarters at every level. CIMIC activity begins at the highest political levels, becomes integrated into the campaign plan, and should remain coherent throughout all operational levels. CIMIC, therefore, contributes to achieving the overall political mission as well as the commander’s mission.

The campaign plan, as agreed by all multinational partners, will—

- Direct the commander on the legal obligations to the civilian sector.
- Prioritize the major tasks.
- Provide the necessary funding.
- Ensure consistency across zones of national responsibility within the JOA.
- Outline the relationships with the strategic decisionmakers.

Commanders should consider the CAO dimension of the operation early in the planning process.

This chapter aims to provide commanders and staffs with an overview of various terminology, general principles for using CAO, the key military and civilian players, and assistance in the overall planning and support of CAO. It focuses on the military role while acknowledging a greater overall role for these types of operations.
PURPOSE
9-1. The purpose of CAO is to—
   - Minimize civilian interference with military operations.
   - Maximize support for operations.
   - Meet the commander’s legal responsibilities and moral obligations to civilian populations within
     the commander’s area of control.

9-2. When possible, a second purpose is to reduce military interference with the civilian populace. This
helps to create civil-military conditions that maximize advantages for commanders in accomplishing
their missions. The long-term purpose of CAO is to achieve mission success and then create and sustain the
conditions to support a lasting solution to a crisis. CAO is the interface between military and civil
authorities, agencies, and populations. It must be considered integral to any military operation.

DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY
9-3. Many multinational armies have adopted different terminology as this area has developed. The U.S.
Army uses CAO while NATO and ABCA use CIMIC. See the Glossary for all definitions. The following
explains the relationship between U.S. and NATO terminology—
   - The U.S. term civil affairs is most closely related to the NATO term CIMIC groups.
   - The U.S. term civil affairs operations refers to the actions of CA personnel. It is related to the
     NATO term CIMIC.
   - The U.S. term CMOC is most closely related to the NATO term CIMIC center.

COOPERATION
9-4. Fundamental to successful multinational CAO is the establishment and maintenance of sound
working relationships with organizations operating within the civil sector. These relationships range from
high-level interorganizational to less formal relations that stem from ongoing working interactions. These
relationships will form the bedrock on which effective cooperation can occur.

9-5. It will be neither practicable nor necessary to have the same degree of cooperation with all civil
agencies. Many mechanisms and activities will underpin this process. These may include general liaison,
regular meetings, and standing for an agency collaboratively staffed by both civil and military
representatives.

9-6. These mechanisms and activities will facilitate various levels of cooperation ranging from basic
information sharing to integrated planning.

FUNCTIONS
9-7. The headquarters CAO staff should carry out the following core functions—
   - Civil-military liaison.
   - Support to the civil environment.
   - Support to the force.

CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON
9-8. This liaison provides the coordination necessary to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of
operations. Such liaison early in the planning process and immediately following the deployment of forces
provides the basis for the other two core CAO functions.
Civil Affairs Operations

SUPPORT TO THE CIVIL ENVIRONMENT

9-9. Support to the civil environment can involve a wide range of military resources: information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise, or training. Decisions on depth, duration, and extent of this support should be made at the highest appropriate level. Decisions must take into account political as well as military and civil factors. Nations will likely have different national agendas as to their extent, type, and purpose of support to the civil environment. The coalition commander will need to understand these positions.

SUPPORT TO THE FORCE

9-10. Commanders, depending on the circumstances at the time, may require significant civilian support within the JOA. They also may require coordination of efforts to minimize disruption to military operations such as population and resources control operations. The force may be partially dependent on civilian resources and information from civilian sources. Commanders will also seek as much tacit civilian support for operations as possible.

GUIDELINES

9-11. CAO implies neither military control of civilian organizations or agencies nor the reverse. It recognizes that—

- The military normally will only be responsible for security related tasks and limited logistics, communication, or other support. It may be possible to support the appropriate civil authority for implementing civil tasks. However, this is possible only if the mandated civil authorities if applicable, and the appropriate military commander have agreed in accordance with the campaign plan.
- In exceptional circumstances subject to political sanction by the governments of troop-contributing nations, the force may be required to take on tasks normally the responsibility of a mandated civil authority. This may involve civil administration operations.
- These tasks should only be accepted where the appropriate civil body is not present or is unable to carry out its mandate.
- The military should be prepared to undertake such tasks necessary to maintain momentum towards a lasting solution to a crisis until the mandated civil authority or agency is prepared and able to assume them.
- Responsibility for civil related tasks will be handed over to the appropriate civil authority, organization, or agency as soon as is practical. Responsibility will be handed over in as smooth a manner as possible.

PRINCIPLES

9-12. The following principles will assist multinational forces in conducting CAO:

- Coordination.
- Unity of effort.
- Minimize the impact.
- Impartiality.
- Transparency.
- Identification of common goals.
- Primacy of the military mission.
- Economy of effort.
- Relationships.
COORDINATION

9-13. CAO is a key strand of the overall operational plan and not an activity apart. It requires close coordination with other military capabilities and actions. It facilitates creating interfaces with the civil environment necessary for the conduct of other functions such as HN support or engineering activities.

UNITY OF EFFORT

9-14. Unity of effort is essential to achieve effective CAO. Activities in theater should have central direction, be closely coordinated, and where necessary be deconflicted without prejudicing the needs of lower levels of command. Explicit policies and procedures must be established specifying what subordinate commanders are cleared to do and what must first be coordinated with higher headquarters.

MINIMIZE THE IMPACT

9-15. Commanders should strive to minimize the military impact on the civil environment and minimize the civil environment impact on military operations. The military often requires access to local civilian resources. In such circumstances, every effort should be made to avoid adversely impacting local populations, economies, or infrastructure.

9-16. The military should take on civil tasks only—
- Where no other practical solution exists.
- Where an otherwise unacceptable vacuum would arise.
- Where it has the available resources.

9-17. Creating a “dependency culture” is likely to prejudice the successful achievement of the overall mission. Responsibility for civil related tasks should be handed back to the civil sector as quickly and as smoothly as possible. Likewise, every effort should be made to reduce the civil environment impact on military operations. An example of this includes the impact of dislocated civilians on the main routes for providing supply and relief aid. This will require careful planning.

IMPARTIALITY

9-18. Not only should strict impartiality be shown towards all sections of the local population when conducting CAO activities, but also every practical effort should be made to avoid compromising the neutrality of civil humanitarian agencies. This may often be difficult, but commanders and staffs must be sensitive to the issue and exercise their judgment.

TRANSPARENCY

9-19. Tension within a civil military relationship is detrimental to the overall goal. Transparency in all CAO activities is the best way to minimize potential tension.

IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON GOALS

9-20. To maximize the effectiveness of CAO, military and civilian organizations should try to identify and share common goals. Such goals should be established early in planning, incorporating political guidance.

PRIMACY OF THE MILITARY MISSION

9-21. Ideally, no conflict will exist between military objectives and those of most of the civilian organizations working in the JOA. Nonetheless, only the commander can decide how much to commit military resources to CAO tasks. Indeed, additional tasks should not be assumed without assessing the resources, in coordination with civilian agencies, and prioritizing military tasks.
ECONOMY OF EFFORT

9-22. Commanders should aim to minimize the use of military assets in civil tasks and encourage maximum use of civil resources. Equally commanders must avoid creating long-term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, government, international organizations, or NGOs. Once provided, withdrawing or reducing resources may strain civil relations or retard the growth of civil-military relations. Also, withdrawing or reducing resources could cause lasting damage to public confidence in the military force.

RELATIONSHIPS

9-23. Commanders must establish close working relationships between the key decisionmakers, military and civilian, thus developing mutual respect and understanding. As the operation matures, commanders must recognize the impact made with the turnover of civilian and military staff.

LEGAL PARAMETERS

9-24. One of the key aspects of CAO is the role that it plays in winning the battle for moral authority and legitimacy. In this respect, legal parameters and frameworks that form the basis for CAO elements of the overall plan can be used to win the battle for moral authority. In addition there are significant legal issues that will have a bearing on various planning factors, particularly as concerns logistics. The overriding feature of CAO is that they are integral to meeting the obligations arising from the legal principle of command responsibility.

9-25. Legal parameters will vary according to the type of operation and its position in full spectrum operations. The domestic legal restrictions that apply to coalition partners will vary in the extent and nature of their involvement in CAO. Coalition partners may also interpret differently the international laws applicable to all the partners. It is critical that consultation be ongoing to illuminate these differences and, where possible, resolve or provide for them in operational planning. The legal staffs of coalition partners must be involved in developing CAO plans and able to consult amongst themselves at the earliest opportunity.

KEY FACTORS

9-26. If an operation is taking place under a UN Security Council resolution, then the terms of the resolution are binding on all UN members. Where the terms of the resolution specifically or indirectly authorize CAO activity or initiatives, the resolution takes precedence over impediments that may have otherwise existed arising from the law of the affected nation in which operations are occurring. This will be the case particularly in Chapter VII (of the UN charter) operations where “all necessary means” are authorized to achieve such tasks as securing humanitarian relief activities or restoring peace and order.

9-27. An operation may be affected, to varying degrees, by HN laws such as those related to customs and contracting. Such issues should be flagged in the IPB process when developing the CAO plan. As part of dealing with the host nation or in dealing with states that are hosting forward operating bases, SOFAs may also clarify issues relating to logistics activity and jurisdiction. The terms of the SOFA may significantly impact CMOC planning and should be well known to CAO planners. SOFAs are also discussed in Chapter 3.
9-28. The logistics aspects of CAO could also be affected or assisted by ASCA existing among coalition partners. These agreements can materially facilitate standardization and streamlining of procurement and supply. Chapter 5 discusses logistics in detail.

9-29. Domestic law considerations for coalition partners can greatly affect the activities that a particular contingent or national personnel may undertake. For example, the National Foreign Assistance Act may contain certain provisions that govern national involvement in issues such as the raising and training of foreign police forces. These provisions may impact on the activities that coalition partners undertake and should be understood as early as possible before beginning an operation.

9-30. The most significant legal factor that may need to be considered in CAO is the possible application of international humanitarian law. The law of this class that has the most direct bearing on CAO is the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and related instruments. This body of law sets out in detail the rights and obligations which may be relied upon to authorize a wide spectrum of CAO which may be deemed important to mission success. CAO also needs to consider the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. In particular, Article 25 lays out a basic minimum standard of living.

**ADMINISTRATION IN HOSTILE OR OCCUPIED TERRITORY**

9-31. Alliances, coalition forces, or nations may be required to conduct civil administration activities across the range of military operations and particularly in the collapsed state context, acting on the authority of a nation, alliance, coalition of nations, or the UN. The territory under administration is effectively under military control. The occupying force has rights and obligations under international humanitarian law to ensure public order and safety as well as the just and effective administration of and support to a hostile or occupied territory.

9-32. Within its capabilities and subject to the principle of military necessity arising from any ongoing combat or security operations, the occupying force must maintain an orderly administration and must have as its ultimate goal the handover to an effective civilian administration/government as soon as possible. Subject to the requirements of the military situation, the multinational force commander must analyze military activities likely to increase tensions as well as those likely to facilitate and accelerate a return to civil administration or government. This is especially important in multiethnic or multicultural environments where a chosen course of action will almost invariably be seen as partisan by one or more of the parties to a conflict.

9-33. Many differences of opinion may exist amongst coalition partners as to when aspects of international humanitarian law may apply. It is also critical that policy applying CAO action under an international humanitarian law regime should be centrally coordinated and monitored by the multinational force commander. Action should be taken in the out of operation environment to find common ground on such issues.

**KEY CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS ORGANIZATIONS**

9-34. Civilian organizations perform for a wide range of activities encompassing humanitarian aid:

- Human rights.
- Protection of minorities, refugees, and displaced persons.
- Legal assistance.
- Medical care.
- Reconstruction.
- Agriculture.
- Education, arts, and sciences.
- General project funding.
9-35. CAO staff and personnel must fully understand the mandate, role, structure, methods, and principles of civilian organizations. Collectively, with local populations and their representatives, they represent the other half of the CAO equation. It will be impossible to establish an effective relationship with them without this understanding.

**PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION**

9-36. Quite apart from the requirement to understand the different roles and mandates of the various civilian organizations, commanders must understand the four humanitarian principles to understand the civil-military relationship. The international community adopted these four principles, under which most civil aid organizations operate and upon which humanitarian action is based. The four principles are—

- **Humanity.** Human suffering is to be relieved wherever it is found. The dignity and other human rights of individuals and groups must be respected.
- **Impartiality.** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discrimination. Relief is given without regard to nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex, or ethnicity, but only on the basis of the urgency of the need.
- **Neutrality.** Humanitarian participants may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.
- **Independence.** Humanitarian participants maintain the right to independence of their own actions and will resist any attempts to place conditions on their actions or movements in return for cooperation with military authorities.

**LEAD AGENCIES**

9-37. A lead agency is one that has been mandated by the international community to initiate the coordination of the activities of civilian organizations that volunteer to participate in an operation. It is normally a major UN agency such as UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Children’s Fund, or—increasingly likely—the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, part of the UN secretariat. Specific responsibilities of a lead agency are to—

- Act as a point of contact for other agencies, particularly in the areas of planning and information sharing.
- Coordinate field activities to avoid duplicating effort and wasting resources.
- Act as an interface with the military at the theater level.

Sometimes such organizations may not begin operations in an area while the conflict is ongoing.

9-38. Often the lead agencies will coordinate field activities through field offices of another agency or organization. Although the latter will usually be from UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the World Food Programme, NGOs such as Save the Children have in the past filled this role. Lead agencies have also contracted other international organizations and NGOs to implement health, food, or transportation programs or to operate refugee camps. The International Organization for Migration has assisted in these areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has conducted its activities with the other agencies in this field. In such situations, NGOs will operate under legal agreements involving them as partners with the HN government and a UN agency. The relationship between the coalition and the lead agency is critical. A memorandum of understanding between the multinational force and the lead agency can provide a useful tool in making the relationship work.

**TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS**

9-39. Three principal types of civilian organizations operate outside formal national government structures: international organizations, NGOs, and international and national donor organizations. The following paragraphs discuss these types and their roles and mandates.
International Organizations

9-40. International organizations are established by intergovernmental agreements and operate at the international level such as the various UN organizations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The major UN organizations that are most likely to be involved in humanitarian relief are the–

- UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
- UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- World Food Programme.
- UN’s Children Fund.
- International Organization for Migration.

9-41. Separate mention should be made of the ICRC, which unlike those international organizations mentioned above, was not established by intergovernmental agreement. The ICRC is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in situations of conflict and their aftermath. The ICRC has a unique status. It fulfills a role conferred upon it by international treaties such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (and their additional protocols of 1977) to which virtually all countries in the world are party, and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted by the states party to the Geneva Conventions in 1986.

Nongovernmental Organizations

9-42. NGOs are voluntary organizations that are not always funded by governments. The term is used in Article 71 of the UN charter. They are primarily nonprofit organizations independent of government, international organizations, or commercial interests. While many NGOs come to the AO from foreign nations, local NGOs may also be operating. They legally differ from UN agencies and other international organizations in that they write their own charter and mission. They may fall into one of two categories:

- Mandated. A mandated NGO has been officially recognized by the lead international organization in a crisis and authorized to work in the affected area.
- Nonmandated. A nonmandated NGO has had no official recognition or authorization and therefore works as a private concern. These organizations could be contracted or subcontracted by an international organization or a mandated NGO. In other cases they obtain funds from private enterprises and donors.

9-43. An implementing partner denotes those NGOs, local or international, mandated and contracted by a UN lead organization or other donor or international organization, to carry out work on its behalf.

9-44. The number of NGOs and their level of sophistication is increasing. In any potential AO they could be numbered in the hundreds. They generally remain strongly independent from political control to preserve their independence and effectiveness. In many cases, their impartiality has been of great benefit, forming the only available means of rebuilding relations when political dialog has broken down. They are often highly professional in their field, extremely well motivated, and prepared to take physical risks in appalling conditions. NGOs will usually be accredited by the host nation before being authorized to operate within the country. However, some NGOs may not be accredited and this can create local tensions.
International and National Government Donor Agencies

9-45. The following international and national government donor agencies have responsibilities for funding, monitoring, and evaluating development programs:

- U.S. State Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration.
- U.S. Agency for International Development.
- Department for International Development (UK).
- Canadian International Development Agency.
- Australian Agency for International Development.
- European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office.
- World Bank.

9-46. These donors may be present during humanitarian emergencies. They may be working with the lead agency or with the civil administration or government.

OTHER AGENCIES

9-47. Within the above generic types, civilian development and human rights agencies are also important.

Civilian Development Agencies

9-48. Some civilian organizations are concerned mainly with reconstruction. Their mandates are to provide technical assistance to developing countries. The UN Development Programme administers and coordinates most development technical assistance provided through the UN system. These agencies normally spend a longer time in the affected area than the military. In these cases the CAO staff will identify any need for military involvement in reconstruction with the local government and, when possible, lead agencies, to enable the organizations to begin work and continue under the most favorable conditions. The reconstruction agencies will usually have allocated resources to plan and develop projects throughout the affected area on the basis of need.

Human Rights and Democratization Agencies

9-49. The primary agencies in this area are the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, although the latter only operates within Europe. These agencies seek to protect human rights in states where abuses may be rampant. They seek to instill democratic values and the rule of law at all levels of government. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has the ability to arrange for and monitor elections and coordinate programs instilling democratic institutional values.

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENTS, AND THE MILITARY

9-50. Governments have the primary responsibility for handling humanitarian needs within their own countries. Civil organizations will establish contacts with government and local authorities to develop their activities. The role of the military in CAO is to work closely with the civil organizations, national governments, local authorities, or a combination of these organizations. In some cases, the military will only play a supporting role. In other situations, CAO participation and coordination will be the main focal point for the establishment and development of the necessary initial contacts. This type of situation can occur when no civil authority is in place, which is a common occurrence.
9-51. Military forces, international organizations, NGOs, government donors, and the UN contain their own organizational cultures characterized by national, professional, and institutional differences. The degree of involvement, liaison, and influence of each organization may vary greatly depending on the situation. Cooperation and consensus between the various organizations may be difficult to achieve due to the requirement for each to maintain relationships on three levels:

- In the field, relationships must be maintained at the tactical level.
- Between national parties (host government or authorized governmental body), relationships must be maintained at the operational level.
- For the international community and supporting donors, relationships must be maintained at the strategic level.

9-52. Where the law of occupation applies, the military commander has a legal responsibility and will be held accountable for matters relating to the relief activities in the JOA. With this responsibility comes the legal authority to regulate the activities of relief and civil agencies. A commander may also have this authority in operations conducted under Chapter VII of the UN charter where “all necessary measures” are authorized and humanitarian assistance is part of the mandate. At all times however, the principle will be to conduct CAO as a consultative and cooperative process as far as possible.

UNDERSTANDING NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

9-53. NGOs are most concerned about protecting civilians during conflict. They become frustrated when the military is not able to afford adequate protection to all civilians, particularly if there is a perception that force is being applied selectively. At times they also feel that the military uses inappropriate tactics, techniques, or procedures to support the humanitarian mission and may compromise the NGO by association.

9-54. Common problems shared by both the military and NGOs include the following:

- Working in an environment with limited or no overarching international political or strategic direction.
- Operating in a very crowded operational theater where little or no infrastructure exists to support operations.
- Making difficult moral choices.
- Experiencing frustration over an inability to fix serious problems.
- Ensuring the safety of their personnel.
- Competing for local resources.

9-55. The military and NGOs often see each other from their own colored perspectives. They have been distilled from expert commentators who emphasize that it is critical that relationships between the parties are based on mutual respect and understanding. Many NGOs have considerable resources that can support the mission and avoid creating any long-term dependency on the military forces.

9-56. The military may view itself as a structured and well-resourced organization with a good understanding of the large political picture and whose presence is the only means of stopping the violence, thereby setting the conditions for ending the crisis. The NGO may see the military as politically compromised and not neutral, deployed on a basis of strategic interests rather than humanitarian need, with hidden political and economic interests, and using mandates that can be seen as uselessly restrictive or narrowly interpreted. Protection can sometimes be viewed as being the first priority, with no interest in developing the competence of the local public security structures. The military may be seen as not understanding the local cultural context, with a propensity to be confrontational. The CMOC can be seen as one-way communication, military to civilian, peripheral to military decisionmaking, and with limited information to share. The presence of the military in an area may bring with it the possible perception of corruption, trafficking, and prostitution with the potential to severely compromise humanitarian aid.
9-57. The NGO community emphasizes its self-mandating and idealistic view. NGOs believe that they are efficient and close to the people, thus representing the people. The military attitude toward NGOs may be that some NGOs are highly competitive and self-interested, unable to speak with one voice or through one forum. NGOs may be viewed as lacking discipline with no understanding of the broader issues. They may also be seen as opportunistic rather than principled, sometimes wasteful and amateurish, playing with danger, and lacking in cultural sensitivity applying what are perceived as simplistic (inadequate) fixes to complex problems. The mere presence of NGOs can also involve them in a conflict, notwithstanding a self-view or mandate of impartiality and neutrality.

SECURITY

9-58. Security adds complexity to the military-civil relationships in PSO. There are many NGO players and no one speaks for them all. NGOs believe that in security management, the military should not be seen as the sole authority. Most NGOs have security plans and processes. The military normally characterizes these as poor quality, lacking drill and discipline. In certain circumstances, NGOs will use the military for emergency rescues on an opportunistic basis. NGOs are developing more competence in security management. This is because the 1990s saw a rapid increase in security incidents and there have been casualties in most danger zones where aid workers have been present. However, the cause of most incidents is crime. Using armed protection by peacekeeping forces is seen as controversial in the aid community. NGOs see the need for security information sharing to be of value for threat and incident analysis. Contemporary challenges in security management for the NGO community include field training and headquarters expertise.

9-59. In relations to the military, there are three possible security strategies for NGOs:

- Developing security plans and the accepting risk on their own. This is seen as the preferred option. Most NGOs see this as offering a long-term solution that meets their needs of remaining close to people.
- Relying on local security forces for protection.
- Asking the multinational force to provide protection.

These latter two strategies do not reduce the threat and have the risk of disrupting relationships with the local population. Military deterrence as a strategy is seen as posing a risk to the image of humanitarian aid and may increase the risk to aid workers.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.

9-60. There is a perception, due to the need for funding, of increased competition amongst the NGOs. This perception accentuates the idea of a lack of structure in the NGO community. NGOs may cooperate at the local level and this needs to be developed further. NGOs need to be persuaded by reason, not by authority, with an emphasis on networking and building coalitions.

9-61. Integral players in these initiatives are the international organizations and NGOs that may already be operating in the multinational force’s area of responsibility and influence. These organizations may have long-standing relationships within the area of responsibility, may have been conducting their operations well before coalition operations began, and may continue during and remain after coalition operations conclude.

9-62. International organizations and NGOs may either support the multinational force’s mission or be neutral or hostile. Their disposition towards the mission and initiatives may be inconsistent or fluid. It is useful to understand that these attitudes are driven in part by how their organizations are structured, managed, and financed.

9-63. International organizations have the following characteristics:

- Tend to have vertical management structures.
- Tend to be large.
- Have well established and long standing managerial chains of command and corporate institutional social structures.
Have personnel, who generally speaking, started with the organization at an entry-level position and worked up a progressive chain of responsibility with an increased loyalty to the principles and practices of the international organization corporate culture.

- Tend to have larger budgets and resources than NGOs.
- Are not as flexible and responsive to fluid and dynamic situations as an NGO due to their institutional size and procedures.
- Are less susceptible to fluctuations or shifts in public opinion and financial support because of their size, structure, and institutional systems.

9-64. NGOs have the following characteristics:

- Tend to have horizontal management structures.
- Tend to be small and have less established managerial chains of command and corporate institutional social structures.
- Have staffs which, generally speaking, are more independent.
- Tend to have smaller budgets and fewer resources than the international organizations.
- Can be very flexible and responsive to fluid and dynamic situations due to their size and independence.
- Are very sensitive to the attitudes of their financial contributors. Because they tend to not have smaller reserve assets, their contributors have more influence on how to allocate contributions.

9-65. Commanders should consider these capabilities, limitations, and influences of organizational structures when working alongside or with international organizations and NGOs. Commanders and civilians on the battlefield, should remember that regardless of the person or organization, a commander’s legal responsibility is to provide protection. Commanders and planners should also be aware that there may not be NGOs to fill significant gaps in CAO with regard to assisting the host nation in restructuring or rebuilding. There are aspects for which no voluntary donor base exists such as rehabilitating prisons and re-establishing police forces and judiciaries. There may also be issues involved in a particular environment that may cause the NGO relief to focus its effort towards one set of victims or party to a conflict. These gaps may unavoidably fall to the military element to fill on an interim basis.

**UNITED NATIONS**

9-66. In addition to the military mission, the UN is likely to have a mandated mission operating alongside the multinational force. The respective mandates will establish the relationship between the force and the UN. In some cases, the UN mission will include assuming responsibility for the AO from a transiting multinational force. The UN mission’s capabilities and mandate must be factored in to the planning of CAO activities. The UN mission will normally have a CA component. This should not be confused with military CA forces and activities. For more information on the UN, go to [http://www.un.int](http://www.un.int) on the internet. For UN information dealing with CAO, go to [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int) on the internet.

**LOCAL AUTHORITIES**

9-67. Local authorities are of prime importance to the CAO effort. They are the prime contacts in coordinating civilian support to military operations and providing military support directly to the local civilian community. The role of local authorities must also be factored into the relationship between the military and the humanitarian participants in the JOA.

**MILITARY CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES**

9-68. Military forces bring capabilities to the CAO effort that are the main resource for the implementation of the commander’s CAO plan. These forces include CAO staffs and CA troops. For U.S. Army capabilities for CA go to FM 3-05.40 and FM 3-05.401.
9-69. Each headquarters should have a CAO staff cell that coordinates the planning and execution to the commander’s CAO plan. The staff cell includes the following:

- CA units, which may be part of a national organization. CA units are likely to contain or be able to call upon expertise in the following areas:
  - Civil administration (including security and law and order).
  - Civil infrastructure.
  - Humanitarian aid.
  - Economic and commercial structures.
  - Cultural affairs.
- Functional specialists. Functional specialists are hired to carry out specific tasks that have been identified through the assessment process. (See Appendix B.) Again, their number and area of expertise will vary according to both need and availability. They should only be employed for the duration of the specified task. These specialists may be either military or civilian. The terms under which the latter are employed will be determined by the legal requirements of the donor nation. However, they must be under readiness states that enable them to deploy when required. CA units are likely to contain many military personnel capable of carrying out specific CAO functional activities. Nations have sources of functional specialists who together may provide a pool of expertise.

9-70. The commander may also task units (general troops) under his or her command to carry out CAO tasks.

MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY

CAPABILITIES

9-71. Military forces have a wide range of protection, mobility, and survivability capabilities that enable the force to carry out its mission. These include fighting troops for protection and survivability tasks; naval and air assets for protection tasks; transportation of people and vital stores; and using engineers to provide essential services such as water, electrical power, sanitation, and shelter and mobility tasks. U.S. forces are prohibited by law from conducting humanitarian demining operations, but special operations forces, engineers, and EOD personnel may be involved with training others to perform these critical missions. The military forces of other nations may not be constrained in this fashion. Additional capabilities include—

- Medical elements for saving lives and limiting the spread of disease.
- Logistics units to provide road transport and vital stores such as food and medical supplies.
- Communication units to enable the passage of information.
- Military police and legal elements enforce the rule of law in accordance with international law, rules, and conventions.

Some of these capabilities could be employed on CAO tasks.

TASKS

9-72. Depending on the nature of the military activity, civilian agencies could require any of the aforementioned capabilities for CAO activities. However, the military will normally only be responsible for providing security related tasks and emergency relief to support the appropriate civil authority—and only within the available military capacity. In the first instance, military support tasks could include, but are not limited to—

- Protection of helpless population.
- Transport to safe havens.
- Provision of essential services such as clean water, sanitation, and shelter.
- Provision of limited medical life-saving support.
9-73. Military support can only be provided when the resources to do so are available, and its provision is in concert with the military commander’s overall plan. Moreover, providing military support should not be at the expense of achieving the overall military objectives for which the military forces have been deployed. The responsibility for civil-related tasks will be handed over to the appropriate civil authority or agency as soon as practical and as smoothly as possible.

9-74. Experience has shown that the demand for military services will normally exceed the resources available. Thus, limited resources must be applied to the highest priorities. To ensure that scarce resources are applied to the higher priority tasks, agencies seeking military support must then understand and apply the agreed mutual guidelines for the provision of support. This includes giving early warning to allow the necessary planning to take place in a timely and efficient manner.

GUIDELINES

9-75. Military assets will be used primarily in support of military missions, but under certain circumstances these assets can be deployed to support other missions when a need consistent with accomplishing the military mission is demonstrated. This includes saving lives and providing essential infrastructure.

9-76. The civil population can become dependent on the military. Likewise the NGOs can become dependent on the resources provided by the military forces, particularly security and logistics resources. Military forces must discourage this dependency. Military forces should provide advice and technical assistance rather than taking ownership of the problem. Military forces can achieve this by acting primarily as coordinators, channeling military support as a last resort through a CAO organization such as CIMIC centers, CMOC, or LNOs.

9-77. Military resources can be made available, but they usually require early notice. Military forces are less flexible than other providers are because resources must be redirected from their primary tasks to provide CAO support. CAO staffs must anticipate requests and know the concept of operations to ensure that required resources can be made available without detriment to other aspects of the mission.

MILITARY PLANNING

9-78. CAO planning must occur within the pre-operational, operational, and transitional stages of any coalition operation. These planning phases may be concurrent. Consideration for the transition phase should occur during the pre-operational stage. Early engagement of the transitional authority is imperative. CAO staff must be included in both the commander’s operation planning staff and the initial reconnaissance.

PREOPERATIONAL STAGE

9-79. At the earliest opportunity, CAO staff will be involved in preparing the coalition force to deal with the civil dimension. This will include planning, advice and education, and training. CAO staff must be involved in the CAO input to the main operational plan by analyzing the courses of action and producing a CAO (CMO) annex. Inputs will be based, where possible, on reconnaissance and detailed assessment. Planning factors for CAO may include the following:

- Food and water.
- Public health.
- Shelter.
- Movement of civil population (such as displaced persons, refugees).
- Detainee handling.
- Public security.
- Infrastructure support and rehabilitation.
- Interim administrative support and action.
9-80. Coordination and information exchange also needs to occur with the following specialist areas. The order of the following should start with the essential elements and move to the less so, for example—

- IO.
- Public relations and PA.
- Engineers.
- Health.
- Logistics.
- Intelligence.
- Legal.
- Police.
- Chaplains.
- Relevant government departments.

**OPERATIONAL PHASE**

9-81. The core CAO task throughout operations is to secure effective civil-military cooperation in support of the commander’s mission. To do this, relations with a wide range of civil bodies will have to be established and maintained. These relationships, along with numerous CMO tasks, will be identified through the continuous assessment process. Centralized coordination of CMO tasks through the J-3 across the AO will ensure that relationships do not conflict with the commander’s mission.

**TRANSITION PHASE**

9-82. The overarching objective of CAO is to achieve civil primacy. In the transition stage, CAOCMO should assist the civil authorities to function without coalition forces in the AO. As the military force reduces the number and scope of its responsibilities, CAO will continue to assist in transferring any civilian responsibilities that the force may have assumed. Transition will normally be to either an international (UN) or local civil authority. The effective transfer of responsibilities will depend on the deployment of an international capability or standing up a local capability.

**PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING**

9-83. Before they deploy to the AO, troop-contributing nations need to be trained in CAO, especially in assessing their country’s capability requirements. These requirements may include—

- Troop awareness. All Soldiers must be aware of the multinational force CMO policy to ensure that assistance is provided in accordance with that policy and not in greater or lesser support than is authorized.
- Staff capability. This is an enhanced level of training in that staffs are trained to plan and coordinate CMO tasks.
- Tactical capability. This involves using dedicated units at the tactical level to execute CMO tasks.
- Training level. This will vary between nations as well as between regular (active duty) and reserve forces within nations.

9-84. If there is a perceived need for a CMO capability, commanders should not train all personnel. It is essential to focus on jobs identified as involved in the coordination, planning, and execution of CMO tasks. Training should begin with the higher levels headquarters and proceed to lower levels as the need and the resources become available. Establishing a cadre for educating others from the initial personnel trained can expand resources.
SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND TARGETING

9-85. CAO personnel will be required to support both IO and the targeting process. Each of the CMO players is a source of information sharing. Each player will be reluctant to share information with the other players. The military will be concerned about compromising sources and information. The other players will be concerned about compromising their neutrality. Information will be shared when the players perceive a common interest. CMO Personnel must build on these common interests and work to ensure that information sharing is both a receiving and giving process. Each group’s concerns need to be addressed and respected. Properly executed, information sharing can be a force multiplier for operations. Chapter 7 discusses IO.

9-86. The CMO staff will assist the targeting process by ensuring that additional problems are not created as a result of targeting. The CMO staff will make the commander aware of the locations of all the other CMO players in the AO, thereby playing in the IPB process. A tactical action can have strategic impact or sometimes the sum of seemingly insignificant tactical actions can have strategic impact. The CMO staff will interact with other CMO players and the civilian community in maintaining the moral authority of the commander in relation to targeting. The CMO staff can gauge the moral impact of targeting on these groups. Additionally, the CMO staff will provide areas of cultural and religious significance that must not be targeted except under extreme circumstances because of the negative moral impact that will be created. Chapter 11 further discusses targeting.

LESSONS LEARNED

9-87. Many nations maintain a database with lessons learned. These can be accessed via the internet. For examples, the Center of Army Lessons Learned is located at http://call.army.mil/ and the ABCA Armies Standardization Program coalition operations lessons learned database is located on its home page at www.abca-armies.org/.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to CAO.

9-88. Is there a comprehensive campaign plan? Does it address CAO issues?
9-89. Have CAO planners been included in the assessment team for the operation?
9-90. What areas of CAO come under multinational force control? What areas remain national issues?
9-91. What are the political and civil implications of the desired strategic and operational end states?
9-92. What are the civil end states implied by the military end states?
9-93. What are the civil centers of gravity that need to be addressed? What are the associated decisive points?
9-94. What are the CAO culminating points?
9-95. Have measures been established to synchronize the CIMIC activities with the campaign plan’s line of operation?
9-96. What are the required civil and military resources to achieve the operational objectives?
9-97. What key civil organizations will be operating in the AO? Has an analysis been conducted on their respective end states, culture, objectives, and methods? How will they affect military operation?
9-98. What structures, reinforcements, policies, committees, and liaison are needed at the strategic level to support the operational commander?
9-99. Where the operational commander is to be reliant on HN support, are sufficient resources available to sustain the force? Are memorandum of understandings and technical agreements for this support in place? What will be the impact on the local economy as human and personnel resources are drawn to military HN support?
9-100. Is the national civil-military plan coordinated with the other governmental departments?
9-101. Have national civil-military plans been coordinated with multinational force headquarters?
9-102. Has the multinational force headquarters established a relationship with coalition ambassadors and, if a UN operation, the special representative of the secretary-general?
9-103. Is the civil administration sound, or will one be established? If the latter, what resources will be required?
9-104. What are the requirements for restoring, or rebuilding the local infrastructure?
9-105. What are the requirements for restoring or providing essential services in the short-, medium-, and long-term? The short-term tasks (such as urgent provision of shelter, water, sanitation, and power) may become military tasks. The military will need to plan accordingly.
9-106. What support is required to assist or establish the HN civilian law and order system?
9-107. Has a CAO operational estimate been conducted?
9-108. Are there adequate CAO personnel available to assist planners?
9-109. Has a CMOC been established at appropriate level to coordinate CAO?
9-110. Is there a lead agency or lead agencies for humanitarian assistance such as UN or ICRC?
9-111. What international organizations, NGOs, and international and national donor agencies will be operating in the JOA?
9-112. Is there a process in place for the commander to deal with “rogue” NGOs? Is it linked to a lead agency?

9-113. What is the policy for dealing with international organizations or NGOs that are political or economic fronts to corporations, political action groups, rogue nations, allies of the combatants, criminal organizations, or terrorist groups?

9-114. What legal authority does the commander have to take a more prescriptive approach to CAO if this should be necessary?

9-115. Is there a synchronization plan that articulates a common operational effect across boundaries (such as military, social, political, cultural, or economic boundaries)?

9-116. What areas of CAO support can nations provide and what areas can nations not provide?

9-117. Do all participating nations have an understanding of CAO or CIMIC?

9-118. Do all NGOs subscribe to the code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster relief?

9-119. Is there a need for mine awareness and UXO training for civilians in the AO?

9-120. What other CAO engineering requirements exist in the theater?

9-121. Is there separate funding to support these requirements?
Chapter 10

Financial Management

10-1. Financial management focuses on supporting local procurement efforts, funding and tracking operations costs, and military pay support. Finance elements help access host nation and other support by–

● Paying for contracts.
● Providing cash to agents making local purchases.
● Providing military pay support.
● Providing limited support to other services such as cashing checks and currency exchange for individuals.
● Preparing and instructing paying agents to disburse funds for purchases and or services.
● Identifying funding sources that are external to national funding of participating nations.
● Determining policy and procedures for operationally related funding.

10-2. Resource managers focus on obtaining obligation and expenditure authority. They also focus on tracking the costs of the operation. Finance elements provide essential input into the accounting systems to support cost capturing. Accurate, detailed costs are needed for reporting dealings with multinational partners to determine how costs have been or should be apportioned.

RESOURCE MANAGER (COMPTROLLER)

10-3. The multinational force must develop a policy for funding the operation. Commanders need to understand the importance of integrating financial management with mission needs in order to successfully execute multinational operations. Every mission, to include peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, and foreign humanitarian relief efforts, must be accomplished with a variety of funding sources and authorities. The G-8 or resource manager is the special staff officer responsible for leveraging resources to support the multinational operation. The G-8 is the commander’s principal resource advisor who is responsible for–

● Coordinating with other staff sections in the development of resource requirements.
● Providing guidance, determining requirements, identifying sources of funding, distributing and controlling funds, determining and tracking costs, determining cost capturing procedures, and establishing a management control process.
● Serving as multinational force principal financial management advisor.
● Representing the commander in identifying multinational resources and financing country needs to the national authorities, national components, and others as required.
● Establishing financial management responsibilities for the AO. This includes designating lead agents for specific financial management functions or special support requirements.
● Providing estimates of resource requirements to the national authorities, national component commands, and others as required.
● Establishing positive controls over resources and funding authority received.
● Coordinating with adjacent staff for managerial controls to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.
● Coordinating with the staff judge advocate on funding authority issues.
● Handling reimbursement for nations providing services to multinational forces and others.
● Preparing finance and disbursing policies, procedures, and guidelines for the personnel annex of the OPLAN or OPORD.

For more information on the G-8 and his or her responsibilities, see JP 1-06.
10-4. Each level of financial management is inherently responsible for developing resource requirements. The G-8 uses the same basic process of receiving guidance, determining total resource requirements, applying available resources to those requirements, and identifying unresourced requirements. Determining what resources are required and available to support the mission and meet the commander’s intent is a responsibility that is common to all levels of financial management.

RESOURCING GUIDANCE

10-5. Resourcing guidance may come from multiple sources. It is the G-8’s responsibility to—

- Provide consistent financial management guidance in support of operations. This includes being involved in the staff estimate process, development of the OPLAN or OPORD and, when necessary, conducting an economic analysis of the AO.
- Ensure consistency of financial service support. The DOD and the military services financial managers will coordinate with the G-8 to ensure that consistent financial services are provided to all personnel assigned to the joint force commander. This includes making appropriate provisions for military pay and services, payment of travel entitlements, and cash operations to support service member requirements.
- Ensure the most efficient use of all available resources. At some level and to some degree, resources are always limited. When prioritizing and allocating resources, the commander must continuously consider limitations on available resources, but not to the detriment of mission accomplishment.

FINANCIAL ADVICE AND REQUIREMENTS

10-6. The G-8, in conjunction with the legal advisor, provides the commander with advice and recommendations on all legal aspects of financial management. This requirement is derived from fiscal law. Preventing shortfalls during operations presents unique challenges. Every mission requires use of a variety of funding sources, authorities, assistance, HN support, and extraordinary reimbursement procedures. The G-8 must perform two key functions for the commander:

- Ensure that resources are available when and where they are needed.
- Aid the commander in maintaining his or her fiscal responsibilities.

10-7. Determining requirements relies heavily on the commander’s guidance, OPLANs, and input from the adjacent staff and subordinate units. The G-8 focuses on the detailed resource requirements for each mission or task (who, what, when, where, why, and how). Armed with these details, G-8s use cost factors—UN, NATO, or coalition approved—to verify and validate event and task costs.

FUNDING

10-8. The commander will have numerous sources of appropriated funds available for multinational operations. These sources include DOD and other federal agency appropriations, as well as UN or coalition funding authorities. It is critical that the G-8 understands the time, purpose, and amount of each funding authority. The G-8 must understand the prescribed method of obligating funds, tracking costs, and reporting requirements. G-8s must consider all sources of available funds, with their restrictions and variations, to effectively and efficiently resource the mission. Doing so reduces the immediate impact on the commander’s internal funds and maximizes the commander’s flexibility. The G-8 must understand the multiple funding sources or agreements and their numerous national, international, or coalition specific purposes, availability, and constraints to keep the commander informed. In short, G-8s must understand funding sources to—

- Accomplish the missions assigned.
- Maximize all resource options.
- Avoid violations of fraud, waste, or abuse.
- Determine costs.
10-9. G-8s are responsible to their commander when determining and validating costs to accomplish the
mission. Accurate and detailed determination of costs (by type) enables the G-8 to—
- Determine a baseline for future planning.
- Estimate future costs.
- Properly allocate resources.
- Develop a baseline for monitoring execution.
- Report costs.
- Seek proper reimbursement.

10-10. The process of preparing budget cost estimates in support of the commander’s intent is the same as
the one for developing an OPLAN. The G-8 must delineate the specified, implied, and essential tasks
associated with resources, and understand the mission and commander’s intent two echelons above. He or
she must make assumptions concerning a variety of factors (such as the operation’s duration, logistic
support, force size, environmental conditions, transportation, special pay and allowances, multi-national
participants, and so forth). Additionally, the G-8 must consider the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) when developing
assumptions and cost estimates. Several methods are available to determine costs for requirements. G-8s
can estimate costs using standard cost factors or models, historical data, or the best judgment if no standard
cost factors exist.

FUNDING AND CONTROL PROCESSES

10-11. Coalition commands will receive their operating budget in various ways and through numerous
channels such as DOD, Department of State, or UN. Often the responsible executive agency or government
will provide coalition operations with internal funds and seek reimbursement for all appropriate and agreed
upon costs after the initial phases of the operation. Methods of reimbursement vary, but all require that a
manual receipt is available, an approved automated accounting system is used, and evidence that the goods
or services are used for the intended purpose of the mission. The G-8 must have accurate cost capturing
methods to depict the costs by type for reimbursement.

10-12. Commanders determine how their funds are distributed and controlled by the G-8. However,
certain staff elements may direct the G-8 on the use, release, or flow of funds in support of the
commander’s guidance and intent. As the commander’s executive agent, the G-8 distributes, controls, and
monitors the execution of resources. G-8s control funds by centralized or decentralized methods.
Regardless of the method, G-8s must have effective and efficient fund certification and control to maintain
accuracy, ensure proper fiscal use, and capture costs.

10-13. Accounting systems track costs (by event, program, unit) based on a fiscal code. G-8s—who must
keep their commanders informed on a daily basis of all aspects of financial management—use the fiscal
code for two main purposes:
- First, the fiscal code helps track expenditures at a detailed level.
- Second, the fiscal code helps prepare and present fiscal information to the command and staff,
  including the status of funds, mission or event cost, and obligation rates.

10-14. G-8s must establish cost-capturing procedures for both internal and external reporting
requirements. This provides visibility of estimated and/or actual commitments, obligations, and
reimbursable and future costs. Reporting procedures should provide accurate information while remaining
simple and flexible.
10-15. In accordance with AR 11-2, all commanders have an inherent responsibility to establish and maintain effective management controls, assess areas of risk, identify and correct weaknesses in those controls, and keep their superiors informed. The G-8 coordinates management controls throughout the unit. The management control process is designed to provide reasonable assurance that accountability and control procedures comply with applicable laws and regulations. As it pertains to financial management, the management control program provides reasonable assurance that obligations and costs comply with international/coalition agreements, that funds are protected, and that proper accounting is kept of all expenditures. The management control process must be established as soon as possible, but not at the expense of operational or tactical considerations.

REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES

10-16. Reimbursable costs will occur during multinational operations as a result of providing support to other nations, organizations, units, and sister services or agencies. Support is defined as performing a service or providing a product to another organization. At the strategic level, reimbursement is coordinated from the UN, NATO, foreign nations, NGOs, or private volunteer organizations. Usually, costs reimbursed only cover incremental costs to organizations (the percentage over and above normal operating costs).

10-17. For U.S. forces, Congress must authorize provisions of certain support and judge advocate general reviews are required. Throughout operations, careful consideration must be given to funding, monitoring expenditure authority (see DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, Volume 15), maintaining accountability, tracking costs, and tracking support received from or provided to the foreign nation, UN, or other designated agencies. This information is necessary to determine the detailed costs of an operation or event and to support the process of billing for reimbursement at all levels. Congress requires detailed reports on the projected and actual costs of operations. Accurate, detailed cost reports are needed to determine what types of goods or services to charge. G-8s capture these costs and provide the required reports and detailed billings.

10-18. When the commander establishes support agreements, the G-8 should ensure that the requesting units and agencies understand what assistance can be rendered. If a current agreement exists, the G-8—with legal assistance, if necessary—reviews the agreement for proper procedures and support. If an agreement does not exist, the G-8 coordinates with the logistics and legal staff counterparts for required support.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to financial management.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

10-19. What are the arrangements to provide or receive multinational support to the local procurement process?

10-20. Who is providing check-cashing funding for finance elements of other nations?

10-21. What are the limitations on the amounts of cash payments (including check cashing) that Soldiers may receive in the AO? Who imposes the limitations?

10-22. How will the multinational force finance support provide currency exchange?

10-23. Will contracted subsistence support to the command affect entitlements to personnel?

10-24. What financial support weapon bounties and claims are needed?

G-8

10-25. Have support agreements been analyzed for financial management implications?

10-26. Has an executive agent been designated?

10-27. Has the financial management appendix to the OPLAN been prepared?

10-28. Have cost capturing mechanisms been established?

10-29. Will financial management support be required for other agencies (such as MWR, ICRC, NGOs, private volunteer organizations, and PA)?

10-30. If necessary, are unique reimbursement procedures through the UN required to capture incremental costs?

10-31. If required, have special appropriations been requested?

10-32. Have procedures been implemented to track multinational support costs and review billing procedures?
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HSS plays a key role in developing and maintaining combat power and can be a major factor in achieving strategic goals. The health services mission is promoting health, preventing casualties, and providing medical units capable of responding to the challenging worldwide deployments in multinational operations. How HSS is delivered in the field may be a factor in a particular nation’s decision to participate. Differences in medical standards, customs, and training require careful coordination and planning.

The multinational forces commander must ensure that forces deliver medical care rapidly, effectively, and efficiently without interfering with the multinational forces mission. Health care is a national responsibility. The command must assess HSS requirements and capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively and provide guidance to enhance the effectiveness of HSS through shared use of assets. Any medical services that a nation can not provide must be covered by agreements between national governments of the nations making up the multinational force. This requires coordinating all HSS assets, providing a detailed health plan, and conducting effective liaison between the senior health service officers of each nation. The multinational command surgeon plans, coordinates, and synchronizes the HSS plan based on actual capabilities of contributing nations with standing health agreements between the contributing nations. The concept of one nation’s forces being treated by another nation’s medical personnel or in another nation’s treatment facilities should be achievable.

**PRINCIPLES**

11-1. For effective and efficient multinational medical support, personnel must adhere to long established principles. The following principles should be the focus of each nation’s health service:

- Conformity with operations and administrative plans.
- Proximity to forces being supported.
- Flexibility to change with the tactical picture.
- Mobility to maintain contact with supported units.
- Continuity of treatment through the casualty management system.
- Protection and prevention to minimize avoidable casualties.
- C2 of health assets clearly defined at an appropriate level.

For an in-depth discussion of these principles, see FM 8-55 or ABCA Publication 256.

**MEDICAL STAFF**

11-2. It is necessary to identify a command surgeon early in the process to oversee and coordinate HSS activities and to advise the multinational forces commander. This surgeon should be involved in all planning and provide a representative to the assessment team. (See Chapter 1.)
11-3. The multinational forces surgeon’s office, staffed with representatives from participating nations, must be established to facilitate the development of the HSS plan.

11-4. Specific responsibilities of the multinational forces surgeon during the force generation process include the following:

- Identifying the HSS assets required to support the planned operation.
- Determining the disease and nonbattle injury rate for planning purposes.
- Obtaining the casualty rates from the operations officer.
- Developing the multinational forces health plan.
- Exploiting medical intelligence data and information derived from national and other service sources.
- Advising the multinational forces commander on health risks relevant to the operation.

COMMAND SURGEON

11-5. The command surgeon is responsible to the commander for medical support in the AO. The surgeon should have direct access to the commander as chief medical advisor. He or she must understand the medical capacities and capabilities of all multinational nations. The surgeon should plan to deploy medical personnel early so they can establish, monitor, and evaluate HSS. The surgeon’s staff should have representatives from all nations.

11-6. The surgeon prepares the HSS plan and medical annex to the OPLAN or OPORD. This plan should—

- Define the scope of medical care to be delivered in detail.
- Allocate resources.
- Determine the number of medical personnel required to staff the multinational surgeon’s office.
- Detail the medical resources required to support the operation.

11-7. The surgeon coordinates HSS provided to or received from multinational forces and the appropriate reimbursements. The surgeon also advises the commander on the following:

- HSS to the operation.
- Intratheater rest, rotation, and reconstitution.
- Preventive medicine.
- Dental and veterinary medicine requirements.
- Other medical factors that could affect operations.

11-8. In addition, the surgeon performs the following:

- Informs the commander on the status of HSS units and assistance required by and provided to the civilian populace and multinational nationals.
- Reviews health programs of civilian agencies in the AO to determine the feasibility for emergency usage. Advises on humanitarian and civic assistance activities within the AO.
- Establishes and coordinates a comprehensive medical logistics system for medical materiel, blood, and fluids.
- Supervises the activities of any medical cells, boards, and centers established by the multinational. For example, he or she would supervise a patient movement center to identify bed space requirements and the movement of patients within and out of the AO.
- Coordinates medical intelligence support for HSS organizations.
- Develops a preventive medicine program that—
  - Includes pre- and post-surveillance programs.
  - Evaluates infectious disease risks.
  - Determines the requirements for an entomologist for vector control.
- Provides technical assistance and advice to the CMOC.
- Ensures liaison is established with each nation’s surgeon.
- Resolves the multinational medical equipment and supply requirement because medical items frequently require long lead-times and special handling.
- Identifies and coordinates appropriate medical facility accreditation and medical professional certification requirements.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

11-9. As a multinational force matures, the members will centralize their efforts by establishing a lead nation command structure. Subordinate national commands will maintain national integrity. The lead nation command establishes integrated staff sections with the composition determined by the leadership. A national commander commands all elements including the supporting combat HSS system. For command purposes, the commanders normally delegate command of their assigned HSS resources to their senior HSS officer, located in the national support element. At each level of command, the senior HSS officer must possess the right of direct access to the commander on matters affecting the health of the command.

11-10. The command relationships of the HSS components must be clearly defined when the multinational forces are organized. These relationships must be embodied in the command directives issued to each national component commander by the authority creating the multinational force. Operational (technical) control of national HSS resources may be delegated to the senior HSS officer to facilitate overall coordination of resources in the theater of operations. It may not be possible to establish C2 over all participants. Some nations may have specific requirements that limit how much command authority the multinational or national commanders can exercise over their forces. Command in its formal sense may not exist and a system of cooperation may exist in its place.

11-11. During operations, the responsibilities of the senior HSS officer at each level include the following:
- Advising the commander on the health of the command.
- Informing the commander and staff on matters affecting the delivery of health care.
- Developing, preparing, coordinating, and monitoring HSS policy and procedures with commanders of National Health Service units.
- Exploiting medical intelligence data and information derived from national and other Service sources.
- Monitoring the activities of HSS assets assigned to their command.

11-12. The commander and the senior medical officer of each nation must understand the legal limits concerning the use of nonnational medical treatment facilities and supplies, especially blood, by their nations’ forces. Exchanging blood between nations is a sensitive issue and must be coordinated as early as possible. Mutual medical support must be in accordance with existing legal directives. Coordination for any lead nation, role specialization, or ACSA authority must be addressed during the multinational planning process. Casualty evacuation, especially outside the AO, and the use of nonnational medical facilities requires careful planning and an agreement.

**PLANNING**

11-13. HSS planning is done at all levels. The process aims at developing a system that provides for the best possible use of HSS resources in a given situation. Details of the HSS planning process are contained in ABCA Publication 256. Considerations include the operational situation (commander’s overall mission) and basic medical threat information including endemic diseases and climate appropriate to the theater of operations. Issues specific to the operation also should be identified and considered in planning.
11-14. The following factors are normally critical aspects of HSS planning:
- Mission and type of operation.
- Operation concept or plan.
- Anticipated duration of the operation.
- Evacuation policy from the combat zone to the theater of operations.
- Selection and consideration of the HSS aim.
- Health threat assessment, including medical countermeasures.
- Health surveillance.
- Provision of casualty estimate by the staff and effects on health care delivery.
- Availability of and restrictions on resources.
- Availability and access to HN facilities.
- C2 requirements and limitations.

THREAT ASSESSMENT
11-15. The medical threat assessment is a composite of ongoing or potential enemy actions and environmental conditions that might reduce the effectiveness of the multinational forces through wounds, injuries, diseases, or psychological stressors.

11-16. The medical threat is a composite of–
- Infectious disease.
- Environmental conditions.
- Occupational health threats.
- Conventional and irregular warfare.
- Biological warfare.
- Chemical warfare agents.
- Directed-energy weapons.
- Blast effect weapons.
- Combat operational stress.
- Flame and incendiary weapons.
- Nuclear warfare.
- Radiological agents.
- Accidents.

POLICIES AND ISSUES
11-17. Force HSS policies must be established to cover the many facets of HSS in multinational operations. The multinational forces surgeon establishes policies with senior health services officers of contributing nations.

11-18. Subject areas for force policy and coordination include the following:
- Eligibility for medical care including noncombatants, contractors, displaced persons, refugees, and HN civilians plus appropriate reimbursement for nations.
- Coordinating HSS provided to or received from the multinational forces or other friendly nations to include using HN facilities.
- Mass casualty response plan.
- Establishing liaison with each nation’s surgeon.
- Medical regulating, to include evacuating casualties to nonnational medical facilities.
- Policies on medical countermeasures and vaccinations.
- Policies on the exchange of medical equipment accompanying patients.
• Policies on transferring a patient from one nation’s evacuation system to another.
• Mechanism for returning patients to their parent nations after medical treatment in another nation’s medical facility.
• Medical support to detainee/enemy POWs operations and facilities.
• Establishing an evacuation system for the theater of operations, to include defining the theater’s holding and evacuation policy, mission responsibility, and evacuation control system.
• Determining HSS reports and returns required, including format, content, and frequency.
• Clinical documentation, policy format, and the exchange of clinical records that should include the following:
  ■ Medical records of the clinical condition with treatment of each patient so that continuing treatment may be related to past events and post-deployment actions.
  ■ Information to notify the patient’s next-of-kin.
  ■ Information to units for preparing personnel strength returns.
  ■ Statistical data for planning purposes and historical records.
  ■ Materials for medical research.
  ■ Information to track patients whose whereabouts is unknown.
• Policies on blood supply source, screening standards, storage, and use.
• Policies on pharmaceutical source, acceptance standards, storage, and use.
• Policies on sharing and exchange of occupational and environmental health surveillance data. Data could include:
  ■ Air, soil, and water sampling.
  ■ Individual or group exposure results.
  ■ Any other environmental sampling.

COUNTERMEASURES

11-19. Historically, disease and nonbattle injuries have rendered more Soldiers combat ineffective than actual battle casualties. Countermeasures must be taken to reduce disease and nonbattle injuries. The capability to assess the Soldier’s health continuously and improve Soldier sustainability is required to protect the force.

11-20. The following countermeasures ensure effective force medical protection:
• A comprehensive medical intelligence system.
• Continuous health surveillance.
• Countermeasures, prophylaxis, and immunization policies approved by the multinational forces commander and implemented by all contributing nations.
STANDARDS OF CARE

11-21. The multinational HSS must ensure continuity of patient management at a standard acceptable to all nations. Achieving the desired degree of patient management depends on the successful interoperability of treatment principles and clinical policies. As a national responsibility executed under national standards or care and practice, each nation sets medical policy for its Soldiers. As such the multinational commander can not direct a sovereign nation’s armed forces to adopt a different standard for sake of uniformity across his or her command. Patient management is a continuous process of medical care, increasing in complexity by roles (levels) of capability to deal with the clinical needs of the patient. While optimal patient management is never compromised unless dictated by the combat situation, it is also a balance between many conflicting factors. These factors include the following:

- Treatment.
- Evacuation.
- Resources.
- Environmental and operational conditions.

11-22. Dental support is arranged in levels, reflecting an increase in capability at each succeeding level. The functions of each lower level of dental support are contained within the capabilities of each higher level. A preventive dentistry program can be provided in the theater of operations.

REQUIRED CAPABILITIES

11-23. The health support plan will address the following HSS functional areas, as described in the ABCA Publication 256:

- Preventive medicine.
- Combat casualty care.
- Hospital, surgical, and dental services.
- Ground and air evacuation.
- Stress management.
- Outpatient services.
- Veterinary services.
- Medical nuclear, biological, and chemical considerations.
- Health surveillance.
- Medical logistics.
- Blood.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the HSS portion of the operation.

MEDICAL STAFF

11-24. Has a command surgeon been appointed?
11-25. Are there health services representatives on the assessment team?
11-26. Have contributing nations provided staff or liaison to the multinational forces surgeon?

COMMAND AND CONTROL

11-27. Have national elements appointed senior health service officers?
11-28. Are the C2 relationships of health service assets clearly defined?
11-29. Are there adequate arrangements for coordination and liaison between health service elements?

SUPPORT PLAN

11-30. Does the HSS plan conform to the operation and administrative plans?
11-31. Are all forces in reasonable proximity to HSS?
11-32. What flexibility is there in the HSS plan? Are there health assets available for surge situations?
11-33. Are the HSS assets sufficiently mobile to provide support to the force?
11-34. Will a casualty receive continuous treatment while in the health care system?
11-35. Have the following medical protection issues been addressed:
   - Health threat assessment?
   - Medical countermeasures and vaccination?
   - Health surveillance system?
11-36. Who is entitled to treatment? Are cross-servicing provisions in place?
11-37. What responsibilities do the multinational forces HSS assets have to noncombatants?
11-38. What is the response to a mass casualty?
11-39. How will casualty evacuation be coordinated?
11-40. Are there sufficient evacuation assets?
11-41. How will medical regulations, both in and out of theater, be affected?
11-42. What are the multinational forces obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva conventions?
11-43. What HSS reports and returns will be available to the commander multinational forces?
11-44. What are the arrangements for preventive medicine measures?
11-45. Are there adequate dental services available?
11-46. What provisions are there for combat stress management?
11-47. Who will inspect foodstuffs from a health perspective?
11-48. How will units obtain class VIII supplies?
11-49. How will medical equipment get repaired?
11-50. What is the blood supply system?
11-51. Does the support plan include provision of, or access to, limited critical medical equipment such as magnetic resonance imagery?
11-52. Does the support plan identify any unusual Soldier physical screening standards necessary for this operation?
11-53. What are the medical support requirements for detainee operations and facilities?

**MEDICAL**

11-54. What does the SOFA with the HN state in regards to the use of HN medical facilities for the treatment of U.S. personnel? What is U.S. policy on using HN medical facilities for this specific operational period?
11-55. Are medical facilities identified to support the operation?
11-56. Are chemical weapon threats known? Are troops and medical facilities prepared to cope with their possible use?
11-57. Are procedures in place to service multinational casualties to include recognizing cultural differences in dealing with casualties and procedures and policies for local civilians? Have procedures been coordinated with national commands.
11-58. What are the other multinational element capabilities and procedures for medical evacuation? Do they include air and ground capabilities, both intra- and inter-theater, that multinational forces will be supported by or required to support?
11-59. What are the sources of medical supply and payment options?
11-60. What are the procedures for tracking patients?
11-61. What are the coordination requirements for return-to-duty transportation?
11-62. What forces have organic level I, II, or III combat health support? For those that do not have this support, what level will other multinational forces provide?
11-63. What are the policies and procedures for medical personnel to use on level II through V medical treatment facilities to provide medical treatment for multinational forces?
11-64. Who is eligible for medical care, both routine and emergency, and under what conditions? This must be coordinated with other staff sections.
11-65. What is the blood policy and distribution system? What is U.S. policy for emergency use of blood from other than U.S. sources, such as host nation, for this operational period?
11-66. What is the mass casualty response plan?
11-67. Is there a medical surveillance program to follow disease trends and detect disease outbreaks?
11-68. What is the public health policy?
Chapter 12

Operational Considerations

Military capabilities differ based on national interests and objectives, national character, doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel. Some doctrines emphasize offensive operations while others emphasize defensive operations. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized operations. Other nations concern themselves with counterinsurgency operations. The multinational force commander must know and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. This chapter provides operational considerations to improve the effectiveness of U.S. forces when operating with the multinational force.

A variety of functions help commanders build and sustain combat power. In general terms, these are called elements of combat power and are described fully in FM 3-0. Army commanders and staffs translate the elements of combat power into more specific operational functions when conducting missions and tactical operations. The five operational-level functions discussed in this chapter are movement and maneuver, intelligence, firepower, support, and protection.

At the operational level, C2, intelligence, and support are critical to building an effective multinational force. A major weakness in one of these areas is a far greater threat than one in other systems. All other elements hinge on the effective integration of these three systems. Major differences, real or perceived, among alliance or coalition partners cannot be tolerated. Within these operating systems, effective liaison and language capabilities make effective operations possible and alleviate friction and confusion.

FIRE SUPPORT

12-1. The multinational force commander must ensure that the force develops good fire support coordination. This will maximize the fires and minimize the possibility of fratricide. Fire support coordination in multinational operations demands special arrangements with multinational force members and local authorities. These special arrangements include communications and language requirements, liaison personnel, and interoperability procedures. An SOP should be established for fire support to achieve the most effective results for its use by the multinational force.

12-2. Effective C2 of multinational force firepower is the key to its use. The staff must judge whether resources and requirements are balanced over the course of a multinational campaign or operation, ensuring the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities exist. Effective joint fire support will contribute substantially to multinational success. Joint detailed integration of joint fire support with maneuver of the multinational force is critical.

ENGINEERS

12-3. Multinational forces may require multinational-level engineers to support operations. These engineers will be responsible for a broad range of technical and dispersed, operational and tactical tasks. These tasks are included in the engineer operational environment functions of—

- Combat engineering (mobility, countermobility, and survivability).
- General engineering.
- Geospatial engineering. (This may be referred to as geomatic by some multinational forces.)
See FM 3-34 and JP 3-34 for a further discussion of the engineer operational environment functions and engineer operations.

12-4. The tasks associated with the three engineer operational environment functions include—

- Providing a full range of operational and tactical level combat engineering (mobility, countermobility, and survivability) support.
- Providing a full range of general engineering support (to include protection construction, diving, firefighting, facilities engineering, infrastructure, sustainment support; power generation and distribution; and in some Services or multinational forces this may include EOD and CBRN as well).
- Providing a full range of operational and tactical-level geospatial engineering support.

12-5. To ensure that efficient and effective engineer effort, the multinational headquarters may require both a senior engineer and a supporting engineer staff to plan and coordinate engineer effort in support of the multinational commander’s plan. The senior engineer and associated staff may also C2 force-level designated engineer units on behalf of the multinational commander. This C2 includes—

- Planning.
- Setting engineer standards.
- Supervising, coordinating.
- Controlling engineer support to the force and, when necessary, to the local population.
- Potentially performing C2 for other nonengineer capabilities and assets.

12-6. Engineers will also be responsible for managing civilian engineer contractors who are engaged to complete tasks in the AO. Control of engineer support will be in accordance with the multinational commander’s priorities and intent. For further operational considerations and details on the employment of engineer assets in a multinational environment, refer to the *ABCA Multinational Engineer Handbook*.

### General Principles

12-7. All multinational commanders should consider several general principles when planning to employ engineers. Of these principles, a force engineer commander should adhere to both centralized control and early warning to give engineer operations the best opportunity to succeed.

**Centralized Versus Decentralized**

12-8. When employing engineers, an important principle is that of centralized command with decentralized execution of tasks. This allows the force engineer assets to be optimized against the multinational commander’s priority of tasks. These tasks can be applied to all units and may include such missions/tasks as combined arms breaching operations; gap crossings and other mobility support; support to demining operations; construction of bridges, roads, base camps, hospitals, or other sites; or other tasks performed directly for the multinational commander.

**Early Warning**

12-9. Due to the long lead times necessary to plan, coordinate, purchase, and assemble the necessary engineer assets and specialist personnel, engineer planning must have an early and well-informed warning. Since much of the necessary information will often not be available, contingency engineer planning will be essential, especially for critical issues and items. Therefore, commanders and staff need to provide as much guidance as possible. The engineer commander and staff will need to be proactive and seek guidance regularly. This results in an iterative planning process with engineer estimates initially being plus 50 percent, and aiming to reduce to plus 5 percent, as more reliable information becomes available. For example, engineers may need to consider redeployment issues early—possibly before deployment takes place—to ensure that critical-path items are considered in a timely manner and that the necessary engineer assets will be in the AO when required, to include those associated with transitions.

**Priority of Work**

12-10. Since it will seldom be possible to execute all the required engineer tasks simultaneously, the force commander must lay down a clear priority of work after receiving staff and engineer advice. Engineers can then plan appropriately and avoid wasting scarce resources on low priority tasks.
Economy

12-11. Engineers are trained and equipped to carry out technical tasks. It is costly to employ them on tasks that can be carried out by other arms. Similarly, it is also costly either to apply more engineer effort than necessary to complete tasks in the required time or to use engineer labor on the unskilled aspects of engineer tasks. Economy of force is facilitated by a good priority of work.

Continuity

12-12. As handovers between engineer units will always increase the time to complete a task, and may also result in some minor points being overlooked, the unit which starts the job should be allowed to complete it where possible. This continuity, or momentum, must be retained to optimize the use of engineer assets.

Protection

12-13. Engineers cannot work effectively and protect themselves at the same time. Where possible and when necessary, protection should be provided for engineers.

ENGINEER SUPPORT

12-14. The role of engineers is to provide support across the engineer operational environment functions (combat, general, and geospatial engineering) to support for the multinational force. While focused on support of the land commander, this includes to both aviation and naval forces and commanders as well. The following paragraphs provide a summary of the typical tasks performed by engineers in a theater. All ABCA armies have differences with regard to the specific responsibilities of their engineers. For further detail, refer to the ABCA Multinational Engineer Handbook. Liaison with the multinational force engineer staff is also recommended.

COMBAT ENGINEERING

12-15. Combat engineering includes mobility, countermobility, and survivability with a primary focus on supporting combat maneuver forces at the tactical and operational levels of war. It is an integral part of a combined arms unit’s ability to maneuver. It is focused on the support of land component forces engaged in close combat. Combat engineering tasks are typically supported by combat engineers. In some cases, they may be performed by general engineers.

GENERAL ENGINEERING

12-16. General engineering, the most diverse of the engineer operational environment functions, may be performed throughout the area of responsibility. It is closely linked to the operational and strategic levels of war. As one of the areas of logistic support, general engineering is a critical component of logistic planning and operations. General engineering support—

- Provides broad mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment support to the multinational force.
- Enhances the combat capability of the multinational force in all phases of a combat operation.
- Encompasses those engineer tasks that establish and maintain the infrastructure. This includes the construction and repair of LOCs, main supply routes, railroads, roads, bridges, ports, airfields, utility systems, logistic facilities, bed down or base camp facilities, and the provision of environmental services.
- Includes critical enablers such as firefighting, engineer dive operations, power generation and distribution, and other specialized capabilities. It may also include support to camouflage, concealment, and deception and the operational level.

12-17. In some Services and multinational forces, these may include aspects of EOD and CBRN support. These operations include both horizontal and vertical construction and may include use of both expedient repair methods and more deliberate construction methods characterized by the application of design criteria, advanced planning, and preparation, depending on the mission requirements.
12-18. General engineering tasks are usually resource and time-intensive, demanding a high degree of preplanning to meet operational requirements. While general engineering may be performed in direct support of combat operations, those engineer tasks performed by general engineers in support of combat maneuver forces at the tactical level are often combat engineering tasks. The joint commander will depend upon a combination of multinational engineer units, civilian contractors, and HN capabilities to accomplish general engineering requirements.

12-19. General engineering tasks are typically performed by general engineering units, but they may also be performed by combat engineer units in some cases. All engineer units may be required to execute elements of general engineering tasks consisting primarily of repair and construction tasks.

**GEOSPATIAL SUPPORT**

12-20. The successful conduct of land operations relies on commanders at all levels appreciating the terrain over which operations are to be conducted. The better the appreciation of this terrain, the greater the degree of certainty of successful prosecution of operations. Up-to-date and accurate geospatial information enhances geospatial knowledge and hence situational understanding. It also assists commanders in gaining a better appreciation for the influence of terrain on operations. Engineers can provide specialist advice on the effects of terrain, climate, and weather.

12-21. Multinational force operations will generally be characterized by only a basic level of geospatial information available to commanders and their staffs. This information may come from the host nation, by one or more multinational partners, or more probably a combination of sources. Furthermore, potential adversaries will likely have access to the same basic level of geospatial information plus a far more intimate knowledge of the AO. Focused operational and tactical-level topographic support, using available geospatial information, can provide the force commander with decision-support aids often unavailable to an adversary. This information could contribute significantly to minimizing the adversary’s advantage gained by local knowledge. These decision support aids assist the force commander to visualize, operate on, and exploit the operational environment. Timely and relevant topographic support, therefore, has the potential to be a significant combat multiplier in multinational operations.

12-22. Quickly acquiring and providing appropriate and relevant geospatial information is generally a resource intensive undertaking requiring specialist capabilities. Topographic support relies on a fundamental layer of geospatial information being available. While the responsibility for providing topographic support to national component forces ultimately resides with their nations, efficiencies and synergies can be gained from coordinating this support. This is particularly true with acquiring and providing the geospatial data set. As a guiding principle, one nation should be assigned the lead responsibility for acquiring and providing geospatial information with other nations assigned supporting roles. This division of responsibilities is a high priority requirement and should be addressed early in the planning.

12-23. Geospatial information should be coordinated at the highest possible level due to the complexities involved with acquiring and providing it. The responsibility for coordination should be assigned to the force engineer commander. Longer-term information densification and maintenance responsibilities also need to be addressed early in the planning process. The force engineer commander should have access to an appropriate level of topographic advice within the engineer staff so he or she can aptly assign responsibilities.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS SUPPORT

12-24. Engineers play an important role in supporting CAO. This support may involve the following:
   - Bridging and demining critical civilian areas or routes to enhance mobility.
   - Providing essential services such as power, water, sewage, and decontamination.
   - Firefighting.
   - Providing shelter.

12-25. Engineers must satisfy the needs of the force as a priority before offering any residual capacity to
   civilian authorities. Engineers may be limited to only providing advice to the civilian authorities and
   population on works being completed.

INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDIZATION

12-26. For Army units involved in multinational operations, one of their major operational considerations
   is their ability to operate with units of the other nations. Interoperability is the ability of forces to train,
   exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks. Historically, the
   problems of interoperability have been solved primarily through trial and error during actual conduct of
   operations over an extended period of time. In order to avoid the problems associated with this method of
   interoperability, the Army participates in multinational and bilateral standardization programs.

12-27. According to NATO, standardization is the development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures, and designs to achieve and maintain the required levels of compatibility, interchangeability, or commonality in operational, procedural, materiel, technical and administrative fields to obtain interoperability. The Army participates in two multinational programs that work towards standardization. Those two programs are NATO and the ABCA Armies program. The final result of this standardization work is NATO STANAGs and ABCA standards.

12-28. Implementation of standardization agreements, either NATO or ABCA, is transparent to U.S.
   units. In the case of doctrine, implementation occurs when the content of the standardization agreement is
   incorporated into Army field manuals. Additionally, Soldiers of each NATO or ABCA nation use their
   own national doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. To them, the interoperability is transparent
   as well. For example, the NATO and ABCA nations have agreed to use the same military symbols. (See
   STANAG 2019.) This way, participating units passing graphic operational information, such as overlays,
   will understand the symbols. U.S. Army forces find these military symbols in FM 1-02. Therefore, when
   the nations operate together, there is no need to develop a common set of military symbols to conduct
   operations within NATO or ABCA forces. There are standardization agreements for the five-paragraph
   OPORD, close-air support procedures, call-for-fire procedures, CBRN reporting procedures, and numerous
   other areas.

12-29. Within a coalition, standardization agreements can provide a baseline for cooperation. Additionally, in many parts of the world, there may be bilateral interoperability agreements among potential coalition members in place prior to the formation of the coalition. Students who have attended professional military development courses in other nations are additional sources for interoperability. However, in most ad hoc coalitions not all participants are immediately familiar with such agreements. The multinational commander must initially rely on lead nation or designated SOPs; good LNOs; and clearly written, uncomplicated operation orders.
CHECKLIST

To assist commanders and staff in planning operations, the following checklist fire support and engineer support is provided.

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

12-30. What is the nature of the multinational operation? For example, is it littoral or land and air phases?
12-31. Where does the operation lie in the spectrum of conflict?
12-32. What is the likely scale of effort?
12-33. What is the likely duration of the operation? What are the issues of rotation and sustainability?
12-34. Are there contingency measures to meet the requirement for increased force levels? Will it be from national backfilling or fall under a call-up of reserves policy?
12-35. What are the intended end state and exit strategy?
12-36. What is the commander’s intent?
12-37. Where is the AO? Consider the climatic, terrain, cultural, political, and socio-economic issues.
12-38. What is the overall multinational force structure?
12-39. What capabilities need to be held at multinational level? Which will provide national support only?
12-40. What fire support assets are the multinational forces providing? What are their capabilities and command status?
12-41. What is the desired fire support organization for early entry forces?
12-42. What is the deployment time frame?
12-43. How will the deployment be carried out (land, air, or sea)?

Surveillance Target Acquisition

12-44. What situational understandings will the multinational force have?
12-45. Will there be a common operational picture? How will ISTAR for maritime, land, and air units contribute to it?
12-46. How will ISTAR assets be coordinated and tasked? What are the battle damage assessment requirements?
12-47. Is there a policy for unmanned aircraft system over-flights of opposing forces prior to hostilities?

Delivery Systems

12-48. What is the desired order of arrival of fire support assets?
12-49. What are the characteristics, capability, and quantity of fire support assets, including range, tactical, and operational mobility and authorized munitions?
12-50. What is the multinational policy for survey, meteorology, and calibration?
Weapons

12-51. What is the capability and interoperability of multinational munitions including proofing compatibility and ballistic data contained in fire control computers?

12-52. What are the planned ammunition stocks and expenditure rates?

12-53. What are the key interoperability constraints?

12-54. Are there any special ammunition handling, storage, and environmental considerations or limitations?

12-55. Are there any occupational health and safety constraints?

12-56. Are volumetric (blast) munitions available? If so, what are the constraints on their employment?

12-57. What nonlethal weapons are available?

Command

12-58. What are the multinational levels of command?

12-59. What will be the command relationships for fire support assets?

12-60. What is the command arrangement for conducting multinational decisive and shaping operations in longer range areas?

12-61. What are the intercomponent liaison arrangements?

Control

12-62. Will real estate requirements to support offensive operations be considered in the overall deconfliction of real estate by the G-3?

12-63. What is the requirement for LNOs on a 24-hours per day basis?

12-64. What operational environment control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aircraft system assets?

12-65. What battle spectrum management requirements exist in relation to EW?

12-66. What will be the multinational ROE before beginning hostilities and after committing the first hostile act?

12-67. What is the policy for using indirect fire systems using nonprecision munitions within the ROE?

12-68. What is the policy for using smoke and illumination within the ROE?

Communications and Information Systems

12-69. How will national communications and information systems be integrated?

12-70. What multinational bearer communications systems will be used?

12-71. If automatic interfaces are unworkable, what will be the LNO requirements? How will digitized and nondigitized forces operate together?
Logistics
12-72. What is the multinational policy on battle casualty replacement?
12-73. Based on identified battle winning equipment, what is the priority for repair of fire support assets?
12-74. What will be the in-theatre repair policy?
12-75. How will ammunition be tracked around the battlefield?
12-76. What are the national integrated logistics systems?
12-77. What key integrated logistics systems might be identified as a multinational system or capability?
12-78. Are there any commercial or national constraints on employing equipment?

Doctrine
12-79. Is there a common multinational fire support doctrine, including definitions and fire support coordination procedures?
12-80. If no common multinational doctrine exists, what is the lead nation’s fire support doctrine?
12-81. What are the applicable ABCA standards and other standardization agreements?
12-82. What is the availability of doctrinal publications?

Organization
12-83. What is the multinational structure and staffing?
12-84. What limitations are there on the national contingent structure?

Training
12-85. When will training take place? At home, en route to operation or in concentration area?
12-86. Will in-theater ranges be available?
12-87. What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems in-theater?
12-88. What part will simulators play in the transition to war training strategy?
12-89. What collective training will take place?

ENGINEER PLANNING
12-90. What are the engineer multinational tasks and the division of responsibilities to achieve those tasks?
12-91. What is the engineer C2 structure for the mission?
12-92. Has a force engineer been appointed? What is the command, control, and coordination authority?
12-93. What are the mission-specific training requirements and responsibilities?
12-94. What are the engineer coordination interfaces?
12-95. When will these coordination measures take effect?
12-96. What are the capabilities of the allies’ engineer forces? Have these capabilities been passed on to other multinational forces?
12-97. Who is the lead nation and what force engineer capabilities are they providing?
12-98. What capabilities is the host nation providing?
12-99. What multinational documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as ABCA standards?
12-100. What are the technical standards for the mission and who is the technical authority?
12-101. What are the unique AO characteristics that affect interoperability, such as severe climatic conditions?
12-102. Who is the lead nation for mapping? Who is maintaining the common map database?
12-103. What is the threat assessment for the enemy engineer force?
12-104. Are engineers involved in the targeting process to assess or estimate the work required to repair infrastructure and utilities. Are engineer involved in the process to clear the area and route of mines and UXO at the end of the hostilities?
12-105. What are the phases and flow of engineer units, capabilities, and materiel to the mission area to support the plan?
12-106. Is this flow reflected in the multinational time-phased force and deployment list?
12-107. Are there any unique multinational engineer capabilities that could facilitate deployment?
12-108. Is there a clear multinational engineer C2 structure to facilitate force deployment and reception?
12-109. What are the protection requirements?
12-110. Has a common multinational facilities survey been conducted and coordinated at the force engineer level?
12-111. Is an engineer materiel management system in place?
12-112. What is the agreed command critical engineer resources list?
12-113. What are the multinational funding arrangements for multinational engineer tasks?
12-114. Are there any specific engineer contracts with the host nation or other contractors?
12-115. What is the host nation actually providing in terms of engineer services?
12-116. How is engineer effort coordinated within the theater?
12-117. What is the multinational engineer priority of work?
12-118. What are the C2 mechanisms to affect common engineer tasks within the multinational force?

**Execution**

12-119. Have the engineer mission, tasks, or both changed?
12-120. Have there been any modifications to the engineer C2 structure?
12-121. What are the ongoing new engineer support agreements?
12-122. What multinational documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as STANAGS and ABCA standards?
12-123. What is the engineer information and intelligence collection and dissemination plan?
12-124. What, if anything, is the impact of NGOs and CAO activity in-theater on the engineer plan?
12-125. What is the interoperability disconnects between multinational engineer partners? Are they being addressed?
12-126. What are the in-theater engineer coordination mechanisms? Are they capturing lessons learned and informing all nations to allow in-theater adaptations to doctrine and new problems?
12-127. Are there any HN cultural constraints and restrictions that are or could impact on multinational engineer operations?
Redeployment

12-128. What are the environmental considerations?
12-129. What is the remediation plan?
12-130. How do engineers plan to hand over projects, facilities, and resources?
12-131. What HN support or NGOs will be receiving projects and facilities?
12-132. Is there any change to engineer C2?
12-133. Is mission creep occurring in terms of engineer reconstruction tasks?
12-134. What engineer tasks will be required to facilitate redeployment?
12-135. What are the legal considerations for facilities and structures handover, taking cognizance of international agreements and protocol?
12-136. What are the CAO considerations?
12-137. What is the plan for phasing engineer redeployment?
12-138. Have the engineer lessons learned been captured, documented, and recorded?
Maritime Operations

Multinational maritime operations cover a range of military activities undertaken by multinational forces, in peacetime or in time of war, to exercise sea control or project power ashore. Maritime forces are primarily navies. However, they may also include maritime-focused air forces, amphibious forces, or other government agencies charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea. When a situation requires that maritime, land, air, space, or a combination of forces operate together, the operation is referred to as joint.

CHARACTERISTICS

13-1. The qualities that characterize maritime forces as political and military instruments in support of government policies are readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. Maritime forces may be used to reassure or provide succor to allies and friends, deter aggression, influence unstable situations, or respond to aggression.

READINESS

13-2. One of the strengths of maritime forces lies in their immediate availability to respond to contingencies. By maintaining proficiency in the capabilities necessary to resolve major conflicts, maritime forces can provide a wide range of services to support peacetime operations.

FLEXIBILITY

13-3. Maritime forces have been employed to resolve many international crises since the end of World War II. The inherent flexibility of maritime forces permits political leaders and commanders to shift focus on, reconfigure, and realign forces quickly to handle various contingencies. Maritime forces provide a wide range of weapons systems, military options, and logistics or administrative skills. Maritime forces can control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or times of crisis. They perform tasks ranging from forcible entry and strike operations to noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. The excellent strategic and TACOM, control, and communications capabilities of maritime forces provide for a uniquely controllable force that complements diplomatic efforts. Maritime forces offer presence without occupation and deterrence without commitment. They represent a worldwide, balanced, and autonomous intervention capability that may be employed nationally or multinationally.

SELF-SUSTAINABILITY

13-4. Although the degree of self-sustainment achievable by an allied force will be determined by the nature of the operation and the types of units committed by the participants, maritime forces can operate in forward areas at the end of long supply lines without significant land-based supply structure. With replenishment-at-sea, on-station replacement of personnel and ships, and the resilience of ships (their ability to sustain damage and continue the mission), maritime operations may be continued indefinitely.
MOBILITY

13-5. Maritime forces are much less constrained by political boundaries than air or ground forces. Maritime forces can deploy virtually anywhere in the world and transit the seas in accordance with international law. With their strategic, operational, and tactical mobility, maritime forces can—

- Monitor a situation passively.
- Remain on station for a sustained period.
- Respond to a crisis rapidly.
- Deploy in combat with authority.

13-6. Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively visible and threatening to adversaries, as needed. If diplomatic, political, or economic measures succeed, maritime forces can be quickly withdrawn without further action ashore. Maritime forces can also respond to indications of pending crises by relocating rapidly from one end of the theater to another or from one theater to another, usually independent of fixed logistics. In combat, the ability to position maritime forces quickly provides commanders with a significant tactical and operational advantage.

EMPLOYMENT OF MARITIME FORCES

13-7. Maritime forces seek to ensure continued, unhindered, and unrestricted use of the sea to further national or shared interests and objectives. The following paragraphs discuss the nature of maritime force employment in peace and war. It must be remembered, however, that the distinctions drawn between peacetime and wartime operations are not clear-cut in many instances.

OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME

13-8. Maritime forces lend themselves well to various peacetime operations, which differ from wartime operations in some respects. Although in some situations peacetime operations are designed to influence governments and military forces (presence and deterrence), they are increasingly designed to influence nonnational entities, such as criminal organizations and transnational groups. Nongovernmental and nonmilitary organizations often have the expertise and finances to conduct certain operations and may be involved in peacetime operations to varying degrees. Maritime forces should be prepared to deal with these other organizations and recognize the contributions that they can bring to an operation. In some contingencies, maritime forces may operate more in a supporting or enabling role, contributing a supply of well-trained and equipped personnel who can adapt and sustain themselves. Peacetime operations will normally have a varying mix of security, humanitarian, and environmental components and may be grouped under the following broad headings.

PRESENCE AND DETERRENCE

13-9. The presence of maritime forces can avoid confrontation and support political aims without necessarily violating national sovereignty. Maritime forces may strengthen diplomatic efforts by “showing the flag” (presence) in a benign fashion as a general indicator of interest and latent capability, thereby helping to prevent emerging conflicts. Alternately, maritime forces can be deployed as a deterrent against specific actions. Maritime forces can also “shield” states at their request by establishing an at-sea presence within territorial seas, thus providing a “trip-wire” function in threatened areas. These operations are, however, fraught with danger because not all parties may cooperate with or refrain from challenging such deployments. Nevertheless, using maritime forces is less intrusive than using land-based forces.
PEACE OPERATIONS

13-10. Peace operations cover a range of activities including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building. The use of maritime forces in peace operations will usually complement land forces and may involve a considerable range of tasks. These tasks may include the following:

- Monitoring or observing cease-fires.
- Interpositioning between the maritime forces of belligerents.
- Establishing disengagement zones.
- Providing a neutral venue for supervised negotiations.
- Preventing forces of the belligerent parties from violating agreements.
- Humanitarian Operations.

13-11. Maritime forces are well suited to support humanitarian aid efforts that relieve or reduce the suffering, loss of life, and damage to property caused by natural or man-made disasters. In particular, maritime forces are useful to provide a secure environment to allow the humanitarian relief efforts of other organizations to progress as directed by cognizant legal authority. Short notice readiness, flexibility, and mobility allow maritime forces to respond quickly to a disaster, particularly if they have Marines or other troops embarked. Maritime forces can be tailored to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation, civil authorities, or NGOs. Maritime forces may provide personnel, equipment, supply, medical and dental care, security, limited construction and engineering, communication, and transportation support.

PROTECTION OF SHIPPING AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION

13-12. When nations make claims over contested waters, challenges to freedom of navigation may arise. In such instances, maritime forces can exercise freedom of navigation by traversing or exercising in the contested waters (in accordance with recognized international law). Maritime forces may also protect merchant shipping with flag-state consent that could otherwise be threatened.

MARITIME CONSTABULARY FUNCTIONS

13-13. In the last three decades developments in international maritime law, particularly the extension of national authority further from shore, has resulted in various low-intensity constabulary functions. These functions are likely to involve naval forces as well as coast guards, civilian maritime agencies, or both. Specific functions may include the following:

- Enforcement of fisheries regulations and exclusive economic zone arrangements.
- Operations against piracy.
- Counterterrorism.
- Interdiction of drugs and other contraband trade.
- Interdiction of the slave trade or illegal migration.
- Enforcement of environmental regulations.
- Control of traffic separation schemes and other maritime traffic management tasks.

ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATIONS

13-14. Maritime forces may also be tasked to respond to oil spills and other environmental disasters. In these cases, maritime forces can be a valuable source of trained and disciplined personnel as well as equipment. Often these operations will be conducted in concert with or in support of other governmental, international, or private agencies whose specific missions include disaster response.
EMBARGOES/MARITIME INTERDICATION OPERATIONS

13-15. Maritime forces may be tasked to enforce internationally imposed sanctions. Effectively enforcing sanctions may require sophisticated coordinating military operations at sea with those in the air. This is especially true in areas of armed conflict or high tension, where the absence of commonly understood and accepted ROE can greatly increase the risks to enforcement units. Assigned tasks may include—

- Stopping, inspecting, seizing, and diverting suspect ships and aircraft.
- Establishing and enforcing a maritime exclusion zone for the maritime vessels of one or more parties to a conflict.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

13-16. Forces conduct NEO to move personnel from an area where deteriorating security conditions place lives at risk. This type of operation is similar to an amphibious raid, involving swift incursion, temporary occupation of an objective, and fast withdrawal after the mission is completed. During NEO, ROE usually limit the use of force to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Maritime forces may have an integral capability to accomplish NEO without assistance from other forces. If not, ships stationed at sea may provide lift capability and the close, secure staging areas for other forces. By evacuating directly from a secure site to ships outside territorial seas, a very low political profile can be maintained. The evacuation force commander must be prepared to deal with the political sensitivity of the situation that will be monitored, if not controlled, from the highest level.

OPERATIONS IN WARTIME

13-17. In wartime the activities of the maritime force are normally aimed at achieving sea control and projecting power ashore.

SEA CONTROL

13-18. Use of the sea requires a degree of control. Total sea control is rarely possible as long as an adversary continues to threaten forces in the area. Therefore, a degree of sea control is normally established within a designated area for a defined period of time. Sea control must provide security for forces, facilities, and sea LOCs. Large maritime forces using an area for their own purposes can usually achieve and maintain sufficient sea control. Smaller specialist forces and civilian shipping require sea control to be established by other forces or escorts. Sea denial is a subset of sea control. Sea denial is achieved when maritime forces prevent an opposing force from using the sea for its own purposes. Sea denial is normally exercised in a given area and for a limited time.

POWER PROJECTION

13-19. Conflicts at sea are rarely isolated from a land campaign or the pursuit of territorial objectives. Even when the maritime component is operationally dominant, the ultimate outcome in the theater is likely to depend on success ashore. Maritime forces often must be prepared to operate in the littoral environment to project force ashore as part of joint operations involving naval, air, and land forces. Naval forces are normally the first forces into a crisis area and may comprise the enabling force that allows a joint force access to the region. Naval forces then contribute to operations ashore by conducting operations in direct or indirect support of those land operations. It is important to note that a maritime commander responsible for sea control may find it necessary to plan and execute power projection actions—such as a maritime air attack of a littoral enemy air field—to achieve, maintain, or achieve and maintain sea control.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the maritime portion of the operation.

13-20. Has liaison been established with the maritime headquarters?
13-21. Has a maritime component commander been named?
13-22. Has the staff identified the supported and supporting relationships with the maritime element?
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Chapter 14

Air Operations

Multinational air operations aim to gain and maintain sufficient control of the air for exploiting air power to achieve the multinational commander’s objectives or achieve strategic goals through a multinational campaign. Unified action is essential for effectively using air power. To achieve its greatest effects, air power must be concentrated at a decisive point in time and space. To attain the strength of unified air action and to ensure that the capabilities of air power are used efficiently as the overall situation demands, air operations are based on two principles. The first principle is that unity of command facilitates effectively applying air power to meet the multinational objectives. This is normally achieved by designating a multinational air component commander. The second principle is that centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power provides theater-wide focus while allowing operational flexibility to meet theater objectives.

MULTINATIONAL AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER

14-1. The multinational commander may designate a multinational air component commander to control the capabilities of air operations. The multinational commander establishes the authority and command relationships of the multinational air component commander and assigns responsibilities. These include the planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of joint air operations based on the multinational commander’s concept of operations and air apportionment decision. These activities rely on the full representation and expertise of all elements of the multinational force contributing to the air operation plan. At the tactical level of operations, the multinational air component commander’s authority typically includes exercising TACOM over assigned and attached forces and TACON over other military capabilities or forces made available for tasking.

14-2. The multinational commander may also establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations. The commander retains the option of controlling air operations directly using the multinational headquarters staff. The multinational commander will normally vest authority in a component commander to carry out the duties of the airspace control authority and air defense commander. Because the multinational air component commander is responsible for air operations and airspace control measures and AD operations have an integrated relationship, the multinational air component commander would be the most likely choice for appointment as the air control authority and air defense commander. Any division of these responsibilities would require detailed coordination for safe and effective air operations.

AIR OPERATIONS PLANNING AND TASKING

14-3. Air operations planning involves—

- Identifying air objectives that contribute to the multinational campaign objectives.
- Determining the air strategy to exploit multinational air assets to support the multinational objectives.
- Identifying centers of gravity to satisfy the multinational force’s strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.
14-4. Air operations planning also involves developing the concept of operations that describes the best course of action and produces the air OPLAN. This plan articulates and communicates multinational air component commander’s strategy for achieving the multinational commander’s OPLAN.

14-5. The air tasking cycle is used to promote efficient and effective use of the available multinational air capabilities and assets. It begins with the multinational commander’s air apportionment process and culminates with the combat assessment of previous missions and sorties. The cycle provides a repetitive process for the planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of air missions and sorties while following the multinational commander’s guidance. The cycle accommodates changes in the operational situation or to the commander’s guidance. It also accommodates late notice requests for support from other commanders. The air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements to produce an air tasking order. A timely multinational air tasking order is critical. Other commanders conduct planning and operations based on the content and scheduling in the air tasking order and depend on its accuracy.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

14-6. Airspace control primarily complements and supports the multinational commander’s campaign plan without adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of any multinational forces. Each commander must be able to use the airspace with maximum freedom consistent with the degree of operational risk directed by the multinational commander. Airspace control procedures are designed to–

- Prevent mutual interference.
- Facilitate AD identification.
- Accommodate and expedite the safe flow of all air traffic.
- Enhance combat effectiveness in support of the multinational objectives.
- Prevent fratricide.

14-7. When designated by the multinational commander, the air control authority must–

- Establish an airspace control system.
- Prepare the airspace control plan.
- Promulgate the relevant airspace control orders.
- Implement airspace control means.
- Harmonize regional airspace control plans.

14-8. Rapidly distributing the airspace control orders and their updates to all commanders within the force in the area of responsibility is a crucial factor in the operation of an airspace control system. The airspace control authority is supported by the airspace coordination center where all component commanders with air assets are represented. All component commanders must comply with the airspace control plan. However, the multinational commander provides procedures to adjudicate differences that the airspace control authority and the component commanders cannot resolve. Centralized direction by the airspace control authority does not imply that it assumes OPCON or TACON over any air assets.
AIR DEFENSE

14-9. AD is an overall multinational force responsibility. Multinational AD integrates the capabilities of all component AD assets to protect and influence the operational environment associated with the multinational campaign plan. The air defense commander should plan and direct the multinational AD assets that the component commanders will execute. The air defense commander—

- Protects the force from hostile air activity.
- Integrates and coordinates the force’s AD assets into a multinational AD plan (including the HN AD systems).
- Promulgates and employs common procedures for air battle management and the reduction of mutual interference.
- Controls and coordinates all AD operations by the component commanders.
- Coordinates with the air component authority to ensure that the airspace control plan best supports AD operations.

MISSILE DEFENSE

14-10. The U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) is the U.S. Army’s operational lead for Army theater air and missile defense. In wartime, the AAMDC deploys into the theater of operations in support of the ARFOR commander or, if designated, the joint force land component commander, and the joint force air component commander ensuring that Army theater air and missile defense operations are properly coordinated and integrated with those of joint and multinational forces.

14-11. Also, based on METT-TC and augmentation with Army and joint, interagency, and multinational personnel, the AAMDC has the capability to serve as an operational protection integrator for the ARFOR or the joint force. In peacetime, the AAMDC ensures Army echelons above corps AD forces are properly trained and ready to support theater air and missile defense operations. The AAMDC plans and executes a variety of training activities, exercises, and simulations to ensure force readiness. It also coordinates with joint and multinational partners to develop procedures for combined theater air and missile defense operations, interoperability, and training. The AAMDC may also support homeland defense operations.
CHECKLIST

Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the air portion of the operation.

14-12. Has a multinational air component commander been designated by the multinational commander?
14-13. Has an airspace control authority been designated by the multinational commander?
14-14. Has an area air defense commander been designated by the multinational commander?
14-15. Has liaison been established between the multinational air operations center and the other appropriate headquarters?
14-16. What are the capabilities and limitations of multinational airpower? Have commanders and staffs been briefed?
14-17. Have planner’s considered all elements of airpower in the employment of multinational fires?
14-18. What is the desired AD organization for early entry forces?
14-19. Has the multinational air component commander published special instructions? Are they consistent with the ROE?
Appendix A
Capabilities

PLANNING

A-1. Representatives of each nation must be present during planning. If a unit is given a mission it is incapable of performing, the plan will not work. National representatives can ensure that the taskings are appropriate to the force. If possible, national representatives should be available in each staff element. They must thoroughly understand their nation’s capabilities and limitations.

A-2. Within the ABCA Armies program, ABCA Standard 1030 provides a format for providing specific details of each nation’s forces to guide planning decisions. Listed equipment is restricted to that which materially affects the organization’s combat power and equipment unique to the organization. Using the format in ABCA Standard 1030 presents an option for obtaining information. This document can be found on the ABCA Web site www.abca-armies.org/.

INTEGRATION

A-3. Each of the multinational member nations provides its own distinct units and capabilities to a multinational force. These capabilities differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control limitations, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, equipment, history, defense budget, and domestic politics. Orchestrating these capabilities into multinational operations depends on understanding the differences in organization, capabilities, and doctrine. The greater the number of nations involved, the greater these differences will be for the multinational force.

A-4. Understanding these differences can determine if multinational operations are a success or failure. Units of the same type in one nation’s army may not perform the same functions as units in another army. An engineer unit in one army may have capabilities to build roads or buildings, while another may be limited to laying out minefields or building defensive positions.

A-5. The commander of the multinational force must be able to integrate force capabilities to achieve the desired end state. Selecting the right mix is a challenge. The multinational staff must be proactive in understanding the capabilities and limitations of the nations in the multinational force.

A-6. Doctrine is another important issue. If a nation does not understand or train for a mission, it will probably fail. National forces will normally operate using their own doctrine internally, while externally their actions should conform to the overall direction of the multinational force. To make this work, however, multinational commanders must know the differences in the other nation’s doctrine. This can be accomplished with LNOs or by augmentees and/or supplemental staff officers. When U.S. forces are operating with NATO or ABCA countries as part of a multinational military command, they will follow the doctrine and procedures imbedded in U.S. field manuals from previously ratified STANAGs and ABCA standards.

A-7. Conventional multinational force capabilities should include the following assets and operations:
  ● AD.
  ● Armor.
  ● Aviation.
  ● Engineer.
  ● Field artillery.
  ● Infantry.
  ● Intelligence.
Appendix A

- Medical.
- Military police.
- CBRN defense.
- Ordnance.
- Personnel.
- Quartermaster.
- Signal.
- Transportation.
- Aviation.

A-8. The following are aviation information requirements needed prior to deployment:
- Determine the aviation assets, capabilities, and requirements of the multinational force.
- Identify the aviation logistics capabilities of the multinational force.
- Identify current and projected requirements for an air LOC.
- Determine aviation support required from multinational forces.
- Identify the intended base of operations.
- Identify the personnel recovery plan in theater. (Rotary-wing units should be prepared to execute organic personnel recovery or depending on capabilities, theater-wide recovery.)
- Identify secure communications capabilities of the higher headquarters and supported units.

ENGINEERS

A-9. QSTAG 1175 covers engineer support capabilities, utilities requirements and other information required prior to deployment. This QSTAG is equally applicable to phases during operations with little modification. In addition to QSTAG 1175, specific information on obstacles; equipment capabilities; future engineer planning; engineer order of battle; and command, control, communications, and intelligence is required. The following engineer information is required prior to a deployment:
- Identify terrain visualization requirements.
- Determine types and capabilities of engineer units for the multinational and other services.
- Determine the facility support requirements, such as latrines and base camp construction, from the multinational force and its supported units.
- Determine the condition of and requirements for infrastructure in the civil-military operations such as roads, airfields, ports, and power generation facilities.
- Identify the availability and type of engineer resources in the operating area.
- Determine real estate support requirements.
- Identify humanitarian and nation assistance engineering requirements.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

A-10. Special operations forces can be a very valuable asset to a multinational force. These forces possess unique capabilities that can compliment conventional capabilities. Selected special operations forces are regionally oriented and usually have personnel experienced and conversant in the languages and cultures found in the AO. They can assist with liaison to facilitate interoperability with multinational forces. When the use of special operations forces is considered, it is very important to understand their capabilities and properly apply those capabilities.
A-11. The multinational force commander may designate a joint special operations task force composed of forces from more than one service to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations in the AO. This commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite C2. The commander would exercise day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached Special Operations Forces and allocate forces against tasks in support of command. The command may define a special operations area for use by the special operations forces. The establishment of a joint special operations area may delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

A-12. The commander must determine where in the organization certain Special Operations Forces best fit. For example, as components, under the G-3 or S-3, or some other structure. The G-3 or S-3 normally integrates both CA operations and PSYOP developed by the respective staff officers into the operation order. Due to the political sensitivity of these areas, approval authority for these operations normally remains with multinational establishing authorities.

A-13. At the earliest opportunity, you must identify to the command’s higher headquarters the requirement for CAO and PSYOP units and staff augmentation. These units may require reserve component augmentation to be fully capable. This should be taken into consideration when requesting these assets because of the process and lead-time necessary to obtain them. CAO, PSYOP, and PA actions can dramatically affect the perceived legitimacy of peace operations. CAO should reinforce and be reinforced by PSYOP themes and actions. PSYOP themes and actions should be coordinated with PA office initiatives to avoid creating a dichotomy, whether real or perceived.
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Appendix B

Threat Assessment

B-1. The threat assessment should consider the following:

- The adversary’s military ISTAR assets and capabilities. Can it detect and locate friendly activities?
- The adversary’s espionage and covert intelligence capability. Does it have operatives in the AO?
- The adversary’s capability to conduct IO and C2 warfare activities, including those aimed at audiences or targets outside the AO.
- The adversary’s early warning—including distant early warning—capability. Can it intercept, direction find, jam, or interfere with friendly transmissions? Does it possess distant early warning? Laser blinding weapons are currently available on the international market, and other weapon systems will probably be fielded in the near future.
- The adversary’s WMD capability. This should consider political intent, industrial infrastructure, delivery systems, and warheads. It should also consider the potential impact of strikes in terms of degradation, casualties, loss of tempo, and their physical and psychological effect on allies and civil populace.
- The adversary’s capability to conduct long range operations, particularly with its longer-range strike assets. Can its main forces interfere with the multinational’s sustaining operations? The adversary’s weapons, logistics, doctrine, training, intent, and performance in recent conflicts should be considered. Factors include air, surface-to-surface missiles, air-delivered forces, naval and marine assets, Special Operations Forces, operational level forward and raiding detachments, and operational maneuver groups.

B-2. The threat assessment should also consider:

- Adversary sympathizers, agents, and partisans in the AO. Will they conduct information gathering, espionage, guerrilla acts, or a combination of activities against us?
- Terrorist, criminal, and insurgent organizations. What are their aims, capabilities, and methods?
- In stability operations, the adversary’s antiair and antiaorm capability. Is additional protection (such as defensive aid suites) required? An antiair and antiaorm capability is assumed in warfighting.
- The attitude of the civil population (by region if appropriate) to the force presence. Are they hostile, neutral, or favorably disposed towards us? Could the population’s perceptions be altered by friendly or adversary actions, including IO?
- Sabotage, in the form of planned attacks by adversary special forces or other agents, or more spontaneous activities by locally employed civilians.
- Subversion and hostile PSYOP. An adversary will usually attempt to subvert friendly forces, either individually, to gain leverage, or collectively for political and military advantage.
- Likelihood of theft. This can be a significant problem in poorer countries.
- Health risks. These include endemic and sexually transmitted diseases, climatic extremes, and environmental and pollution hazards that may include residual WMD contamination and the prevalence of illegal drugs.
- Mines. The presence and location of vehicle and antipersonnel mines in the AO. Current and earlier conflicts must be considered.
- Road conditions and local driving patterns. In Bosnia, road deaths outnumber those killed by military action.
- Fire hazards. Weather and vegetation may create fire hazards. Living in makeshift accommodations presents a substantial fire risk, particularly in a cold climate.
- Fratricide. The risk of fratricide increases in warfighting, but is present at all times. It is particularly likely in multinational operations.
- Attack aviation. Adversary aviation attacks threaten our own sustaining operations. The most vulnerable area for a threat posed by an adversary’s attack is the sustaining operations area. Commanders must consider and plan for this threat.
Appendix C

Civil Affairs Operations Estimate

C-1. The CAO staff officer prepares the CAO estimate during the commander’s decisionmaking process. The CAO officer’s estimate and the commander’s decision will be the basis for the CAO (CMO) annex of the operation order.

C-2. See figure C-1 for an example of the CAO estimate.

| Civil-Military Cooperation Operations Estimate Number ____.
| References: Maps, charts, or other documents.
| 1. MISSION. The commander’s restated mission.
| 2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS:
|   a. Intelligence Situation. Include information obtained from the intelligence officer. When the details make it appropriate and the estimate is written, a brief summary and reference to the appropriate intelligence document or an annex of the estimate may be used.
|   (1) Characteristics of the AO. These characteristics include physical features, climate, and basic political, economic, and psychological factors.
|       (a) Attitudes of the populace (cooperative or uncooperative).
|       (b) Availability of necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter, and medical care). Include civilian self-support capabilities.
|       (c) Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations, such as HN, NGOs, and international organizations.
|       (d) Characteristics, migration rates, and numbers of dislocated civilians in the area.
|       (e) Amount and type of damage suffered by the economy—particularly in the transportation, public utilities, and communication fields).
|       (f) Status and character of civil government.
|       (g) State of health of the civilian populace.
|   (2) Enemy strength and dispositions. Consider sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, and movement of dislocated civilians.
|   (3) Enemy capabilities.
|       (a) Affecting the mission.
|       (b) Affecting CAO activities.
| b. Tactical Situation. Include information obtained from the commander’s planning guidance and from the operations officer.
|   (1) Present dispositions of major tactical elements.
|   (2) Possible courses of action (COAs) to accomplish the mission. (These COAs carried forward through the remainder of the estimate.)

Figure C-1. Contents of CAO (CMO) annex.
Appendix C

(3) Projected operations and other planning factors required for coordination and integration of staff estimates.

c. Personnel Situation. Include information obtained from the personnel officer.
   (1) Present dispositions of personnel and administration units and installations that have an effect on the CAO situation.
   (2) Projected developments within the personnel field likely to influence CAO.

d. Logistics Situation. Include information obtained from the logistics officer.
   (1) Present dispositions of logistics units and installations that have an effect on the CAO situation.
   (2) Projected developments within the logistics field likely to include CAO.

e. CAO Situation. In this subparagraph, the status is shown under appropriate subheadings. In the case of detailed information at higher levels of command, a summary may appear under the subheading with reference to an annex to the estimate.

   (1) Disposition and status of CAO elements and related significant military and nonmilitary elements.
   (2) Current problems faced by the command. Estimate the impact of future plans of the supported unit operation pertinent to the CAO mission.
   (3) Projected impact of civilian interference with military operations.
   (4) Government functions.
      (a) Public administration.
      (b) Public safety.
      (c) Public health.
      (d) Labor.
      (e) Legal.
      (f) Public welfare.
      (g) Public finance.
      (h) Public education.
      (i) Civil defense.
   (5) Economic functions.
      (a) Economics and commerce.
      (b) Food and agriculture.
      (c) Civilian supply.
      (d) Property control.
   (6) Public facilities functions.
      (a) Public works and utilities.
      (b) Public communications.
      (c) Public transportation.
   (7) Special functions.
      (a) Arts, monuments, and archives.
      (b) Civil information.
      (c) Cultural affairs.
      (d) Dislocated civilians.

Figure C-1. Contents of CAO (CMO) annex. (Continued)
(8) Public information functions.
   (a) Television.
   (b) Media.
   (c) Coordination with joint task force information operations plan.

  f. Assumptions. Until specific planning guidance becomes available, assumptions may be required for
  initiating planning or preparing the estimate. These assumptions are then modified as factual data
  becomes available.

3. ANALYSIS OF COAs. Under each subheading (paragraph 2e) for each COA, analyze all CAO factors
   indicating problems and deficiencies.

4. COMPARISON OF COAs
   a. Evaluate CAO deficiencies; list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA.
   b. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each operational and tactical COA under
      consideration from the CAO standpoint. Those that are common to all COAs or are considered
      minor should be eliminated from the list. Include methods of overcoming deficiencies or
      modifications required in each COA. Priority will be given to one major CAO activity that most
      directly relates to the mission, such as minimizing civilian interference with tactical and logistics
      operations or providing and supporting the functions of civil government, community relations, and
      the like.

5. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS
   a. Indicate whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from the CAO standpoint.
   b. Indicate which COAs can best be supported from the CAO standpoint.
   c. List primary reasons why other COAs are not favored.
   d. List the major CAO problems that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include specific
      recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effect of these
      deficiencies.

Annexes (as required).

Figure C-1. Contents of CAO (CMO) annex. (Continued)
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Appendix D
Protection Measures

D-1. Defensive measures provide a defense against the threat—passively or actively. Examples of defensive measures include—

- AD.
- CBRN alert and dress states.
- Maneuver reserve.
- Increased patrolling.
- Protective equipment such as body and appliqué armor or prefabricated single-channel ground and airborne radio systems.
- Physical security measures such as fences and additional guards.
- Alert states and policy on wearing personal protective equipment.
- Immunization and health education.
- Out-of-bounds areas for friendly forces.
- Road march and movement measures.

D-2. Offensive measures are adopted when the threat can be pre-empted or no other defense is possible. Examples of offensive measures include—

- Offensive C2 warfare measures, especially against headquarters; communications; and ISTAR assets.
- Destruction of ballistic missiles and supporting facilities.
- Destruction of CBRN industrial infrastructure and means of distribution.
- Arrest of suspected adversary sympathizers.
- Out-of-bounds areas for the civil population, to deny them access to friendly forces or locations.
Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Terms for which FM 3-16 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Allied Administrative Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Component Command (graphic only)</td>
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<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition and cross-servicing agreement</td>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>air defense</td>
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<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
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<td>APP</td>
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<td>ARCENT</td>
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<td>ARFOR</td>
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<td>Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (NATO)</td>
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<td>C2</td>
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<td>coalition task force (graphic only)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>inspector general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>intermediate staging base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTAR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Italy (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2X</td>
<td>joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-7</td>
<td>information engagement directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>lines of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIE</td>
<td>military information environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>multinational coordination center (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>multinational division (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>multinational force (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWR</td>
<td>morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>Navy Component Command (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>operational command</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>public affairs office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential decision directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oils, and lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>prisoner of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>peace support operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QSTAG</td>
<td>quadripartite standardization agreement (ABCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Army (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>battalion or brigade personnel staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>battalion or brigade operations staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>battalion or brigade logistics staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-5</td>
<td>battalion or brigade civil-military operations staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-6</td>
<td>battalion or brigade communications staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>secretary general (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Spain (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt</td>
<td>support (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General (graphic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>standardization agreement (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACOM</td>
<td>tactical command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>transfer of authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SECTION II – TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>air tasking order</td>
<td>(joint) A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions. (JP 3-30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>airspace control authority</td>
<td>The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. (FM 3-52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>airspace control order</td>
<td>(joint) An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for airspace coordinating measures. It is published either as part of the air tasking order or as a separate document. (JP 3-52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>airspace control plan</td>
<td>(joint) The document approved by the joint force commander that provides specific planning guidance and procedures for the airspace control system for the joint force operational area. (JP 3-52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>airspace control system</td>
<td>(joint) An arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, procedures, and facilities required to perform airspace control functions. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alliance</td>
<td>(joint) The relationship that results from a formal agreement ([for example], treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 3-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area of operations</td>
<td>(joint) An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
<td>(joint) The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFOR</td>
<td>The Army Service component headquarters for a joint task force or a joint and multinational force. (FM 3-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>battle damage assessment</td>
<td>(joint) The estimate of damage resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. (JP 3-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>civil administration</td>
<td>(joint) An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil affairs</td>
<td>(joint) Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civilmilitary operations. (JP 3-57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
<td>(NATO) in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. (AAP-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
<td>(joint) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. (JP 3-57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
<td>(joint) An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. (JP 3-08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coalition</td>
<td>(joint) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coalition action</td>
<td>(joint) Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. (JP 5-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combatant command</td>
<td>(joint) A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 5-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>command and control system</td>
<td>(joint) The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned and attached forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (JP 6-0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
commander’s critical information requirement (joint) An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. (JP 3-0)

compatibility (NATO) The suitability of products, processes or services for use together under specific conditions to fulfil relevant requirements without causing unacceptable interactions. (AAP-6)

coordinating authority (joint) A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1)

counterintelligence (joint) Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (JP 2-0)

director of mobility forces (joint) Normally a senior officer who is familiar with the area of responsibility or joint operations area and possesses an extensive background in air mobility operations. When established, the director of mobility forces serves as the designated agent for all air mobility issues in the area of responsibility or joint operations area, and for other duties as directed. The director of mobility forces exercises coordinating authority between the air operations center (or appropriate theater command and control node), the tanker airlift control center, the air mobility operations control center (when established and when supporting subordinate command objectives), and the joint movement center, in order to expedite the resolution of air mobility issues. The director of mobility forces may be sourced from the theater’s organizations or US Transportation Command. Additionally, the director of mobility forces, when designated, will ensure the effective integration of intertheater and intratheater air mobility operations, and facilitate the conduct of intratheater air mobility operations. (JP 3-30)

electronic warfare (joint) Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. (JP 3-13.1)

environmental considerations (joint) The spectrum of environmental media, resources, or programs that may impact on, or are affected by, the planning and execution of military operations. Factors may include, but are not limited to, environmental compliance, pollution prevention, conservation, protection of historical and cultural sites, and protection of flora and fauna. (JP 3-34)
fire support coordination

The planning and executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (FM 6-20-10)

firepower

(joint) The amount of fire which may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapon system. 2. Ability to deliver fire. (JP 1-02)

full command

(NATO) The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Note: The term "command" as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or operational control. (AAP-6)

geospatial engineering

(joint) Those engineering capabilities and activities that contribute to a clear understanding of the physical environment by providing geospatial information and services to commanders and staffs. Examples include: terrain analyses, terrain visualization, digitized terrain products, nonstandard tailored map products, precision survey, geospatial data management, baseline survey data, and force beddown analysis. (JP 3-34)

geospatial information

Foundation information upon which all other battlespace information is referenced to form the common operational picture. (FM 3-34.230)

geospatial information and services

(joint) The collection, information extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the Earth’s surface. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and also include instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data. (JP 2-03)

health service support

(joint) All services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical intelligence services. (JP 4-02)

host-nation support

(joint) Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 4-00)

human intelligence

(joint) A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 1-02)
| **information operations** | (joint) The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 3-13) |
| **intermediate staging base** | (joint) A tailorable, temporary location used for staging forces, sustainment and/or extraction into and out of an operational area. (JP 3-35) |
| **interoperability** | (joint) The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (JP 3-32) |
| **in-transit visibility** | (joint) The ability to track the identity, status, and location of Department of Defense units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; and personal property from origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations. (JP 4-01.2) |
| **joint** | (joint) Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1) |
| **law of war** | (joint) That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. (JP 1-02) |
| **liaison** | (joint) That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 3-08) |
| **line of communications** | (joint) A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (JP 1-02) |
| **mission** | (joint) 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (JP 1-02) |
| **mission creep** | Tangential efforts to assist in areas of concern unrelated to assigned duties that cripple efficient mission accomplishment. |
| **multinational operations** | (joint) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16) |
| **national command** | (NATO) A command that is organized by, and functions under the authority of, a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under a NATO commander. (AAP-6) |
| **noncombatant evacuation operations** | (joint) Operations directed by the Department of State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. (JP 3-0) |
| **operation order** | (joint) A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (JP 1-02) |
operation plan
(joint) 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. In the context of joint operation planning level 4 planning detail, a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. (JP 5-0)

operational command
(NATO) commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Note: It does not include responsibility for administration. (AAP-6)

operational control
(joint) Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 1)

operations security
(joint) A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (JP 3-13.3)

order of battle
(joint) The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. (JP 2-01.3)

petroleum, oils, and lubricants
(joint) A broad term that includes all petroleum and associated products used by the Armed Forces. (JP 4-01.6)
psychological operations  
(joint) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (JP 3-13.2)

rules of engagement  
(joint) Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02)

standardization  
(joint) The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Department of Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility. (JP 4-02)

status-of-forces agreement  
(joint) An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. (JP 3-16)

transfer of authority  
(NATO) Within NATO, an action by which a member nation or NATO Command gives operational command or control of designated forces to a NATO Command. (AAP-6)

weapons of mass destruction  
(joint) Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high-yield explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. (JP 3-28)
References

Field manuals and selected joint publications are listed by new number followed by old number.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

AAP-6. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.

MULTINATIONAL PUBLICATIONS
Most ABCA publications are available online: http://www.abca-armies.org. ABCA web site requires a user ID and password.

ABCA Multinational Engineer Handbook. 5 May 2005.
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JP 4-02. Health Service Support. 31 October 2006.
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FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008.
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Index

A
ACSA, 6-5, 6-6
AD, 5-2, 8-4, 14-1, 14-2
air component commander, 14-1, 14-2
air defense commander, 8-4, 14-1
responsibilities, 14-2
airspace control, 8-4, 14-2
airspace coordination center, 14-2
alliance, 1-1, 1-2, 2-4, 2-6, 9-6
aviation, A-2, B-2

C
C2, 2-7, 2-9, 2-14, 11-3
structure, 2-2
CA, 2-21
CA activities, 9-2
campaign, 8-2, 13-4, A-2
planning, 2-9, 2-15, 5-1, 9-1, 14-2
chaplain
responsibilities, 3-2
chief of staff, 2-16, 8-6
CIMIC, 9-1, 9-5
CIMIC center, 9-2
CIMIC groups, 9-2
civil-military engineering board, 6-8
CMO, 9-1–9-16, 9-15
functions, 9-2
guidelines, 9-3
objective, 9-15
purpose, 9-2
staff responsibilities, 9-16
CMOC, 2-14, 2-16, 6-8, 6-9, 9-2, 11-2
coalition, 1-1, 1-2, 2-4, 2-6, 2-7, 9-6
combat engineering, 12-3
command and control. See C2.
command authority, 2-9, 2-10, 8-4, 11-3
illustrated, 2-11
command historian, 2-18
command jurisdiction, 2-9
command relationships, 1-2, 2-9, 2-10, 4-1, 11-3, 14-1
command structure, 2-2
combination, 2-6
integrated, 2-6, 2-7
lead nation, 2-4
parallel, 2-5
types, 2-4
command surgeon, 11-1
responsibilities, 11-2
communications
establishing, 2-22
comptroller. See G-8.
contracting, 6-3, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-10, 9-5
contracting office, 6-7
contractors, 6-4, 6-6, 6-7, 6-10
cooperation, 2-14
coordination, 2-14
coordination center, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 8-6
counterintelligence, 4-3

D
deployment, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 6-1, 6-7, 6-9, 6-10, 8-5, 9-15, 11-1, 12-2, 13-2
deployment agency, 6-9
director of mobility forces, 6-9
engineer, 2-17, 4-2, 5-2, 6-8, 6-11, 6-13, 8-5, 9-13, 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-4, 12-5, A-2
role of, 12-3
tasks, 12-2

F
financial management, 10-1–10-4
fire support, 12-1
fiscal code, 10-3
force commander
responsibilities, 2-15
force projection, 5-2
foreign criminal jurisdiction, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5
fratricide, 5-10, 8-1, 8-4, 8-5, 12-1, 14-2, B-2
full command, 2-10
funding, 10-2

G
G-1, 2-15, 2-17, 3-1
G-2, 4-1
G-3, 2-21, 7-4, A-3
G-4, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-6, 6-8, 6-9
G-8, 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-4
responsibility, 10-1, 10-2
geospatial data, 4-3, 12-4

H
homeland defense, 14-3
HSS
capabilities, 11-6
plan, 11-2
policies and issues, 11-4
standards of care, 11-5
threat assessment, 11-4
humanitarian principles, 9-6

I
ICRC, 9-8
information bureau, 2-20
intelligence, 4-1–4-4
intelligence foreign disclosure officer, 4-1
international law, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6
prohibitions, 3-6
international organizations, 2-16, 9-8
interpreters, 2-21, 2-22, 4-3, 6-7
IO, 7-1–7-2, 7-1, 8-1, 8-4, 8-5, B-1
IPB, 4-2, 9-5, 9-16
ISB, 6-11

J
J-3, 2-21, 8-6
jurisdiction, 2-9, 3-3, 9-5

L
law of war, 1-3, 3-2, 3-5, 3-6, 5-6
lead nation concept, 6-2
lead-nation concept, 2-4, 2-5
legal advisor
responsibilities, 3-2
linguists, 2-13, 2-14, 2-21, 2-22, 6-7
LNO, 2-12
Index

LO, 2-12, 2-13, 2-21, 4-1, 4-4, 5-2
logistics, 3-3, 6-1–6-12
logistics procurement support board, 6-7
logistics support, 6-1 responsibility for, 6-1

M
maritime operations, 13-1 characteristics, 13-1 employment of, 13-2 functions, 13-3
media, 2-18, 2-19, 2-20, 2-21, 4-2, 4-3, 5-5, 7-1, See also PA.
media operations, 2-20
METT-TC, 10-3, 14-3
military police, 4-2, 8-5, 9-14
mortuary affairs office, 6-9
movement center, 6-8

N
NATO, 2-6, 2-7, 2-10, 12-5
NEO, 13-4
NGO, 2-16, 5-1, 5-5, 9-5, 9-8, 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12, 9-14, 13-3

O
OPCOM, 2-10
OPCON, 2-9, 2-10, 2-15, 3-6, 14-2
OPSEC, 4-3

PA, 2-19, 2-20, 2-21, A-3 elements of, 2-19 guidance to soldiers, 2-21 objectives, 2-19 operations, 2-19
PA guidance, 2-21
PAO, 2-19, 3-1
peace operations, 2-2, 2-9, 8-2, 13-2, A-3
petroleum office, 6-8
planning
CMO, 9-14
HSS, 11-3
intelligence, 4-1 logistics, 6-2
PA, 2-19 transition, 5-3
political advisor, 2-17
ports of debarkation, 6-11
POW, 3-6, 8-6
predeployment, 5-1, 5-4, 5-5 training, 9-15
prisoners of war. See POW.
protection principles, 8-1
protection, 4-3, 5-4, 8-1–8-6
protection, 11-1
protection, 14-3
Protection, 5-5
protection measures,
8-2, 8-3, 8-4 defensive, D-1 offensive, D-1
PSYOP, 2-21, 4-2, 8-4, A-3, B-1

R
reception center, 2-13, 2-15, 3-1, 6-11
Red Cross. See ICRC.
redeployment, 2-18, 5-3, 6-1, 6-6, 6-9, 6-10, 12-2
reimbursement, 10-3, 10-4 procedures, 10-4
relief in place, 5-4
religious ministry, 3-2
resource manager. See G-8.
ROE, 1-3, 2-15, 3-2, 3-3, 3-7, 5-4, 5-6
role specialization, 6-2, 6-7, 11-3

S
S-1, 2-15, 3-1
S-2, 4-1
S-3, A-3
S-4, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-6, 6-8, 6-9
sea control, 13-4
SOFA, 3-2, 3-3, 3-5, 9-5
Special Operations Forces, 2-13, A-2, A-3
staffing, 2-15
surgeon, 11-2 responsibilities, 11-2

T
TACOM, 2-10
TACON, 2-10, 2-15, 3-6, 14-2
team building, 1-2, 1-4, 5-4, 5-5
threat assessment, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4, 8-5, B-1
TOA, 2-9, 5-2, 6-12
transitions types of, 5-4

U
UN, 1-2, 2-4, 2-12, 2-14, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 6-7, 6-9, 6-10, 9-5, 9-8, 9-13
UN Development Programme, 9-9
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 9-10
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 9-8
unity of effort, 1-2, 2-5, 2-9, 6-1, 6-10, 9-4
unlawful combatants, 3-6
use of force, 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 13-4

V
visitor’s bureau, 2-16, 3-1
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